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PROVINCIAL LANGUAGES IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

Several languages in the Roman empire proved their ability to sustain themselves in spoken and even in written form against the competition of Greek and Latin. The latter two define a civilization without filling it; for 'Greco-Latin' indicates a mixed culture in which, to the very end, a majority of the population must have spoken neither Latin nor Greek in their homes, whatever they spoke of necessity in the courts and market-places. Bilingualism, even trilingualism, was common, then as now, in cities like Beirut, Alexandria, or Marseilles. In the back-country, local dialects persisted for a long time, some destined to emerge into the full light only in the Middle Ages (Welsh, Berber, and Basque, for example), others destined to recede slowly before the pressure of classical languages: Celtic in Spain, Galatia, or North Italy, or Thracian, Dacian, or Lydian—though, before they disappeared, these too laid their distinctive marks on their successors. So the descendants of Latin differ from each other, Roumanian from Spanish. Technical aspects may be left to the experts in linguistics, whose surveys of the minor tongues show the obscurity of the subject:¹ the vitality, the distribution according to social classes or to any but the most general geographical areas, the extent of literacy of the speakers or their bilingualism, are matters for mere guess-work, in almost every case. But there are four languages about which a little more can be learned: Syriac, Coptic, Punic, and Celtic. The present paper sketches their history.

An entrance to the subject is offered, surprisingly, by two

¹ K. Holl, *Hermes*, XLIII (1908), pp. 240-54; a wider survey with bibliography in J. Sofer, *Wiener Studien*, LXV (1952), pp. 140-52.

opinions of a lawyer, Ulpian, writing in roughly A. D. 215: "*Fideicommissa*," he says, "may be devised in any tongue, not only Latin or Greek, but Punic or Gallic (= Celtic) or any other."² In *fideicommissa*, to be sure, a greater freedom of formulation may have existed from the start, but the reference to Punic or Celtic is a new departure. Again, Ulpian says (*D.*, XLV, 1, 1, 6), "It makes no difference if the answer [to a *stipulatio*] is given in some other language. So if someone asks in Latin, the answer may be in Greek . . . But whether this is extended to Greek only or to other languages as well, Punic or Assyrian (= Syriac)³ or some other, may be questioned . . . Yet according to what Sabinus has written [*ca.* mid-first century] and in fact as is clear enough, any kind of speech contains the obligation of its words, provided that each party understands the other's language himself or through accurate interpreters." A narrower opinion meets us in Gaius, *Inst.*, III, 93, written in the time of Marcus Aurelius. Among verbal contracts, while some are valid only between Roman citizens, "others [*obligationes*] belong to *ius gentium*, and so are valid between all men whether Romans or non-Romans. And even if they are expressed in Greek, as in this form, Δώσεις; Δώσω. Ὁμολογείς; Ὁμολογῶ, etc., these too are binding on Romans so long as they know Greek. *Per contra*, though they are expressed in Latin, they are valid between non-citizens if they know Latin. But the formula, 'Are you a sponsor?' 'I am a sponsor,' is so peculiar to Roman citizens that it cannot be properly put into Greek even by interpretation."

These passages are relevant, or at least one of them has been brought in by several inquirers, as proving the revival of Celtic in Ulpian's day. Sherwin-White dismisses the whole argument along with the text. "This proves too much," says he⁴—as much

² *Dig.*, XXXII, 11 pr. More usual is his *Regulae*, 25, 9, in P. F. Girard, *Testes*^o (1937), p. 486, "A *fideicommissum* written in Greek is binding, but a bequest written in Greek is not binding"; or *Dig.*, XLVI, 4, 8, 4, *acceptilationes*, as they come under *ius gentium*, can be given in Greek if the Greek words closely fit the Latin formulae.

³ Assyrian means what we now call Syriac, as *Assyrii* means 'Syrians' (Jerome, *In Is.*, V, 19, 23; Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena*, ed. F. Legge, I, p. 123, n. 6, at 5, 7; Lucian, *Octogenarians*, 4) and Assyria often means Syria (*idem*, *Goddess of Syria*, I [Loeb Class. Lib.] n. *ad loc.*; Lucan, *B.C.*, VII, 636; Tatian, *Or.*, col. 888).

⁴ *The Roman Citizenship* (1939), p. 278, n. 7, on *Dig.*, XXXII, 11 pr.

for Punic as for Celtic; but the wider result which he brushes aside is exactly what this paper aims at. The other texts which have been cited above show at first, in the earlier Empire, some tolerance of Greek, but tolerance of more exotic languages only in Ulpian's day. The problem had apparently not much exercised his predecessors, but did elicit several comments from him. Moreover, though his concessions to foreign languages are indeed very limited and grudging, they are granted in the face of a long-established prejudice against anything but Latin in the courts. Legal substance was strictly tied to legal terminology, was really untranslatable, as Gaius says. So the Romans generally insisted on the use of Latin for suits and contracts, making exceptions only for procedures under *ius gentium*, for honored individuals, or for persons like veterans who stood in special need of favor.⁵ The connection between Latin and Roman law accounts for the presence of interpreters, private or public, who appear in the sources generally as in Ulpian on *stipulationes*; ⁶ the same connection is the most important single factor in the intrusion of Latin loan-words into Greek, and in its predominance in the eastern provinces to an astonishingly late date.⁷ This is the background against which we must understand those concessions, limited as they are, in Ulpian's opinions. They are the first sign of a new position for provincial languages.

One of Ulpian's contemporaries leads us further into the subject. It is Bardesanes (154-222) in his *Book of the Laws of*

⁵ On the necessity of using Latin and on limited exemptions to types of cases, to individuals, or to privileged groups, see R. Taubenschlag, *Opera minora* (1959), I, pp. 219, 221; L. Mitteis, *Röm. Privatrecht* (1908), I, p. 282; H. Zilliacus, *Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen* (1935), pp. 80-92; S. Riccobono, *Il Gnomon dell' Idios Logos* (1950), p. 120, with bibliography, p. 120, n. 2.

⁶ On the interpreters, Taubenschlag, II, pp. 167-70, collects the papyrological references; literary sources and inscriptions are covered without special attention to law in W. Snellman, *De interpretibus Romanorum* (1919).

⁷ On loan-words into Greek, see R. Cavenaile, *Aegyptus*, XXXII (1952), pp. 193 f.; S. Daris, *ibid.*, XL (1960), pp. 177 f.; and A. Cameron, *A. J. P.*, LII (1931), pp. 237 f. The vocabulary of law and of administration, hard to separate, makes up about a third of the total of loan-words. On the use of Latin into the very late Empire (4th and 5th centuries) in the Greek East, see L. Hahn, *Zum Sprachenkampf in röm. Reich* (*Philologus*, Suppl. Bd. X [1907]), pp. 695 f., 708; C. Wessely, *Wiener Stud.*, XXIV (1902), pp. 99 f., especially 122 f.

Countries, written against the Romans who "abolish the laws of the countries they conquer"—whereas the very variety of those laws, in Britain, Gaul, or Syria, on marriage, theft, libel, or homicide, expresses man's freedom in moral definition. It is a work of protest, asserting the distinctness of cultures, and curiously enough, written by a man credited with the chief role in the creation of a national literature. For Bardesanes, despite a knowledge of Greek, despite even a willingness to send his son to school in Athens, wrote in Syriac. He focussed upon ideas and an audience that combined elements of Greco-Roman civilization with others purely local. If some of his thought drew on the common currency of Hellenistic philosophy, other elements like his fondness for writing in verse or his doubts about Chaldaean astrology would appeal principally to the un-Hellenized common folk.⁸ Their knowledge of Greek was limited. For, in the Near East from Syria into Mesopotamia, what prevailed in the streets was one or another of the closely related members of the Aramaic family, notably Syriac. The speech habits attested in the New Testament still meet us at a much later date. Evidence for Syriac is especially good in the area around Antioch and among Christians—monks and church dignitaries as well as the ordinary members of congregations.⁹ What is at once clear and sur-

⁸ *The Book of the Laws* is discussed by S. Mazzarino in *Rapports du XI^e Congr. int. des sciences historiques* (1960), II, pp. 37 f.; Eng. trans. in vol. VIII of *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, pp. 730 f. The date is in dispute and may fall later in the century. On his bilingualism and his son in Athens, see A. Baumstark, *Gesch. der syrischen Lit.* (1922), pp. 12, 14. On the mixture of local elements, Hellenism, and Palestinian Christianity in his writings, see H. H. Schaefer, *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, LI (1932), pp. 24, 50 f.

⁹ Jerome, *Vita Malchi*, 2 (near Antioch, a Syriac-speaking monk born at Nisibis); *Vita Hilar.*, 22 (monk in Gaza, whose followers at Elusa, *ibid.*, 25, also spoke Syriac); *Ep.*, 17, 2 (implying a parity between Greek and Syriac in Syria generally); Chrysostom, *On the Statues*, *Homil.*, 17, 3; 19, 1 (farmers around Antioch speak Syriac); Theodoret (himself reared in Syriac), *Hist. relig.*, 5 (monks at Zeugma in the 4th century sing hymns, some in Greek, some "in the native tongue"; cf. *ibid.*, 14 and 17, monks knowing only Syriac); *idem*, *Hist. eccl.*, IV, 9-10 (two groups of heretics, Audiani and Messaliani, the former from the name of its founder, the latter from Syriac 'praying people,' speaking Syriac, especially in monasteries near Melitene and Antioch, later in Pamphylia); Marc. diac., *Vita Porphyri.*, 66-8, mother and child in Gaza know only Syriac; *Patrologia graeca*, XX, p. 1459 (Pro-

prising is the high proportion of people, concentrated in the more backward districts, who spoke only their native dialect, after centuries of domination by another civilization, compared to the much smaller number of people who knew only Greek. Bilingualism was of course common. In inscriptions, names show a thorough mixture of roots and races. Almost all, however, are written in Greek, joined by a few in Syriac only in the fifth century. They demonstrate the complete supremacy of Greek as the language of the educated.

Syriac produced little literature of its own until the second half of the second century. It then began to spread from the church in Edessa. Edessene Syriac came to prevail in all Oriental Christianity. A beginning was made in the second century with translations of short parts of the Bible, and especially with a popular and quickly diffused gospel-harmony, Tatian's *Diatesseron*,¹⁰ but it was Bardesanes who was responsible for a sudden advance in literature. He wrote, besides homilies and treatises, 150 hymns of enormous influence and doubtful doctrine. They were added to by his son Harmonius, and corrected by Ephraim (Afrem) in the later fourth century in counter-hymns of more careful orthodoxy. In Bardesanes' own lifetime other genres of Christian literature, including dialogues, apocryphal Acts, and treatises, appeared in Syriac, along with a few pagan works, a gathering number of further Christian ones, and

copius born in Jerusalem, reared in Syriac, employed as Church interpreter in Scythopolis); *S. Silviae peregrinatio*, 47 (*C. S. E. L.*, XXXIX, p. xiii), villagers in 385 near Jerusalem speak only Syriac or a little Greek, but the bishop, knowing Syriac, still insists on Greek for the services and is translated aloud by his Elders; for Antioch and vicinity, P. Peeters, *Tréfonds orientale de l'hagiographie* (1950), pp. 14-17; V. Chapot, *Hellénisation du monde antique* (1914), p. 341, emphasizing the importance of the late revival of place-names like Hierapolis-Bambyce as a proof of a resurgence of language; R. A. Pack, *Studies in Libanius* (1935), p. 26, n. 3; G. Haddad, *Aspects of Social Life in Antioch* (1949), pp. 89, 101-3, 106-7, 115, describing the intimate mixture of languages in the middle Empire, Syriac prevailing among rustics and resurgent in the 5th century.

¹⁰ A. Vööbus, *Studies in the History of the Gospel Text in Syriac* (*Corp. script. christianorum orient.*, Subsidia 3, 1951) believes that the *Diatesseron* was originally written in Syriac (p. 12) and only slowly replaced by the 'Vetus Syra' in the earlier 4th century and by the 'Peshitta' (pp. 48 f.) in the later 4th. Details of his views are still disputed.

Monophysite and Nestorian writings from the fifth century on. For a while, this literature was much under the spell of Greek. It did not entirely free itself until the fourth century. From its beginnings, however, in its richness of symbolism and its emphasis on verse forms, it had characteristics peculiarly its own, and left traces in the style and thought of men like Eusebius, Basil, and Theodoret who wrote in Greek. Many works, for example, of the famous Ephraim, were translated from Syriac into Greek, and spread into other areas.¹¹

A Gnostic element in one or two early pieces of Syriac, and in Bardesanes himself, must show the penalty paid for being out of the mainstream of language as of theology. Another example is to be found in Manichaeism. Its founder (d. ca. 276) wrote seven works we know of, one in Persian, six in Syriac, prophetic of the fate of his beliefs, since, when the Manichaeans were driven out of Persia by King Bahram and his successors, some went east and their doctrines took root in Iranian and Chinese, while others speaking Syriac spread in the opposite direction, and had established their mission in Egypt by 300, further west in Africa by the mid-fourth century. St. Augustine was their best known convert. One of the earliest Syriac Manichaean writings, dated to the late third century, is Thomas' *Psalm-Book*, which "seems to have been inspired by the example of [Bardesanes] and his son Harmonius."¹² Egyptian Manichaeans presented a problem to the Christian church by the end of the third century, and to the Roman government also, since they seem to have played a part in the revolt of Achilleus (296-7).¹³

¹¹ The more important references in ancient sources to Syriac authors are generally highly admiring: Theodoret, *Hist. eccl.*, IV, 26; Sozom., *Hist. eccl.*, III, 16; Euseb., *Hist. eccl.*, IV, 30; Callinicus, *Vita S. Hypat.*, pr. 2 (ed. Teubner, p. 4). On Syriac authors, modern authorities are Baumstark, pp. 1-100 *passim* (the basic treatment); Haddad, pp. 114-15; A. Schall, *Studien über gr. Fremdwörter im Syrischen* (1960), pp. 28-9; J.-B. Chabot, *Litt. syriaque* (1934), pp. 9-41; E. M. Buytaert, *Héritage littéraire d'Eusèbe d'Émèse* (1949), pp. 95 and 105; and C. Brockelmann, in *Handbuch der Orientalistik* (ed. B. Spuler), III (1954), pp. 146-74 *passim*.

¹² C. R. C. Allberry, *Journ. Theol. Stud.*, XXXIX (1938), p. 343; on early Manichaeism and its texts, *ibid.*, pp. 338-49; T. Sävje-Söderbergh, *Studies in the Coptic Manichaean Psalm Book* (1949) pp. 156-65, who mentions also the Mandaean elements in the work.

¹³ P. Ryl., 469; Allberry, p. 348; W. Seston in *Mél. R. Dussaud*

Their teachings, except for a few extant fragments in Syriac, were spread through translation into Greek at first, and shortly afterwards through Coptic, by which they were able to reach the less Hellenized population of Upper Egypt. A large find of Coptic Manichaean texts in Egypt, including Thomas' *Psalm-Book*, was made in 1930, another more recently, and still to be published.

Coptic was the Egyptian language rendered in written form by the use (mostly) of the Greek alphabet. Previous efforts to find a more convenient system than hieroglyphic had begun, long before Alexander conquered the land, with Demotic, but while the everyday speech went on evolving, Demotic set into a scribal form, and was at any rate never a very satisfactory vehicle for reaching the common people. A second experiment of little success, sometimes called Old Coptic, used Greek characters, and texts mostly magical have survived, dating from about A. D. 100 on.¹⁴ Coptic proper, however, gradually displaced both this and Demotic, because it made a more intelligent use of Greek letters and because it was the chosen medium of Christianity. It was first employed for the translation of Scripture out of Greek in the second century—the persecutions of 189 show that the Church was by then established, perhaps even conspicuous, in Egypt—and the earliest figure in the progress of translation became a bishop of Alexandria in that year, Demetrius (189-231). A Coptic Bible was complete by 300, and at about that time the first known original works in Coptic were written, by Pachomius; a century more and the language in its written form was approaching maturity, its literature (much of it translated from Greek) large and vital. The competition

(1939), I, pp. 230-34, supposing that they were incited as fifth columnists by Persia against Rome.

¹⁴ G. Steindorff, *Lehrbuch der koptischen Grammatik* (1951), p. 2; *idem*, in *Coptic Studies in Hon. of W. E. Crum* (1950), p. 192; M. Chaîne, *Éléments de grammaire dialectale copte* (1933), pp. xvi f., xxiv; W. C. Till, *Bull. John Rylands Lib.*, XL (1957), pp. 230 f.; and H. P. Houghton, *Aegyptus*, XLII (1962), pp. 3-5. Old Coptic texts run into the 4th century, and are all pagan except for a few very late ones. On the distribution of the dialects, see J. Vergote, *Chron. d'Égypte*, XXXVI (1961), pp. 237 f., especially map, p. 242. I owe the reference to Dr. D. W. Young, whom, with Dr. Cyrus Gordon, I must thank for their kindness in reading and correcting the sections on Syriac and Coptic.

among the dialects, especially Bohairic and Sahidic, had been settled, at least for a long time, in favor of the latter representing Upper Egypt. Herein lies the obvious explanation for the invention of written Coptic. For Greek was the language only of a minority of the population, though a very prominent and respected minority, concentrated in Lower Egypt, i. e., the Delta, and the Church in that area was less cut off by its original adherence to Greek. With the appointment of bishops of Upper Egypt in the episcopacy of Demetrius, a mission to the less Hellenized part of the country was announced, necessitating hymns and gospels which would be accessible directly to the fellahin, or indirectly through the interpreters attested in each church.¹⁵ Sahidic actually included a larger number of loan words, mostly Greek; yet because it was a more essential invention in Upper Egypt, it considerably antedated Bohairic of the Delta. It was more used, more filled with a literature of its own, and made more perfect through practise, than any other dialect.

The connection that existed between Syriac and monasticism in Asia Minor, because monks were so often from the poorer, less Hellenized classes, helps to explain the close ties between Syrian and Egyptian monks. While the former knew the rules of St. Pachomius and translated for their own use the Lives of St. Anthony and his successors, the latter welcomed both Syriac works and Syrian monks even to the more remote parts of Upper Egypt.¹⁶ Egyptian and Syrian shared, beyond their religion, the same social outlook. And as Syrian monks generally used their mother tongue, not Greek,¹⁷ so Egyptian monks used Coptic. People of the upper classes made up a minority in the monasteries, occasionally an isolated Greek-speaking enclave, while on the other hand St. Anthony, the real founder of monasticism, and Pachomius its legislator, spoke only Coptic.¹⁸ Coptic tales

¹⁵ *Monumenta Eucharistica et Liturgica vetustissima*, 57 (a. 325); E. R. Hardy, *Christian Egypt* (1952), pp. 34-5 and 217, n. 28, 4th century interpreters in provincial Egypt; yet services in Egyptian, not Greek, became more common.

¹⁶ Baumstark, pp. 84 f.; *Patrologia orientalis*, III, p. 433.

¹⁷ See above, note 9.

¹⁸ On the isolated Greek-speaking minority of a Pachomian monastery, see Hardy, p. 73; cf. a Syrian monastery split between Greek and Syriac, in G. Bardy, *La question des langues* (1948), p. 20; on Anthony speaking Coptic, see Athanasius, *Vita S. Anton.*, 16 and Jerome, *Vita*

of heroes like these two were written in and for ascetic communities, and drew upon traditions of old Egyptian folk-tales for the development of the genre. It has been noticed, too, that many martyrs and monks bore names of a native, not Hellenized, type, like the famous Paphnutius = Pa-p-noute, 'God's man,' who from monk became bishop and was sent to Nicaea in 325.

But names offer a valuable sign of linguistic allegiance. The displacing of Syrian Hierapolis by the older native name Bambyce finds a parallel in Hermopolis-become-(Coptic) Shmun, and in similar revivals of their ancient titles for other Egyptian cities.¹⁹ Personal names trace a similar history. The Greeks in Egypt called their children by straight Greek names like Apollonius, or Timagenes—much less often Dionysius (Greek translation of Petosiris through the equivalence of Dionysus and Osiris), hardly ever Ammon (pure Egyptian). The natives, on the other hand, sought to rise into the dominant class by the Hellenizing of their names either in an arbitrary fashion or through some likeness of origin or sound. Often, despite considerable legal difficulties, they took a double name: 'Dionysius also known as Petosiris,' 'Theon who is Thionis,' or the like. These double names have been several times analyzed, for different times and districts.²⁰ In the great majority of cases, the Greek half of the names comes first, and the Egyptian half may be dropped, indicating the social ambitions of the bearer. They belong to the big cities, to the educated and official strata (as opposed to Egyptian names usually among the poor, the rural, and the priesthoods). They increase enormously in popularity

S. Paul., 4. E. Amélineau, *Les actes des martyrs de l'église copte* (1890), pp. 215, 226, describes the writers and traditions of martyr-stories. E. A. W. Budge, *The Paradise of the Holy Fathers* (1909), I, pp. xvii and 99, tells of a visitor to a community of monks in the 390's who met a number with names like Busiris=Pa-Asar. For such visitors who knew no Coptic, the monasteries had to supply interpreters (Rufin., *Hist. monach.*, 7).

¹⁹ For Bambyce, above, note 9; for the revival of ancient place-names in Egypt, W. L. Westermann in *Coptic Papers read at a Symposium . . . Brooklyn Museum 1941* (1944), p. 16. He does not date the changes, but I presume they appear first at a late date.

²⁰ V. Martin, *Recherches papyrologiques*, II (1962), p. 62; *idem*, *Mitt. aus der Papyrussammlung der Oesterr. Nationalbibliothek*², V (1956), pp. 85-9; R. Calderini, *Aegyptus*, XXII (1942), pp. 5-31; C. E. Holm, *Gr.-äg. Namenstudien* (1936), especially pp. 46 f., 168.

in the second century A. D., drop off in the third, and become rare in the fourth century. Examples of single-name sons of double-name fathers are few, and not early, and the compositions of names with the Egyptian feminine prefix 'ta-' (Taapollos, 'daughter of Apollon,' a mixed example) increase towards the third century.²¹ What all this points to is a decline in the prestige of Greek, perceptible in the first half of the third century, pronounced over the next century, and accompanied by some revival of native nomenclature among the literate classes. The carelessness of Greek spelling, grammar, and syntax in papyri and ostraca—especially ostraca, which better reflect the linguistic habits of the lower classes; the decreasing popularity of Greek literature in Egypt; and the history of Coptic described above—all these fit neatly together.²²

The story of personal names in Egypt involves one particular difficulty. Are people who seem to stand for some kind of separatism also the bearers of native names? The question can be answered, if at all, only through a study of the major heresies of the late third and fourth centuries, principally Meletianism; but leaders of the Church, whether or not orthodox, arose mostly from the better educated classes, where the conservatism in nomenclature found among Egyptian families perpetuated the same names, generation after generation, regardless of changes in religious or political allegiance. Thus the chief men in the Church for the most part bore Greek names in the fourth and fifth centuries,²³ with the possible exception of the Meletian bishops of the list of 327 A. D. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that these Meletians were backed by a strong monastic

²¹ Calderini, p. 21; *P. Oslo*, III, p. 160. 'Ta-' is the feminine equivalent of 'Pa-', which is also more often attested in later nomenclature.

²² S. G. Kapsomenos, *Mus. Helveticum*, X (1953), pp. 250-8; C. H. Roberts, *ibid.*, p. 273; C. Préaux, *Mitt. aus der Papyrussammlung der Oesterr. Nationalbibliothek*², V (1956), pp. 109 f., noting a "slow deterioration of the Greek language" among ostraca going down to A. D. 258.

²³ This emerges from my count of the names in G. Heuser, *Prosopographie von Aegypten*, IV: *Die Kopten* (1938)—he covers only 'A' to 'E'—and in H. Munier, *Recueil des listes épiscopales de l'église copte* (1943), pp. 3-15. The proportions do not change significantly over this period (though they do in the 5th/6th centuries), and show Greek, Egyptian, Latin, and Hebrew in about the ratios 5:1:1:1. An exception is the group of Meletian bishops at Nicaea, 2:1:0:1 (Munier, pp. 2-3).

element, that their partisans were concentrated in the less Hellenized Upper Egypt, and that their center was Lycopolis in the Thebaid, center also of a Coptic dialect (Achmimic). Meletianism, in short, may have expressed a long-standing dissatisfaction with a foreign and intrusive civilization, and its adherents may unconsciously represent what was Egyptian, rural, indigenous. Yet the patterns of thought and movement do not emerge very clearly. One scholar tries to show that Coptic was the language of dissent, Gnostic, Manichaean, or other. So he naturally emphasizes that Meletius supported Arianism versus Athanasius. Yet Athanasius propagandized in Coptic, evidently with hopes of an audience among the non-Hellenized, and did have the friendship of two Coptic speakers, and those the most influential, Anthony and Pachomius. Meletius' bishopric was one that changed its name, I do not know when (Lycopolis-Siut), and in its neighborhood the abbot Shenoute, who certainly stood up for the poor, wrote Coptic, and presided over a famous monastery made up of Coptic speakers; yet the population was half pagan, tinged with Gnosticism.²⁴ This jumble of facts is offered only to illustrate the uncertainties involved in the subject. It seems impossible to sort out all the various hints of one loyalty or another.

E. R. Hardy (*op. cit.*, p. 53) nevertheless suggests the grouping of these phenomena—language, heresy, monasticism—under the heading of nationalism. "There is," he says, "a real parallel with the Donatists of Africa. In each case a schismatic movement that made a special appeal to a national group arose out of disputes about church order, and took disciplinary rigor as its distinctive principle." The parallel is an interesting one, and has received powerful support in the last generation. There is no need to go into it at length, if only because it seems to yield no firm conclusions; but beyond that, the evidence, little and confused as it is, seems rather to tell against the parallel. Briefly, North Africa was a land of three languages, Berber (Libyan), Punic, and Latin, in order of their age in the country. It is

²⁴ This argument and the various friendships involved appear in Peeters, pp. 28-31 and Hardy, pp. 73-4; on Shenoute and Siut, see P. du Bourguet, *Bull. de l'Inst. Fr. d'arch. orientale*, LVII (1958), pp. 119, 121, and Rémondon, *ibid.*, LI (1952), p. 68; Houghton, p. 6; and F. Zucker, *Sitzb. der deutschen Akad., Kl. für Sprachen*, 1950, I, p. 17.

argued that Donatism found its chief support in the rural parts, where the real natives, speaking Berber, rallied against an aristocracy doubly alien: both Punic and Roman, urban and orthodox. While there are strong reasons for saying that the movement had a social character and that its distribution on the map of the African provinces conformed roughly to differences in class and occupation,²⁵ the specific matter of its language cannot be bent to the same shape. The inscriptions in Berber, it has most recently been argued, are not Berber at all, but debased Punic in Latin characters, while, if this be wrong, it is at least generally admitted that Berber was deeply penetrated by Punic, and touched also by Latin.²⁶ Besides these purely linguistic points, the 'Berber' inscriptions, though notoriously hard to date, are much rarer in the days of Donatism than in the second and earlier third century, even though the relative prosperity of Africa in the fourth century might be expected to have stimulated an increase in writing among the peasant population. And Donatism did not produce any Berber literature, either. The explanation may lie in the competition of other languages for written purposes, for when the sources refer to the trilingualism of the country, they mean Latin, Punic, and Greek.²⁷ For literary ends, Berber obviously offered no challenge to Punic; Punic, in which parts of the Bible were probably translated, may have enjoyed a kind of resurgence against the language of Rome, in the fourth century; but beyond all this, it is not even clear that Donatist congregations understood

²⁵ This view, often defended in recent years, is now attacked by E. Tengström, *Donatisten u. Katholiken* (1964). There is neither space nor necessity to take sides on the question here.

²⁶ On 'Berber' inscriptions being really neo-Punic, see the very convincing treatment of G. Levi Della Vida, *Oriens antiquus*, II (1963), pp. 65-94. R. G. Goodchild, assuming that the language is Berber, nevertheless detects much Punic in it (*Antiquaries Journ.*, XXX [1950], p. 141); W. Vycichl, *Journ. Near Eastern Studies*, XI (1952), pp. 198, 200 f., and O. Rössler, in *Sybaris. Festschr. H. Krahe* (1958), p. 120, both go further. For Latin elements in 3rd century Berber (?) inscriptions, see Goodchild and Ward-Perkins, *J. R. S.*, XXXIX (1949), p. 94; on names in one district revealing Romanization among Berber-speaking people, see H.-G. Pflaum, *Carnuntina. Vorträge beim internationalen Kongress der Altertumsforscher* (1956), pp. 126 f., especially p. 145.

²⁷ Aur. Vict., *Epit.*, 20, 7, of a man reared in Lepcis before 200; Augustine, *Sermo*, 288, 3, of his own time.

spoken Berber more naturally and easily than Punic.²⁸ Both languages were widely used, the native tongue among the poor (to survive to the present day with some loan-words from Punic surprisingly embedded in it). What is known of their relations with each other, however, and of their comparative vitality, is best interpreted by assuming a very wide prevalence of bilingualism, Punic and Berber, with Latin strong in the élite of the North African provinces.

If we stopped here, our evidence might seem to rest upon a uniform base, and to fit together remarkably well. The language of the conquerors (first Macedonian, then Roman, and the latter alone in the West) advanced steadily over the Mediterranean world, within the areas marked out by need—for naturally no one abandoned his native speech without some special necessity. Thus trade and tribute, commerce and administration, made the first converts, and thereafter ambition, to rise into the ruling classes. In the lower classes and remoter countryside, however, where these needs were not felt, Greek and Latin yielded place to a score of local languages. Here could be seen the phenomenon on which this paper concentrates: a positive counter-attack by two or three minority languages towards the close of the second century, demonstrating the height of its strength by the end of the fourth. The population least Hellenized or Romanized discovered something of their own that needed saying, something quite unconnected with the way of life of their rulers, or even hostile to it, and desperately important: namely, a new faith.²⁹ On the Tigris or Nile, the conversion of

²⁸ Almost the only source on the question for the period after 200 is Augustine. Key passages showing Punic prevalent among Donatists, in rural areas as well as urban, lie in *In Epist. Ioan.*, 2, 3, (*P. L.*, XXXV, p. 1991) and *Ep.*, 66, 2; 108, 4; 209, 2-3. Some of these are well discussed by E. F. Gautier, *Le passé de l'Afrique du Nord* (1952), pp. 135-6; more fully in the excellent article of M. Simon, *Annuaire de l'Inst. de philol. et d'hist. orientales*, XIII (1953), pp. 614-29, with careful weighing of the contrary views of Frend, Courtois, and Green. *Pace* Frend, I cannot believe that Augustine means Berber when he writes 'Punic' (see *Sermo*, 113, 2; *Contr. litt. Petil.*, II, 239).

²⁹ A curious illustration is offered by about 100 texts in Neo-Phrygian, all that are known, mostly curses called down on the head of whatever man violates the inscribed tomb. Some have been recently translated (A. Heubeck, *Indogerm. Forschungen*, LXIV [1958], p. 25). All these texts seem to date to the 3rd century. It is argued either

some backward peasant could be accomplished only in his own language; and it was conversion to a religion based on sacred texts. Meter aids memory, among illiterate people. Concession could be made to them. Hence the immense popularity of Bardesanes' hymns, incorporating his lessons in a form easy to remember and to repeat. If he was tinged with Gnosticism, the orthodox Ephraim had to meet him on his own ground, correcting Bardesanes in other hymns of different teaching, as Arius, to reach a like audience, "composed songs to be sung by sailors, millers, and travellers, and others of the same kind, which he adapted to certain tunes . . . and thus seduced the unlearned by the attractiveness of his songs to his own impiety."³⁰ But at the foundation lay the prose of scripture, joined in due course by biographies of heroes of the Church, by collections of divine sayings, theological treatises, and sermons. If they were produced in the larger Christian centers where orthodoxy was hammered out, they bore that mark; if in isolated villages, then they might well combine oddities of both language and belief, even angry rejection of an orthodoxy tainted at its source: for cities, in the minds of rustic farmers, were the abode of tax-collectors and recruiting-sergeants as well as of bishops.

Religion thus seems to be the key to the appearance of written Coptic, Syriac, Phrygian, and perhaps Punic. But before leaving it at that, let us go on to Celtic, the last of the three languages (along with Punic and Syriac) in the Ulpian passages cited earlier. We may begin with the statement of Irenaeus (*Contra haeres.*, I, 3 = *P. L.*, VII, p. 444) that, in the 170's, he had to speak Celtic to his congregation. Ausonius (*Epicedion in*

that the people who commissioned these inscriptions feared the loss of efficacy of the magic, if translated into Greek, though they themselves no longer spoke Phrygian easily (O. Haas, *Die Sprache*, VI [1960], p. 13, n.); or that the texts represent an artificial revival, to reach and confirm in their paganism the rural population, tending towards Christianity (W. M. Calder, *J. R. S.*, II [1912], p. 249; *J. H. S.*, XXXI [1911], pp. 163 f.; *ibid.*, XLVI [1926], p. 22; and on the Tekmoreian Association aimed against the Church, W. M. Ramsay, *ibid.*, XXXII [1912], pp. 151 f.).

³⁰ Philostorgius, epit. by Photius, *Hist. eocl.*, 2, 2—just as Augustine (*Retract.*, 1, 20; *Ep.*, 54, 34) "to reach the attention of the humblest masses and of the ignorant and obscure, and to fasten to their memory as much as we can," wrote anti-Donatist hymns in Latin on the model of Donatist hymns.

patrem, 9) describes his father's imperfect knowledge of Latin and Greek—i. e., neither was his natural speech—and this in a rank of society by no means the lowest. His father's life-span must have lain in the later third and earlier fourth centuries. Between the dates of these passages, Celtic comes more often to the notice of our sources than in the first century (Aulus Gellius, *N. A.*, XI, 7, 4; several passages in the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*; and so on); and in some parts of France and Switzerland, Celtic habits of nomenclature definitely reasserted themselves. Place-names revert to a pre-Roman form, Lutetia becoming Parisii, Julia Equestris becoming Noviodunum³¹—just as happened in Egypt and Syria. And a further parallel: Celtic prevails among the rural population. Working with the epigraphic evidence around Trèves, L. Weisgerber shows that personal names of a Celtic root make up 0-15 percent. of the total in or near the city, 40-50 percent. in outlying districts. Further into the countryside he cannot go, because the number of inscriptions sharply decreases. Presumably Celtic increases.³² The lack of evidence for written Celtic in places where it was undoubtedly the vehicle of ordinary speech is striking, and perhaps requires a special explanation; for in fact the Gauls seem to have made no effort to develop an alphabet of their own, hardly any to perpetuate their tongue in Latin letters. Only a very few texts survive (mostly dedications), along with the words of medical incantations in the early fifth century. These latter, like Coptic experiments in Demotic, and Phrygian curse-inscriptions, were preserved by magic, because magic would have lost its force in translation.³³ Native beliefs, more broadly, however, contributed nothing to keep Celtic alive. It was a characteristic of the ancient priests of Gaul not to reveal their lore in writing; and to them was traditionally entrusted also the education of

³¹ Material on Celtic gathered summarily by MacMullen, *Historia*, XIV (1965), pp. 99 f.; on place-names, E. Meyer, *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Gesch.*, XXII (1942), p. 416; C. Jullian, *Comptes-rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres*, XXIV (1896), p. 295.

³² *Rhein. Mus.*, LXXXIV (1935), pp. 301-56, especially map, p. 322.

³³ I omit the earlier scattered Narbonnese texts in Greek letters. On those in Latin letters, see G. Dottin, *La langue Gauloise* (1920), pp. 146-213, though his no. 52 is not Celtic (see R. Egger, *Ogam*, XIV [1962], pp. 431 f.). For magical spells, see Dottin, pp. 43, 214, and G. Must, *Language*, XXXVI (1960), pp. 193-7.

the aristocracy. Druids and nobles thus turned their backs on literacy, and when it came, consequently, it came through the less conservative of their subjects and through the Latin alphabet.³⁴

In Gaul, then, the rising prominence of Celtic has no connection with religion. It is a phenomenon complete to itself. Yet it does share with the emerging literature of Coptic and Syriac Christianity one obvious characteristic. It represents a rural resurgence of some sort, a slight but detectible shifting of vitality and creativity from cities to countryside, and from classical culture to more truly indigenous elements. As to the date at which this phenomenon appeared, the evidence strikes no discordant note. In the general history of the empire, one can see the tide of Romanization running strong in the first century, clearly receding in the fifth. The point of slack tide is best put at the turn of the second to third, when, quite appropriately, the successor to the Antonines was chosen in a civil war that rambled from Asia Minor to Gaul, and placed a trilingual African on the throne. After him came his sons and great-nephew, half-Syrian. The men who helped them to run the government, the great jurists as well as the senatorial class, reflected the same very mixed background.³⁵ These facts of the period are too familiar, and besides too small a part of a large and complicated picture, to receive proper treatment here. Yet they serve to show how easily Ulpian might extend consideration to "Punic or Gallic or any other" language in the early third century, in recognition not only of the status of their speakers but of the very languages themselves.

There is, of course, no evidence that Greek and Latin, in terms of mere numbers of speakers, receded as time went on—quite the reverse. They continued their steady advance. But there is

³⁴ J. Whatmough, *Κελτικά* (n. d. [1947]), p. 30.

³⁵ Italians in the senate first drop below half (sharply, from 55 per cent. to 42) under the early Severi (M. Hammond, *J.R.S.*, XLVII [1957], p. 77; the enrollment of the senate in the 1st to 3rd centuries discussed compendiously, *ibid.*, pp. 74-81). The jurists' origins are studied by W. Kunkel, *Herkunft u. soziale Stellung der röm. Juristen* (1952), pp. 157 f., where he discusses, for the period from the mid-2nd to early 3rd centuries, the possibilities, great or small, of an African origin for jurists numbered in his list 36, 41, 53, 56, 70 (cf. p. 310) and the Eastern origins of nos. 55, 63, 68-9 (cf. p. 312).

the evidence here offered that the strata of provincial society in which classical culture would once have been accepted without question realized after a time that they had a culture of their own, with its own vitality—that they had inherited a language in which to express it—and that they had, finally, learnt from their conquerors the habits and techniques of saying it in writing.

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CORRECTION.

Owing to an unfortunate mechanical error, a passage in the recently published article by Professor Harald A. T. Reiche, "Aristotle on Breathing in the *Timaeus*" (*A.J.P.*, LXXXVI [1965], pp. 404-8) was badly garbled. On page 404, lines 13 through 17 should have been printed as follows:

"Let A and B designate inhalation and exhalation by mouth
"and nose, a and b the corresponding phases of pore-exhalation
"and pore-inhalation. Then in the first part Plato observes the
"sequence ABba. Given the simultaneity of inhalation by mouth
"and nose and pore-exhalation (and, of course, vice versa), this
.....

The editors deeply regret this error.

THE HERCULES-CACUS EPISODE IN *AENEID* VIII.

In striving to give the *Aeneid* unity, Vergil relied, as has been recognized, less on the arrangement of the action than on a highly complex system of parallels and contrasts as well as on an elaborate interweaving of motifs. The action in the individual parts of the poem often recedes into the background, and the principle which rules is that of their function.¹ This process is characteristic of dramatic rather than epic technique. For although the latter also demands a basic unity, it does so primarily in terms of the action.² An equally important offshoot of the epic, however, is the tendency toward episodes. By means of his dramatic technique, Vergil integrated these in the total framework of his poem far more effectively than if he had merely related them to the course of the main action and thus met Aristotle's postulate that the individual parts of the epic should contribute to the whole. Vergil, then, used one of the key elements of the epic he inherited, the episode, for his dramatic purposes and thus gave it a new meaning.

An example of the subtle network of interrelations the poet establishes is the Hercules-Cacus episode in the eighth book of the *Aeneid*. The larger problem within which this short story has to be discussed is the unity of book VIII or, rather, the apparent lack of it. The "centrifugal" and "episodic" nature of this book has often been noted.³ When we look at it from the

¹ Cf. V. Pöschl, "The Poetic Achievement of Vergil," *C.J.*, LVI (1961), p. 295. I am grateful to Professor George E. Duckworth of Princeton University for his many helpful comments on this paper.

² See R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915): "Aristoteles hatte gelehrt, daß wie in der Tragödie so auch im Epos Einheit der Handlung erforderlich sei; . . . Vergil hat die Regeln des Aristoteles zu befolgen gesucht . . . Im Mittelpunkt seines Gedichtes steht der Held, von dem es der Namen trägt, aber nicht er bildet die Einheit, sondern eine Handlung: die Übersiedelung der Troer oder die Überführung der Penaten von Troja nach Latium." On the influence of Aristotle on Vergil, see T. W. Stadler, *Virgils Aeneis. Eine poetische Betrachtung* (Einsiedeln, 1942), pp. 63-4. The interaction between dramatic and epic technique is discussed by W. F. J. Knight, *Roman Vergil* (2nd ed., London, 1944), p. 129, and in an earlier article by the same author, "Integration of Plot in the *Aeneid*," *Vergilius*, VI (1940), pp. 17-25.

³ Especially by F. Bömer, "Studien zum VIII. Buche der Aeneis,"

viewpoint of the action, the results are meager indeed. On the first day the action, i. e. Aeneas' seeking help, does not progress at all. Instead, the hero learns about a cattle thief, the cult of the *Ara Maxima*, and the topography of Rome, but nothing about those things which he is interested in primarily. During the following night the making of the armor is described. This scene at best illuminates the central action from a different angle, while the action as such does not develop any further. Before it has really begun, then, it is swiftly brought to an end on the next day: Evander grants his help, and Aeneas and Pallas leave Pallanteum. Thereafter the interpretive elements predominate for good. It is thus quite obvious that the function of whatever action takes place in this book is more important than the action itself.

To understand this function properly, we must take into account the various structural patterns upon which the *Aeneid* is constructed and by which it attains unity. Firstly, as R. S. Conway and G. E. Duckworth have shown, the books of the second half correspond to those of the first, each pair of books displaying a remarkable number of parallels.⁴ Book VIII is thus linked to book II, and I should like to demonstrate that several motifs of the second book recur in the Hercules-Cacus episode. Outstanding among them is the metaphor of the serpent. Second, the division of the work into halves is counteracted and permeated by another, threefold one. In this tripartite arrangement, the central and rather unhomeric triad (V-VIII) deals with the destiny of Rome and is framed by the tragedy of Dido (I-IV) and the tragedy of Turnus (IX-XII) in which Homeric material is not used for patriotic and historical purposes. The even-numbered books in each third are linked by parallels and

Rh. M., XCII (1944), pp. 319-69; cf. N. Terzaghi, "Sulla composizione dell' VIII canto dell' Eneide," *Atti del V Congresso Naz. di Studi Romani*, V (1946), pp. 265-73; D. L. Drew, *The Allegory of the Aeneid* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 6-41; and the remarks by V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck, 1950), p. 276 (hereafter referred to as Pöschl).

⁴ R. S. Conway, *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 139-40; G. E. Duckworth, *Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil's Aeneid* (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 2-10 (hereafter referred to as Duckworth, *Structural Patterns*). This section of Duckworth's book is an expansion and revision of his article in *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15.

contrasts.⁵ Moreover, the close correspondence between VI and VIII is so evident that it has also been stressed by scholars whose structural analyses of the *Aeneid* are different from the ones just mentioned. Professor Otis, for instance, remarks in a recent study of the poem that the parallelism with book VI is explicit and essential to a full understanding of the action and structure of VIII.⁶ Third, since this is the last book of the second tripartite section, we can expect it to contain some elements linking it to and foreshadowing the last and climactic third of the *Aeneid*, which focuses on Turnus. The description of the battle of Actium on Aeneas' shield, for instance, while serving as a fitting conclusion of the Roman core of the *Aeneid*, also forecasts the victory of Aeneas, Augustus' ancestor and model, at the end of book XII. We shall see that on the most important of its various levels the Hercules-Cacus episode serves precisely the same purpose, but that the identification of Cacus with Turnus is far closer than that of Antony and Cleopatra with Turnus. Briefly, the chief means by which this important connection is effected are symbolism and imagery in conjunction with numerous verbal parallels. Fourth, from the viewpoint of

⁵ For a discussion of the tripartite structure of the poem, see Duckworth, *Structural Patterns*, pp. 11-15, and *id.*, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 1-10; Pöschl considers the three parts to be "Dunkel-Licht-Dunkel" (p. 280), and in *O. J.*, LVI (note 1, above), p. 295, he points out that books I-IV have a homogeneous setting, and so have IX-XII, whereas in V-VIII the setting changes. The same division is made by K. Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro* (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 418, who refers to similar structural principles in Cicero's *De Re Publica* and summarizes the three parts as follows: I-IV, Aeneas in Carthage; V-VIII, arrival in Latium and preparation for battle; IX-XII, the conflict. B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 1-24, discusses specific links between the even-numbered books of the first third; for a more general analysis, see Stadler (note 2, above), pp. 49 ff.

⁶ B. Otis, *Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963/64), p. 311 (hereafter referred to as Otis). His arrangement of the *Aeneid* resembles that of the *Eclogues* proposed by P. Maury, "Le secret de Virgile et l'architecture des Bucoliques," *Lettres d'Humanité*, III (1944), pp. 71-147, in that he links I to VII, II to XII, III to XI, IV to X, V to IX, and VI to VIII. The close connection between VI and VIII is also stressed by W. A. Camps, "A Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *O. Q.*, n. s. IV (1954), pp. 214-15, who argues that the center of the *Aeneid* lies in VII, 25-285, and by E. Paratore, *Virgilio* (2nd ed., Firenze, 1953), p. 311.

composition as well as of dramatic effect, the climax of book VIII is the description of the shield and not the *prodigium* (520-40). As this point is central to an understanding of the theme and structure of VIII, it may be discussed with brevity.

Bömer has rightly pointed out that the prodigy is placed over the individual episodes,⁷ but from this does not follow that it is the *cardo* which links the episodes to each other. Yet his thesis may be supported to some extent by Otis' division of the book into the following three main parts: a) the first day in Rome (102-368), symbolizing the Herculean and Arcadian past; b) the second day in Rome (454-596), the present; c) the second day in the valley near Caere (597-731), the Augustan future.⁸ Tripartite structure is characteristic of the individual books of the *Aeneid*, and given that in most instances the second main division and, primarily, its central portion contain a theme of importance to the epic as a whole,⁹ the prodigy may be said to take on such a pivotal function. For it foreshadows the coming events and states explicitly one of the major themes of the book; Aeneas is the divine man of Roman destiny—*ego poscor Olympo* (VIII, 533).

Although Otis' arrangement is rather attractive in that it seems to offer the key to the composition and unity of book VIII, some reservations must be applied to it. Mainly, the separation of past, present, and future is not so clear-cut as it may appear, but the three levels overlap repeatedly. When he introduces Aeneas in the "past" to the topographical present of Rome, Evander points out to him sites which recall monuments erected by Augustus.¹⁰ Besides, the "present" is characterized by Evander's recalling the past, especially in VIII, 479 ff. and 560 ff., and by the prodigy, which points to the future. Further, the "Augustan future," which term can be strictly applied only

⁷ Bömer, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 322-37.

⁸ Otis, p. 330. Cf. *id.*, "Three Problems of *Aeneid* 6," *T. A. P. A.*, XC (1959), pp. 167-70, where he argues for a similar division of VI.

⁹ So G. E. Duckworth, "Tripartite Structure in the *Aeneid*," *Vergilius*, VII (1961), pp. 2-11.

¹⁰ See P. Grimal, "La promenade d'Evandre et d'Enée à la lumière des fouilles récentes," *R. E. A.*, L (1948), pp. 348-51. Already E. Norden, "Vergils Aeneis im Lichte ihrer Zeit," *Neue Jahrb.*, VII (1901), pp. 271-3, recognized some of these allusions to the Augustan building program.

to VIII, 671-729, is preceded by an only slightly shorter account of Rome's past. Nor is this interweaving of present, past, and future surprising. One of the themes of the book is the union of different peoples. The Trojans, the past inhabitants of Italy, fuse with her present inhabitants into a future people, the Italians. The fact that Evander anticipates this development and thus speaks of "we Italians" (VIII, 331 f.) is not one of Vergil's "inconsistencies," but serves to underscore this theme explicitly. A last example of this interplay of the various time levels may be taken from the Hercules-Cacus episode itself. Evander speaks of Hercules' adventure as if he and his men had been present (200-1):¹¹

attulit *et nobis* aliquando optantibus aetas
auxilium adventumque dei.

It would seem, then, that Evander, Hercules, and Aeneas were contemporaries. This was chronologically untenable, and thus the event, represented first as contemporary, is later projected into the mythical past (268-9):

ex illo celebratus hinc laetique *minores*
servavere diem.

On a different level, the *et nobis* may well refer to Vergil's contemporaries, the god whose advent is celebrated being Augustus.¹² Thus, the line between past and present is again blurred,

¹¹ So Terzaghi, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 267-8; cf. F. Münzer, *Cacus der Rinderdieb* (Rektoratsprogramm Basel, 1911), p. 12. According to Terzaghi, *nostri* in line 222 marks a kind of transition from *nobis* in line 200 to *minores* in line 268. Vergil, he argues, would have corrected this contradiction in a final revision of the book. Again, I believe, this "contradiction" may have been intentional and thus serves to stress the interfusing of past and present.

¹² H. Bellen, "ADVENTUS DEI. Der Gegenwartsbezug in Vergils Darstellung der Geschichte von Cacus und Hercules (Aen. VIII 184-275)," *Rh. M.*, CVI (1963), pp. 23-30, especially p. 26, argues that the effect of the *et* is to give these lines a general significance rather than that they merely refer to Evander and his people. Cf. the general remark of E. Norden, *op. cit.* (note 10, above), p. 271: "... von Vergil werden Gebräuche der Gegenwart in die uralte, von ihm aufs sorgfältigste nach den Quellen studierte Vergangenheit zurückverlegt ... Das alte und neue Rom, Vergangenheit und Gegenwart schaute man gewissermaßen ineinander." The result, however, never is narrow allegory.

and the "Augustan future" is superimposed on the original time level.

Given that the division of the book along these chronological lines presents certain difficulties, we must consider the units into which it naturally falls. Again the arrangement is tripartite: the day during which Aeneas is familiarized with the site of Rome and Roman customs (102-369) is followed by the night during which the armor is made (370-450), while on the second day Aeneas departs from the site of Rome and receives from Venus the armor, which then is described. From this division it is clear that the various elements of the book build up to the description of the shield which coordinates them and brings about a certain unity. This is borne out by the function of the second of the tripartite sections: unlike in most of the other books, it is not the focal point of the book but prepares for it. The armor has to be forged first before it can be given its spiritual interpretation. Similarly, the prodigy in part serves to direct the reader's attention to the *Vulcania arma* (535). It can be expected, then, that the first main division and the shield description are connected also. This link, as I shall demonstrate, is provided by the Hercules-Cacus episode.

A final point we have to consider in discussing the function of book VIII as a whole or of its individual episodes is the close connection between this book and book VII, which has been stressed by scholars from different approaches.¹³ As the first two books of the second half they prepare the last four. Both are books of embassies and negotiations, and it is only after Aeneas has gathered an army that he can set out for the conquest of the enemy in IX-XII. Further, the two books grouped together epitomize the course of Latin and Roman history from the be-

¹³ Most recently by V. Buchheit, *Vergil über die Sendung Roms* (Heidelberg, 1963), pp. 9, 117, 127 (hereafter referred to as Buchheit); also J. Perret, *Virgile, L'homme et l'oeuvre* (Paris, 1952), pp. 117-18; Terzaghi, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 265-6; cf. G. Hirst, "An Attempt to Date the Composition of *Aeneid* VII," *C. Q.*, X (1916), pp. 95-6: "It appears to me that VIII was composed continuously with VII, the two forming practically one episode. . . ." Hirst assumes that VII and VIII were the earliest books to be written, the *terminus ante quem* being the year 26 B. C., whereas Terzaghi tries to demonstrate that VIII was composed after parts of VII and XII had been written. For a general comment on this question, see note 66, below.

ginnings to Augustus' victory at Actium. Moreover, the alternating rhythm of even-numbered books, which usually are more tragic and serious, and those of odd number whose tone is lighter, is broken by latent tragedy in VII, 1-285¹⁴ and the activity of Allecto in the same book. VII and VIII are linked, then, by a common theme rather than by alternation and contrast. Several motifs appear in both books, and it is the primary function of the *prodigium* passage to sum up some of these, especially the one of the hero *quem numina poscunt* (VII, 272), before the various themes and motifs are finally pulled together by the description of the shield. We thus have a soaring line of movement, progressive in spite of the "episodes" and, at the same time, cohesive. To investigate this aspect further is beyond the scope of this paper. The point is that the Hercules-Cacus episode looks backward and forward in various ways. Because this has not been taken into account, the interpretations given to it so far fall short of grasping its full significance.

The rather simple allegorical explanations offered by Drew, who looked upon the events of book VIII as closely paralleling the triple triumph of Augustus on August 12th and 13th of 29 B. C., and Conway, who saw in the frenzy of Cacus a reflection of Mark Antony's proscriptions, have been superseded by more sophisticated ones, which recall those given to the *Eclogues* in recent years.¹⁵ H. Fraenkel thus views the beginning of Evander's speech (185-9)

¹⁴ K. J. Reckford, "Latent Tragedy in *Aeneid* VII, 1-285," *A. J. P.*, LXXXII (1961), pp. 252-69. Discussions of the alternating rhythm may be found in Conway, *op. cit.* (note 4, above), p. 141; Duckworth, *op. cit.* (note 5, above), p. 2, who sees an alternating rise and fall of tension in books I-II, III-IV, etc. In *Structural Patterns*, p. 11, n. 43, Duckworth, with a view to VII and VIII, applies some reservations to Stadler's system of dividing the *Aeneid* into "systolic" even-numbered and "diastolic" odd-numbered books. Cf. Otis, pp. 329-30: "The imbalance of forces in Book VII is so great that a whole book is needed to restore a proper equilibrium." Pöschl, pp. 176-7, argues that the odd-numbered books come closer to the style of Homeric epic and tend to be less unified than the even-numbered ones, which deal with Aeneas and exhibit a tight composition that approaches dramatic form. As we have seen, these characteristics cannot be rigidly applied to VII and VIII.

¹⁵ D. L. Drew, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 13 ff.; R. S. Conway, "Poesia ed Impero. Studio sull'influsso di Virgilio," *Conferenze Vergiliane* (Milano, 1931), pp. 28-9. Cf. P. Grimal, "Enée à Rome et le triomphe d'Octave," *R. E. A.*, LIII (1951), pp. 51-61, and *id.*, *Les inten-*

non haec sollemnia nobis,
 has ex more dapes, hanc tanti numinis aram
 vana superstitio veterumque ignara deorum
 imposuit: saevis, hospes Troiane, periclis
 servati facimus meritosque novamus honores

as "the key lines" which imply a covert apotheosis of Augustus, who delivered the Romans from dire jeopardy.¹⁶ H. Bellen is even more explicit in that he considers these lines an apology for the incipient worship of Augustus and to be intrinsically connected with 200-1, which he takes as referring to the Romans' hope for salvation after the battle of Actium.¹⁷ Yet if we are to understand why Vergil decided to render the Cacus episode so elaborately, we must look at it as a whole and not emphasize a fraction of it out of proportion. By analyzing the entire episode, then, H. Schnepf nevertheless reaches practically the same conclusion.¹⁸ He argues that Hercules is identified with Augustus, because he displays qualities similar to those of the emperor. Hercules is the mythical counterpart of Augustus as benefactor of mankind, as bringer of peace, and as a mortal deified. Without discussing his suggestions in more detail, I merely want to point out that Schnepf is aware only of the connection between our episode and the description of Augustus' triumph on the shield.

That the text does not warrant this narrow allegorical approach was emphasized first by V. Pöschl. According to him, Hercules' conquest of Cacus is a mythological model for both

tions de Properce et la composition du livre IV des Élégies (Collection Latomus, Vol. XII [Brussels, 1953]), pp. 14 ff. For the allegorico-symbolical approach to the *Eclogues*, see J. J. H. Savage, "The Art of the Third *Eclogue* of Vergil (55-111)," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 142-58, and *id.*, "The Art of the Second *Eclogue* of Vergil," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1960), pp. 353-75.

¹⁶ H. Fraenkel, "The Key Lines (VIII 185-89) for the Cacus Episode in the *Aeneid*," *Miscellanea Galbati* (Milano, 1951), I, pp. 127-8. Otis, p. 331, supports Fraenkel's view.

¹⁷ H. Bellen, *op. cit.* (note 12, above), pp. 23-30.

¹⁸ H. Schnepf, "Das Herculesabenteuer in Vergils Aeneis (VIII 184 ff.)," *Gymnasium*, LXVI (1959), pp. 250-68. He rejects convincingly Bömer's (note 3, above) argument that the whole episode is merely an *aiton*. That its elaborate treatment does not justify such a simple conclusion was recognized already by F. Sbordone, "Il cielo italico di Eracle," *Athenaeum*, n. s. XIX (1941), p. 152.

the victory of Aeneas and the triumph of Augustus.¹⁹ It must therefore be stressed that the function of the episode is symbolic. Several levels of meaning are involved which are subordinated to each other without being mutually exclusive. Thus, in a well-documented chapter of his recent book, which grew out of studies of *Aeneid* VIII, V. Buchheit proposes that Hercules and Cacus symbolize Aeneas and Turnus. He demonstrates rather convincingly that elsewhere in book VIII and, significantly, in book VI, Aeneas is closely associated with Hercules.²⁰ Since Buchheit is mainly concerned with investigating the connection between VII and VIII, he points out a few parallels between the Allecto-Turnus and the Hercules-Cacus episodes. But even within this rather limited scope he fails to notice some more important parallels in the Allecto passage and book VII, quite apart from the fact that several more appear in other books.

The literary antecedents of our episode are Livy, I, 7, 5-15 and Dionysius, I, 39, and a comparison shows that Vergil, as regards all the essential details, treated the account *ab integro*.²¹ The reasons for this striking difference are easily understood when one realizes that a comparison of Turnus' characteristics with Cacus' reveals a resemblance that is far too close to be coincidental.

The scene in which Turnus appears for the first time takes place at dark midnight (VII, 414). Thus Vergil already hints that Turnus' destiny belongs to the sphere of the underworld.

¹⁹ Pöschl, p. 276, and with some excellent remarks on the nature of symbol and allegory, pp. 36-7.

²⁰ Buchheit, pp. 116-33. Buchheit does not fully realize the significance of the parallels in VI. Among the ones he cites are VI, 122-3, 395-6; the *nubigenae* Hylaeus and Pholus in VIII, 293-4, and the *nubigenae* Latin twins in VII, 674-7; VIII, 362-5, and 552-3 (Aeneas' steed is caparisoned in a lion's skin, but it is worth noting that already in II, 722, i. e. in the parallel book to VIII, Aeneas dons the lion's skin when he leaves Troy); the cavern of Cacus and that of Allecto (VII, 563-71); Allecto, like Cacus, is called and described as a *monstrum* (VII, 323-9).

²¹ See F. Münzer, *op. cit.* (note 11, above), *passim*, and J. G. Winter, "The Myth of Heracles at Rome," *Roman History and Mythology*, ed. H. A. Sanders (New York, 1910), pp. 171-273, both of whom also discuss the versions of Propertius (IV, 9, 1-20) and Ovid, *Fasti*, I, 543-87; cf. F. Sbordone, *op. cit.* (note 18, above), pp. 152-80. The most recent discussion of the function of Hercules in Propertius' elegy is that of W. S. Anderson, "*Hercules Exclusus*: Propertius, IV, 9," *A.J.P.*, LXXXV (1964), pp. 1-12.

This association is made even more explicit by the intervention of Allecto and the Chimaera on his helmet.²² The imagery that surrounds Turnus is therefore dominated by darkness and fire, and it is typical of Hades that both symbols are combined into one.²³ In VII, 456 f. Allecto thus fixes in Turnus' breast torches blazing with dark light:

sic effata facem iuveni coniecit et *atro*
lumine fumantis fixit sub pectore taedas.

In the Hercules-Cacus episode Cacus belches forth black fire (VIII, 198-9):

huic monstro Volcanus erat pater: illius *atros*
ore vomens *ignis* magna se mole ferebat.²⁴

In both passages, these lines are followed by a description of the characters' state of mind, which in VII is heightened by the simile of the cauldron. Turnus is dominated by fury and madness, which takes on the aspect of wickedness (VII, 460-5):

arma *amens* fremit, arma toro tectisque requirit;
saevit amor ferri et *scelerata insania* belli,
ira super: magno veluti cum flamma sonore
virgea suggeritur costis undantis aeni
exsultant aestu latices, *furit* intus aquai
fumidus atque alte spumis exuberat amnis

Cacus is characterized by the same qualities and by trickery of which Turnus is free at present, but which he displays later, an example being his stratagem to ambush Aeneas (XI, 515 ff.). In X, 231 the nymphs thus call him *perfidus*. The dangers resulting from Cacus' *saevitia* have been mentioned by Evander at the outset. Thus the following verbal parallels appear:

. . . *saevis*, hospes Troiane, periclis
servati (VIII, 188-9)

²² For the symbolic significance of this emblem, see S. G. P. Small, "The Arms of Turnus: *Aeneid* 7.783-92," *T. A. P. A.*, XC (1959), pp. 243-52, and Buchheit, pp. 108-15.

²³ For detailed references, see J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle. Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe* = *Studien Bibl. Warburg*, XX (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 596-7.

²⁴ The other two passages in which *ignes atri* appear refer to Dido's pyre (IV, 384) and to the pyre on which the fallen warriors are burned in XI, 184. Underworld connotations are evident there, too.

at *furiis* ²⁵ *Caci mens effera, ne quid inausum*
aut intractatum *sceleris* dolive fuisset. (VIII, 205-6)

The metaphor of the cauldron, with which Turnus is associated first, recurs throughout books VII-XII. Especially the motif of the fire, which burns under the cauldron and allows the water to simmer, is echoed and alluded to in the descriptions of Turnus' repeated fits of anger.²⁶ Vergil adapted the simile from Homer, who compared Hephaestus' taming of the river Scamander and especially the violent contact of the flames with the water to a cauldron placed over a fire, while the fat of a pig boils in it (*Il.*, XXI, 362-4). Attracted by the situation in which the Homeric simile occurred, Vergil included in his simile the image of the river that boils up in the heat. Thus the cauldron in the *Aeneid* is filled with water, and *fumidus amnis* and *unda* evoke the original image. By choosing a strikingly similar diction and imagery for the description of the scene in and outside the cave whose top has been taken off, Vergil clearly intended to link it to the pivotal Turnus simile in VII. Again darkness is mingled with flame, while *nebula atra* has taken the place of *vapor ater*. What is more, smoke, river, and wave are not mentioned in Homer's description of Polyphemus' cave (*Od.*, IX, 216 ff.), but hark back to the cauldron metaphor:

desuper Alcides telis premit, omniaque arma
advocat et ramis vastis molaribus instat.
ille autem, neque enim fuga iam super ulla pericli,
faucibus ingentem fumum (mirabile dictu)
evomit involvitque domum caligine caeca.
prospectum eripiens oculis, glomeratque sub antro
fumiferam noctem, commixtis igne tenebris.
non tulit Alcides animis, seque ipse per ignem
praecipiti iecit saltu, qua plurimus undam
fumus agit nebulaque ingens specus aestuat atra.
(VIII, 249-58)

²⁵ This reading, based on MSS PRγ^c and favored by most editors, is preferable to *furiis* which does not fit the context nearly so well. Cf. Münzer, *op. cit.* (note 11, above): p. 55, n. 68, and Buchheit, p. 118, n. 493.

²⁶ For a detailed study of the recurrence of this metaphor, see M. von Duhn, "Die Gleichnisse der Allektoszenen des 7. Buches von Vergils Aeneis," *Gymnasium*, LXIV (1957), pp. 59-83. Cf. Pöschl, pp. 154 ff.

Compare again with VII, 460-6 where the following parallels appear, different from the ones cited above:

arma amens fremit, *arma* toro tectisque requirit;
saevit amor ferri et scelerata insania belli,
ira super: magno veluti cum *flamma* sonore
virgea suggeritur costis *undantis* aeni
exsultantque *aestu* latices, furit intus aquai
fumidus atque alte spumis exuberat *amnis*,
nec se iam capit *unda*, volat *vapor ater* ad auras.

The mention of *amnis* in the cauldron simile corresponds to that of the stream which flows by Cacus' cave. The latter is referred to twice (236, 240), both times in a prominent position at the end of the line, and thus forms an integral part of the scene:

dissultantque ripae refluit *exterritus amnis*. (VIII, 240)

This is obviously an echo of VII, 465:

fumidus atque alte spumis *exuberat amnis*.

It is worth noting that the river is not called by its name, Tiber, as in that case the association with the *amnis* in VII would have been less obvious. However, as all the other Homeric themes in books V-VIII, the Scamander motif has been subtly adapted *ad maiorem Romae gloriam*—the Trojan river has turned into the Roman one.

The kind of *furor* Vergil had in mind when he described that of Cacus is reflected by his choice of words. To be sure, Cacus is never called *furens* outright as is Hercules (228), and we shall see the reason for this later. However, the connotations of *caligo* (253), for instance, are not purely material. Cicero defines his state of mind as *caligo*, when his concern for the well-being of Decimus Brutus *praestrinxerat aciem animi*.²⁷ The context in the *Aeneid* passage is similar: Vergil also identifies *caligo* with an impairment of the power of perception. An even more important parallel occurs in Catullus' Peleus epyllion where the poet describes the madness that blinds Theseus as *caligo caeca* (Cat., LXIV, 208). This epithet, in connection with *caligo*, occurs in only one other passage in the *Aeneid*.²⁸ In

²⁷ *Phil.*, XII, 2, 3; cf. *Fin.*, V, 15, 43; Pliny, *Ep.*, V, 8, 8.

²⁸ In III, 203. Again, I believe, it is not merely used for the descrip-

VIII it thus is the visual and dramatic representation of Cacus' *mentis ad omnia caecitas*,²⁹ which is stressed in 205 f. Similarly, in book XII Aeneas, when he pursues Turnus, has to pierce through the intense *caligo* that surrounds and protects his opponent (XII, 466-7):

solum densæ in caligine Turnum
vestigat lustrans, solum in certamina poscit.

Perhaps *lustrans* here, although this should not be pressed, connotes brightness, especially since it would otherwise merely repeat the meaning of *vestigat*. In any event, the same conflict between dark and light is implied here which is made more explicit in Hercules' combat with Cacus. At the same time, the imagery of this latter episode looks back to book II where Venus lifts from Aeneas' eyes the cloud of darkness which symbolizes his *furor* (604-6):³⁰

aspice (namque omnem, quae nunc obducta tuenti
mortalis hebetat visus tibi et umida circum
caligat, nubem eripiam.

The fact that a form of *caligare* is used here for the only time in the *Aeneid* heavily underscores this link.

Münzer has rightly pointed out that Vergil adapted the scenery, as described particularly in 190-2, to the story so as to prepare for and underline the formidable vehemence of the conflict.³¹ However, the frequency with which the theme of stone appears in our episode can be understood more properly as foreshadowing its function in book XII. For as the episode recalls the first simile with which Turnus is associated, so it anticipates the last one which characterizes him alone. In XII, 684 ff. he is compared to a rock that rushes headlong from a mountain, leaving ruin in its wake. By the simile following it (XII, 700 ff.), this scene is contrasted with the majestic and calm eternity of mountains which symbolizes Aeneas. "By these opposite symbols," observes Pöschl, "is not only expressed the contrast between Aeneas and Turnus, but also that between victory

tion of the dense fog, but also connotes the gloom of Aeneas and his companions, and their uncertainty.

²⁹ This is Cicero's definition of *furor* in *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 5, 11.

³⁰ Cf. Fenik, *op. cit.* (note 5, above), pp. 7-8.

³¹ Münzer, *op. cit.* (note 11, above), pp. 33-6, 52-3.

and defeat, between demonic and divine forces, between barbarian and Roman character, between the ephemeral force of unthinking destruction and a power that outlives centuries."²² We will see shortly that this characteristic applies to Hercules' fight with Cacus also. Meanwhile it will be easily seen that the verbal similarities between the Turnus simile and the Cacus scenery are remarkable:

ac veluti *montis saxum* de vertice praeceps
cum *ruit*, avolsu vento, seu turbidus imber
proluit aut annis solvit sublapsa vetustas;
fertur in *abruptum* magno *mons* improbus actu
exsultatque solo, silvas, armenta, virosque
involvens secum: *disiecta* per agmina Turnus
sic urbis *ruit* ad muros, ubi plurima fuso
sanguine terra madet. . . . (XII, 684-91)

The site of Cacus' cave is described as follows:

iam primum *saxis* suspensam hanc aspice *rupem*,
disiectae procul ut moles desertaque *montis*
stat domus et scopuli ingentem traxere *ruinam*.
(VIII, 190-2)
caede tepebat humus. . . (196)

In VIII, of course, there is no contrast between solid and tumbling rock as in XII. Rather, the poet achieves the same effect, namely the foreshadowing of Cacus' defeat, by describing the scene after the rocks have been scattered, the technical reason being that the reader is to witness later the destruction by which the landscape received its present appearance. But in both VIII and XII, the description of a rockslide serves as an introduction to the combats of Hercules and Cacus, and of Turnus and Aeneas, and as a symbol of Cacus' and Turnus' impending doom.

²² Pöschl, pp. 216-17. Pöschl believes the source of this simile to be *Il.*, XIII, 754. I wonder, however, whether the specific mention of the *vertex montis* might not come from Homer's description of Polyphemus in *Od.*, IX, 191-2. Later in the book, Polyphemus breaks off the peak of a mountain to hurl it at Odysseus (*Od.*, IX, 481). Further, Vergil uses *vertex* more frequently in describing Turnus than in the descriptions he gives of other warriors (VII, 784; IX, 29, 732; X, 270). Although this point should not be pressed, it would give us an additional connection between Turnus and Cacus whose resemblance to the Homeric Polyphemus was pointed out first by Münzer, *op. cit.* (note 11, above), pp. 36-7, 48-9.

The peripety of both combats is described in a similar way, although the roles are reversed. Hercules (VIII, 233 ff.) breaks open the cave with a huge rock and thus is able to overcome Cacus. Turnus, in a last desperate effort, hurls a rock at Aeneas (XII, 896 ff.), but misses and thus enables Aeneas to overcome him. The rock in VIII has the appearance of a landmark, its huge size is stressed and so is the effort Hercules has to make in tilting it (233-9). The same holds good for Turnus' rock in book XII, although its hugeness is described in more detail (896-905). Moreover, in the subsequent simile the poet associates this stone with night and represents it as a symbol of Turnus' failure for which not he, but the *dea dira* (XII, 914) is responsible. Similarly, the *saxum* in VIII, originally a part of Cacus' cavern, is associated with the darkness Cacus represents. That this is its function is hinted at the outset, for it is

dirarum nidis domus opportuna volucrum. (235)

Vergil avoids on purpose identifying the *dea dira* in XII, 914. But there can be little doubt that, in mentioning her, he wanted the reader to recall the *Dira* Jupiter sent to withdraw Juturna from her brother's side. She is the daughter of the night and winged like a *volucer* (XII, 845-8):

dicuntur geminae pestes cognomine Dirae,
quas et Tartaream Nex intempesta Megaeram
uno eodemque tulit partu, paribusque revinxit
serpentum spiris verticibusque addidit alas.

These creatures are the *dirae Tartareae sorores* of Allecto, as they are called in VII (325-6, 456), and thus the phrase *dirarum domus volucrum* echoes the *sedes dirarum aëarum* from which Allecto, a *monstrum* like Cacus, is summoned in VII, 324 and to which she proudly refers in VII, 454 f.:

respice ad hæc: adsum dirarum ab sede sororum,
bella manu letumque gero. . . .

The rock of the *dirae volucres* is likewise a weapon in the fight which symbolizes and anticipates the war in books IX-XII and the death of Turnus.³³ That there are other imagistic and sym-

³³ Cf. Sbordone, *op. cit.* (note 18, above), pp. 155-6: "Il rombo che fa tuonare l'etere, . . . il ritirarsi del fiume contro corrente sono sintomi

bolic links between Turnus and Allecto has already been pointed out.

After Venus removes the cloud of darkness from the eyes of her son in the second book, he is able to see the destruction wrought in Troy. The images of stone, wave, and smoke that predominate in the description of Cacus' cave and of its destruction are powerfully combined here to underscore the vehemence of the devastation (II, 608-12):

hic, ubi disiectas moles avulsaque saxis
saxa vides, mixtoque undantem pulvere fumum,
Neptunus muros magnoque emota tridenti
fundamenta quatit totamque a sedibus urbem
eruit.

The association of the wave with smoke resembles that in VIII where *fumus undam agit* (256-7), rather than that it reflects the activity of Neptune. Nevertheless, the significance of the lord of the waves in this context should not be overlooked. Whereas in II the imagery thus is applied to a situation unfavorable for the Trojans, it characterizes in VIII an episode signaling the destruction of Troy's enemies. This reversal has been prepared in book VII where the reader sees for the first time Neptune actively help the Trojans (21-3):

quae nec monstra pii paterentur alia Troes
delati in portus neu litora dira subirent
Neptunus ventis implevit vela secundis . . .

It is significant that he protects them from *monstra* one of which, the wooden horse, marked the beginning of their defeat, while the conquest of the Cacus monster anticipates their final triumph. On one level, then, Cacus certainly corresponds to the *fatale machina* of book II. His fate, however, gives additional testimony to the fact that the situations in II and VIII are reversed. In II the Greeks destroy and the Trojans suffer from them, whereas in VIII they profit from them and the Greeks help to found.

Ultimately, Vergil's decision to use the function and imagery of stone in the *Aeneid* may be traced back to the proem to the third book of the *Georgics*. There the description of the temple

accessori d'un fenomeno tellurico." It cannot be ruled out that the *dea dira* may be Allecto.

the poet plans to build for Augustus is terminated by Sisyphus' unconquerable stone (37-9):

Invidia infelix furias amnemque severum
Cocyti metuet tortosque Ixionis anguis
immanemque rotam et non exsuperabile saxum.

This passage is generally³⁴ interpreted as the punishment of Augustus' political enemies, who are represented by the *Invidia* and linked to the two great mythological penitents of the underworld. For Augustus' Roman mission was viewed as a fight against the demonic forces that obstructed Rome's call to dominate and pacify the *orbis terrarum*. Sisyphus' stone has been aptly called "a solid prototype of ascent-descent,"³⁵ and it is in this function also that the stone motif appears in the *Aeneid*. Rocks are lifted and fall down and thus symbolize, in books VIII and XII, the ascendancy of Aeneas and his mission as well as the downfall of the demonic characters Cacus and Turnus. The fact that the stone motif in VIII is preceded by further ascent-descent themes—Hercules runs to the top of the mountain (221), another stone is dropped to block the doorway (226), Hercules runs up and down the Aventine three times (230-2)—and that it occurs in a veritable *descensus* episode³⁶ may explain why its choice suggested itself in this context.

Primarily, however, Sisyphus' stone is a symbol of futility, of a task too big to be accomplished with success. The rock which Turnus hurls at Aeneas in XII and which falls short of its target has precisely the same symbolic connotations. To both Turnus and Sisyphus success is denied because they acted against the will of the gods. The stone symbolism in VIII, as it only prepares for that in XII, does not reach quite the same depth of significance. Yet the rock with which Cacus blocks the entrance to his cavern proves equally futile against Hercules' onrush and actually traps Cacus. Since the description of Aeneas' first day in Rome, i. e. especially the Hercules-Cacus episode, explicitly recalls the mythological Hades of book VI,³⁷ we are justified in linking the *saxum* theme in VIII to that of

³⁴ Cf. W. Richter, ed., *Vergil. Georgica* (München, 1957), pp. 268-9.

³⁵ S. P. Bovie, "The Imagery of Ascent-Descent in Vergil's *Georgics*," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), p. 343.

³⁶ So J. Kroll, *op. cit.* (note 23, above), p. 398.

³⁷ See Otis, p. 331.

Sisyphus. Given that Sisyphus is mentioned in the third *Georgic*, he belongs by implication to the mythological characters described in *Aeneid* VI.

There are further parallels between Cacus and Turnus. The *fores superbae* of his cavern (196) indicate Cacus' pride. It is that very pride which Aeneas in VI is asked to subdue, and because of this mission he does not spare the proud Turnus.³⁸ The heads dripping with blood that are nailed to the entrance of Cacus' cave (195) anticipate the ones of Turnus' enemies which he attaches to his chariot in the twelfth book (511-12). The phrase *fugit ocior euro* (VIII, 223) recurs in the *Aeneid* only once, namely when Vergil describes Turnus' flight from Aeneas in XII, 733. Besides, just as Turnus in his rashness forgets his sword made by Vulcan and thus renders himself almost defenseless (XII, 735-41), so Cacus in careless haste breaks the chains which are made by Vulcan and by which the stone that blocks the doorway is suspended, thereby making the outcome of the combat rather definite. In book XII, after the Aeneas-Turnus similes, the two protagonists are compared to two bulls fighting to gain possession of the two armies, which are compared to herds (715 ff.). The fight in VIII takes place over the same object. Its setting is a grove filled with the plaintive lowing of the cattle (215-16):

discessu mugire boves atque omne querelis
impleri nemus et colles clamore relinqui.

The scene in XII is not very different. The outcome of the combat will decide who will rule over the grove, which in VIII is identified with the site of Rome (XII, 719):

quis nemori imperitet, quem tota armenta sequantur.
. . . gemitu nemus omne remugit. (722)

Both times the effect of the fight is heightened by the echo it finds in nature. The verbal similarity of the descriptions is again very close:

. . . impulsu quo maximus intonat aether. (VIII, 239)
. . . ingens fragor aethera complet. (XII, 724)

In XII, the mention of *aether* forms a transition to the mention

³⁸ Turnus' pride is singled out in, for instance, X, 445, 514; XII, 326.

of Jupiter (725 ff.). In the Hercules-Cacus episode, where the *genius loci* is a different one, it is followed by a reference to Hades, for *regia* (242), although it is designated as that of Cacus, connotes the realm of the god of the underworld.³⁹ Also, the glare in Turnus' eyes, reflecting his unbridled fierceness, is recurrent in Vergil's description of the hero. In XII this aspect is further stressed by the likening of his voice to that of a bull set for a fight (102-4):

oculis micat acribus ignis
mugitus veluti cum prima in proelia taurus
terrificos ciet

Compare with Cacus whose eyes inspire the onlookers with fear and who also roars while battling Hercules:

terribilis oculos (VIII, 266)
. atque insueta rudentem
desuper Alcides telis premit (248-9)

To depict Cacus' eyes as blazing with fire would have led to repetition, since the proper place of Cacus' fire, his *fauces*, is mentioned in the following line. Finally, Hercules overcomes Cacus and thus puts an end to the bloodthirst of the *semihomo* (194), the *semifer* (267). The poet therefore makes special mention of his *et siccum sanguine guttur* (261). Almost the same expression occurs in the wolf simile that points up Turnus' animal bloodthirstiness (IX, 62-4):

ille asper et improbus ira
saevit in absentis; collecta fatigat edendi
ex longo rabies et siccae sanguine fauces.

A further point of resemblance between Cacus and Turnus is their huge physique. The only attribute of Turnus which Cacus noticeably lacks is the former's conspicuous beauty.

When we analyze the raw material with which Vergil had to work, i. e. the Turnus and Cacus legends, further similarities appear. According to one of the two Turnus legends which the poet combined in creating the character of Aeneas' antagonist, Turnus was a chthonian deity in southern Latium and closely

³⁹ For detailed references, see Eroll, *op. cit.* (note 23, above), p. 392, and W. Headlam, "Ghost-raising, Magic, and the Underworld," *C. R.*, XVI (1902), p. 55.

connected with fire.⁴⁰ This, I believe, may lie at the base of the frequent association of Turnus with fire in the *Aeneid* and especially of the use of fire as his favorite weapon (IX, 71 ff., 535 ff.). It also explains best the creation of Cacus as a fire-breathing demigod, as son of Vulcan. Due mention, of course, is also made of Turnus' divine descent. Yet Vergil was the first to humanize Turnus, while on the other hand he deified Cacus who in Livy's and Dionysius' account is a simple mortal. Both Cacus and Turnus, then, meet on the semidivine level. What ultimately may have led Vergil to associate Cacus and Turnus was the cult of the goddess Caca in Rome. Caca was probably worshipped as goddess of fire, before Vesta took over her function.⁴¹ Of a cult of her "brother" Cacus, however, there is no trace, and the connection between Cacus and Caca is vague indeed. Similarly, the goddess Juturna had entered into the Roman cult. A spring on the Forum Romanum, beside the temple of the Dioscuri, was sacred to her. As a deity of water localized in southern Latium she was the complement of the fire deity Turnus. This explains Vergil's "invention" of representing them as brother and sister.⁴² Thus the parallelism between Turnus and Cacus, who are enemies of Rome, and between Juturna and Caca, who enjoyed worship in Rome, is obvious. It is heightened by the fact that both times deities of fire are involved.

⁴⁰ R. Crahay and J. Hubaux, "Les deux Turnus," *S.M.S.R.*, XXX (1959), pp. 173 ff., 211-12, treat this important and complex aspect of the Turnus legend lucidly and in detail and discuss the theories of Latte, Wissowa, and others.

⁴¹ See J. Bayet, *Les origines de l'Hercule romain* (Paris, 1926), pp. 208 ff.; cf. Münzer, *op. cit.* (note 11, above), pp. 98 ff. Winter, *op. cit.* (note 21, above), p. 253, sees in Cacus "an old Roman divinity of unknown attributes but possibly a primitive fire god whose precise nature had been long since forgotten, whom Vergil recreated and endowed with the power and personality of Typhoeus." This is, at least, a sensible guess.

⁴² So Crahay and Hubaux, *op. cit.* (note 40, above), pp. 179-80. Münzer, pp. 49 ff., believes with Latte and Wissowa that Turnus and Juturna were associated for purely etymological reasons. More recently, a similar view is taken by A. Montenegro Duque, *La onomástica de Virgilio y la antigüedad prelatina* (Salamanca, 1949), I, p. 89. Duque points out that, aside from the homophony of *Juturna* and *Turnus*, the localization of the nymph in Lavinium (cf. Serv., *Aen.*, XII, 134, 139), adjacent to the Rutulian territory, may easily have suggested the legendary union of the two.

That the poet wanted to establish a link to the Hades of book VI is evident from his repeatedly stressing the darkness and spaciousness of Cacus' *antrum* or *spelunca*, which terms denote the underworld in VI. The descriptions of the entrance to Hades in VI, and of Cacus' cavern resemble each other to a marked degree. This is apparent already from the opening lines:

spelunca alta fuit vastoque immanis hiatu,
 scruposa, tuta lacu nigro nemorumque tenebris. (VI, 236-7)
 hic spelunca fuit vasto summota recessu . . .
 solis inaccessam radiis. (VIII, 193, 195)⁴³

There are more allusions which heighten the subterranean atmosphere. Hercules is praised as the conqueror of Cerberus who, like Cacus, lives in a blood-stained cavern (296-7). Moreover, Vergil was the first to incorporate the Cacus legend in the myth of Geryoneus, and Geryoneus, together with the fire-breathing Chimaera, is one of the monsters Aeneas feels tempted to slay in the mythological Hades (VI, 288-94). Typhoeus, whom the Salians also single out in their hymn, has rightly been interpreted as a symbol of evil, and thus he is subdued by Hercules, who personifies virtue.⁴⁴ But it is also worth noting that the literary tradition since Hesiod (*Theog.*, 860), Pindar (*Ol.*, 4, 5-6; *Pyth.*, 1, 15 ff.), and Aeschylus (*Prom.*, 353-74) knows of Typhoeus as banished under Mt. Aetna, where he causes volcanic eruptions by belching fire. Cacus also breathes fire and, significantly, he does so only when he hides beneath the rocks of his cave. The workshop of his father Vulcan—and this gives added testimony to the unity of book VIII by means of recurrent motifs—is also located under *antra Aetnea* (419). As most Chimaerae are the descendants of Typhoeus, a link is also established to the fire-belching emblem on Turnus' helmet.⁴⁵ A further indication of the poet's intention to cast the Hercules-Cacus episode as an underworld scene is lines 206-7, which appear with slight variations in *Georgics*, IV, 550-1. There

⁴³ Compare also with Allecto's cavern in VII, 533-70; cf. note 20, above.

⁴⁴ So A. Loyen, "Hercule et Typhée: A propos de Virgile, *Enéide* VIII, 298," *Mélanges Ernout* (Paris, 1940), pp. 237-45.

⁴⁵ For similarities between Typhoeus and Turnus, see Small, *op. cit.* (note 22, above), and Buchheit, pp. 111-13. Buchheit, pp. 128-30, also discusses some of the similarities between Cacus and Typhoeus.

Cyrene bids Aristaeus to sacrifice four oxen and heifers to Orpheus and Eurydice after both were sent into Hades. But subsequently the oxen become a symbol of resurrection, a source of new life. Likewise, Hercules frees the Pallanteans from a demonic and deadly threat, and this salvation begins with the theft of the same number of cattle.

The parallelism of theme and imagery between VI and VIII therefore appears to be much more functional than that between II and IV.⁴⁶ Far from repeating itself under different circumstances, the underworld scene, which is merely described in VI, now is given a new interpretation in that it is applied to Turnus. In XII the association of Turnus, the former chthonic deity, with the nether world is pointed out most clearly; he fights with the weapons of hell, for long before Allecto seized him, his sword had been dipped in the waters of Styx (XII, 90-1). While book VII, then, largely because of the role of Allecto, indicates the beginning of this reinterpretation, the Hercules-Cacus episode marks the most important step in this development. Turnus, as symbolized by Cacus, is no longer depicted as the unwilling victim of the infernal powers, but as a free agent who by his very inclinations (205-6) came to associate himself with them.⁴⁷ The underworld terminology thus takes on an additional dimension. *Umbra*, for instance, in VI simply denotes a characteristic of Hades, while *umbrosae* in VIII, 242 is also, I believe, to remind the reader of Turnus' association with the *umbræ* to which his life finally passes. Thus Pöschl's interpretation of the Aeneas-Turnus similes in XII holds good here also:

⁴⁶ The relationship between II and IV is analyzed by Fenik, *op. cit.* (note 5, above), *passim*.

⁴⁷ Turnus is certainly not a puppet in the hands of fate but preserves his free will; cf. J. McInnes, "The Conception of *Fata* in the *Aeneid*," *C. R.*, XXIV (1910), pp. 169-74; R. S. Conway, *op. cit.* (note 4, above), pp. 100 ff.; and G. E. Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will in the *Aeneid*," *C. J.*, LI (1955-6), pp. 357-64. These scholars emphasize that the poet uses what may be called "double causation," i. e. the characters already want to do by inclination what the god or goddess wishes, and the deity thus merely provides the external impulse. Recent discussions opposing this view include E. L. Highbarger, "The Tragedy of Turnus: A Study of Vergil, *Aeneid* XII," *C. W.*, XLI (1947-8), pp. 114-24, especially 118-19; J. B. Garstang, "The Tragedy of Turnus," *Phoenix*, IV (1950), pp. 47-58, especially p. 50; and R. M. Boltwood, "Turnus and Satan as Epic 'Villains,'" *C. J.*, XLVII (1951-2), pp. 183-6.

there is indeed a conflict between demonic and divine powers, and since the *semihomo* Cacus stands for a barbaric, uncivilized stage of evolution whereas Hercules fights the *superbos*, there is also a contrast between barbarian and Roman character.⁴⁸ Further, Cacus and his burst cave are impressive symbols of the ephemeral force of unthinking destruction, whereas Hercules and the *Ara Maxima* fittingly represent a power that outlives centuries.

The thematic and imagistic link between VI and VIII is one of the clearest indications that Vergil did not plan rigidly to divide the *Aeneid* into halves. Several scholars have seen this without quite realizing some of its implications. Otis, for instance, writes that VIII, in contrast to VI, deals with Aeneas' direct assumption of heroic leadership rather than his psychological preparation for it.⁴⁹ We can do better, I believe, by using the terms presentation and actualization, and thus become aware of the recurrence of these themes. In book VI, the underworld is presented and described to Aeneas, whereas in VIII it becomes a reality, which foreshadows the one of books IX-XII and against which Hercules-Aeneas has to fight. The description of the grandeur of Rome in VIII⁵⁰ is likewise followed by a re-enactment of the event without which this grandeur could not have been realized: the battle of Actium. Yet as the epic is about Aeneas rather than Augustus, this scene again is given the form of a mere description. The reality that makes Augustus' reign possible takes place at the end of XII—Aeneas' conquest of Turnus. It marks the beginning of the triumphant ascendancy of the Aeneidae, which no enemy will be able to obstruct and of which Actium is the climax.

But what about Cacus as a tragic character? For it has rightly been pointed out that Turnus' fate must be considered tragic.⁵¹ Mainly, Turnus' doom can be attributed to the fact

⁴⁸ Cf. Small, *op. cit.* (note 22, above), pp. 244-5, and Reckford, *op. cit.* (note 14, above), p. 262.

⁴⁹ Otis, p. 331.

⁵⁰ The monuments pointed out to Aeneas are Augustan; see note 10, above.

⁵¹ See, for example, Pöschl, p. 153; G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus as a Tragic Character," *Vergilius*, IV (1940), pp. 5-17, and the articles cited in note 47, above. W. Ehlers, "Turnus," *R.-E.*, VII A (1948), col. 1413, rejects this notion and looks upon Turnus as an "enemy of the state."

that he represents the *vis consili expers*, whereas Aeneas embodies the *vis temperata*.

At first sight it seems that this does not apply to Hercules. For the poet obviously delights in portraying Hercules' anger rather more elaborately than Cacus' (VIII, 219-20):

hic vero Alcidae furiis exarserat atro
felle dolor

Mad with rage he dashes forward and tries to break into Cacus' cavern (228-32):

ecce furens animis aderat Tyrrhinus omnemque
accessum lustrans huc ora ferebat et illuc,
dentibus infrendens. ter totum fervidus ira
lustrat Aventini montem, ter saxea temptat
limina nequiquam, ter fessus valle resedit.

But obviously, so long as he is dominated by his anger, he cannot overcome Cacus. *Nequiquam* therefore, with its typical foreshadowing effect,⁵² hints at Hercules' beginning recourse to his rational faculties. His subsequent actions are deliberate and systematic. Though his *furor* is not likely to abate completely, it is not referred to any more. Only before Hercules moves in to kill Cacus does his temper flare once more (256-7):

non tulit Alcides animis, seque ipse per ignem
praecipiti iecit saltu

He thus takes on a quality of Turnus whose inconsiderate haste Vergil stresses repeatedly. Primarily, however, his reason prevails, and thus the Salians praise him explicitly as the hero *non rationis egentem* (299).

Why, then, the depiction of Hercules' fury in the first place? To explain this by the literary tradition of the Hercules *furens* would reflect the poet's intention inadequately. The clue, I believe, is again Hercules' identification with Aeneas. In book II, four specific references are made to Aeneas' *furor* and *ira*. The first of these (316-17) is separated by a goodly number of lines from the remaining three, which follow each other in close succession (575-6, 655-72, 745-51). Three times Aeneas wants to succumb to the *vis consili expers* and return to engage in a

⁵² Cf. G. E. Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and Vergil* (Princeton, 1933), pp. 12-13.

rash fight. Each time he is unsuccessful, and it is only his reliance on his reason and deliberation that ensures his eventual victory. The same holds good for Hercules. His fury is first mentioned in VIII, 219, separated by a relatively fair number of lines from the consecutive three manifestations of his *ira* (228, 230, 230-1). Three times he yields to the *vis consili expers*, three times without success, until his *vis temperata* enables him to win in the struggle whose length in the *Aeneid* by far exceeds that of the other versions of the Hercules adventure.⁵³ But there is an element of anticipation as well, for when Aeneas kills Turnus at the end of book XII, he does so in a spirit of equally violent determination—*furiis accensus et ira terribilis* (946-7). *Furor* and *ira* are again Turnus' rather than Aeneas' characteristics.

Cacus is certainly not a tragic character in the sense that he fails to live up to his ideals or becomes the victim of gradually increasing ill fortune as does Turnus.⁵⁴ Yet like the Rutulian hero, he himself is responsible for his death because of his *insana cupido* for things which properly belong to the gods. Cacus robs the divine Hercules of his cattle—significantly, the *rapinae* are called *abiuratae* (263)—while Turnus fails to dedicate the spoils taken from the slain Pallas to the gods.⁵⁵ Cacus in his frenzy interferes with the rights of Jupiter's son; Turnus opposes the will of the gods by disputing Aeneas' claim on Lavinia in spite of Latinus' sacred pledge. Turnus has to be overcome so that Rome can be founded. It is equally inconceivable that the city could have been founded with the Cacus monster living at its site. Both Turnus and Cacus are not really enemies of the state, but the fight of neither is a *bellum pium et iustum*.

As Bernard Knox has demonstrated, the second book of the *Aeneid* is dominated by the image of the serpent.⁵⁶ It is therefore not surprising that the metaphor is echoed in book VIII,

⁵³ Dionysius, Livy, and Propertius describe Hercules' slaying of Cacus in seven words, while the combat in the *Fasti* lasts ten lines.

⁵⁴ Cf. Duckworth, *op. cit.* (note 51, above), p. 16, and Highbarger, *op. cit.* (note 47, above), p. 118.

⁵⁵ See Heinze, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 209: ". . . es ist frevelhafte Selbstüberhebung (X 501), der die gerechte Nemesis folgt: das Wehrgehenk des Pallas entscheidet Turnus' Untergang."

⁵⁶ B. M. W. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame," *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 379-90.

and specifically in the Hercules-Cacus episode. Reflecting the course of the events in II, the serpent there at first stands for concealment and trickery and then, associated with Pyrrhus, for instance, it symbolizes open, unthinking violence. The same transition from *dolus* (206) to violent battle characterizes our episode. Cacus, as we have seen, stands for this *vis consilii expers*. Thus it is probably more than a coincidence that in the description of his death three words occur that are associated with the serpent imagery in II. Hercules seizes Cacus in a knot-like embrace and close-entwined, he throttles him (259-61):

his Cacus in tenebris incendia vana vomentem
corripit in *nodum complexus* et angit *inhaerens*
elisos oculos et siccum sanguine guttur.

An even more conclusive echo is *angit*, the root-word of *anguis*, which occurs here for the only time in the poem.

The image does not come completely unprepared. Instead of the *clava* Hercules carries in the accounts of Livy, Ovid, and Dionysius (ρόπαλον), and the *Maenalius ramus* in that of Propertius, his weapon in the *Aeneid* is the *nodis gravatum robur* (220-1). Thus, whereas all the other writers have Hercules slay Cacus with his club, he here strangles the monster in the manner of a serpent, in *nodum complexus*. This is a further indication that Hercules' *furor* has not subsided yet, for the serpent metaphor, symbolizing fury, is in II first associated with Aeneas also. Hercules *furens*, then, looks back to Aeneas' madness in book II and anticipates his wrath in XII. Yet as Aeneas' *ratio* in the latter part of II is contrasted by the serpent metaphor with Pyrrhus' violence, so the serpent image in VIII serves to express Hercules' transition from *dementia* to *ratio*; in full control over his reason he slays the serpent which represents, by implication, unthinking violence (299-300):

non te rationis egentem
Lernaeus turba capitem circumstetit anguis.

There is more to it still. As we have seen, Hercules' association with the serpents is twofold. Firstly, he slays the twin snakes of Juno (289) and the Lernaean hydra which was reared by Juno as a menace to him. This as well as the fact that the Lernaean serpent, like the Chimaerae, was an offspring of

Typhon and the chthonic Echidna, underlines the parallelism between Hercules and Aeneas, and their respective opponents. Second, Hercules, in killing Cacus, is identified with a snake.

This latter aspect of the hero is borne out by the archaeological evidence. In a bronze group found in Etrusco-Latin territory at Chiusi and dated to the third or second century B. C., Hercules stands between two snakes without any hostile intent.⁵⁷ The frequency with which similar representations recur in the *lararia* suggests that he may have been also considered one of the penates. Vergil thus introduces a theme which he soon develops more clearly. Once Evander has identified Aeneas with Hercules, it is but natural that the Trojan hero allies himself with Evander's *lares* and *penates*. In sacrificing to them, he connects them with Hercules (VIII, 542-4) :

et primum Herculeis sopitas ignibus aras
excitat, hesternumque larem parvosque penatis
laetus adit.

The "obscurity" of these lines has been much discussed.⁵⁸ Does Aeneas leave Evander's home to rekindle the fire on the *Ara Maxima* and then return to sacrifice to the lares and penates? It is more plausible, I believe, to consider the altars as those of the household gods, the *lar* being nobody else but Hercules. Thus he is rightly called *hesternus*, for on the previous day Evander introduced Aeneas to the cult of the *Ara Maxima* by telling him the Hercules-Cacus episode. This association of Hercules with the household gods should not be neglected when we look at the description of the battle of Actium, where (VIII, 678-9)

hinc Augustus agens *Italos* in proelia Caesar
cum patribus populoque, *penatibus* et magnis dis.

It is no coincidence, I submit, that Augustus' men are explicitly

⁵⁷ Published and discussed first in *Not. Scavi* (1887), pp. 227 ff., and pl. V, 1. For further discussion, see J. Bayet, *Hercle* (Paris, 1926), pp. 112-13, and *id.*, *op. cit.* (note 41, above), p. 378. Cf. A. Reinach, "Divinités gauloises au serpent," *R. A.*, XVII (1911), pp. 221-56, and A. Furtwängler, *Die Antiken Gemmen* (Leipzig, 1900), II, p. 29, and pl. VI, 45.

⁵⁸ Most recently by G. Funaioli, "Sui versi 541-544 del libro VIII dell'Eneide," *Atti del V Congresso Naz. di Studi Romani* (1946), V, pp. 274-7, where he also refers to the earlier scholarship done on this passage.

called *Italos*, which harks back to Evander's premature *Itali* in line 331. The penates, then, are not simply those of Aeneas and the Trojans as in III, 12, but in the context of the eighth book have become somewhat "Italianized."⁵⁹ As Hercules subdued the *semihomo* Cacus, so Augustus with the help of the penates, among them Hercules, overcomes the *ops barbarica* (685) of Antony and Cleopatra. Further, it has been recognized that the model for the praise of Hercules' *facta* (288 ff.) may well have been the *ἐφύμνιον* sung by Orpheus in honor of Apollo in Apollonius' *Argonautica*, II, 703 ff.⁶⁰

ut prima novercae
monstra manu geminosque premens eliserit anguis (288-9)

distinctly echoes *ὥς ποτε . . . Δελφύνην πελώριον ἐξενάριξεν / κοῦρος ἔνι γυμνός*. There is little doubt that the twin snakes here foreshadow the ones of Cleopatra (697) and thus Vergil may subtly hint at Apollo's role in defeating the Egyptian queen at Actium. More significant, however, are the parallels between Hercules and Apollo. Their original association with serpents is far from being hostile.⁶¹ But this is incompatible with their being or becoming Olympians. Thus Hercules has to slough off his serpent nature, which is still clearly reflected in Vergil's account, by killing Juno's snakes. It was a must, and that no permanent enmity toward Juno and her snakes results is shown by the bronze groups—the two serpents are, of course, those of Juno. Moreover, in Lanuvium and perhaps in Rome also, Hercules and Juno were jointly worshipped as deities of fertility and war. It was as such a fertility spirit, an *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*, that Hercules had come to be associated with a snake. The alliance between Juno and Hercules is hailed by Propertius in that very elegy which contains his version of the Hercules-Cacus episode (IV, 9, 71):

sancte pater, salve, cui iam favet aspera Iuno!

⁵⁹ For a study of III, 12 and VIII, 679, see R. B. Lloyd, "Penatibus et Magnis Dis," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 38-46.

⁶⁰ A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), pp. 605-6.

⁶¹ A well-documented account of this interesting aspect is given by J. E. Harrison, *Themis. A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 381, 429-36. Similarly, the *ἀλεξίκακος* Cadmus is described both as snake and snake-slayer (Nonn., *Dion.*, III, 443).

It is difficult to believe that the *poeta doctus* Vergil should have dwelled on the double aspect of Hercules in connection with Juno without being aware of its implications. On the contrary, with a view to book XII the significance of this episode emerges rather distinctly. The "Roman" program of Hercules and Juno is essentially the same. The hero is praised for destroying Troy (VIII, 290-1)—certainly a rude matter to bring up in Aeneas' presence, which already puzzled Servius.⁶² Similarly, Juno rejoices that Troy has fallen and begs Jupiter to perpetuate this state of affairs (XII, 828):

occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia!

Hercules' cult at the *Ara Maxima* is seemingly Greek, but in reality it unites Greek with Italian, i. e. especially Latin, Sabine, and Oscan elements.⁶³ By being identified with Hercules, then, Aeneas identifies himself in part with the peoples he and his descendants will defeat. The same mixture of peoples is advocated by Juno, the formerly Greek-minded goddess, in book XII, 826-7:

sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges
sit Romana potens Itala virtute propago.

Her wish is graciously granted by Jupiter. Cult is again singled out as one of the strongest unifying factors. In religious rites the blending of formerly heterogeneous elements manifests itself most clearly (835-7):

commixti corpore tantum
subsident Teucri. morem ritusque sacrorum
adiciam faciamque omnis uno ore Latinos.

Finally, even the rather Greek character of the Hercules *ἑφύμνιον* suggests that the poet intended to associate the hero with Juno. As Cartault has pointed out,⁶⁴ the song is not a poetic invention of Vergil, but does reflect what was a religious custom

⁶² Servius lists three explanations, none of which is entirely convincing: first, it would be a *sacrilegium* to omit this deed in such a hymn; second, *quod Herculi datur, Graecis aufertur*—but this seems unnecessary, for the Greeks now help the Trojans; third, "potest oblitteratus dolor videri quando ad fatalem terram perventum sit."

⁶³ So J. Toutain, "Observations sur le culte d'Hercule à Rome," *R. E. L.*, VI (1928), pp. 200-12, refuting Bayet's assertion that the cult was purely Greek.

⁶⁴ Cartault, *op. cit.* (note 60, above), p. 606.

in Rome. This custom can be traced back to 207 B. C., when Livius Andronicus wrote a hymn which was based on Greek models and sung by three choirs of young girls during an expiatory procession. The procession took place in the temple of Juno Regina (Liv., XXVII, 37).

More overtly, therefore, than in the second book the serpent metaphor, as applied to Hercules in VIII, suggests salvation. Already in mythology the snake men, as ἀλεξίκακοι, symbolized the cycle of life, death, and rebirth. This is the context in which we have to view the surprising mention of Troy's destruction. Cacus, who hides under the ground, flees the light of the day, terrorizes the countryside, and whom Hercules attacks with his *robur* and rocks, resembles the serpents described in *Georgics*, III, 414 ff. But it is the life-giving serpent nature of Hercules that prevails.

Given the numerous similarities between Turnus and Cacus, we have to ask why Vergil wanted to depict Cacus as a *monstrum* (198). The explanation that, by so doing, the poet simply wanted to stress Turnus' savage aspects is unsatisfactory, considering that the Egyptian monster gods (698) participating in the battle of Actium clearly echo the Cacus *monstrum*.⁶⁵ The word does not appear between lines 289 and 698, and in 289, where it is applied to the twin serpents strangled by Hercules, it harks back to Hercules' strangling Cacus (261-2). This latter connection is underscored by the verbal parallel *eliserit* (289)—*elisos* (261), as forms of *elidere* are used only three times in the *Aeneid*. The twin serpents of Allecto in VII, 450, those of Juno slain by Hercules, and the ones of Cleopatra (VIII, 697), which are followed by the mention of the *monstra* in the next line, establish another link between Turnus, the Cacus episode, and Cleopatra, and thus primarily between Turnus and Cleopatra. At the same time, the *monstrum* of book VIII, as we have seen, parallels and echoes the one of the second book, the wooden horse, also called *fatalis machina*. Now I believe it is plausible to assume that Vergil, when he used *monstra* in the Cleopatra context, had in mind Horace's definition of the queen as *fatale monstrum* (*C.*, I, 37, 21).⁶⁶ And since he evidently wanted the

⁶⁵ For the political connotations of *monstrum*, see Bellen, *op. cit.* (note 12, above), pp. 25-6.

⁶⁶ There are no chronological objections to this. As M. Schanz and C.

reader to recall the Cacus *monstrum* when he mentioned *monstra* again in the Cleopatra passage, the connotations of *monstrum* should be the same in both cases. Thus Turnus should be considered a *monstrum* similar to Cleopatra.

As it turns out, it is singularly appropriate to view Turnus as a monster in the Horatian sense. In a recent article, J. V. Luce shows convincingly that the term, as applied to Cleopatra, denotes a *natura varia et multiplex*; it expresses horror mingled with admiration, and sums up all the complexities and contradictions of her character.⁶⁷ Horace portrays Cleopatra with sympathy, *monstrum* refers to her weaknesses and also emphasizes her virtues. The same holds good for Vergil's attitude toward Turnus. Turnus also is characterized by an amazing mixture of character traits and represented as highly complex (XII, 666-8):

aestuatur ingens
uno in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu
et furis agitatus amor et conscia virtus.

The implication of *monstrum*, which evokes as it were the lore of those abnormal monsters that abound in Greek myths, is that a hero has to come to subdue it. This is what Hercules does in the Cacus episode. Besides, it is worth nothing that in the first Epistle of the second book, Horace describes the labors of Hercules in a way strikingly reminiscent of the phrase in the Ode (*Ep.*, II, 1, 10-12):

diram qui contudit hydram
notaque fatali portenta labore subegit,
conperit invidiam supremo fine domari.

In the Epistle, Hercules is a prototype of Augustus. In the Cacus episode, Hercules, symbolizing Aeneas and, on a secondary level, Augustus, subdues an exponent of that *invidia* whose defeat Vergil predicts at the end of the proem to the third *Georgic*.

Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (München, 1935), II, p. 58, have aptly pointed out, the whole scholarship on the order of the composition of the *Aeneid* has resulted in "einem krausen Wirrwarr der Meinungen ohne rechtes Resultat." The recent attempts of G. d'Anna, *Il problema della composizione dell' Eneide* (Roma, 1957), and *Ancora sul problema della composizione dell' Eneide* (Roma, 1961) bear out this statement.

⁶⁷ J. V. Luce, "Cleopatra as *Fatale Monstrum*," *C. Q.*, n. s. XIII (1963), pp. 251-7.

It seems significant that Horace, too, singles out the hero's encounter with the Lernaean hydra whose importance in the Vergilian account we have seen above, and that both Horace and Vergil (VIII, 295) refer to the monsters slain by Hercules as *prodigia* or *portenta*. In his discussion of the meaning of *monstrum* in the Cleopatra Ode, Fraenkel, by quoting parallels from Cicero, argues that it "probably contained less of what we hear in "monster" and more of what the Greeks heard in *τέρας*, a Roman in *portentum* and *prodigium*, something outside the norm of nature, something at which we look with wonder and often with horror."⁶⁸ The reaction of the men looking at the corpse of Cacus points to much the same feelings (VIII, 265 ff.).

Interestingly enough, Luce demonstrates that *monstrum* might imply the thought of Cleopatra as a Chimaera. An additional connection between Turnus and Cleopatra is that in the political context of the fourth Roman Ode, the phrase *vis consili expers* (C., III, 4, 65) is generally taken as alluding to Antony and Cleopatra, who represent the *vis consili expers* on Aeneas' shield, while Turnus symbolizes it throughout the second half of the *Aeneid*. In Odes, III, 4 the conflict between *vis temperata* and *vis consili expers* is illustrated by the battle of the gods, among them Juno, and the giants among whom Typhon is prominent.⁶⁹ Should it be considered a mere coincidence that the protagonists of these very principles in *Aeneid* VIII are the divine hero Hercules whose close association with Juno we have noted, and Cacus whom Vergil purposely brings in relation with Typhon? Moreover, in discussing the parallel structure of the two Roman Odes which frame the fourth, Fraenkel remarks on "the streams of Greek myth and Roman history flowing into a common bed."⁷⁰ In *fatale monstrum*, according to Luce, these streams are interfused in a single phrase, and so are they in the Hercules-Cacus episode in which *monstrum* is a key word and

⁶⁸ E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1959), p. 160.

⁶⁹ On Horace's dependence on Pindar's *First Pythian Ode* in this and other respects, consult Fraenkel, pp. 273-85. The many similar themes and passages in the poetry of Vergil and Horace are discussed by C. T. Murphy, "Vergil and Horace," *C.B.*, XVIII (1941-2), pp. 61-4, and by G. E. Duckworth, *op. cit.* (note 47, above), p. 364, n. 35 (on Vergil's "Horatian" attitude to Turnus), and *id.*, "*Animae Dimidium Meae*: Two Poets of Rome," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVII (1956), pp. 281-316.

⁷⁰ Fraenkel, *op. cit.* (note 68, above), p. 267.

which reflects a major theme of book VIII and indeed the whole second half of the *Aeneid*: the coalescence of different traditions into a new one. That Hercules is one of the ἀλεξίκακοι in the third Roman Ode (C., III, 3, 9) may be remarked only in passing.

Little evidence in the time-honored way of verbal parallelisms can be adduced to prove that Vergil and Horace "influenced" each other in this particular instance. However, Horace's rather graphic description of the fall of the *vis consili expers* by its own weight, *mole sua* (C., III, 4, 65), finds its concrete and visual counterpart in the figure of Cacus who *magna se mole ferebat* (*Aen.*, VIII, 199), and in the ships of Antony that are distinguished by *tanta mole* (VIII, 693).⁷¹ And when Horace continues (C., III, 4, 66-7) that

vim temperatam di quoque provehant
in maius

one is again struck by the appropriateness of these lines for Hercules, who is a prototype of the *vis temperata* in the *Aeneid* and thus is finally deified. It is not my intention to press this argument nor do I want to take up the tedious and ultimately irrelevant question of who influenced whom. However, the examples cited again point up the fact that the two poets were keenly aware of each other's work and that their poems were a source of mutual inspiration.

Two final observations may be added. First, in the light of this interpretation of the Hercules-Cacus episode Pallas' prayer to Hercules in X, 460 ff. takes on an added meaning. As Evander encouraged Aeneas by hinting at his victory over Turnus, so Jupiter, on the divine level, now comforts Hercules by prophesying Turnus' death (X, 471-2). And it is Aeneas who will avenge Pallas. The parallelism of Aeneas and Hercules is heightened by the fact that Hercules now (X, 465) sheds the *lacrimas inanes* Aeneas cannot suppress in IV, 449.⁷² Second, by having Faunus, at the request of the *amens* Turnus, oppose

⁷¹ Significantly, *moles* is used most frequently in connection with the wooden horse in the second book, cf. II, 32, 150, 185. In V, 118, 223 it characterizes the (boat) Chimaera, piloted by the Trojan namesake of the giant Gyas, who is mentioned in *Odes* III, 4, 69. Elsewhere it reflects a characteristic of Polyphemus (III, 656) and of Mezentius (X, 771).

⁷² For the significance of this latter passage, see Pöschl, pp. 88-9.

Aeneas in the twelfth book (776 ff.), Vergil probably wanted the learned reader to recall our episode in VIII, for according to an earlier legend, Hercules combatted Faunus, and not Cacus, when he came to Latium.⁷³

By way of a summary, then, it may be said that the chief function of the Hercules-Cacus episode is threefold. First, by echoing and foreshadowing various motifs of other books, it contributes significantly to the unifying part book VIII plays within the *Aeneid*. Perhaps it is because of this very "other-directed" function that VIII seemingly lacks inner unity. Second, by parallels of imagery, language, symbolism, and, partly, theme, the episode is firmly linked to books II and XII, and thus Hercules and Cacus, symbolize, above all, Aeneas and Turnus. Third, the close relation of VI and VIII, closer than that between II and IV, primarily supports the view of the *Aeneid* as a trilogy.

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⁷³ *F. H. G.* (Müller), IV, p. 387, 6. For a detailed discussion, see Bayet, *op. cit.* (note 41, above), pp. 164 ff., 229 ff.

EURIPIDES' *MEDEA*: A RECONSIDERATION.

The theme of Euripides' *Medea*¹ is subtly suggested in the opening speech of the Nurse as she stands before the gates of Jason's house in Corinth:

O would that the Argo's bark had never slipped
Through the blue Clashing Rocks. . . .

For once the train of events was set in motion by the obscure drives of those ancient heroes who sought the golden fleece, the tragedy had to run its course to the end. The fatal setting has been inexorably determined for Medea, Jason, their children, and their once happy household. And yet within this context set by *Moira*, there remains the tension of human love and hate; for as there is no greater boon to men than happy marriage, there is no fiercer tiger than a woman scorned. Thus is the fundamental polarity of the play established in the *prologos* by the Nurse's tale: the problem of human passion set within the narrow confines of circumstances that cannot be altered, and the importance of human love for man's ultimate happiness or despair.

Very cleverly does Euripides manipulate the characters of the

¹ For some of the vast literature on the play, see Denys L. Page, *Euripides: Medea* (Oxford, 1938; repr. 1961); W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griech. Literatur*, III (Munich, repr. 1961), pp. 355-74, with the literature quoted; A. Rivier, *Essai sur le tragique d'Euripide* (Lausanne, 1944), pp. 51-63; Walter Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides* (Basel, 1947), pp. 43-72; U. Boella, *Euripide: Medea* (Turin, 1947); P. W. Harsh, *A Handbook of Classical Drama* (Stanford, 1948), pp. 171 ff.; G. Ammendola, *Euripide: Medea* (Florence, 1951; repr. 1962); E. M. Blaiklock, *The Male Characters of Euripides* (Wellington, New Zealand, 1952), pp. 21-35; Albin Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Göttingen, 1964²), pp. 162-5, with the literature; L. Méridier, *Euripide: tome I* (ed. 5 by Paul Masqueray [Paris, 1961]), pp. 103 ff.; and finally, see the excellent analysis by G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London, 1941; repr. 1961), pp. 147-65. A. Rivier resumes some of the ideas of his 1944 monograph in "L'élément démonique chez Euripide jusqu'en 428," in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique: Euripide* (Fondation Hardt, tome VI [Geneva, 1960]), pp. 45-72. In my own analysis of the play I have profited from discussions with my students at Fordham University and also with my colleague, Mr. Robert Russo.

Nurse and the Tutor. The Tutor is cautious and pedantic, given to pompous secrets and disclosures. An eavesdropper, he is full of his own importance; he enjoys the effect his revelations have on the emotional servant—and yet Jason's actions merely support his fixed opinion of human perfidy and selfishness. The Nurse, on the other hand, reflects the woman's point of view—and, indeed, Medea's—solicitous as she is for the children, profoundly aware of the violent upheaval that is taking place within her mistress' soul. And if the Nurse (at least for the sake of the audience) acts as an emotional extension of Medea, the worldly-wise, self-important Tutor represents the calmly rational interests of Jason, the man. Thus the contrast between the two minor characters echoes, in a sense, the larger conflict between the more heroic figures of Jason and Medea. For if it is given to the Nurse to portray the brooding unhappiness of Medea, the cynical comment on Jason's infidelity is put into the mouth of the Tutor (85-8):²

And are not all alike? Do you just now see
That every man loves himself before his neighbor?—
And some indeed with justice, others for gain—
As now for his new bride's sake their father hates them?

Note here (88) how the key word *ἐννύ*, "love," "marriage bed," stresses what seems to be Jason's chief motive in the eyes of the perceptive Tutor. The Nurse too had touched on Jason's affair without delicacy (18), and the Chorus of Corinthian women take it for granted (154 ff.). But Jason, on the other hand, chides Medea for her preoccupation with *κοίτη* and *ἐννύ* (563-71). Surely, he suggests, there are other, more important values in a happy marriage, such as money, status, and a royal home for their children. Procreation has always been a curse to men (573-6). The same theme is resumed in the second stasimon, where the chorus fervently pray they may not be led astray by adulterous love (635 ff.), while they recall the theme first broached by the Nurse in the prologue (630 ff.):

If Cypris comes in due measure,
No other goddess has her loveliness.

² See the discussion of the scene by Page, p. xiii, and Grube, p. 148. Line 87 of the Paedagogue's speech need not be deleted with Brunck, Page, and others. It is a typical qualification of the pedantic Tutor, and the fact that it disturbs the symmetry of the lines should be no obstacle. See, however, Page's note *ad loc.*, p. 74.

Just as Jason accuses Medea of a selfish love from the very outset of their adventures over the golden fleece (526 ff.), so too he will accuse her at the end of murdering her children because her bed was spurned (1267). This then is the central theme of the play: the tragedy of love grown cold, the mysteries of that area of human behavior which is ruled by the goddess Aphrodite. The minor motifs of the play, and indeed there are many, will somehow be set against the common melody of this dominant theme.

Skilfully contrived is the choral passage in which we first hear the agonized voice of Medea from offstage. If we had been prepared to see a woman of monstrous power and witchery, a being of preternatural passion and resource, we are deceived. Her cries are merely those of a woman wronged, deceived, and abandoned by a man who has forsworn and betrayed his pledges made to Zeus and Themis. Medea's first cry, we should recall, is the longing to kill herself (98). This *cri de coeur* is surely unfeigned; we shall do well to recall this farther on in our discussion of Medea's character. The Nurse, more used to the harsher ways of slavery, cannot resist attributing Medea's suffering to her inexperience; as a princess she was always given her own way (cf. 119-21).³ Even the Chorus of Corinthians seem more used to the ways of men who stray to other loves (154 ff.). In any case the entire concerted feeling of the introductory choral passage would stress Medea's weakness as a woman wronged, who must look to Zeus the father of oaths for vengeance. Further, the sympathetic relationship between the confidante Nurse and Medea is now extended to the ladies of the Chorus; the foundation of confidence has been laid, and upon this Medea proceeds to build. On the common bond of female frailty their support is sought and won.

But her plans would perhaps have remained in the vague were it not for the unforeseen *démarche* of Cræon, the aging ruler of the country. Little is told us about his feelings or his character. But he is undoubtedly happy to marry off his daughter

³ See also Grube, p. 151. But Edouard Delebecque, *Euripide et la guerre du Péloponnèse* (Paris, 1951), pp. 63-4, interprets the lines as a comment on tyranny in general, referring to Cræon the king of Corinth, and hence reflecting an undercurrent of anti-Corinthian feeling. See also the following note.

to the handsome adventurer and hero of the Argo; and he sees the strange Asiatic woman as a barbarous and evil influence. At the same time he completely underestimates her passion and her ingenuity. She strikes at his weakest points. In the first place, she reminds Creon that he knows nothing of her except by hearsay; he has personally had no cause to mistrust her; and (here he shows himself most gullible) he has done her no wrong by giving his daughter as he wished (309-10). Creon is completely taken in by Medea's attractive and specious friendliness ("It is Jason I hate, not you," in effect); his mistake is to think he can give Medea a day of grace without regretting it. Indeed he has qualms (350), but these are dissipated by her passionate appeal and his own stupid self-confidence. There is nothing she can do, he thinks, to harm him (356). But when the king departs, we see Medea's true nature beginning to emerge: she laughs at Creon's foolishness (371), and sets to work at once, calculating ways she might kill all three of her enemies at once (374-5).

Here Medea's transformation is quite startling: her boldness knows no obstacle, and she is completely fearless. For the first time she indicates the source of her powers, Hecate, whose presence graces her hearth (395-6), and her father's father, Helios (406). And now too she reveals the inner springs of her torment: that she has become a laughing-stock, she has been scorned (405).

Because of Jason's Sisyphæan marriage—

Sisyphæan, indeed, because of Sisyphus' ancient connection with Corinth,⁴ and perhaps because of the implication of treachery and ultimate frustration associated with that doomed hero's name. Fittingly does the Chorus in the first stasimon sing of the inversion of the course of nature: women shall revolt against men; and the cause is again suggested: Medea's conflict over

⁴ On Sisyphus' connections with Corinth, see Page, *ad loc.*, pp. 102-3; Delebecque, pp. 64-5; and E. Bethe, "Sisyphos," *R.-E.*, III A (1927), cols. 371-6, especially 372-3. References to Sisyphus are not uncommon in Euripides: see C. D. Beck, *Index graecitatis Euripideae* (Cambridge, 1829), and J. T. Allen—G. Italie, *Concordance to Euripides* (Berkeley, 1953), *s.v.* It is clear, however, that with the references to Sisyphus and to Helios, Euripides has attempted to suggest the Corinthian setting of the play. On Helios, see note 12 below.

her marriage bed. The stage is thus set for the entrance of the perfidious Jason.

Jason's entire posture is disarmingly cool and rational. He seems the embodiment of Greek moderation and prudence.⁵ To hear him talk one might almost think that his new marriage to Glaukê (or Creousa) was merely a kind of business relationship, entered into for the greater financial security of Medea and her children. What has weakened Medea's position, however, was the undoubted wrong move she had made in publicizing her feelings and intentions (451 ff.): her acts were tantamount to *lèse-majesté*, and this gives her enemies the weapon (as they think) to destroy her. At this point, Jason is in something of an expansive mood; he feels his central position is so strong that he can be yielding on all other fronts. I have done all I could, he ironically says, to defend you with the King; no matter what she may call him or think of him, he shall always look to her welfare and the happiness of their children.

Medea's first fierce outburst is not a calculated one, but emerges from the deepest wellsprings of her emotions. She cannot help but curse Jason and cast up all the favors she has bestowed upon him from those first perilous adventures on the Argo. In any case, she has nothing to lose: at least Jason will never forget the depth of the injustice he has inflicted on her. The scene once again reinforces our initial image of Medea: a helpless, abandoned barbarian woman in a land of Greeks who pride themselves on their culture and humanity.

But Jason, not content with victory, proceeds to retaliate, inflicting wound for wound. Medea's heroic protestation, he suggests, is mere sham; she always loved no one but herself, and her passion allowed her no choice but to save Jason as she did

⁵ For a discussion of the scene, see Grube, pp. 154-6. But I feel that Grube does not perhaps sufficiently stress the fact that Jason's "wisdom without passion" (p. 156) is in reality only a façade; it is what Jason would have Medea believe; but she knows better. Grube over-emphasizes the difference in the ages of Medea and Glaukê, implying that Medea was past the child-bearing stage (p. 156, n. 1), when there is no evidence for this. Though Glaukê seems obviously the younger woman, there is no objective reason for making Medea "no longer young" (Grube, *ibid.*). After all, the two boys are still infants in the care of a Tutor. Grube is perhaps influenced by the conflict, in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, between the older Deianeira and the young Iolê; but there is no reason for carrying the analogy this far.

(526-44). It is a common theme with Euripides: to suggest that acts of apparent generosity and heroism are, on analysis, selfish ones. Every man is forced to act out of self-interest; it cannot be otherwise. In the words of the Tutor, "Are not all men the same?"

In a passage of supreme irony Jason explains how grateful Medea should have been for the privilege of being allowed to live in Greece (436-41); apart from having her talents recognized, she enjoys the rule of justice and the laws (537-8) and is not subject to the caprice of power. Jason poses as acting out of wisdom and prudence (548-9); the sexual side of marriage, he protests, interests him no longer as it does her (555-7). But Medea, shrewdly, is not deceived: it is lust that is his ultimate motive (623-5); and now she realizes that there will be no help from that quarter. If she is to remedy the situation, she must take her courage in both hands and act without scruple, come what may. Thus this strange scene, in many ways distasteful, is necessary for steeling Medea's resolve to take vengeance into her own hands within the hours that are left to her in Corinth.

The second stasimon strikes once again at the heart of Jason's motivation: the insatiate drive of adulterous love (637 ff.). On this there seems no doubt throughout the play, despite the suggestions of commentators that Jason's new alliance was one of convenience rather than passion. Cypris is again marked as the source of the conflict: Aphrodite, the ambiguous goddess, whose pleasures must be used with moderation: moderation is indeed the fairest gift of the gods (635-6). Cypris will appear once more in the following choral ode as the source of Athens' grace and cultural pride (838 ff.), breathing upon the land fragrant, moderate breezes. It is clear that the word "moderate" is one of the keynotes of the play. It suggests a virtue that neither Jason nor Medea shares.

The third epeisodion introduces a primitive figure from Athens' heroic past, Aegeus, son of Pandion, who legend tells us took Medea as his second wife. The place of Aegeus in the tale was also stressed by others, including the controversial Neophron, whose work was supposed to have influenced Euripides.⁶ Commentators have long stressed the fact that Aegeus' appear-

⁶ On the problem of the Neophron fragments and their relationship to Euripides, see especially Page, pp. xxx-xxxvi; and cf. also L. Méridier, *Euripide*, I, pp. 110 ff., and Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung*, p. 163.

ance at this stage is a kind of arbitrary solution—a *deus ex machina* in the midst of the drama. It just happened that Aegeus was passing through Corinth at this time; and, indeed, so far as Medea was concerned, no further help should have been needed, since her preternatural powers could summon up all that was necessary. But such a summary dismissal of the scene seems quite unwarranted.⁷ In the first place, it would not be unnatural for Aegeus to return from Delphi by sailing across the gulf of Corinth and travelling back via the Isthmus, thus avoiding the wild and robber-infested hills between Delphi and Thebes. Second, Aegeus' visit to Delphi and the interpretation of the oracle by Pittheus of Troezen was an old Attic tradition, and Medea was long associated with the tale. Aegeus' plan to visit Troezen would make some at least of the audience smile.⁸ That all this should be condensed into the events of the same day is, of course, part of the dramatic contrivance. But the scene, as it stands, is not only dramatic, but it is also intensely integral for the outcome of the play. For Medea, we should recall, is still operating as a mere woman, and cannot proceed further in her plans without the assurance of a haven and a refuge. Further, Aegeus' own concern for an heir must surely be the spark that

⁷ I do not agree with Page's characterization of Aegeus as "a simple, kindly fellow, who knows that he is stupid, but has some clever friends" (p. xiv). The character of Aegeus has been misunderstood also by Rivier, *Essai sur le tragique d'Euripide*, p. 57. For a discussion of the scene, see Grube, pp. 156-7, and especially the article of R. A. Browne, "Medea-Interpretations," *Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood* (ed. M. White, *Phoenix*, Suppl. vol. I [Toronto, 1952]), pp. 76-9, with the literature cited. See also the brief note on the scene by J. C. Kamerbeek, *Euripides' Medea van Aantekeningen Voorzien* (Leyden, 1962), p. xi, which follows Browne's interpretation of the Aegeus-scene: that is, that Aegeus deliberately comes to Corinth to consult Medea.

⁸ Pittheus, king of Troezen, was the father of Aithra, to be the wife of king Aegeus and the future mother of the hero Theseus. On the political significance of Troezen in the play, see Delebecque, pp. 66-8. On Pittheus and his interpretation of the oracle given to Aegeus, see R. Hanslik, "Pittheus," *R.-E.*, XX (1950), cols. 1873-5, with the sources quoted; see also Page, *ad loc.*, p. 121, and the Introduction, pp. xxix-xxx. The abruptness of Aegeus' departure, which was first noticed by Nauck (see Page, p. 127, on line 756), is surely intended to be part of his character. Having completed his business with Medea, he no longer wishes to be involved, and he is eager to be on his way. The ancient sources on Aegeus have been collected by K. Wernicke in *R.-E.*, I (1894), cols. 952-5.

sets off Medea's mind to plan the ultimate vengeance on her faithless lord by destroying her two children.

The Aegeus-scene is a masterpiece of craftsmanship. The Attic king stands as a vivid contrast to the autocratic, bumbling Creon of Corinth. Aegeus is both energetic and intelligent; and his agreement with the crafty Medea is based on a firm contract, with clear advantage to both sides. Aegeus, however, manifests no interest in the precise details of Medea's plan; if he suspects the worst, he says nothing. He is the calm, uninvolved spectator, showing impartiality for both sides. For this reason Medea is constrained to bind him with a solemn oath—characteristically to Gaia and Helios—in a scene which forms the most religious part of the entire play.

Aegeus emerges as the figure closest to the heroic ideal of early Hellas, and the archaic simplicity of his portrait recalls the technique of Aeschylus. In addition, he gives the impression of being the only other character in the play who could match wits with Medea. He will not, be it noticed, offer her a safe-conduct out of Corinth. He repeats this lest there be any mistake (725-8, lines which should not be deleted with Kirchoff). Indeed, this very reservation of Aegeus will force Medea into finding a special way to escape Jason and, presumably, the palace guards and the people of Corinth. Aegeus is therefore the skilled diplomat; he comes perilously close to becoming an accessory after the fact. Yet, correct in all he says and does, he will not lay himself open to charges from any of the neighboring kings. Intent on his own journey, he leaves abruptly as soon as he has completed the oath-formula that Medea administers so efficiently, barely staying to hear the benediction the Chorus pronounces on him and his future progeny.

And now that Medea has the security of a haven at Athens, she can plan at leisure, devising the method of the poisoned tunic and the crown to be delivered by her innocent children. Linked with this plan, somewhat illogically, is the idea of murdering the two boys: "no one will take them from me" (793); and later, "he will never again see my children alive" (803-4). Her motivation here is dark, and she will barely admit it to herself; but she cares not, provided this act of frightfulness will stop her enemies from laughing at her (797). Finally, the Nurse is prevailed on to go and fetch Jason (820-2); meanwhile, she will

use the brief interval of the choral ode on Athens to prepare the poisoned garments as she proposed (789). This is the precise place for the preparation; there is no need for her to be on the stage at any time.

The third stasimon which follows is not quite so irrelevant as some critics have suggested. In the first place, it occurs precisely after the midpoint of the play, and allows a certain release from the tension of the previous climactic scene. It is fitting, too, that after the manifestation of the ancient king's loyalty, the reference to Troezen and Theseus' maternal grandfather, the Chorus should sing in praise of Aegeus' native city, Athens. Euripides had long since abandoned the tautly relevant choral ode save for special occasions. Actually it is Euripides at his poetic best; Athens won no finer eulogy from any ancient poet, with the possible exception of Sophocles. The secret of Athens' glory is founded on her clearest air, her soil and water, her flowers and general atmosphere, filled as it is with the numinous presence of Aphrodite and the Loves, Harmonia and the Muses. Here Cypris is the goddess of all that is beautiful, "coming in due measure," transforming the energies of men and women into philosophy and art and the achievements of a great city. The Harmonia of which the Chorus here sings is, in fact, at the heart of Euripides' play: it represents the enlightened and sophisticated discipline of the passions, the avoidance of extremes, and the elevation of what is best in man to the highest degree of excellence. In this process, Euripides hints, Athenian tradition and atmosphere magnificently combine, just as the Muses cooperate in the birth of Harmonia, and the loves share in excellence.

The second part of the ode (846-65), however, recalls the more immediate plight of Medea, and the tone of this last section is quite different from the mood of solemn music with which it began. The question, how can a city like Athens receive a murderess and infanticide, is merely rhetorical; the Chorus is all but aware of what Medea will do. As for the words the Chorus applies to her, "the unholy one" (850), and "infanticide" (849), it would be hardly likely that Medea would be onstage to hear them. She is offstage preparing the destructive wedding-gifts for Glaukê, until the last words of the song—just in time to receive the returning Jason. But the action now moves swiftly

towards the dénouement; Medea was never before irresolute. But now, once sure of her prey, she strikes violently and without error: "no creature is fiercer than a woman scorned."

The second scene with Jason has a simple theme: the cool plotter is foiled, the clever outsmarted. Thus Medea's actions, words, her tears and protestations are understood on two levels, and the audience comes to lean more sympathetically on Medea's side. And why does not Medea plainly plot to kill Jason and have done with it? No, such a vengeance would be far too easy—and, in fact, in violent disagreement with the traditional tale of blood. No, Medea plans a more exquisite type of torture: the rival must be totally destroyed, and she must see Jason tormented and in pain. She will allow him no simple escape for the injustice he has inflicted on her.

In the conduct of the interview Medea again relies on the same feminine charm that deceived old Creon. Embracing her husband affectionately (cf. 895), and calling her babies out to greet him, she then dissolves in tears—tears whose meaning Jason cannot help but misjudge. In a delicious irony, Euripides has Jason forbid Medea to squander her possessions on his prospective bride. Medea, on the brink of exile, should not impoverish herself for a young princess. Such an act of apparent generosity seems wasted to the thrifty, calculating Jason. But perhaps he does not want his future wife to remain under obligation to Medea; he wants the connection cut off as cleanly as possible. He would see Medea off, without any loose strings. In any case, the irony is delightfully malicious. But with Medea's appeal—so confident is Jason of his powers over women—his suspicions are lulled and his fate is sealed. As for Medea's children, her motivation here remains somewhat confused. But no matter; her course is already fixed, and the clarity or logic of her plans for her children is a secondary matter. Once the monstrous gifts are sent, there is no turning back. Hence the sigh of despair with which Medea greets the returning Tutor (1008). Next follows the bewildered soliloquy, in which Medea sends her children towards the house, and then calls them back again. She is not hallucinated, but under the conflicting thrust of contradictory emotions.⁹ It is her womanly feeling, her maternal love

⁹ Surely, as everyone holds, the infants are not to hear the ominous words, "I shall kill them, who gave them birth." But this can be

for these innocent, fragrant babies, that all but forces her to abandon her gruesome plans (1071 ff.). The scene is too vividly done to be a projection of Medea's imagination: the sweet smell of the children as she holds them close to her bosom is in ironic contrast to the noisome, vicious murder in which they have unwillingly cooperated. As she takes them with her into the house, her last words are (1078-80):

At last I know what I am about to do;
 Passion is far stronger than my counsel—
 Passion, the greatest cause of woe to men.

Surely these point to a tragic solution; but we are still uncertain, given her swift-changing moods, what she really intends to do.

In a choral ode that might rank as the height of grim irony, the women of Corinth sing of the hazards of raising children. At the risk of irrelevancy, Euripides cannot resist the occasion to stress the uncertainty of man's nature and the vagaries of Fate. Is Euripides subtly justifying Medea for murdering her children? It would be hard to think so. Yet, in the present instance, the very obstacle to the children's happy development—namely the malice of both their parents—Euripides seems to gloss over. For here it is no chance death that carries off the babies to Hades, but the uncontrolled fury of their own mother. But the grim irony of these lines (1110-11)—one might almost have said inconsistency—is fully Euripidean.

In the following scene, we have in the Messenger's recital one of the most nauseating descriptions in all of Greek literature. Euripides reveals himself as a master of pure horror; the only other scene which approaches it is the dismemberment of Pentheus' body at the close of the *Bacchae*. But there is much more here. The total destruction of the innocent Glaukê seems gratuitous and wasteful: it serves merely to demonstrate Medea's awe-inspiring power and the force of her vengeance. The gifts

accomplished if Medea sends them towards the doors of the house, while she herself remains close to the orchestra. She then recalls them before they enter, to embrace them before finally entering the house with them herself. In the address to the children, 1071-80, Grube thinks that Medea is suffering from an hallucination; the children, he holds, have already gone into the house, and Medea in her mad illusion imagines them really present. It is an ingenious view, and supports Grube's theory that Medea is insane. In any case, lines 1062-3 are surely to be deleted with Pearson.

brought by the unsuspecting children arrive just as Glaukê is looking longingly upon her new husband.¹⁰ Ironically, again, it is Jason who urges her to accept the gifts. The poison takes but a short time to work. Only after Jason and his sons have left her bed-chamber, and Glaukê has admired herself in her mirror, does the noxious ointment begin to take effect. Euripides betrays his morbid streak: in one swift stroke, the once beautiful body is reduced to a shrivelled corpse. Flames torment her lovely hair as the poison wracks her body, and the flesh seems to melt in tears from her limbs. King Creon, too, as he attempts to embrace his dying daughter, is caught in the terrible snare; he rips off his flesh in an attempt to free himself from this preternatural glue. If Jason had been present, he too would have been consumed. Thus Corinthian royalty is reduced to a bloody tatters as Hekate's fiendish violence is released. For such is the power of love, when Cypris comes not in due measure. None is more violent than a woman scorned.

But the brutality of these deaths—though excessive—is not mere *grand Guignol*, but it is integral to the meaning of the play. The volcanic eruption of Medea's jealous passion knows no bounds: all must be destroyed, however innocent, who formed an obstacle to her aims. Perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, the violence of the scene serves psychologically to attenuate the emotional impact of a far more gratuitous crime, the slaughter of the children. This may be; but it seems a needless assump-

¹⁰ As editors point out, both the crown and the poisoned tunic are unnecessary; but the flaming crown must have been a traditional element in the story, and this would have been the easier device to destroy Jason along with his new bride; indeed, the murder of Jason seems to have been an element of some of the early tales: cf. Page, p. xxvi. For previous versions of the story, see also A. Lesky, "Medeia," *R.-E.*, XV (1931), cols. 29-65, with the literature cited.

For the treatment of the theme in ancient art, see Page, pp. lvii-lxviii; and the comprehensive article by E. Sinon, "Medea," *Enciclopedia dell'arte antica, classica, e orientale*, IV (1961), pp. 950-7. A lovely imperial sarcophagus from the Museo Nazionale, Rome, illustrates the entire play in frieze-narrative style: the torment of Medea abandoned, the commission of the children with the poisonous gifts, the agonizing Glaukê with fire streaming from her hair, and Medea's final escape in a chariot of winged serpents. See E. Sinon, *ibid.*, p. 955, and also S. Aurigemma, *Le terme di Diocleziano e il museo nazionale romano* (Rome, 1958), p. 41, no. 90, with plate xvii b.

tion. As a *tour de force* the scene recalls the tragic suffering of Heracles, imprisoned in the poisoned tunic in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*. There the hero leaps and bellows in pain as the close-fitting tunic devours his skin. But the pathetic suffering of Heracles is integral to the character and image that Sophocles is attempting to develop throughout the play. It is the destruction of the human Heracles (though he is the son of a god, Zeus), accomplished in all innocence by the well-meaning Deianeira, out of jealousy. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles was produced shortly before the *Medea*, and that Euripides is here attempting to outdo his predecessor at least in theatrical effects.¹¹ But we cannot be certain; the two scenes, at any rate, clearly reveal the different dramatic techniques of each poet.

And what of the murder of the two children? Why the long meditations, why the wavering, when the audience from the beginning is aware of what is to take place? The Nurse from the outset of the play was terrified of what would happen to the children, and constantly bids them to stay out of the way of their frantic mother (36):

She hates her children, and does not enjoy
To look upon them . . .

reminding her surely of Jason and of the love they once shared. But it is clear that they are doomed from the outset, and there is no turning back. And yet Medea's motives are confused—she is, after all, a woman, and a mother—and Euripides will drain the last drop of uncertainty and suspense. It is perhaps true that Euripides was the first to add this detail to this story: other writers had not portrayed Medea as the murderess of her own children. Further, the psychological subtlety of Medea's conversation with herself (or her *θυμός*), debating whether she should kill them or not, is a brilliant effect in its own right. In *Medea* we see the nature of the violent conflict between the softer (or more feminine) and the vicious, more animal side of her nature. Here love and hate are inextricably intertwined; the contradictions within her soul are ruthlessly exposed.

Once Glaukê has been slain, Medea fears that the children

¹¹ The problem, however, remains unsolved; see the cautious note of Page, p. xxvi.

will be punished if they are left behind. She cries to the Chorus (1236 ff.):

My friends, I am resolved to do the deed,
Straightway to slay my children and depart
This land, and not delay to hand them over
To some more hostile hand to kill.

But why does she need to mention this? No matter the motive; she is resolved to kill them. We know that in this way she will most hurt Jason, cutting off his hopes of male inheritance. Does Euripides introduce this note to soften the cruelty of the deed in the eyes of the audience? Not necessarily. He is, for one thing, following the ancient tradition that the Corinthians murdered the children, with the subsequent establishment of a cult. But above all, he allows Medea in her confused mental state to cling to a final reason for doing what she had wanted to do, namely, spite Jason. There is no logic in the deed, and Medea's emotional confusion is masterfully portrayed. She is, when all is said, "an unfortunate woman" (1250), as she goes within to do the deed.

At last, for one moment does the Chorus lose sympathy for Medea, calling her "this foul, bloody Fury, by alastors led" (1260; if the text is right). It is the last straw, and they now abandon their promise to remain cooperative to the pathetic heroine. Most likely the Chorus rushes to the gates of Jason's house when they hear the children scream, only to find the gates bolted against them; for even Jason, when he finally rushes onstage, cannot get in (1319). The Chorus' song, as they stand helplessly outside, may provoke a smile from modern audiences, but was surely accepted by Greek stage-convention. Finally, with the suddenness of a thunderclap, Medea appears and taunts her husband from above, on a chariot of the Sun-God Helios, drawn by serpents or dragons. In her arms or beside her are the corpses of her two little boys, whom she will leave in Corinth to be buried in the precinct of Hera Akraia.

In truth, we have lost sympathy with both the main characters, and their wrangle becomes almost an indecent domestic quarrel, without dignity or restraint; and we almost long to see the play come to an end. The wounds they inflict upon one another are vicious and deep. Yet, as Jason heaps invective upon the proud woman he once loved, we almost begin to feel a

twinge of sympathy for this stupid, and selfish, man. He has been the source and well-spring of the tragedy. Having done the damage and set the machinery in motion, he wishes to contract out of the complications. But the forces he released were far more overpowering and shattering than he could have dreamed. As Jason curses Medea and bewails the love that brought him so much sorrow, Medea and her sun-chariot move off into the upper air; the Chorus departs with a trite, all but meaningless refrain. The action, however, needs no further comment. All has been said. Neither Jason nor Medea can recover from the shattering love and hate they have created. Nothing can heal the great wound that human passion has made.

Does the poetry of the play support its dramatic structure? In the first place, Euripides' feeling for the poetic metaphor was hardly of the same level as Sophocles' or Aeschylus,' and the dramatic imagery of the *Medea* is in many cases fleeting and casual. The most dominant are those taken from the elements (fire, water, earth, and air); and those that portray Medea as an untamed animal. There are also several minor images and themes which we shall discuss farther on.

The imagery of the elements is suggested, in a sense, in the Chorus' apostrophe to "Zeus and earth and light" (148), when they appeal for heavenly help in the plight of the abandoned Medea. Jason, at the end of the play, suggests that Medea either (1296-8)

bury herself below the earth
Or wing her body to the air above
Unless she wants to pay the penalty
To the royal house.

Earth and air: earth is the element of Medea's patroness, Hecate, who dwells within her hearth (397); air is the element of Zeus, and also the element of her forebear Helios, who will ultimately assist her to escape over the rooftops of Corinth. It is by Earth and Helios alone that Medea forces Aegeus to swear (746), and not by any of the other gods.¹² Air, again, is mentioned by the Chorus as it sings of Jason's infidelity (439-40):

¹² On the connection of Helios with Corinth, and the confusion on Medea's relationship, see Jessen, "Helios," *R.-E.*, VIII (1912), cols. 58-93, especially 64.

Gone is the grace of oaths; Shame
 No longer dwells in mighty Hellas.
 It has flown to the upper air.

So too will Medea escape to the upper air, with Helios (who should normally shun to look upon treachery and malice) conniving in her foul deed. Similarly, the fire-motif of the play is also connected with Helios, the sun-god. From him come the gifts that Medea has anointed with noxious drugs; and these produce a stream of consuming fire burning Glaukê's lovely face (1187 ff.).

For the element of water we have the sea, an image that is so prevalent in the play chiefly because of the voyage of the Argo that brought Medea and Jason together. It was Themis, protectress of oaths, who transported Medea across the seas to Greece (210 ff.)—

Across the night-dark seas
 And through the briny waters
 By difficult straits to Hellas.

For Medea was rapt like booty from Colchis (256), and it is natural that she should, throughout the play, often think longingly of her home beyond the seas. There is no harbor in which she can take refuge from anxiety (258, 442). The Nurse in the prologos speaks of the new catastrophe threatening the household, even before she has "baled out" the old (79). The god has brought Medea into a "sea swell of evil" (362). As the plot about her grows, Medea sees her enemies as "loosening the sheet" for full speed under a favorable gale (278-9), and she knows that there is no easy escape from Atê. Jason, in his first altercation with Medea, sees himself as a clever skipper avoiding the gale of Medea's passionate abuse by riding the storm with furlled sails (523 ff.). In the face of her protestations, Jason questions Medea's altruism and insists that it was Cypris who was the savior of their sea-venture (527-8). Finally, we see Aegeus as the final haver of Medea's plans; she shall at last find rest and security at Athens (768-70):

Just as my life was storm-tossed, he appeared
 A haven for my plans; and here shall I fix
 My cable, coming to the citadel of Pallas.

The sea-imagery is, however, natural in a play whose back-

ground was the famous voyage of the Argo. This was the expedition that set the stage for the ill-fated romance between Jason and Medea. From the opening-speech of the Nurse, it is suggested that the Argo-expedition, once embarked upon, necessitated the entire chain of events that followed, and the irrevocable Atê (cf. 278-9) from which Jason and Medea cannot escape. Again at the close of the play the Argo's voyage is recalled by the Chorus of women (1263); and it is a beam from that ship that will ultimately kill Jason, according to Medea's prophecy (1386-7). In this way the Argo-motif comes full circle: Medea's tragedy is linked with those earlier events that set in motion the legendary quest for the golden fleece. The sea-imagery only underlines the role of Fate and necessity throughout the play. Of the four elements, it is fire and water—Helios and the sea—that are the most important for the poetic texture of the play.

Closely linked with the portrait of Medea's character is the animal imagery. The old Nurse's description of Medea's savage glare (92, 187-8) sets the tone for this image-complex. The Nurse is terrified; Medea greets her faithful servants (187)

With the glare of a lioness with cubs—

an image, incidentally, that is unique in Euripides. And yet Medea, the lioness is more prepared to consume her babes rather than protect them. Again, at the end of the play, Jason picks up the theme in calling Medea (1342-3)

A lioness—no woman—of wilder bent
Than even the Scylla of Etruria.

Scylla, as Homer had once described her (*Odyssey*, XII, 85-100), was among the ugliest monsters of antiquity: with her twelve legs, six heads each with three rows of teeth, she lived on a rock near a whirlpool traditionally set near the Strait of Messina, devouring her prey from the sea. The animal-imagery is perhaps reflected in the description of the tunic that "eats" poor Glaukê's flesh (1189; the only use of this verb in Euripides), and the bite or sting that Medea hopes her acts will inflict on Jason (817, 1345, 1370).

Linked with the image of Medea as a monster, we may take the Chorus' appellation of Medea as a Fury driven by avenging

spirits (1260); almost like the *daimon* that is angry at the household (130), she swoops down like some bird of prey to wreak havoc on the head of Jason (1231-2). Aptly then does Jason, foreshadowing Medea's final escape, warn the Chorus (1296-8):

She must bury herself below the earth
Or wing her body to the air above,
Unless she wants to pay the penalty. . . .

The animal imagery of the play vividly expresses the source of Medea's conflict, that "passion mightier than all counsel" (1079). This is close, indeed, to the "demonic power" that A. Rivier speaks of, manifested in the gradual outburst that occupies the second half of the drama.¹³ But there is no need to postulate such a force here. It is more like Euripides to suggest that every woman is a Fury beneath the skin; and that passion itself is a greater force than any demonic quality. There is all the power necessary for the final catastrophe: love once turned to hate knows no limit to cruelty, vengeance, and pain.

Fittingly is this wild, animal quality in Medea's nature manifested in the grim dragon-borne chariot of the sun-god on which she makes her escape. This external, theatrical effect is the natural complement of the bestial violence that has been unleashed in the course of the play. Is the device then truly a *deus ex machina* in the pejorative sense, as commentators since Aristotle have taken it?¹⁴ It was clear from the Aegeus-scene that Medea must find her way out of Corinth alone. The cautious, righteous king of Athens will not lift a finger to give her a safe-conduct or help her flee the vengeance of the Corinthians if they wished to punish her for her misdeeds. When Aegeus has left the scene we realize that such an escape from Corinth would

¹³ See A. Rivier, *Essai sur le tragique d'Euripide*, especially pp. 59 ff.

¹⁴ See Aristotle, *Poetics*, 15, 9, 1454 b, although some dispute remains about Aristotle's precise meaning. See P. W. Harsh, *A Handbook of Classical Drama*, p. 173 and note. But Aristotle's use of the words *ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* with reference to the *λύσις* (or dénouement) of the *Medea*, seems clear enough. The *λύσις* begins with the final "unravelling" of the plot, and this would not normally be midway through the play. Now the Aegeus scene marks approximately the half-way mark (line 709, to be exact) of the *Medea*. Hence the use of this term, as well as the reference to the *mechanê* would seem to make it all but certain that Aristotle is here referring to the chariot-scene at the end of the play.

be humanly impossible, especially for a woman, except by some trick; of this both the audience and the playwright would be aware. But Medea has from the outset stressed her lineage from Helios; it is from him that the baneful gifts came; and he is called on to witness the wrongs committed by his progeny, and invoked to seal Aegeus' sacred oath. It is logical then that Helios should supply the means of escape. Hence the chariot of the sun-god, although unexpected, is not unmotivated or irrelevant. And it offers a fitting exit for a woman whose vast passion recalls the demons and the Furies.

Apart from these, three other minor images occur. There is a metaphor from sports implicit in Jason's protest to Medea that his motive for a new marriage is not "the wrestling for children" (557), even though he straightway seems to contradict this. So too, there are "dread wrestlings" when Creon tries to extricate himself from the body of his daughter in a gruesome interlude (1214). Sports, a bird of prey, or, more probably war, are suggested in the enemies that Medea will swoop upon (94) and lay prostrate (585), in the victories she will carry off (45, 765). In a text that is still somewhat controverted, the length of Glauké's faint, overcome with the poison of the robe, is measured with reference to a speedy athlete covering a running track of about 100 yards in length (1181-2).¹⁵

A few metaphors are derived from money, as for example Medea's plea that there might be some way of telling the character of men just as we can detect counterfeit gold (516-17). In Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (494-5), the Chorus wishes for a basalt touchstone to determine whether Teiresias or Oedipus is right in their dispute over the murder of Laius.¹⁶ Euripides is,

¹⁵ Though the text is badly corrupt, it would seem that the general sense is clear. Page is right in following the interpretation of J. U. Powell, *C. R.*, XLVII (1933), pp. 210-11; hence the distance run by the swift athlete is "one limb of a course of 200 yards," *ad loc.*, p. 161, and this seems correct, even though we cannot precisely fit the disturbing ἀνέκων. Méridier, on the other hand, in his *Euripide*, I, p. 167, interprets the distance run as the complete course of six plethra or 200 yards; the time required for Glauké's recovery from her initial fainting spell is therefore twice as long, about two minutes by Méridier's reckoning. It is clear that Euripides is referring to a few moments, and we cannot make it more precise; in any case, we may presume that ancient runners were much slower than modern ones.

¹⁶ See also the lines of Theognis, 963 ff., where the poet speaks of those

however, more explicit: there is no "character," he says, that has been impressed on men's bodies by which we could detect what sort of people they are. The well-springs of men's motivation remain hidden; and tragedy can be the result. Jason, in the play, is especially given to measuring value by gold. In urging Medea not to squander her precious gifts on Glaukê, he egotistically adds (962-3):

If my lady has esteem for me at all
I am sure she values me above all wealth.

And Medea replies (964-5):

Allow me. They say that gifts persuade the gods.
And gold is greater than a thousand words.

It is Jason she is speaking to; and with him she must measure things by gold, and not by their true value or significance.

Lastly we may make brief mention of images drawn from religious ritual. There is the religious cry, the *όλολυγή*, by Glaukê's maidservant, as she sees her mistress in a faint and imagines she has been visited by a divine spell or fit (1171-3). Indeed, Glaukê's attack is a kind of visitation, but one from the dark recesses of hell; only when the maid notices the savage changes in the young girl does she scream in lamentation and alarm. Lastly, Medea refers euphemistically to her slaughter of the babies as a sacrifice, when she speaks half to herself and half to the Chorus (1053-5):

My children, do go in. Whoever cannot
Assist at the sacrifices should take care
To be absent. I shall not weaken my hand.

Sacrifice it indeed is, to her passion for vengeance against Jason, but to no heavenly god.

In addition to the imagery of the play, there are some recurring motifs of interest. Important for the character of Medea is the insistence that she should not be "laughed at" by her enemies. Four times does she refer to this (383, 797, 1049, 1362); it is a preoccupation even from the beginning. She means that she will not allow her enemies—and it is chiefly

who try to conceal "a deceptive, counterfeit character"; but Time, he suggests will bring all to light. Euripides is far more pessimistic in his view of human deception.

Jason she has in mind—to have their way with her without retaliation. The accounts must somehow be squared; and even though she must live forever miserable (1250), she will take with her some element of satisfaction. It is not correct to see in this, as some earlier commentators did, a drive for power and domination, a bitterness at being reduced to naught.¹⁷ Rather, it is simply the instinct for self-preservation; the passion for vengeance and retaliation. Medea's thinking throughout is emotional, not logical. As we notice the motive arising in her consciousness, she is convinced that slaying her children will inflict the most stinging wound on Jason. Even when her maternal feelings threaten to prevail, the thought that her enemies might punish her through her children (1060-1) offers her the final courage to go through with her plan. There is no will to dominate here; Medea's feelings are like those of a wounded animal; she must strike back, and the thought, that they will laugh at her, becomes a powerful, obsessive force in her actions to the end.

What are we to say of the main conflict or tension of the play, that between Medea and Jason? Jason's is a superb portrait, and has been misunderstood. With Medea he cleaves to a consistent, coolly aggressive line. If we believe Jason's own presentation of himself, his marriage with Glaukê is no more than *amour de vanité*, a union with a royal house to bolster his fortunes and his family. In fact, he protests that his plans are all for Medea's ultimate good. But it would appear that Medea's (and the Chorus') estimate of Jason is the right one: he is guilty of adulterous lust, and he has fallen out of love with Medea. This is the hidden spring of Jason's character; he himself will never admit it. And if it is true, it would indeed be tactically shrewder for him not to admit it. He must not open his flank by admitting he is simply in love with a more attractive, younger woman; there was nothing to be lost by holding up a more disinterested motive. Thus he must be thought to connive with Creon in the expulsion of Medea and the children. And Medea, with womanly intuition, realizes the entire truth at once. She is aware of Jason's motives, and plans—and Jason knows it. Yet

¹⁷ See, for example, Max Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie* (Leipzig, 1930; ed. 2, 1954), I, p. 261; and cf. the discussion by A. Rivier, *Essai*, pp. 55 ff.

he does not overplay his hand; he is a masterly caricature of the cool, masculine ego hiding behind a cleverly erected façade of respectability. And the Chorus underlines this theme of the play by its protest against the "harsh-sounding reputation" of women (420); there is much that could be said in reply, had they the gift of song.

Jason prides himself on his wisdom, prudence, and caution (545-75); but he is false to the core. With Medea, it is the exact opposite: her façade, such as it is, is made transparent both to the Chorus and to the audience. Deeply feminine, she realizes both her powers and her weaknesses. Yet her overmastering passion more than makes up for her frailty. To cajole and wheedle, to lie and deceive, to flatter with gifts and to slay defenceless children—these are her forte. She will conquer Jason in the way women can, by guile (*σοφία*) and not by a show of brute force. A man would have killed him; and perhaps Medea did toy with this idea at the outset, when the first news of the betrothal was announced. More vindictively, she slays those who are the sole support of his ego: his new bride, Creon, his young heirs-to-be. Hence scholars are wrong in thinking that Medea is a madwoman, an incarnate witch, a woman possessed of a *daemon*. For Euripides she is pure woman, but woman at the mercy of her own destructive passions, wounded in the weakest and most sensitive part of her nature. The result is like the eruption of a quiescent volcano. And, at the end, there is a reversal of roles: it is the man who is weak, the woman strong; the man begging for mercy, and the woman triumphantly superior.

Allied with the fundamental theme of the play are a number of minor motifs and an element of apologia. Euripides cannot forbear to discourse on the origins of music and the inadequacy of the current view, the inferiority of women, the insecurity in the education of children, and the unpopularity of his own views. The poet speaks at times through the Chorus, the Nurse, and, of course, through Medea. Shrewd and sophisticated, Euripides remained aloof from Athenian politics; critical of traditional policy, he was always more the spectator than the participant. In this play, he seems to plead for tolerance (293 ff.; 215-24; 579-81, and elsewhere); he defends his right to think for himself without having his case prejudiced before he has been

heard. To each his own, he seems to say; natural temperament, not malice, should be thought to be the cause of such diversity of views. Indeed, Euripides' attitude of the wise moderate is a clue to his solution of the central conflict of the *Medea*.

At the play's end, there is a natural shift in our sympathy for the main character. In fact, we have lost sympathy with either Jason or Medea. If anything, we are shocked at Medea's final callousness and animal brutality, and perhaps incline more toward Jason's point of view. He has done nothing to merit such gratuitous destruction and pain. But for Euripides it would appear that neither of the two extremes represented by Jason and Medea is correct: both manifest an excess of passion, egotism, and self-seeking. Euripides does not take sides; he is once again the spectator, whose policy is moderation, the mean between extremes (635-6):

May my love be Moderation
The dearest gift of the gods. . . .

The *Medea* is many things, and Euripides does not hesitate on occasion to raise its theme to a universal dimension, by discoursing on the general injustices of society and of the rule of the gods. But typically, however, he does not analyze the problem very deeply and is content to brush over it lightly. Essentially the *Medea* is neither a moral nor a religious play. It is a psychological disquisition on the sharp decay of man's noblest passion, love, and the proximity of love to hate. Passion and reason are in conflict; and the stronger force is victor in the end. The sex-roles have been reversed; woman has been victorious; "the rivers flow upstream" (410). The modern reader of Euripides gets a tantalizing glimpse of the foreshadowing of philosophies or psychologies yet unborn. And yet, Euripides does not really state his position, but remains ever enigmatic and aloof. Medea's despairing cry perhaps can best sum up the final theme of the play (330):

Ah, what a great evil love is for men!

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A ROMAN GOVERNOR VISITS SAMOTHRACE.

About three years after the publication of the inscriptions in *Samothrace* 2, I (New York, 1960) another most interesting inscription came to light in the Stoa excavation and was promptly published by James R. McCredie, "Samothrace: Preliminary Report on the Campaigns of 1962-1964," *Hesperia*, XXXIV (1965), pp. 114 f. with a photograph on Plate 34. The excavator thinks that this and other stones found together had been brought into the southern room from outside for reuse (in the Byzantine Period).

The inscription contributes a Latin word not in the Thesaurus, a term for a specialist in the interpretation of omens, also the name of a hitherto unknown senator and governor of Macedonia. It gives the exact date of this new proconsul. It shows the kind of entourage with which the governor traveled. It contributes the name of a month in the calendar of Samothrace and the equivalent of this month in the Julian calendar of A. D. 165, also the name of a hitherto unknown eponym of Samothrace and his exact year. It offers some interesting names and provides fascinating clues to the units from which the governor's military escort was drawn. Since the excavator deliberately refrained from making an epigraphical study, we here offer our own text with an interpretation and a commentary in the opinion that students of Roman Greece and of Roman administration will find it both informative and suggestive.

The inscription records the visit of the governor and his entourage to the sanctuary on May 1, A. D. 165. The closest parallel is the Latin inscription of *Samothrace* 2, I, 53, which is dated first by the Samothracian eponyms, then by the Roman consuls of A. D. 124, then gives the phrase *mystae pii sacra acceperunt* with the day and month, then the names of the proconsul and legate, then other Roman names¹ including one identified as a licitor, then a list labeled [*serv*]*i* with at least five lines of names, below which the inscription is broken.

¹ The name which appears in *Samothrace* 2, I, 53bis as *C · Amaoil(ius)* (??) · *Isinis* (??) seems in the photograph to read *Emilius Iu(v)enis* with the *liu* of *Emilius* in ligature. It is of course common to find *V simplex* for *V geminata* in words and names like *Iuvenis*.

The new inscription, where the phrase *mystae pii sacra acceperunt* is perhaps replaced by the formula in line 11, is similarly composed but more completely preserved. It reads:

- [ἀγ]αθή[ι] τύχη
 [βασιλεύον]τος Αἰλίου Ἐπιμάχου,
 [---μη]νὸς Μονιχιῶνος,
 [Orfito] et Pudente cos(ulibus), k(alendis) Mais,
 5 P. Anti(us) P. [f. O]ristis procos · prov · Mac ·
 amici [V]iō[i]us · Lupercianus
 Septimius Tigr[a]nes · vacat
 Fl. Theodo[.]us ·
 Marcius Felix · lic[tores] -----
 10 Asc[o]n[i]us Vennus · vi[atores] -----
 Cleinia, Pompeianus, pi pr(ece)
 serrvi eus(dem) procos
 [---] Lydus
 [---] [---]
 15 [....]ius 25 Parthenopae[us]
 Dionysius Abascantus
 Lycorus Zoticus
 Zelotus vacat
 Phileus Felix · autuitor
 20 Pam[---] verna
 Philo[.]sedius 30 Onesimus Vin[ni]
 Moschus dec
 milit(es) Eutyches servos Sep
 Menan[der---] 39 timi T[i]granis
 Numenius [---] Ths Pasiphilus
 35 Pothinus a(diutor) 7 XRC: [---] · Ths
 Iunius · mi · ep 41 Atithreptio
 Cim[-----] [...]orius

Restorations and variant readings: 1 McCredie. 2 [βασιλεύον]τος Oliver, [ἀγορανομούν]τος McCredie. 3 McCredie. 4-6 Oliver. 7. *Tigrines* McCredie. 8 *P. Theodosus* McCredie. 9 *lic[tores]* Oliver, *Vic[---]* McCredie. 10 *Asc[o]n[i]us*, *vi[atores]* Oliver; *Asc[.]us*, *Vic[---]* McCredie. 11 Oliver. 12 *serrvi eus(dem)* Oliver, *procos* McCredie. 15 *Mappius* McCredie. 17 *Lycoris* McCredie. 21 *Philo[---]eus* McCredie. 23 *Mydus* McCredie. 25-27 McCredie. 28-29 *Felix Aucustor Verna* McCredie. 30-31 *Onesimus Virin Dec* McCredie. 32 *milit(es)* Oliver, *Mult* McCredie. 33 McCredie. 35 Oliver. 39 Oliver. 41 *Asethreptio* McCredie. 42 [---] *ereus* McCredie.

The date is given first by the eponymous magistrate of Samothrace and by the day and month of the local calendar. Then the date is given by the Roman calendar. The name of the governor follows in complete form, undoubtedly with filiation though the abbreviation *f* has been lost. Below are the names of those who accompanied him, names divided into three main groups, (1) the *amici* (and other Romans), (2) the *servi eius* (or *eiusdem*) *proconsulis*, (3) the *milites*, whose names are followed by identifying abbreviations. Other names seem to have been added as an afterthought. They are that of the *amicus* crowded into line 6, and those in lines 38-42, which impinge on the space of *milites*.

McCredie, who did not read *amici* in line 6, saw no reason to separate Vennus from the names above, but the term *amici* cannot be stretched to include Vennus, if I am right in reading *vic[tores]* (line 9) instead of *Vic[-]*, or Cleinia(s) and Pompeianus, if I am right in reading *vi[atores]* (line 10) instead of *Vic[-]*. Vennus, Cleinia(s), and Pompeianus are *apparitores*,² not *amici*. What unites the group is not *amicitia* but *civitas*: they are the Roman citizens who accompanied the governor. The names of the *apparitores* are merely appended to those of the *amici*, just as the names of slaves belonging to others are appended to the list of the governor's slaves. The order is Roman citizens who accompanied the governor, slaves of the governor, peregrine auxiliaries, other slaves.

In the Latin the letter E appears sometimes with three clear horizontal strokes but at other times in a form indistinguishable from I; the letter I is represented by the prolongation of the second vertical stroke of an N in line 11, *Cleinia*, and in line 36 *Vinni* or *Virini*.

Line 2: The eponymous magistrate of Samothrace was the *basileus*. The restoration is assured by the same phrase in *I. G.*, XII, 8, 216, which begins βασιλεύοντος Σαβείνου. A similar dating should be restored in Samothrace 2, I, 40.

Line 4: As McCredie pointed out, there are two years with an eponymous consul named Pudens: A. D. 165 was the year of

² See A. H. M. Jones, "The Roman Civil Service (Clerical and Sub-Clerical Grades)," *J. R. S.*, XXXIX (1949), pp. 33-55 (reprinted in Jones, *Studies in Roman Government and Law* [Oxford, 1960], pp. 151-75).

Orfitus and Pudens, 166 was the year of Pudens and Pollio. We can eliminate the year 166, which would have carried the name of Pudens in the first place.³ That the first of May fell in the month Munychion in 165 is a welcome addition to our meagre knowledge of the local calendar.

Line 5 gives as the name of the proconsul P. Antius Orestes, otherwise unknown.⁴

Line 7: Septimius Tigranes, whose name heads the list of *amici*, is second in importance among the *amici*, because Luperianus (line 6), whose name could have been added beside his, was deliberately recorded above as an afterthought.

Line 8: After the abbreviated nomen follows a cognomen Theodorus or Theodotus rather than Theodosius.

Line 9: After the cognomen Felix there followed a title rather than an agnomen.

Line 10: The nomen doubtless had the I as a prolongation of the second vertical hasta of the N. The international character of the Roman governing class and civil service comes out in the names of lines 7-10. The name Tigranes is Iranian or Armenian; the name Theodo[.]us is Greek; the name Felix is of course Latin, and the rare name Vennus, correctly spelled here, is Celtic.⁵ Tigranes, however, was so named, I suspect, in honor of a royal benefactor.

Line 11: *pi pr(ece)*. This formula is known from *Samothrace* 2, I, 29, *pius prece* (rather than *prece* | *pius*), where it accompanies a Roman name engraved in Latin in an inscription which is otherwise in Greek concerning Greeks. Here it could be singular or plural.

Line 17: There are no women in the list of slaves. The last two letters of the name Lycorus (not Lycoris) are in ligature.

Line 19: The rare name Phileus is attested at Athens in a prytany catalogue of 367/6 B. C., published by W. K. Pritchett,

³ A. Degrassi, *I fasti consolari dell' impero Romano* (= *Sussidi eruditi* 3 [Rome, 1952]), pp. 46 f.

⁴ At least he does not appear in Hugo Gaebler's list, *Zeitschr. f. Numismatik*, XXIV (1904), pp. 249 f. and *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia*, Abt. 1 (Berlin, 1906). Nor does he appear in *P. I. R.* or in the *Année épigraphique*.

⁵ W. Schulze, *Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen* (= *Abh. Gesell. Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Kl., N. S., V, 5 [1904]), p. 22.

Hesperia, XI (1942), p. 233, and on a grave stone at Chios, *S. G. D. I.*, 5681.

Line 21: Philo[.]sedius belongs to a name still unattested.

Lines 28-9. The most interesting entry under *servi* is without doubt that of the *verna* Felix whose occupation was read by McCredie as a name Aucustor, non-existent. The bottom of McCredie's letter C is very clear but not intentional in my opinion; a faint letter T occupies the same space and is situated at the right level. McCredie's letter S, moreover, seems merely a weatherbeaten I. Hence I read *autuitor*, an interesting new word resembling *auspex*. Felix may be identified as an ὀρνεοσκόπος (*ὀρνεοσκόπος*). Verres, when governor of Sicily, was accompanied by a *haruspex*, and a school of *pullarii* was maintained for administrators who wanted that kind of advice,⁶ but a private *autuitor* born in the administrator's own household is something rather new.

Lines 30-31: The second name can be read either *Vinni* or *Virini*, i. e. *Venni* or *Verini*. If Onesimus is a slave, Vennus or Verinus will not be his father but his employer, and the abbreviation *dec* cannot be resolved now with any certainty.⁷

Lines 32-7: The *militēs* are without Roman citizenship, hence are not legionaries but *auxilarii*. The abbreviations following the names are unfamiliar except for the century or centurion sign which I read easily in line 35 from the photograph. For the word in front of it compare *C. I. L.*, VI, 3069, *adiutore centuri(onis)*, and 3076, *centuri(onis) adiutore*, also *I. L. S.*, 2163, *adiut(or)* alone. For the abbreviation *THS* a resolution *Th(rax) s(agittarius)* or *Th(racum) s(agittariorum)* seems plausible. Those of line 36, as read by McCredie, suggest a resolution into *mi(les) ep(istularius)*, if an armed messenger may be so styled. In line 35, where McCredie read the name as Dominis, the photograph shows an initial *P* (not *D*) and *th* in ligature (not *M*).

⁶ A. H. M. Jones, *Studies in Roman Government and Law*, p. 154.

⁷ A *dec(urialis)* would be free-born, like the *T. Fl. Capitolinus decurialis* of *C. I. L.*, VI, 32313; a *dec(urio)* could be a slave but is out of place here. If the abbreviation stands for *decumanus*, it probably means a collector of court dues who assisted the lictor Vennus of line 10. On the *decumanus*, etymologically a tithe collector, see Emil Vetter, "Die familia Silvani in Trebula Mutuesca und die sectores materialium in Aquileia," *Studi Aquileiesi offerti il 7 Ottobre 1953 a Giovanni Brusin nel suo 70. compleanno* (Aquileia, 1953), p. 108.

Lines 36-42: These names, added as an afterthought, are those of other slaves. The first is a slave of the Septimius Tigranes recorded above in line 7. The other three are not specifically identified, but Atithreptio has a name which is not attested elsewhere but which resembles the *nomen servile* Atitallon of *C. I. L.*, VI, 299. In view of *Iliad*, XXIV, 60, *θρέψα τε καὶ ἀτίτηλα*, the thought occurs that the name Atithreptio arose by false analogy between *τρέφω* and *ἀτιτάλλω* and by influence of the word *θρεπτός* for a slave bred in the house or for a foundling.

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ΘΕΥΡΙ AND TENGRI.

In his article "A Possible Turco-Mongolian Source for *θευρί* in Hermas' *The Pastor*," in this periodical, LXXXIV (1963), pp. 295-9, John R. Krueger tried to prove that *θευρί*, the name of an angel in the fourth vision of Hermas' *The Shepherd*, is *tengri*, the Altaic word for the sky god. According to Krueger, "the congruence in the general form and tone of the words seems to be too great for a chance resemblance."

Krueger's equation is untenable for several reasons. To begin with, it is inadmissible to disregard the text in which the name of the angel occurs. The mere fact that Krueger speaks of "Father" Hermas makes one wonder whether he read more than the passage to which the late Ferdinand D. Lessing drew his attention. There exists a vast literature on *The Shepherd*.¹ With all the differences of opinions on details, it has long been recognized that the book is largely dependent on the Jewish apocalyptic writings of its time; for the fourth vision I refer to Erik Peterson's admirable "Die Begegnung mit dem Ungeheuer."² The relationship of Hermas' ideas about the two spirits in man's mind with those in the *Rule of the Community* of the

¹ Bibliography in B. Altaner, *Patrology* (New York, 1960), pp. 87-8. In his *Hermas et les Pasteurs* (Paris, 1963) S. Giet assigns the text to three authors.

² *Vigiliae Christianae*, VIII (1954), pp. 52-71.

Qumrân finds has recently been discussed by Audet³ and Joly.⁴ It is *a priori* unlikely for the Jewish-Christian visionary in Rome to have known the name of the sky god of the nomads on the borders of China.

After the Hun invasion of the Ukraine and Hungary in the 370's and 380's Ammianus Marcellinus, Eunapius, Olympiodorus, or Priscus could possibly have heard of *tengri*, provided the Huns believed in him. But the name, transcribed *ταγγρα*, occurs for the first time in a Protobulgarian inscription of the ninth century.⁵ In the Byzantine literature it does not appear before the fifteenth century, when Ioannes Cananus rendered the battle cry of the Turks by ἀλάχ ταγκρὸν ῥασοῦλ Μαχουμέτη.⁶

Krueger writes: "The Greek form Θεγρί has no ν. This is not surprising, in view of such well-known orthographies as ἄγγελος for *ἄγγελος. The combination *Θεγγρί seems unwieldy, and *Θεγρί is not in harmony with Greek orthoëpic practice." I do not quite understand what Krueger means. Ptolemy, disregarding "orthoëpic practice," wrote Ἀνγκριονάριοι⁷ and Ἰνγκρίονες.⁸ Hermas, his contemporary, could as well have written θεγρί.

Θεγρί is the Lord's angel over the beasts, ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων; he shuts the mouth of the θήριον, looking like a κῆτος, which terrifies Hermas. Krueger finds the equation of this *thegri* and the Altaic sky god *tengri* "semantically acceptable." But the concept of divine messengers is alien to the pre-islamic Turks and Mongols. Neither in the Orkhon nor in later inscriptions, neither in the beliefs, myths, and folklore of Turkish nor in that of Mongol tribes has the sky god *tengri* anything to do with animals.⁹ On the other hand, the late Jewish and early Christian literature is full of angels who "preside" over the elements and

³ J.-P. Audet, *Revue biblique*, 1953, pp. 41-82.

⁴ R. Joly, *La nouvelle Olio*, V (1953), pp. 394-406.

⁵ V. Beševliev, *Die protobulgarischen Inschriften* (Berlin, 1963), p. 150.

⁶ Gy. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II (Berlin, 1958), p. 21.

⁷ *Geogr.*, II, 11, 9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 11, 6.

⁹ Cf., e.g., J.-P. Roux, "La religion des Turcs de l'Orkhon, dès VII^e et VIII^e siècles," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, CLXI, 1 (1962), in particular pp. 19-24 on "Le grand dieu ciel"; *id.*, "La souveraineté dans les inscriptions paléo-turques," in *The Sacral Kingship* (Leiden, 1959), pp. 230-41.

living beings. The angels of the wind, the fire, and the waters in the Revelation of St. John¹⁰ are well known. There are angels of the lightning, thunder, hoar-frost, hail, snow, fog, rain, and the ocean.¹¹ In the *Plea for the Christians*, addressed to Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus in 177, Athenagoras speaks of the "crowds of angels and ministers, whom God, the maker and creator of the world, appointed to their several tasks through his Word. He gave them charge over the good order of the universe, over the elements, the heavens, the words, and all it contains."¹² In another passage Athenagoras speaks of the angels who "exercise providence over the parts of the world entrusted to them."¹³ About sixty years later, Origen again wrote about the angels over the earth, trees, plants, springs, rivers, wind, and the animals on land and sea.¹⁴ Like Hermas, he knew of angels, *qui bestiis praesunt*.¹⁵

The Christian authors did not mention the names of the angels, the *θεοὶ κοσμικοὶ καὶ μερικοὶ* of the Neoplatonists,¹⁶ but the Essenes knew them.¹⁷ In his Commentary on Habacuc Jerome mentioned a "stupid" *liber apocryphicus, in quo scriptum est, quendam angelum nomine Tyri praeesse reptilibus, et in hanc similitudinem piscibus quoque et arboribus et bestiis universis proprios in custodiam angelos assignatos*.¹⁸ The Maurist editors of the Commentary recognized in *Tyri* the *Thegri* of Hermas.¹⁹ They adduced also the reading *Tygrin*, which, as *Hegrin* in a Latin translation of *The Shepherd*²⁰ indicates, is closer to the original than *thegri*. Since Jerome thought highly of *The Shepherd*, he could not have called it a stupid book. The apo-

¹⁰ 7, 1; 14, 18; 16, 5.

¹¹ *Book of Enoch*, 1, 60, 11-21.

¹² *Supplicatio*, 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 24, referred to by Epiphanius, *Adv. haer.*, II, 2, 64, 21. Cf. also Justin, II. *Apol.*, 5, 2.

¹⁴ In *lib. Iesu Navae Homilia*, XXIII, 3 (*Griech. christl. Schriftsteller d. ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, XXX [Berlin, 1921], p. 444). The homily is preserved in Rufinus' translation.

¹⁵ In *Numeros Homilia*, XIV, 2, *ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁶ Iamblichus, *De myst. Aeg.*, 5, 23.

¹⁷ Porphyrius, *De abstinentia*, II, translated by Th. Taylor (London, 1965), p. 163.

¹⁸ Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXV, pp. 1286-7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1285, n. d.

²⁰ M. Whittaker's edition, p. 20.

crypt was probably of Jewish origin.²¹ Furthermore, the angel ἐπὶ τῶν δρακόντων occurs in a magical papyrus²² and on a silver amulet from Beirut in the Louvre where he is called Θαβρα.²³

In the manuscript tradition the names of angels are often distorted. It can happen that the distorted forms of originally quite different names become similar. *Theriel*, the name of an angel in a Coptic magical text, is formed in analogy with Gabriel, Michael, etc. *Theri is not too different from *Thegri*. But the triad *Theriel*, *Throel*, and *Sabael* goes back to a misunderstood τὰ Θηρία τοῦ Θρόνου τοῦ Σαβαώθ.²⁴ In the Cabala occurs an angel whose function is comparable to that of *Thegri*. Written in Greek letters, his name would be Θεγρίων.²⁵

The identification of *Thegri*, *Tyri*, *Tygrin*, *Hegrin*, *Thabira*, the angel over the beasts, reptiles, or snakes, with the Altaic sky god *Tengri* is phonetically unsound and semantically unacceptable.

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²¹ Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 62, n. 38.

²² K. Preisendanz, *Papyri graecae magicae*, II (Leipzig-Berlin, 1921), p. 161.

²³ Quoted *ibid.*

²⁴ M. Kropp, *Ausgewählte koptische Zaubertexte*, III (Bruxelles, 1930), p. 48.

²⁵ M. Dibelius, *Der Hirt des Hermas* (Tübingen, 1923), p. 488, note.

REVIEWS.

WHITNEY J. OATES. *Aristotle and the Problem of Value*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. x + 387. \$8.50.

Professor Oates criticizes the "current tendency" to maintain "that after all Plato and Aristotle are far closer together than we might expect" (p. 52). Aristotle's inability to believe many of Plato's arguments, especially the theories of the separate Forms, of the Form of the Good, the Demiurge, and divine creation, also his unshakable preference for individual particulars as the most truly real things in the world, affected his whole philosophical system so profoundly that it would be absurd to think of him as essentially a loyal Platonist. Oates refuses, too, to take part in the currently popular hunt for earlier and later passages in Aristotle's writings, the more and less Platonic stages in the development of his thinking. "There was that crucial moment when Aristotle said to himself that he could not accept the Theory of Ideas," he points out (p. 66, n. 20), and that moment "must have come before the composition of any of the genuine works of Aristotle which are now preserved . . . Therefore, in discussing Aristotle's metaphysics of substance, it is perfectly sound methodologically to derive our evidence indiscriminately from the entire corpus." The really interesting and important question to ask about Plato's philosophy, he says, is how did Aristotle's rejection of Plato's Theory of Forms improve or weaken his ability to solve the problems that Plato hoped to solve by his Theory.

Oates concludes that Aristotle's decision to abandon the Theory of Forms was a disaster. Plato's finest accomplishment, he maintains, was to show how reality and value could not be separated or studied in isolation, one from the other. The Forms owed their reality as well as their knowability to the Form of the Good; the Demiurge was motivated in all his creative activity by good and good alone. (Oates thinks that it is "difficult to see any real difference between the doctrine of the *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*," and is as little concerned about "the so-called development" in Plato's thought as he is about development in Aristotle's thinking, p. 18.) Aristotle, on the other hand, separated the problems of reality and value ("ontology and axiology"), and so not only "falsified the facts of real life" but also found it impossible to give a consistent theory of value—to explain, that is, the "ground" or "source" of value, or the "sanction" for value.

Oates believes that a thoroughgoing naturalist could indeed develop a value theory which would at least be internally consistent; but Aristotle, he argues, was unable to do even this much, because, although he was by temperament a naturalist and empiricist, "there is too much Plato in Aristotle to permit him to be a 'naturalist through and through'" (p. 183). He tried hard to describe reality or substance without recourse to the Form of the Good or to the Divine Craftsman, but he found that he could not abandon Platonic ways of thinking altogether; he "injected," "interjected," or "slipped" value terms into his ontology over and over again. This is apparent

1) in his theory of the superiority of *οὐσία* to the other categories, 2) his assumption that there is a hierarchy of *οὐσίαι*, 3) his conclusion that substance as Form acts on matter as a *τέλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὰγαθόν* (*Met.*, A 983a24-b1 and many other places), 4) his theory of the First Mover, which, as "the really beautiful," "that which is in itself desirable," "pure actuality," and "good in the category of substance," is the guarantor of all orderly genesis in the universe, 5) in his notion of nature as a norm, 6) in his assertion of the superiority of actuality to potentiality, and in many other ideas. He could not work out a coherent way to justify this occasional use of value terms, however, because he insisted, against Plato, that God or the Good was not responsible—except in a trivial and mechanical way—either for the goodness or the reality of individual substances. "No matter what he may say, Aristotle, because of his general metaphysical approach, cannot avoid having value in a secondary status . . . It is respectfully requested at this point that the reader compare Plato's Theory of Ideas, where at the apex of the hierarchy of Ideas stands the Idea of the Good, that which at the same time is most real and most valuable" (p. 231 and n. 144).

The consequences of this split in Aristotle's thinking are very serious, almost unforgivable, according to Oates. Above all it "produced a God who is the pure activity of unalloyed and contentless self-consciousness. . . How can this principle, or whatever name you wish to call it, so void of content, be asserted to be supremely good . . . and as such be the object of love, ultimately the source of all motion in the universe?" (p. 242). Secondly, in his descriptions and recommendations concerning human goods, goals, and organizations, Aristotle could not, like Plato, refer all questions of value to Absolute Good, but had to shift constantly from one "sanction for value" to another: now it was nature, now happiness, now pleasure, now reason, now what the good man thinks or feels, now the mean, now whatever everyone agrees to be true, and now what we hold to be true of the gods or of the First Mover. Aristotle was too close to the teachings of Plato not to see that we need "objective" explanations for value, but his attempts to work these out are feeble, and he slips again and again into "subjective" explanations. Oates is repelled by the "obviously crass conventionality" of the *Rhetoric*, for instance (p. 371), the "element of deception, amorality, immorality—call it what you will" (p. 349).

Both Plato and Aristotle, according to Oates, saw the necessity to work out a teleological system, but Aristotle succeeded only in producing a "truncated, or, if you will, to a degree spurious" teleology (p. 251). Individual events in the sublunary world were explained by him as caused by Form-substances that are the various perfections being striven for by the substratum, and the eternal serial survival of all of these substances is assured, he maintained, by the existence of the "really beautiful" which is the final cause of the motion of the outermost sphere. But this is "not a true teleology," Oates asserts, for several reasons. First, "form or purpose is confined to individual particular things internally, and thus cannot provide us with any ground for comparative evaluation . . . 'Better' has only internal significance. That is, the particular thing is 'better' the more closely it approximates its essential form and purpose. In no

way can 'better' mean one thing is 'better' than another" (p. 135). Secondly, "the higher the degree of reality or 'reification' a thing achieves, the more valuable it is. But, note, the converse is not implied, as we have seen to be the case in Plato's metaphysic of the Ideas," (p. 149). What Oates means by "the converse" he explains some pages later: "The degree of Being achieved by anything gives us a clue to its worth. But let us not overlook the fact that this is not a two way street, for the converse, that is, that value is a clue to the degree of Being, is not asserted" (p. 178). Third, if God, the "Ultimate Final Cause," is *νόησις νοήσεως* and thinks nothing but itself, and if it causes only the one motion directly, the revolution of the outermost sphere, it can inspire no worship or gratitude, nor be called in to explain virtue and vice, wisdom and stupidity in our lives. "For teleology to have meaning, as everyone would agree, a mind fully conscious of the purpose in view and capable in some sense as an agent to do something about achieving the purpose is absolutely essential" (pp. 250 f.). And finally, when Aristotle tried to "bridge the gap" between human and cosmic teleology all he could do was draw an "analogy" between human happiness at its best, the thrill of First Philosophy, and what we must presume to be the experience of the First Mover. Oates admits that Aristotle often talks about God "very much in the way in which Plato speaks of the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*" (p. 333), but he insists that this remained a "wish" on Aristotle's part. Aristotle's relentless rationalism drove both creation and a creator out of his analysis of the world order.

Although Oates is very generous about giving full quotations from Aristotle, both in Greek and in English, he must, of course, leave out many important passages and even whole theories. He decides against including a discussion of *De Anima*, III, ch. 5, for instance, and the other mentions of Aristotle's theory of the "active intellect" (see p. 247, n. 76). It might be argued, however, that this theory, for all its obscurities, ought to have been considered at length, for it may well be Aristotle's *attempt* at solving the most important of the difficulties that Oates finds in Aristotelian philosophy.

First, let us consider the language of *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, ch. 6 (another passage that Oates chooses not to discuss: p. 267). Here Aristotle argues carefully and in detail against the necessity to take into consideration the existence of a Form of the Good in studying ethics or politics. He concludes that 'good' is indeed found in the category of Reality (*ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται*), *οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς*, but that (in addition to studying this) the philosopher must study the good for each kind of thing. It is just not very scientific to reduce all branches of knowledge to one. Now, how are we to take the examples of good in the category of substance, *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς*? Are there two or is there only one substance the essence of which is to be good? Both the discussion of divinity in *Met.*, I, chs. 7 and 9, and the discussion of complete, actual knowledge in *De An.*, III leave the impression that these were perhaps not altogether separate and independent substances. (Cf. the similar ambiguity concerning the World Soul and the Craftsman in the *Timaeus*.) The "active" *νοῦς* in each man, then, is not merely "analogous" to the actual *νόησις* that is God; Aristotle was apparently trying to connect the two causally, somehow. That the surviving texts show bad and

confused thinking on this subject, and that the later commentators, the Arabs, and the Thomists read too much into the theory of the active intellect is clear. But it is surely important to see what Aristotle may have been *trying* to do. If we then go back to passages, like that at the end of *Nic. Eth.*, X, where Aristotle attempts to describe human *eudaimonia* at its best, we will assume that he was not really introducing (or "interjecting" or "slipping in") a new and illegitimately "subjective" "sanction for value"; he was writing one of the more difficult chapters in his master plan to work out a single, consistent teleological explanation for everything. Good for man meant complete actualization of what-it-is-to-be a man; but that meant above all complete actualization of his ability to know; but actual knowledge is 1) necessarily prior to potential knowledge, and 2) identical with the object of knowledge. No wonder Aristotle was tempted to conclude that complete realization of human happiness, *θεωρία*, comprehension of the beauty of the cosmos, the actualization of the most divine part of a man, was essentially identical with the eternal activity of God! Actual knowledge would in any case have somehow to include momentary identity with that Highest Actuality, and the eternal actuality of God would have to be prior to and therefore somehow a cause of this fleeting intellectual vision.

Aristotle's breathtaking idea of good in the category of substance, *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς*, is open to all sorts of criticism, but surely we must at least give Aristotle credit for trying very hard, by means of this theory, to "complete" his teleology. Plato is perhaps more vulnerable to Oates' attacks than Aristotle is. The bare assertion that the author of all Reality is "the Idea of the Good, that which at the same time is most real and most valuable" needs a defense, which Plato never gives us. And if we are going to shake a finger at Aristotle for shifting back and forth from a notion of divinity as static perfection to one of divinity as a grand and happy ruler, we ought at least to add that Plato was guilty of the same vacillation. It is surely no easy matter to reconcile The Form of the Good and the Demiurge.

Another text that Oates decides to leave out of the reckoning is *Physics*, I, ch. 9. This is the clearest of several passages where Aristotle says what he takes to be the true relation between Form and substratum as opposed to what Plato believed the relation to be. In both analyses, he points out, Form is assumed to be "divine, good, and desirable," but Plato then failed to see that what desires Form must be the substratum. Plato, he complains, made the substratum both co-author with Form in all coming-into-being and also the author of failure, ugliness, and non-reality. In other words, according to this account, whereas Plato had offered a quasi-teleology, one which was incomplete because substratum introduced energy that was not directed toward good (and because, as a consequence, Plato could not show how the goodness of the Forms themselves caused events but had to bring in an outside agent, the Demiurge), he, Aristotle, offered an air-tight teleology: the only cause of activity anywhere was Form and it had this power because it was good and for no other reason. Oates calls this a "rather curious passage" and quotes it only in a footnote (n. 35 on pp. 99 f.), a note, indeed, which he adds in order to explain a quotation from Ross. After giving the text, Oates remarks merely that, "throughout this text as

well as the others which bear upon Aristotle's theory of evil, it is interesting to note how his failure to see the relation between the ontological and the axiological orders has resulted in confusion." Other readers of Aristotle, however, might want to pick out passages like this one in the *Physics* and make them the starting points of their account. Then, instead of saying with Oates that Aristotle's "analysis of potentiality and actuality or process and activity is strictly ontological and thus in Aristotle's terms should be neutral from the point of view of value" (p. 315), they might legitimately argue that we must never forget, when reading long passages concerning ontology, that Aristotle *began* by identifying the formal and the final cause, that he was more concerned to trace all process to the goodness of complete reality than Plato was.

Among the passages that Oates takes to be of great and central importance are those, like *Categories*, ch. 5, where Aristotle attributes reality in the highest degree to individual particulars, "this man" and "this horse." Following many modern historians of philosophy, Oates then assumes that Aristotle found himself in an insoluble "epistemological dilemma" (pp. 73 f., 181 ff.). He knew that knowledge, definition, and the understanding of causes all concerned, not those unique, partially informed pieces of substratum, but the abstracted perfections toward which the substratum was striving. Knowledge, therefore, was of one thing; the completely real another. But Aristotle, although he admits several times that this is a "difficult" problem, always assumed that he inherited the puzzle from Socrates and Plato and that he had a far better solution than his predecessors had (*Met.*, M 1036 a 37-b 7, etc.). The reader who took the first books of the *Physics* and the middle books of the *Metaphysics* as more complete and precise statements of Aristotle's basic premises than the *Categories* might argue that when Aristotle speaks of the reality of individual particulars, he does not mean this acorn or this boy, he means the perfection of the oak tree and perfection of what-it-is-to-be a man, which, though they do not exist apart from the individuals, are always present, always operate, and can always be discerned by the mind as completely actual. The real question is how do we jump from perception of the imperfect particulars to knowledge of the actual substances pulling them towards realization? Once more we are forced to assume that Aristotle's attempted solution lies buried somewhere in the obscurities of his theory about the "active intellect" and $\delta\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\ \rho\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$.

Oates' book deserves to be read carefully by all students of Plato and Aristotle. It will stimulate fresh thought about all of the most vital questions that must be asked by anyone who hopes to understand Aristotle's system, its value and its failings. Some, perhaps even quite a lot, of this stimulation will surely come in the form of reaction and silent protest, but even as a reader finds himself reacting negatively to the conclusion reached by Oates, he will usually also find that he has been forced to think anew about old problems. Like many another excellent and significant work, the value of this book may well lie more in the thinking that it will quicken in each reader than in the specific conclusions that it comes to.

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Paul Pédech. *La méthode historique de Polybe*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1964. Pp. 644. (*Collection d'Études Anciennes* publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.)

The present work more than lives up to the expectations raised by Professor Pédech's eight articles on Polybius and his edition of Book XII of the History (Paris, 1961). His conclusions, which are far reaching, will have to be taken very seriously by future students of Polybius. His statements are well documented at every point and most persuasively argued. The Polybius in whom Pédech believes is a complex figure, characterized above everything else by a highly intellectual approach to his subject. Polybius asks himself certain questions, arrives at certain conclusions, and then sets out to demonstrate his results, in such a form that the reader will be convinced by the logic of his presentation that no other conclusions are possible. He wrote the first part of his History, ending with the Third Macedonian War, in Rome, and the second part (through 146 B. C.) after he returned to Greece. As a result of a series of travels by land and sea (Spain, Africa, Egypt, Gaul), made possible by his friend Scipio, he became increasingly interested in the advance of geographical knowledge, and incorporated the observations he made on his journeys in the later books. He also inserted passages in the revised edition of what he had written earlier, which show how eager he was to have his say on controversial issues such as the dimensions of the oecumene and the possibility of life on the equator. Highly critical of the works of others he was equally demanding of himself. Information must be sifted scientifically, preferably through the reports of eyewitnesses whom he interrogated—when he had not first hand knowledge from his own experience—and with careful allowances for the prejudice of his informants. He had an instinctive distrust of literary sources, a special regard for science and for practical experience in war, statesmanship, and diplomacy. His theory of causation included many aspects: institutions, the analysis of possibilities by those responsible for making decisions, the limitations imposed by geographic factors, and the psychological characteristics of leading men. Behind it all there was *τύχη*, but Polybius' real interest lay in the intelligent or unintelligent actions of individuals at the crossroads of history, and in the personal characteristics of each, as explaining his action. His tendency is to reduce both individuals and states to a formula which also shows the interconnection of events throughout the world.

Of the twelve chapters in this book no less than six (chapters 2-7) are concerned with Polybius' views of historical causation, which the author discusses under three headings: *αἰτία*, *ἀρχή*, and *πρόφασις*. These terms are derived by Pédech through an analysis of two Polybian passages (viz. III, 6-7, 3 and XXII, 18, 2-11). *Αἰτία* is the real cause, and it is intellectual rather than material (p. 86). That is, a series of judgments are made, rightly or wrongly, on the basis of which action ultimately is taken: if rightly, then the action will be successful, if wrongly the result will be failure. The historian (Polybius) examines these judgments carefully and is then in a position to assign praise or blame to the ruler who made them. The

ἀρχή is merely the first act implementing a judgment already arrived at, and the πρόφασις is the diplomatic explanation—true or feigned (p. 88). In part this conception of Polybius' is derived from others, notably Eudemus and Carneades, but he alone is responsible for defining the αἰτία as an intellectual activity (p. 98).

Having established Polybius' general theory of causation, Pédech turns to its application in practice. The longest chapter (chap. 3) deals with the causes of wars. These are treated chronologically within each of four geographical groupings: 1) Macedonian Wars; 2) Syrian Wars; 3) Cleomenic War, War of the Allies and War of Antiochus; and 4) Punic Wars. The first division, which includes the War with Rhodes as well as the three Macedonian wars with Rome, is perhaps the most instructive, certainly the most complex. The character of Philip, a damaged soul who rises to greatness as his position becomes more and more desperate, is contrasted not so much with that of Flamininus or any other individual Roman, as it is with the impersonal but relentless logic of the Roman πολιτεία, fulfilling the destiny decreed for it by τύχη (p. 119). The Third Macedonian War, like the Second Punic War, has as its αἰτία the calculations of a man no longer living when it broke out, Philip in the first instance and Hamilcar in the second. Pédech has been forced to rely on Livy almost entirely for his reconstruction of Polybius, but his conclusions, at least to the reviewer, are compelling. The Syrian Wars are perfunctorily handled, partly because Livy is less useful to supplement Polybius. Group three is characterized by Polybius' animus towards the Aetolians, whom he holds responsible for all three. The last group is chiefly interesting for Pédech's remarks about the historian's independent position vis à vis his sources, and for his growing appreciation of the juridical aspects of Roman policy.

Chapters four and five go over much of the same ground, the former sorting out the evidence for Polybius' psychological study of the leading figures and for his views on man's relation to his environment; the second discussing the use of speeches in the History. Pédech shows that Polybius was chiefly interested in speeches for the effect they produced, both on later events and on the audience. Chapter six deals with Polybius' views on governments, and Walbank's interpretation of *anacyclosis* is generally accepted. Pédech sees no real contradiction between two theories: that of the stability of the mixed constitution, and that of the law of growth and decline. He does go a good deal farther than Walbank does in emphasizing that Polybius saw clear evidence in his day that Rome had entered on the downward path. In fact Pédech believes that Polybius' views on approaching ochlocracy in Rome were fully confirmed by events under Sulla, Caesar, and Octavian (p. 316). Chapter seven reviews the various interpretations of Polybius and τύχη. Chapters eight and nine discuss, respectively, Polybius' critical method and his use of historical comparisons.

Chapter ten, on chronology, is closely reasoned. In effect Pédech argues that the historian combined the greatest possible accuracy with flexibility. He provided himself with a universally applicable calendar based on the Olympic era, but he divided each Olympiad into four equal periods, disregarding the various systems of inter-

calary months and carefully distinguishing the seasons astronomically. He never used Roman consuls or any other eponymous magistrates to establish a date. The flexibility was achieved by anticipation or retrospect where the logic of events made this desirable, thus avoiding the awkwardness of Thucydides' campaigning seasons.

Chapter eleven evaluates Polybius' claims to have written a universal history. Interest centers around the *συμπλοκή* which begins in 217 B. C., and which gradually brings together the separate currents of history into a single Roman stream. Pédech argues that Polybius' History still has unity even when he enlarged his original plan. After 167 B. C. the main theme is the decline of Rome from her apogee (p. 502). Polybius' objective is a calm appraisal of the historical forces at work in accomplishing such notable results (p. 514, n. 103). The final chapter discusses at considerable length the effects of the historian's growing preoccupation with geography as a science valuable in its own right, on the completion of his work. He includes a summary of the arguments he had made earlier in the Budé edition of Polybius, Book XII.

Much of this is necessarily speculative. Whether Polybius would or would not have attacked Timaeus for geographical errors about Africa, Corsica, Sardinia—even Sicily—, unless he had already verified the facts for himself by personal observation depends, ultimately, on one's judgment of Polybius. And conversely, one's judgment on Polybius depends on when in fact he made his voyages; one assumption will not serve to prove the other. Polybius' attack on Timaeus for his account of the Fountain of Arethusa, for example (XII, 4d), even if we supplement the fragment from Strabo (VI, 2, 4), is no proof of autopsy by the historian. Polybius did have a tricky mind. As Pédech himself points out, the historian praises the Roman legion over the Macedonian phalanx because it has greater adaptability to the terrain, then reverses himself in extolling the Roman camp because, unlike the Macedonian, it makes no concessions to the terrain (p. 424)! It looks very much as though Polybius will use any argument he can find to support an *a priori* opinion. If Pédech has succeeded in raising our estimate of Polybius' intellectual stature, it may be doubted whether he has removed the doubts of his intellectual integrity so forcefully presented by Michel Feyel (*Polybe et l'histoire de Béotie* [Paris, 1942], especially p. 305).

Occasionally Pédech's faith in Polybius carries him onto somewhat treacherous ground. Not only does he accept Carcopino's adventurous "two Ebro" theory (*R.E.A.*, 1953, pp. 258-93) to save the historian from what would otherwise be "l'erreur grossière" of locating Saguntum north of the Ebro (p. 184), but later he argues that Polybius was honestly misled on the circumstances leading to the Second Punic War by Scipionic historians (p. 186). He also insists that in his lost account of the Sixth Syrian War Polybius must have used the *αἰτία, πρόφασις, ἀρχή* formula here because he did so in describing the War with Perseus which came in the same period (p. 147). Why? One last example must suffice. Polybius' estimate of the distance between the Baetis and the Anas rivers in Spain is exaggerated, so Pédech suggests he is following the Herodotean dictum of 150 stades for a day's march (Hdt., V, 53; Pédech, p. 558, n. 252). Earlier, however, he expresses the view that Polybius had never read Herodotus (p. 421, n. 75).

In closing, attention should be directed to the wider usefulness of this work for students of the Hellenistic period. Both text and footnotes contain valuable interpretive remarks, almost a supplement to Susemihl, on the prose writers of the age: Agatharchides, Theopompus, Dicaearchus, and Callisthenes among a host of others. Three indices (*Locorum*, *Nominum*, *Graecitatis*) and a detailed *Table des Matières* are models of their kind.

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JEAN GAGÉ. *Les classes sociales dans l'empire romain*. Paris, Payot, 1964. Pp. 488. 30 F. Fr. (*Bibliothèque Historique*.)

Professor Gagé deepens our understanding of the society of the Roman empire by this study. For English readers it will naturally challenge comparison with M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, of which the second edition by P. Frazer (1957) alters or enlarges the text of 1926 only in so far as Rostovtzeff himself had done so in the Italian and German editions which followed the English, though the notes are much expanded. The English reader may also recall the older books by Sir Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (2nd ed., 1905) and *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire* (2nd ed., 1899), books whose continuing value is evidenced not only by frequent reprints but by their appearance as Meridian paperbacks. Such studies as T. G. Tucker, *Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul* (1920) are too limited in time, and as J. Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome* (English trans. of 1940 from French of 1939) too specialized in coverage, to merit comparison. At the other extreme, surveys like Michael Grant, *The World of Rome* (1960), H. Mattingly, *Roman Imperial Civilization* (1959), or Pierre Grimal, *The Civilization of Rome* (English trans. of 1963 from French of 1960) are broader in coverage and more general in treatment.

Rostovtzeff in his central chapters goes far more deeply into conditions in the provinces during the Flavian and Antonine periods than does Gagé. However, he stops at Diocletian, whereas Gagé goes down into the later Empire in the West. Moreover, Rostovtzeff's concern, despite his title, is mainly with economics; with production, organization of trade and finance, and the like, and he uses primarily the archaeological evidence. Gagé gives a more social analysis of the classes both at Rome and in the provinces, and draws more on the literary evidence. Dill's two books are, indeed, concerned like Gagé's with society but almost with Society with a capital S. His books, based on familiarity with and understanding of the literary sources, deal principally with the upper classes at Rome as these expressed themselves in literature, though he does speak of the middle and lower classes in Rome and Italy and of society in Gaul in the later empire. Gagé happily combines the literary and archaeological evidence to give a broader and better balanced picture, in terms of geography, of time, and of social stratification.

Gagé opens (rather than concludes) with a commented bibliography (pp. 7-32) divided roughly as are the succeeding chapters. This both indicates the principal modern works on which he has drawn, though supplementary bibliographical references are frequent in the notes to each chapter, and indicates his chief emphasis. As might be expected in a book primarily for a French audience, the works cited are overwhelmingly French; even so, too little notice is taken of significant studies in German and English. It might be noted, for instance, that no mention is made on p. 11 of the second ed. of Rostovtzeff's *S.E.H.* (1957), and it is perhaps hardly fair to "consider as a sort of abridgment the volume of the same author, *Rome* (in English), edited by E. Bickerman in 1960." Though the original publication of *Rome* (1927) was in the year following that of *S.E.H.* (1926), it is a general history and an "abridgment" only in so far as obviously it expresses the same point of view. Also on p. 11, F. M. Heichelheim's *Wirtschaftsgeschichte* is in course of revised publication in English. W. L. Westermann's *Slave Systems* (1955) is an expanded translation into English of his article *Sklaverei in R.-E.* (1935), not a separate work as suggested. Gagé might have added to the bibliography on slavery R. H. Barrow, *Slavery in the Roman Empire* (1928), and to that on commerce (p. 13) Sir M. Wheeler, *Rome Beyond the Imperial Frontiers* (1954), and probably R. Meiggs, *Roman Ostia* (1960), though this bears on many aspects of social, commercial, and architectural history. For the coinage of the early empire, Mattingly and Sydenham's *Roman Imperial Coinage* (p. 13) has been replaced by H. Mattingly's magisterial *Catalogue of the Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, even if P. Strack's three volumes of *Untersuchungen* on the coinage of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus might be regarded as too specialized for mention. Indeed, it might have been well to include numismatics among the historical sources discussed on pp. 8-9, if not the more special subject of papyrology. A number of useful studies of coinage have been published in England by Mattingly, Grant, and Sutherland. In the bibliography on the Augustan principate, M. Grant's important *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (1946) surely deserves mention, and probably P. Grenade, *Essai sur les origines du Principat* (1961) and J. Béranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du Principat* (1953), though these two are cited on p. 78 in n. 1. A. Magdelain's still significant essay on *Auctoritas Principis* (1947) is apparently not mentioned either in the general bibliography or in the notes to chapter I on the principate. These omissions, though perhaps singled out from an area of special interest, might be extended to other subjects and periods. But it is invidious to be over-critical of a selective bibliography prepared for an audience familiar with one given language.

More important than what an author did not do is what he has achieved. A general introduction (pp. 33-57) summarizes the conclusions to be spelled out in detail later and gives various factors and considerations conditioning the study. The book is then divided into three parts: the early empire, the crisis of the third century, and the later empire. Of these the first (pp. 59-247) is the most thorough and detailed. The presentation is hierarchical, beginning with the emperor, his powers, his position, and his "clientèles collectives." Gagé opens this part by giving higher praise to Caesar as

the shaper of the new order than to Augustus. The two following chapters discuss the senators and equestrians, with attention not only to their privileges, status, and way of life but to their public responsibilities. In the chapter on the lower classes, both at Rome and in provincial communities, there is an interesting discussion of the position and influence of soldiers as citizens, and of "non-conformism" to the social pattern and of how the government sought to suppress brigandage and similar disorders. An excellent chapter deals with the municipal bourgeoisie upon which the administration depended so heavily for local government, maintenance of order, and the collection of taxes. The sixth chapter reverts to the emperor as a social influence through his entourage, the development of imperial protocol, and imperial marriages. The final chapter of the first part considers the social condition of intellectuals and their use by the government.

The second part (pp. 249-334) pulls together the very scattered and partial evidence for the great social changes which occurred in the half century from the death of Severus Alexander in 235 to the emergence of Diocletian in 284. Emphasis is placed, as might be expected, on the preponderant importance of military concerns and on the consequent adaptation of society to a military pattern. Municipal self-government was stifled by "servitutes fiscales." The Edict of Caracalla (212) aimed as much at a general equality of subordination as at fiscal, religious, or recruitment needs. On the whole, Gagé is more sympathetic than have been many recent scholars towards Rostovtzeff's interpretation of the class struggle as a union between soldiers and the peasants from whom they were recruited against the urban bourgeois, though he does not feel that this view suffices to explain the support and downfall of the older Gordians in North Africa in 238. The third, and last, chapter of the middle section relates the social changes of the third century to the emergence of new religions, especially Christianity. Since the social history of the crisis of the third century is not well covered in other books, this part of Gagé's book is particularly stimulating. What he has to say about the militarization of society has been reinforced in the more detailed study by Ramsay MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (1963), who points out that the process worked both ways: that not only were civilian patterns of society approximated to the military but that the military entered more and more fully into civilian life.

The third part (pp. 335-438) treats the later empire along the lines followed in the first part, but more cursorily. An introduction presents the social effects of the new fiscal and administrative arrangements of Diocletian and Constantine. The first chapter presents the isolated and sacred emperor, surrounded by a court which has absorbed control of all administrative functions. Barbarians become common in the army and rise to high command. The second chapter offers an excellent picture of the new senatorial class of large landowners resident chiefly in the provinces, with only token assemblies at Rome and presently at Constantinople. In the cities, the curial class and ordinary townfolk are more and more oppressed and bound by financial obligations. A whole chapter is devoted to the economic and social importance of land, with the power of the owners and the increasing "serfdom" of the cultivators, who

only occasionally rose en masse against their condition, as in the revolts of the *Bagaudae* in Gaul or the *Circumcelliones* in North Africa. The final chapter discusses the various ways in which individuals sought to escape from oppression, by placing themselves under the protection of the powerful or by joining the Christian Church, which enjoyed increasing immunities and favor. Gagé concludes that the gloomy picture of general disinterest in the fate of the empire presented by Salvian is fully justified.

A brief conclusion (pp. 442-8) reviews various explanations of the "Fall" and concludes, against Piganiol, that the real weaknesses were internal: over-expansion, over-organization, and fundamentally the failure of the emperors (i. e. the state), as the largest land-owners, to make the condition of the cultivators anything but worse (p. 447). Ordinary people no longer looked to the emperor, as they had during the early period, as their "patron" but sought refuge from the oppressive imperial administration in local protection. Thus the transition, particularly in the west, from the late empire to the early Middle Ages, with its separatist and localized society, was easy, gradual, and logical.

The book closes with a chronological summary of emperors to 395, outlining their families and chief achievements, and indices of proper names and of administrative and social categories. A map of the empire under Trajan precedes the conclusion.

Those familiar with Roman history will find the value of this book not in any startlingly new interpretations but in the organized presentation of material usually treated in broader contexts and less coherently. The chapters are supported by valuable footnotes which supplement the opening bibliography, though their references are likewise largely to French scholarship. This survey of the social structure, classification, and conditions throughout the Roman empire is thorough, informative, well documented, and characterized by both imagination and good sense. It should prove stimulating to scholars and to students.

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R. D. DAWE. *The Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964. Pp. x + 352. \$13.50.

In another book Professor Dawe calls the text of Aeschylus "so very problematic that it is difficult to discuss any aspect of his art for long without being compelled to touch on textual problems." Editorial neglect of manuscript evidence can issue in seriously flawed interpretations and worse translations. One or two letters altered can in some cases have drastic effects on criticism (e. g., Soph., *O. T.*, 376: Brunek's *σε μοῖρα πρὸς γ' ἐμοῦ* for MSS' *με μοῖρα πρὸς γε σοῦ* and Aesch., *Ag.*, 144: Lachmann's *αἰνεῖ*, Gilbert's *αἰνεῖ*, or Schutz' *αἰτῶ* for MSS' *αἰρεῖ*). In the present work Dawe, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, surveys textual edifices reared on the shifting sands of random evidence and sets about the work of demolition. The complete collation of 16 manuscripts of the Byzantine triad,

presented in an *apparatus criticus* covering nearly half the book, constitutes the scholarly spine of the investigation. Written in an engaging style belied by its austere title, the rest of the book is an impassioned plea, painstakingly documented, for an end to stemmawriting and excessive emendation before the unglamorous but necessary work of manuscript collation is complete.

In his introductory chapter, Dawe charges modern editors of Aeschylus (especially the "committee" responsible for the O. C. T.) with evading their proper task: too much effort has been exerted on conjectural emendation and too much value ascribed to it at the expense of thorough manuscript investigation. Excessive faith has been put in the assumed superiority of the oldest manuscript, M (= Laurentianus 32.9), and in a too eager exercise of *Stemmatik*. As a result, with nearly 150 manuscripts extant, hasty affiliations have been contrived on the basis of a few significant errors and a mere handful, deemed worthy of adequate collation, have served as substructure for editions of the poet. That so shaky a substructure should evoke universal acceptance "could be better explained," says Dawe, "by the moralist than by the scholar" (p. 2). Dissenters like Friedrich Heimsöth with his *Die Wiederherstellung der Dramen des Aeschylus* and *Die indirekte Überlieferung des aeschyleischen Textes* were derided or ignored by the Establishment.

Also ignored by editors were the more scrupulous (though still mistaken) attempts to clarify the Aeschylean *Textgeschichte*, Turyn's *The Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Aeschylus* (1943) and a 1953 doctoral dissertation dealing with Thomas Magister's work on Aeschylus by one of his students, Miss Elizabeth Bryson. This is the authoritative picture of the transmission in Miss Bryson's own words (quoted by Dawe, pp. 12-13):

The mediaeval manuscript ω was the ultimate source of all our extant manuscripts. From this the immediate descendants are μ and ϕ , the hypothetical redactions from which are derived the two main families of the old tradition. The scribe of μ drastically abridged and revised the scholia which he found in ω ; in ϕ these scholia were preserved in a much fuller form. μ has only one extant representative, M; but ϕ was the source of β and π , and from these two manuscripts are descended all the remaining extant manuscripts of the old tradition. θ , the recension of Thomas Magistros, used multiple sources from both the μ and the ϕ groups. The edition of Demetrius Triclinius, τ , was based for the triad on the Thoman recension, but also drew independently on old sources.

The editor, if this picture is valid, would be expected to take the following tack; collate the members of the ϕ group to reconstruct ϕ , using it and M to reconstruct ω . The occasional interpolations introduced into the *veteres* under the "horizontal" influence of the then popular Byzantine texts could easily be purged by our knowledge of the Thoman and Triclinian recensions. As Turyn puts it, "if we know what were the Byzantine readings carried by the Byzantine recensions, then we can detect them as being just interpolations whenever they appear sporadically in the old manuscripts."

But the rub lies in knowing what readings to ascribe to Byzantine conjecture when they are not labeled as such, as they are not in the so-called Thoman group. It is at this point (chapter II) that Dawe suggests the inadequacies of the Turyn-Bryson construct, especially the latter's analysis of interpolation in the Thoman recension. Furthermore, his comparison of the so-called "decadent Byzantine" manuscripts QK with O, one of the more respectable *veteres* of the ϕ group in Turyn's stemma, shows that any value judgment based solely upon the distinction between "Byzantine" and "ancient" is meaningless: "Too often we are invited to draw the line between ancient manuscripts which are heavily interpolated, and heavily interpolated manuscripts whose original stock must of course be ancient" (p. 22).

In chapter III Dawe sets before the reader sample lists of significant errors drawn from the apparatus to demonstrate that, while broad affiliations are evident, "almost all manuscripts constantly show the influence of groups to which they do not themselves belong" (p. 23). For example, in BCH Δ , the most well disciplined group, the number of times they all agree is but a small fraction of the times only two or three of them agree. The fallibility of stemmata based on incomplete collation is especially verified when Dawe shows that A, assigned by Turyn to the π branch of the ϕ group, barring β affinities for *Pers.* 1-ca. 214, actually has more than twice as many affinities with M and I (Mt. Athos, Iviron 209) than with π or β manuscripts. Thus all the manuscripts violate the most fundamental assumption of *Stemmatik*, "that the copies made since the primary split in the tradition each reproduce one exemplar only, i. e., that no scribe has combined several exemplars (*contaminatio*)" (Maas, *Textual Criticism*, p. 3). And Dawe shows that, while in minor matters scribes are content to follow their main exemplar, the greatest divergency among members of a group occurs at major *cruces*, where we need them most. This evidence of such widespread shopping about for true readings by "thinking" scribes renders an Aeschylean stemma impossible at least until all the manuscripts have been collated completely. In this chapter Dawe also introduces the first bits of evidence to disprove the uniqueness of M in preserving ancient readings, and recommends that for the textual criticism of Aeschylus "the only thing which can profitably be said of a manuscript is that it is good or bad, not that it belongs or does not belong to group x, with or without an admixture of readings from y and z" (p. 42), a course of action long advocated for many other classical authors by Giorgio Pasquali (*Storia della tradizione e critico del testo*, 1934).

Since, according to Dawe, Miss Bryson had not sufficiently articulated the unique character of "Thoman" interpolation, in chapter IV he takes each manuscript in turn and tries, in his own words, "to catch the scribes in the act of emending, and endeavor, where possible, to understand their motives and the way their minds worked." In a venture of this kind, the tares are every bit as precious as the wheat, for detailed knowledge of Byzantine philological capability can then be used later to gauge whether unique readings in one or a few manuscripts are genuine ancient preservations or merely emendations. In the first section of the chapter Dawe deals with

metrical emendation, i.e., addition or deletion to give a twelve-syllable line, insertion of the *vitium Byzantinum* (both attempts to fit the classical tragic trimeter to the Procrustean bed of the contemporary Byzantine dodecasyllable), real restorations of meter, and avoidance of hiatus. In the second and more important section, he weeds out emendations motivated by misunderstanding the text or by the desire to clarify it. His conclusions are rather startling. All the manuscripts show emendation, some of it apparently from periods much earlier than that of the Palaeologi. Scribes demonstrate remarkable familiarity with the text but shallowness in critical, especially metrical, matters. And finally, "for every instance of emendation one could cite several places where scribes have refrained, for whatever reason, from making an obvious and correct alteration" (p. 102).

In chapter V this new found knowledge of what scribes do and can do is applied to each *prima facie* case of unique ancient preservation to determine whether it is a genuine preservation, an emendation, or sheer accident. By discovering unique preservations of an ancient reading in almost all of the 16 manuscripts, Dawe bursts the bubble ϕ , certifies an open recension, and pushes the ultimate source ω too far into the past to be a useful critical tool. "Byzantine," as a designation for the triad, is clearly a misnomer.

Dawe examines the scanty *external* evidence, chiefly the papyri, in chapter VI and finds nothing in it to disprove the conclusions reached by internal evidence and some things impossible to prove except on his theory. On the evidence of dislocation in line order he reservedly proffers the suggestion that at a very early period the Aeschylean tradition may have been transmitted orally.

Chapters VII and VIII are miscellanies containing explanatory notes to the apparatus, suggestions on topics related to the study of the manuscripts, and some excellent emendations by Dawe himself. The final chapter surveys the hitherto uncollated Salamanca manuscript (E) of the *Eumenides* and its relationship with FGT. Once again he finds unique preservations of the truth in each—a picture, in miniature, of the situation of the triad manuscripts. His collations further disclose that the hitherto discredited G—its value, according to Denniston-Page, "could not be less than it is without entirely ceasing to exist"—actually represents the earliest stage of Triclinius' editorial work on the *Oresteia*, and should, therefore, no longer be neglected by editors.

The overwhelming quantity of Dawe's incontestible evidence is more than enough to outweigh the isolated instances where, as he himself freely admits, he may encounter difference of opinion. A few examples may be cited. P. 83: Dawe sees "no detectable motive" for O's substitution of $\epsilon\tau\iota$ for $\mu\omicron\iota$ at P. V., 80. Could not O's scribe have thought (wrongly, of course) that $\mu\omicron\iota$ was pleonastic after $\epsilon\mu\eta\gamma\eta$ in the previous line? $\epsilon\tau\iota$ would make good sense (though bad meter) if he were reading these lines as the angry limit of Kratos' patience at being twice (42, 78) abused by Hephaestus. (Alteration of $\tau\rho\alpha\chi\upsilon\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ to $\theta\rho\alpha\sigma\upsilon\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ by PKA, to bring it in line with $\theta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ in 42, may have had the same motive.) P. 85: Dawe calls Y's $\pi\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma/\epsilon\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ for $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\alpha\varsigma/\epsilon\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ at P. V., 302-3 "arbitrary substitution." It was more likely the unconscious slip of a scribe who,

when he was writing *θεωρήσων τύχας/ἐμὰς ἀφίξει*, still had in mind its mate in meaning *πόνων ἐμῶν/ἥκεις ἐπόπτῃς* from three lines above. P. 89: Dawe calls Ya's *πατρίδι* for *πατρίαι* at *Pers.*, 932 "substitution of a near-synonym." Why not attribute it more simply to A-Δ confusion, a common enough "mechanical" error?

For a book that must have been a nightmare for proofreader and typesetter alike, their peccadillos are understandable. On p. 50, line 11, for *τοιούτος* read *τοιόσδε*. On p. 66, line 21, ". . . giving reasonable sense and a hiatus" should read ". . . giving reasonable sense and *avoiding* a hiatus." On p. 83, lines 14-15, "the mess made of 246": the apparatus shows no mess in O at P. V., 246; presumably 244 (very messy!) is meant. On p. 92, line 20, for 1006 read 1005. On p. 120, line 1, for 923 read 924. On p. 155, line 9, for *προσγίνεται* read *προσγίνεται*. On p. 316 of the apparatus, the line number 446 is missing.

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ERIC A. HAVELOCK. Preface to Plato. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1963. Pp. xii + 328. \$5.75.
(*A History of the Greek Mind*, I.)

Havelock's book is written with verve, eloquence, and a vividness appropriate to the great cultural drama that he tries to unfold before us. Wishing to get at the core of Plato's thought, he turns, like others before him in similar endeavors, to the *Republic* but insists from the onset that its political content is of secondary importance. Plato's true subject is education, and from the dual attack on poetry (in Books II-III and X) it should be evident what enemy stands in the way of his educational reforms and proposals. The objective which Plato pursues is to break the exclusive hold that poetry had on the Greek mind. The peculiar strength of this hold was due to the powers inherent in the oral tradition. Havelock is convinced that this tradition had continued with unbroken force to Plato's day, writing and "the advantages of literacy" being still a monopoly of the poets (p. 46). Mobilizing a maximum of visual and acoustic resources, poetry demanded and achieved the total surrender of the listener's personality. The listener (or pupil) responds through a mechanism of irrational reflexes, he becomes emotionally identified with what he hears, the rhythms take possession of his mind, impressing upon his memory paradigmatic situations, with the result that throughout his life he remains in bondage to the "poetised statement." Obviously this kind of education cannot produce individual minds; its cultural function is to enforce conformity with the *mores* of the social group. For poetry is a codification of these *mores*; epic poetry in particular represents a *summa* of all knowledge useful and essential for the preservation of the social organism. Havelock likes to speak of Homer as the "tribal encyclopaedia." The content as well as the form of the epic must be understood in the light of this cultural function. Now if such was the role of poetry

and if "that nexus of motor responses, unconscious reflexes, and passions and emotions which had been mobilized for countless time" (p. 200) was still mobilized in Plato's day, his critique of poetry is indicative of a desire to destroy the "Homeric state of mind." The issue is truly *περί ὅλου καὶ παντός*. Plato tries to break the control of *μίμησις* over the mind of his contemporaries; he seeks to replace emotional identification by an attitude of intelligent, critical examination. But when we see him engage in this fight—or build up his own philosophical counterpositions—we must realize that he himself is the spearhead of larger historical forces, the executor, so to speak, of a cultural *ananke*. The prevalence of oral tradition had reached the point where it was giving way to literacy. With books and the written word coming into their own new mental attitudes were needed. Instead of continuing to rely on "the perpetual stimulation of the young in a kind of hypnotic trance" (p. 208) it was now possible to treat knowledge as an "object," as something existing apart from and in separation from oneself (this I take it, is the meaning of what Havelock calls "the separation of the knower from the known," a misleading and not felicitous phrase which should certainly not be taken to imply that the Greeks had never yet known "objects" or that the subject had never yet played a conscious and conspicuous role in Greek literature).

If Havelock's thesis is correct not only the Greek epic and Plato but also much of the intervening intellectual development will call for a historical reassessment. As I have indicated, the validity of his views is predicated on his interpretation of Plato's attacks on poetry; *μίμησις* as used by Plato in the context of this critique is for Havelock the epitome of the traditional pattern of education. He is fishing in dark and troubled waters. Very probably Plato extends the range of *μίμησις* far beyond what it had covered in earlier writers; yet in spite of several recent studies on *μίμησις* we do not yet see clearly how he refashioned the concept. The extension of *μίμησις* accounts for most of Havelock's problems. Still, some preliminary points on which he argues with great energy are hardly controversial. Nobody, I think, would today deny that Plato judges Greek poetry by criteria not germane to it or that the Greeks responded to a performance not in a purely rational (or in a purely aesthetic) spirit but rather with an intense involvement of their emotions. Yet Havelock goes far beyond these generally accepted positions. He wonders (pp. 21 ff.) why Plato does not distinguish between the *μίμησις* of the poet and that of the actor (or performer). Is it not pertinent to remember that these functions overlapped (see the description in 398 A of a poet arriving in the city *βουλόμενος αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα ἐπαείξασθαι*)? When Plato raises the question *πότερον μιμητικὸς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ μὴ*; (394 E 1) Havelock would like to know (pp. 23 ff.) to what kind of *μίμησις* the question refers. We may remember that in Athens citizens "acted"; we may (with Havelock) think of recital and memorization but why not also and especially of reading aloud, a habit which in antiquity seems to have been more common than silent reading? If the evidence for the fourth century is not conclusive, it still seems arbitrary that Havelock never even considers this possibility. How-

ever this may be, Plato certainly does not in 396C5 speak of "a grown man who for some reason is continually engaged in reciting or performing poetry himself" (p. 24). The passage is not at all "descriptive." Plato tries to decide which of the two poetic forms that have just been distinguished—narrative and dramatic *μίμησις*—would be more to the taste of a certain type of man (note *ὁ μὲν, μοι δοκεῖ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ . . . ἐθελήσειν . . . ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μίμῃσει*). In particular there is nothing in the text to support or suggest the words "continually engaged" in Havelock's paraphrase, words that unfortunately are pivotal for his theory: "All memorization of the poetised tradition depends on constant and reiterated recitation." (The pupil's) "living memory must at every turn be reinforced by social pressure." "The community has to enter into an unconscious conspiracy with itself to keep the tradition alive" . . . "individuals' memories . . . have continually to be recharged at all age levels" (pp. 43 f.). There being no evidence to back up these assertions (no "weight of Plato's testimony . . . impossible to shake off," p. 39), we may as well remove this pressure or relax this strain, and the Greeks of the fifth and fourth century will be found able to develop their minds in response to the various impressions, influences, and stimuli of life, while preserving as much veneration for Homer, as much emotional involvement in tragic spectacles, and as much mimetic talent as their individual temperament and endowment allowed.

It would be very tedious were we here to review the history of the rise of individualism in the second half of the fifth century. The evidence is familiar, and there is no possibility of squaring it with Havelock's view of the Greeks as beings without individual consciousness, limited to automatic responses and imitations, finding themselves in every situation pulled by the invisible puppet strings in the hands of the poet. It is certainly impossible to entertain such a view of the "emancipated" minds or the intellectual upper stratum (Havelock himself admits in his final chapter that beginning with Hesiod there had been a continuous and progressive breaking-away from Homer's authority; one could wish for a better integration between this chapter and the rest of the book). As for the masses, if Havelock's thesis were to be restricted to them, his interpretation of *Rep.*, V, 475 D would gain additional importance. For Havelock tries to read (pp. 242 ff.) Plato's description of the men who live by *δόξα* as a thumbnail sketch of the "Homeric man," arguing that not only in the well-known sections of II, III, and X but also in the argument of V which proves the inferior status of *δόξα* Plato's real target is poetry. We may grant that the difference between *δόξα* and philosophic *ἐπιστήμη* is in the offing at 475 D, although Plato's actual and immediate concern is to exclude the *φιλοθεάμονες*, the *φιλήκοοι*, and some other categories from the name *φιλόσοφοι*. The closest that we come to poetry is in these words: *οἱ φιλήκοοι* (while never willing to listen to *λόγοι*) *ὥσπερ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὅσα ἐπακούσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κόμας ἀπολειπόμενοι*. To use this passage as evidence without making allowance for its pervasive

irony is a risk which few scholars would take. For the rest, people passionately addicted to shows doubtless exist in any cultural setting in which there are shows (including our own with its habitual moviegoers). The reason why Plato here speaks of such people is that although by no means φιλόσοφοι they have φιλομαθία in common with the philosophers and may be called ὅμοιοι φιλοσόφοις; it is therefore all the more important to set them apart (E 2). From these men, or from those said at 480 A to enjoy φωνάς τε καὶ χροάς καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα but not αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν it is a far cry to the audio-visual automata which are Havelock's Homeric men. As often as he can, and far more often than any unprejudiced reader of Plato would, Havelock identifies the πολλά that Plato opposes to his one Form with the events and actions of poetry, concluding that "whenever the epistemology of Plato's own system is in question he feels compelled to define it in contrast to the psychology and language employed in the poetic performance" (p. 245). He also warns us not to "become distracted and imagine we are asked to look at entities" when reading in the *Republic* statements like the following: οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γινῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν (477 B 10; p. 227); for Plato's preoccupation in such passages and contexts is not with metaphysical entities but with "syntactical relations." The strain which this interpretation puts on the plain meaning of Plato's Greek and the corresponding strain on the reader's intelligence are a matter of indifference. What happens if τὰ ὄντα in the course of Plato's argument emerge as Forms (for which Havelock offers no syntactic explanation)?

If it were true that "the oral state of mind is still for Plato the main enemy" (p. 41), it would perhaps be conceivable that Plato, although in his dialogues he takes on a great number and variety of foes, never actually discovered this arch-enemy. But how truly astonishing would it be that so far from annihilating this enemy, Plato *horribile dictu* was willing to play along with him and to further his interests. A μίμναις of the right kind is welcomed as a part of the guardians' education (see e. g. *Rep.*, 397 D 3 f., 398 A 8 ff.; *Legg.*, 667E10-668B2, 812B8). Audio-visual influences are repatterned with loving care (see especially 401 B f.). No Greek educator was more emphatic than Plato on the importance of non-rational, pre-rational, and irrational influences in shaping the character (the *Laws* to which Havelock pays scant attention go in this respect even farther than the *Republic*). Κιριωτάτη ἡ ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ <ῆ> ἁρμονία (401 D 5). And even on the rational and most truly philosophical level we never find Plato championing literacy, books, bookishness or anything of the kind. Plato's dialectic cannot be divorced from the διαλέγεσθαι, a word which does not smack of literacy. In the *Phaedrus* (224B-227A) and in the *Seventh Letter* (341B-344D) Plato proclaims the superiority of the spoken over the written word ("illogical" is Havelock's comment, p. 56, n. 17). Finally Plato's Forms, the εἶδη, by their very name suggest a certain connection with visual, concrete reality. What this connection is need fortunately not be here investigated—402 C 2 ff. seems to me a revealing passage—; for Havelock knows this aspect of the theory of Forms and in

Chapter XIV censures Plato for his inconsistency in not setting up a doctrine of concepts rather than of Forms (it is odd to think that Plato should have had this choice). "Form . . . tends to make knowledge visual again" . . . "Plato allows himself to fall back into the idiom of precisely that psychic condition which he is setting out to destroy" (pp. 268 f.; see also 270 f.). Still worse, "we ourselves, he can say, may 'imitate' the Forms" (μίμησις! the "enemy"! how careless Plato was to let him slip in). It never occurs to Havelock to suspect that the error may not be on the side of Plato.

Generally speaking it is a weakness of the book that whatever Havelock perceives, whether it be right or wrong, is given exaggerated and overdramatized presentation. Partial aspects are again and again substituted for the total picture. The reader, if he wishes to preserve some contact with reality, must learn to make large discounts. Havelock's central thesis of the epic as "tribal encyclopaedia" may contain an element of truth but more than one grain of salt must be applied to it before this grain of truth becomes apparent. Essentially the thesis must rest on the internal evidence of the epic; for if at the end of the fifth century and in the fourth there were people for whom Homer was an expert in all τέχναι (*Rep.*, X, 598 D 8) it stands to reason that they tried to find a novel ideal of universal knowledge realized in him, an ideal somehow related to the sophists' conception of knowledge and education. Hesiod, *Theogony*, 66 f. where the Muses μέλπονται πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἥθεα κεδνὰ ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν μεν give Havelock a certain measure of support. Although rather highhanded in his treatment of the authenticity and the syntax of the passage (p. 62 and nn. 3 f.), Havelock interprets the statement correctly, except for finding in it a hint that the ways of the gods and those of men are the same. Still the passage cannot bear as much weight as Havelock puts on it. Moreover, if the epic has its roots in the Mycenaean period, it cannot be easy to say with precision what social organisation found its *mores* embodied in Homer's poetry. Was it the Mycenaean society or that of the dark ages, the archaic or the classical? Havelock's position on this question is not consistent; in fact it could hardly be. To assume a constancy of the *mores* is no real solution; to regard oral poetry itself as the agent of continuity, and by that token as the *organon* of cohesion without which society would have disintegrated (pp. 118 ff. and *passim*, p. 125) is ingenious but raises a host of questions. One wonders what happened to the society—or to the poetry—when kings went out of existence. If Havelock were right, this development ought perhaps never to have taken place. Other difficulties for his theory arise from the "selective" character of the epic, i. e. from the fact known ever since Erwin Rohde (and borne out by any History of Greek Religion) that many archaic beliefs and primitive superstitions, many local and regional customs, are ignored by the epic. Does the epic present reality, i. e. life as it actually was, or rather reality ennobled and idealized in the direction of the heroic, with emphasis on the norms, παραδείγματα and καλά? I am aware that an answer based on the *Iliad* would differ somewhat from one based on the *Odyssey* or on the *Works and Days*—and how much are we really entitled to say about the lost

epics? Havelock is far too rigid when he insists on Homer's "total acceptance of the mores of society," allowing him only to expand "horizontally" but not to rise "vertically" (p. 89). All told, if we are not content with thinking of the bard as entertaining his audience and spreading cheer and glee, if we wish to endow him with some kind of authority, we must continue to look for a better formula than is offered by Havelock's "tribal encyclopaedia." There are too many facets of Homer's poetry that it does not cover. Nevertheless, and in spite of many provokingly one-sided or exaggerated contentions by which Havelock elaborates his theory, I believe that the thesis as such is a contribution to a question that we all must take seriously.

There are other theories in the book that may stimulate further inquiry. In fact there may well be more of them than I have been able to discover but it cannot be an easy task to extract them. It is probably quite true that, as Havelock suggests in his final chapter, there is room for further studies on the "conceptualization" of the Greek world view and that the Presocratics in particular offer a promising field for such investigation. But such an inquiry, to be illuminating, should not be conducted with the intention of filling out a pre-established scheme. It had better not start from the axiom that the Presocratics "began as men who on the one hand composed as poets" (and <on the other> "felt a repugnance" to the oral tradition, p. 288; similarly pp. 289 and 290). To turn Anaximander into a poet, Havelock has to deprive him of the authentic prose fragments restored to him by "the credulity of Kranz" (p. 308, n. 38)—what about other villains beginning with Theophrastus who credits Anaximander with ποιητικώτερα ὄνόματα but quotes prose from him (12A9; B2; incidentally while Diels in the fourth edition of the *Vorsokratiker* "still omitted any B section for Anaximander" he indicated clearly in the A section that he accepted the passage in question as authentic)? Father Parmenides "remained a minstrel" (p. 303). Heraclitus must have been "heard"—one wonders where—"and memorized (this is possible since he had enthusiastic followers) but not read" (p. 319, n. 38). How can anyone be so positive? Of Melissus, Zeno, and others of the lesser fry from whom we have prose texts nothing is yet said but Anaxagoras' "book"—the Greek has βιβλία—attested in a famous passage of the *Apology* (26D) was "a single sheet, a leaflet or pamphlet," not the full text but a "collection of extracts" (p. 55, n. 16). All this and more of the kind must be postulated because reading habits do not fit Havelock's idea of an oral culture. Actually in the *Apology* passage Socrates asks Meletos whether he despises his audience (n. b. the jury of 500, not by any means the intelligentsia) and considers them ἀπίστους γραμμάτων. It seems one has not to look far to find evidence damaging to Havelock's thesis of an "oral culture." Novel views are propounded also about the content of the Presocratic systems, if the word "system" may still be used of men whose philosophical positions and doctrinal differences are less important than their "constant" and "besetting preoccupation" with problems of language (pp. 288 ff.). However, since this chapter is clearly intended to be provisional—Havelock speaks of himself as "only raising the curtain" (p. 298)—it is perhaps better not to examine his views

too closely, but to express the hope that if a study of conceptualization is to be undertaken it will not like the present book play fast and loose with the evidence and will proceed with as few antecedent commitments as possible.

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ANNA MORPURGO. *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon*. Rome, Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1963. Pp. xxxi + 405. (*Incunabula Graeca*, III.)

It is a pleasure to be given an excellent book to review, and *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon* is an excellent book. It is thorough and authoritative, and can be recommended unconditionally to all those interested in Mycenaean studies. The few objections to portions of it which I shall mention below are very minor, and do not affect its over-all excellence.

The work is more than a lexicon of Mycenaean Greek, for it includes personal and place names as well as lexical items, and fragments as well as complete words. What we have before us is a concordance (in transliteration) of all syllabically used sign groups occurring on the Linear B inscriptions. Fragments containing two or more signs are alphabetized by first recorded sign regardless of whether that sign begins the word or not. Thus]*si-ja* follows *si-ja*-[which in turn follows]-*si-du-wo*. Fragments containing only one sign are grouped together in alphabetical order towards the end of the volume.

Each entry consists of two parts: the textual and the lexical. Any grammatical information that seems certain occurs after the lemma: case and number in common nouns; type of noun if a personal or place name; tense, voice, etc., if a verb. Then come all the occurrences of the word on all the tablets together with a certain amount of context, varying in extent from one word to nearly the entire tablet. The labor here must have been enormous, for not only do we find recorded tablet and line number, but also indications of restorations, emendations, and in some cases, variant readings: in other words all the information—short of printing the text itself—needed to grasp what actually occurs in the text. And all of this is recorded with an astounding accuracy. I found no misprint or error in the textual part of the entries that was not picked up in the corrigenda, and there are very few items mentioned there. This section is so accurate, in fact, that Professor M. Lejeune, who has prepared a much-needed reverse index of Linear B, has based it principally upon this lexicon (*Nestor*, p. 313).

One might have expected Miss Morpurgo's decision to include everything to have extended also to the meanings proposed for the various lexical items, but here she has been selective. She states (p. vii) that in principle the lexicographer can envision his task in two ways: he can mention only those interpretations which agree with his own, and indeed can propose interpretations peculiar to himself; or he can include all views without indicating a preference.

The objection to the first method is that such a lexicon is only so authoritative as is the compiler himself, while the second method produces a lexicon which is obviously unsuitable for those less skilled in Linear B studies, for they will be overwhelmed with unsifted information and contradictory interpretations. Miss Morpurgo has tried to find a middle ground, and has selected for inclusion only a few of the many opinions expressed on the more difficult entries. Sometimes she has contented herself with references to the works in which the word is discussed.

Her choice leaves her vulnerable to attacks from both sides. Beginners will still be perplexed with the numerous suggested interpretations of the more difficult words, such as *ke-ke-me-na*, and specialists may be annoyed at not finding cited all works dealing with the problem. But beginners had better learn to live with perplexity in Mycenaean studies, for it will never leave them, and specialists can be reasonably expected to dig out references for themselves. For my part I should have preferred to have references to all (or at least all reasonable) opinions, but find that her entries serve excellently for a first glance into a problem, and provide the basic information necessary to form a preliminary judgment. Her reporting of the opinions of others is admirably clear and accurate, and when the meaning of a word is secure, her definition and discussion are entirely adequate.

Miss Morpurgo has been able to cite the literature systematically only through August, 1961, so that many of her entries are inevitably now incomplete. Since that time L. R. Palmer's *The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts* (Oxford, 1963) has appeared, and her references to Palmer can now be replaced by references to the glossary of that work. Surprisingly she never refers to the annual bibliography *Studies in Mycenaean Inscriptions and Dialect (S. M. I. D.)* published by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London. To be sure this work is only a bibliography, but one section lists interpretations of individual words proposed during the year. Under *a-ka-ni-jo* Miss Morpurgo writes: "verbi vis obscura (v. tamen Doria² p. 27 sq.)." Such a reference is not helpful, for one has no idea what he will find if he does consult Doria's work. *S. M. I. D.*, 1958, p. 17 tells us that Doria interprets the word as *Hagnaïos*, a month-name. On the basis of this skeletal information we can then decide whether or not to look further into Doria's proposal. Other references, too, are unhelpful. At one point we are referred to Szemerényi, 'MLS' 21. I. 1959 p. 164, for most a hopeless reference, since the *Minutes of the London Seminar* are not widely distributed. As it happens, *S. M. I. D.* fails us here also, and we are stuck. It would have been altogether better always to include the interpretation proposed together with a reference to where it is found. Or failing that, to include, whenever possible, a reference to *S. M. I. D.*, so that the reader will not waste time tracking down impossible proposals.

Few etymological connections with other Indo-European languages are made, but related Greek forms are often mentioned. Whenever possible Miss Morpurgo cites the corresponding Attic form rather than a dialect form which may in fact be closer to the Mycenaean than is the Attic. She says of *a-pe-a-sa*: "Intell. . . ἀπ-έαρ[σ]α

(<*ap-esntya; gr. ἀποῦσα),” which is possibly misleading. ἀποῦσα is of course an analogical form rebuilt on the masculine stem -ont-, and does not derive directly from *esntya. But Arcadian and Locrian εασσα and Cretan ιαττα (Schwyzer, *Gr. Gramm.*, I, 678) do, and reference to these forms would better elucidate the Mycenaean form. A similar difficulty arises when she includes the formula *i-go* <*ekwos in the entry *i-go* ‘horse.’ In some sense *i-go* does derive from *ekwos, but the derivation cannot be made by the usual phonological route, for an Indo-European *ekwos should regularly yield Mycenaean *e-go and classical *eppos.

An extremely useful index of classical words cited concludes the lexicon; an index which makes it possible for one interested in a classical word to see whether that word has been thought to be exemplified in Mycenaean. This section is the more valuable since Frisk in his etymological dictionary has been reluctant to include Mycenaean cognates. The index is long—eighteen pages—and may perhaps convey the impression that much of the Mycenaean vocabulary is known. To this extent it is misleading, for many of the Greek words occur as suggested interpretations of personal names, and many are guesses, more or less probable, as to the meaning of Mycenaean lexical items. Relatively few connections are certain, and it might have been helpful to indicate the certain equations in some way.

To conclude my review of this excellent work, I shall cite the sum total of uncorrected mistakes I found. The editorial staff of *Classical Journal* is in Columbus, Ohio, not Chicago; and p. 164, line 41 *incertuma ut lacunam* is doubtless typesetter's Latin for *incertum aut lacunam*.

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Taciti de origine et situ Germanorum librum edidit et illustravit IOANNES FORNI, commentariolo instruxit FRANCISCUS GALLI. Romae in Aedibus Athenaei, 1964. Pp. 305. Lire 4500. (*Flos Latinitatis Latinorum Auctorum Excerpta Curante Hectore Paratore.*)

In 1962 appeared an edition of the *Agricola* of Tacitus with commentary by Giovanni Forni. That was an outstanding publication in every way (cf. *A.J.P.*, LXXXV [1964], pp. 322-5). Now we have the *Germania* in the same series and format. It falls somewhat short, however, of the height of overall excellence achieved by its predecessor, for it suffers from the fact that time required a speedy publication and that the work had to be divided between Forni and Francesco Galli. Nevertheless it is a fine edition and may be recommended to those who wish to find in one volume a fairly reliable summary of scholarly opinions on the interpretation of the text. The editors themselves do not often offer their own opinions but are for the most part content to present in capsule form the present state of knowledge on the several points. In his preface

Forni offers an apology: the urgency of preparing a text and commentary on the *Germania* forced him to reduce his original design to one of relatively narrow limits. He had planned a much more comprehensive work. Whole sections on sources, reliability of information contained in the *Germania*, epigraphical and numismatic documentation, and a more complete account of archaeological evidence had formed part of that original design. Much had to be omitted or reduced in size. We wish for more, but must be content with what we are given. There are some omissions of fact, some defects, and some matters of minor annoyance. There are also some remarkable appendices, some happy suggestions, and some very welcome summaries of knotty problems.

The introduction (pp. 11-49) contains three sections: one on the origin and significance of the work, another on composition and publication, and a final one on the manuscript tradition. Like all editors of the *Germania* Forni cannot resist the temptation to search for a purpose in its writing and publication. For like most political literature of imperial times the work does not "carry its meaning on its face." It is buried beneath the surface, but its existence is undeniable. Forni concludes that it is an ethnographic treatise, probably a digression in origin prepared for the publication of some future historical work (the *Histories*), then re-worked and published separately. The immediate stimulus for publication was incidental, a contemporary event, the sojourn of Trajan on the German front. Onto the body of this treatise were grafted, here and there, sentiments of a political and ethical content, calculated to recall the decadent Roman society to a rebirth, to a transformation wholly necessary for survival in the face of the German menace.

With such a definition of the origin and purpose of the *Germania* I cannot completely agree. True, it is an ethnographic treatise, as Mommsen and Norden and others have long ago demonstrated. True, the immediate stimulus for its publication may have been Trajan's prolonged stay in the north just after his ascension to the purple. But that it was originally prepared with the thought in mind of using it for some future historical work is, I believe, mistaken. Forni might have profited from a more thorough study of Syme's remarks in his *Tacitus*, I, pp. 46-8 and 125-9, and from the very thought-provoking and well-written article by Nesselhauf in *Hermes*, LXXX (1952), pp. 222-45. In Nesselhauf's view the purpose for which Tacitus wrote the *Germania* may be found by looking back into the age of Domitian and not forward to some projected piece of historical writing. The point is worth noting here.

Augustus crossed the Rhine in an attempt to join Germany to the Empire. Temporary victories, eventual failure. Tiberius was forced to put an end to the costly, unsuccessful conduct of the German war by Germanicus. Caligula abandoned his project of defeating the Germans. For almost a century, failure and shame. Then Domitian became emperor and in 83 personally led the long-awaited but never attempted attack. His armies crushed the Chatti and moved to the east bank of the Rhine, in the process adding two new provinces to the Empire (*Germania Superior* and *Inferior*). Then he returned to Rome and inaugurated a series of ostentatious celebrations almost without precedent in their lavishness. An immense display of uni-

forms, symbols, and literature flooded the city. For all intents and purposes the German problem was solved. Coins, those indices of official policy, indicate to what extent Domitian went to sway public opinion on the matter of his German victory: he is pictured as a conqueror of the barbarian, *Germania* herself sitting sadly at the feet of her Roman master. Some bear the legend *Germania capta*. In all corners of the Empire are heard the praises of Domitian, who did what none of the others (except Augustus to a degree and only for a short time) had been able to accomplish. He is given the title of *Germanicus*.

Of course, all was not rhetorical exaggeration or propagandistic excess. The achievement of Domitian was, in fact, solid and lasting. Land on the east bank of the Rhine was occupied by Roman military forces. In front of the legionary fortresses now began to appear a protective net of auxiliary encampments to strengthen and hold the newly won area. Later the legions themselves would be able to move into the interior a short distance. Domitian's victory gave birth to the German *times*. The armies were later reduced from eight to six legions and the *Schwerpunkt* of military activity began to shift to the Danube.

Such was the state of affairs when Tacitus wrote the *Germania*, and the *Agricola*. He addressed the treatise to people with a first hand knowledge of Domitian's war and triumph, people who had constant reminders before their eyes of their great and victorious emperor. But now Domitian was dead. Tacitus could speak at last. His treatise painted a picture of Germany quite different from the official one presented to the Roman people for the previous ten to fifteen years. It swept aside a mass of delusions and false impressions. The truth remained. Most of his readers would have understood. Germany had not been conquered. The enormous potential of the German tribes, inhabiting an immense extent of land, was still a threat to Rome. The Chatti had been defeated. Germany still lived, the great enemy, wild and untamed, young and unspoiled, just emerging from the chrysalis of time in the first stage of her growth. Only a small part of Germany had been won, the so-called *agri decumates*, and Tacitus almost sneers as he writes the phrase. His *Germania* tells the truth without elaboration or polemic. For such things there was no need. The truth put the lie to Domitian's distortion of history more effectively than point-blank accusations. Exactly the effect that Tacitus hoped to achieve in writing the treatise. Such was his purpose.

This summary of part of Nesselhauf's article illustrates, I believe, the importance of his conclusions. Everyone may not agree, but Forni does not even include the article in his bibliography.

Turning to the text itself (pp. 51-205), with the commentary very conveniently placed at the bottom of each page, we note first the absence of a critical apparatus. This is generally annoying, but because of the extensive notes on textual problems not disastrous. However, in some places it can lead an inattentive reader into a false sense of security. One should have Anderson's or Koestermann's text at his elbow at all times. In preparing the commentary Galli has made very extensive use of all existing commentaries, but his greatest single debt is to Anderson's (Oxford, 1938). In many dozens of places Galli has merely given us an Italian translation of

Anderson, sometimes word by word paragraph after paragraph. It would serve no useful purpose for me here to illustrate this point. I confine myself rather to some textual and interpretative observations.

Chapter 2, 2-3. Here Galli gives us a fine summary of scholarly opinion on the much-debated origin and etymology of the words *Germani* and *Germaniae*. On the famous phrase *a victore † ob metum* he has nothing new to offer. Two articles on this passage evidently appeared too late for him to have noticed: H. Heubner in *Gymnasium*, LXIX (1962), pp. 462-9, and B. Melin in *Eranos*, LXI (1963), pp. 143-60.

Chapter 3, 1. Forni incorporates *barditum* into his text, rejecting *barritum*, in keeping with the old, and probably correct, theory of the *Schilägesang*.

Chapter 6, 2. On the word *dextros* Galli should have consulted L. L. Hammerich in *Festgabe für Th. Frings* (Berlin, 1956), pp. 283-97.

Chapter 18, 3. Forni accepts *pereundum* into his text, but Galli says nothing in his commentary about the fact that several good manuscripts read *pariendum*, a word which fits neatly into the thought of the next clause because of its connection with children and a mother's duty to them.

Chapter 29, 3. On the *agri decumates* in this passage Galli does not even mention the suggestion of Syme (*Tacitus*, I, p. 128, n. 6) that Tacitus added the phrase himself. Thus the authority followed by Tacitus had not mentioned the area at all. Syme says that this passage about the *agri decurates* "seems to have been inserted without due regard to its context." This observation, if true, could be important in estimating Tacitus' utilization of source material and his techniques.

Chapter 33, 2: *urgentibus imperii fatis*. Galli ought to have noted here that recently the suggestion has been raised that the phrase may not necessarily imply defeat or some evil: see B. Zanco in *Aevum*, XXXVI (1962), pp. 529-31.

Brief indices (pp. 206-10) follow the text and notes. Then there follows (pp. 213-302) a series of appendices which in the eyes of the reviewer constitute a most welcome addition, apparently written by Forni. In brief, clear language we have here a very reliable account of the *limites* in Upper and Lower Germany, Raetia, Noricum, and Pannonia. Each section is equipped with an excellent bibliography. Up to date maps make it a very valuable part of the book.

There are some typographical errors in the text and in the commentary, but of a minor nature and not likely to cause difficulty. But on page 80 (second line of the commentary) read *κυνήν* instead of *κυνέη*. And in Chapter 22, 1 read *Statim e somno* instead of *es omno*.

May we look forward to a new commentary on the *Historiae* and *Annales*? I hope so.

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CEDRIC H. WHITMAN. *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1964. Pp. ix + 333. \$6.00. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, XIX.)

In this work Professor Whitman presents his concept of the Greek comic hero as a complement to his study of the tragic hero of Sophocles and the epic hero of Homer. It is a pleasure to welcome so scholarly and so solid and sound a contribution to classical learning. For the treatment of the subject is penetrating and thoughtful, with frequent arresting and provocative ideas. This volume will henceforth play an essential part in the study of Aristophanes and of Old Comedy.

At the outset, the author does an excellent and much needed job of clearing away a number of traditional and wholly indefensible pronouncements concerning comedy, especially its reputed power as a political and moral weapon forming and modifying public opinion concerning issues and individuals of the day. This oft-repeated view has been attacked before, and Whitman's sensible discussion should help to dispel any lingering delusions. The habitual picture of Aristophanes as a passionate conservative is also effectively challenged. The section "Criticism and Old Comedy" is fresh and timely and long overdue.

Whitman asserts that Old Comedy is a heroic form, and the comic hero, in inner structure, is no different from the protagonists of tragedy and epic, sharing "their largeness, their excessiveness, their representative individualism." He then describes in broad outline the distinctive, general qualities of the comic hero, chief and paramount of which is *poneria*, the "ability to get the advantage of somebody or some situation by virtue of an unscrupulous, but thoroughly enjoyable exercise of craft. Its aim is simple—to come out on top." *Poneria* in itself is viewed as a kind of heroism, and a parallel is found in the figure of Karaghiozes, hero of the modern Greek shadow theatre. The grotesque is redefined with emphasis on the complex contained therein of subhuman, human, and superhuman. The heroic vision of Aristophanes, says Whitman, was structured around the quality of *poneria* and this uneasy, but powerful, union of beast, man, and divinity.

Nine plays of Aristophanes (*Ecclesiazusae* and *Plutus* are rightly omitted as not belonging to Old Comedy) are then extensively analyzed, with emphasis centered on the figures of the protagonists but the treatment as a whole including far broader aspects of general plot as well. A summary of headings will give an idea of the categories into which Whitman divides the plays: "City and Individual" (*Acharnians*, *Knights*, *Peace*), "The War Between the Generations" (*Clouds*, *Wasps*), "The Anatomy of Nothingness" (*Birds*), "The War Between the Sexes" (*Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazusae*), "Death and Life" (*Frogs*). These discussions, like the introductory chapters, are uniformly fresh and stimulating, viewing the plays as poetic dramas of heroic fantasy rather than as political or social propaganda. There is a convincing defence of the finale of the *Wasps*. The treatment of the *Birds* is almost brilliantly done, perhaps because Whitman, like many others, considers this play the masterpiece of Aristophanes' genius, a work of "visionary breadth

and encompassing totality," expressing the "full heroic acceptance of nothingness."

In a work as detailed as the present one, with several approaches exhaustively employed, there are bound to be a number of points with which various readers will disagree. The reconstruction of the earlier version of the *Clouds* is almost purely hypothetical and unconvincing, and Whitman's severe criticism and disapproval of the extant version, considered by numerous critics as one of the finer comedies of Aristophanes, is surprising, to say the least. The flat dismissal of all serious literary criticism in the agon of the *Frogs* will probably win few adherents, although there is no question but that there is a deeper meaning implicit in the scene. The ten-page comparison of the art of Aristophanes with that of Dali contributes little to an appreciation of the comedian. The idea of circularity which Whitman finds in the *Wasps* is carried too far and becomes improbable. And this is the one main criticism which might be leveled against the book as a whole. All too often Whitman, in an effort to drive home a theory, stretches and strains his material out of all reason. The grotesque (animal-human-divine, beast-man-god complex), which forms so essential a part of Whitman's comic hero, is an interesting and commendable idea, but it simply does not apply in each and every instance—nor does it need to. Yet the author becomes overly elaborate and subtle in his attempt to make it so apply, until the reader is lost in amazement at the devious ingenuity of argumentation and in the end is less convinced of the validity of the theory than he was when it was first presented. The same might be said of the discussion of imagery. Images are a vital part of all dramatic poetry, but as they are traced in the *Acharnians*, the pattern becomes so cunning as to be improbable. Whitman's theories are perfectly good in themselves; they need not be overworked.

Whitman's own literary style displays, on the whole, the lucidity and grace which have long been claimed as a result of training in the classics. There are many delightfully pointed passages ("Comic heroes, it seems, are made not born. Their careers are the results of decisions framed in desperation and carried out with steadfast paranoia"). At times, however, he becomes precious ("the absurdity of self against the selfless Absurd") and even ponderously obscure (The moral dialectics of nature versus law, and nature versus education "have now found a poetic language, and a truly representative action, by virtue of which their outlines are clothed in a becoming garb; and this poetic texture further allows the opposing antinomies of the intellect to be absorbed into the broader image of the encircling trap of nature"). And on one occasion Whitman himself is transported into the absurd. In the discussion of slapstick humor, the effect upon the spectator of a custard pie throwing scene is described as "a feeling of sublime peace, of an access of knowledge which is true, of a revelation of the essence of things. . . the boundless swings into view, and the yearning which is satisfied is too deep and humane ever to be purged from the human psyche. It is the heroic longing, fulfilling its own metaphor of order, its own order, sprouting wings and deposing Zeus."

These last comments, however, should not be allowed to detract

from the overall value of a work of most considerable merit, a very welcome contribution to the field of Aristophanic study and of literary criticism.

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FRANZ JOSEF WORSTBROCK. *Elemente einer Poetik der Aeneis. Untersuchungen zum Gattungsstil Vergilianischer Epik.* Münster Westf., Aschendorff, 1963. Pp. 268.

This study of the *Aeneid* does not attempt to codify all the isolated techniques and skills which underlie Virgil's art of epic composition. Rather, it brings into sharper focus certain formal elements long recognized as basic in the make-up of the "historical" epic, as refashioned by Virgil. In the Renaissance of the sixteenth century, says Worstbrock in his first chapter, Virgil was considered the prince of epic poets and the *Aeneid* the epic model to be followed. Jerome Vida's versified *De Arte Poetica* (1527) and Scaliger's *Poetice* (1561) are the most notable examples of the "Virgil worship" which prevailed at the time. Later on, especially in Germany, epic theorizing took a new turn and now Herder, Goethe, and the Schlegels elevated Homer to the first rank. But, in both these epic theories, the formal criteria used to canonize or depreciate Virgil (or Homer) were the same: the *dispositio* and the *elocutio* of the respective poems. These were terms taken over from the ancient rhetorical schools and applied, with some changes in emphasis, to poetics. *Dispositio* or "composition" (the architectonics of a poem) means the planned organization of a poem, the linking together of the separate books and of the parts within a book to fashion a poem that is one and entire. *Elocutio* deals with the style, the verbal artistry, the diction. Worstbrock calls these elements *Komposition* and *Sprachstil*, while in modern English criticism the term often used for either or both of these is "form." The trouble with the earlier critics, remarks Worstbrock, was that, while they recognized the novelty of Virgil's composition and style, they based their judgments more on a preconceived, *a priori* esthetic than on a close study of the text. "Only a study that hews close to the text . . . can determine the elements of the epic *Formtypus* fashioned by Virgil. Only such an interpretation is on the way to recognize in Virgil the actual *Neugestalt* of the epic tradition."

The bulk of the book (pp. 26-199) is then devoted to a detailed analysis of three salient elements of the *Aeneid*: 1. Virgil's unique method of functional composition by books; 2. the versification and syntax, with particular emphasis laid on the use of parataxis and enjambement; 3. the role and function of epic epithets and the emotional overtones they evoke. In the last chapter, Worstbrock traces the influence of Virgil's *Gattungsstil* on two famous epic poems, Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered* and Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Making use of the same formal elements as before, he shows that, in essentials, both these poems are strongly Virgilian in character.

Worstbrock is at his best when analyzing passages of the *Aeneid*,

to determine either their function in the composition or their stylistic quality. Under the rubric *Buchkomposition*, he examines the beginnings and endings of many of the books. His general conclusion (pp. 69-73) is that the openings are not primarily mere transitions in the epic action—Virgil is not greatly interested in the linear connection of the outward events—but rather points of vantage from which to look before and after, to sum up the emotional overtones of past events and often to give the *Stimmung* or mood of events soon to come. Especially admirable are his explications of *Aen.*, VII, 1-36, III, 1-12, and V, 1-7. The endings of the books often function as codas, so to speak, which round off the self-contained movement of a book and give a nice symmetry to the whole. So, for example, book V opens with a scene of storm and a dialogue between Palinurus and Aeneas; it closes with a scene of calm on the sea, the loss of Palinurus and the lament of Aeneas. Worstbrock is careful to stress the teleological thrust of the story, the purpose of the *fata*, and the purposeful actions of the hero.

The third chapter is packed with details about Virgil's syntax and versification and calls for slow, patient reading. But it is very rewarding for the insights it yields into the arcana of Virgil's craftsmanship. In the matter of syntax, Worstbrock pays particular attention to parataxis, Virgil's peculiar manner of building up a sentence with a chain of co-ordinate clauses joined together by *et*, *atque*, *-que*, etc. This device he calls "die Grundform des Satzes in der Aeneis" (p. 146). Now why did the poet make such frequent use of this apparently artless form of sentence structure? Mostly, says Worstbrock, to amplify a topic, or to give variety and, above all, vividness to a description. "Parataxis is the style of vividness, because it presents things in the immediacy of their appearance." Similes are a favorite place for this syntactical device; the parallel clauses build up slowly and with growing intensity to a climax. But Virgil's syntax functions always in close harmony with the metrical structure. In this connection, the role of enjambement receives special treatment (pp. 155-9). The run-over line serves to bind the syntactical units together; it relieves the monotony of line-by-line composition, and it helps greatly to put stress on the run-over word(s). One readily recalls the force of *nescius* in IV, 72, of *demens* in VI, 590, and of *dissiluit* in XII, 741.

In the fifth chapter (pp. 168-99), Worstbrock discusses the innovations made by Virgil in the use of epithets. To Ennius and other early Latin poets (including Lucretius), Homer's long, picturesque epithets offered a challenge to go and do likewise. So they strained to lend dignity and weight to their epics by forging Latin compounds (like *altittonans*, *suaviloquens*), formed on the analogy of Homer's sonorous epithets. Virgil shrank from fathering new compounds upon his mother tongue. Some old ones, by now deeply imbedded in the epic vocabulary, he makes use of, as *omnipotens* and words ending in *-fer* and *-ger*. But more generally he reduces Homer's compound words to simple ones: "rosy-fingered" dawn becomes *roseus*; a wood "with twinkling leaves" becomes simply *frondosus*. But, to make up for the undoubted loss in sonority and imaginative richness, he resorted to other means of heightening the stylistic potential of his epithets. To begin with, he

uses a great variety of adjectives (especially color-words) to suggest the dominant mood and atmosphere of a scene. The night of Troy's fall was dark, sinister, fateful: *nox atra cava circumvolat umbra* (II, 360); *per caecam noctem* (397); *obscura nocte* (420). Again, while Homer's epithets more often stress the outward, visible traits of a person ("swift-footed" Achilles, Hector "of the glancing helm"), Virgil's personal epithets suggest rather the moral and spiritual side of an individual (*audax* Turnus, *fidus* Achates, *pius* Aeneas). *Infelix* Dido is dowered by the poet with a great variety of epithets (*pulchra*, *candida*, *optima*, *laeta*, *trepida*, *furibunda*, *nescia fati*, etc.) which accompany her on her luckless, tragic way to the pyre. Finally, Virgil's epithets are often *Gefühlswörter*, emotionally evocative words, like *miser*, *tristis*, *crudelis*, *dulcis*, etc.). In sum, the Virgilian epithets "bind the gestures and appearance of a figure with its inner nature and fate, with a scene, and with the epic action" (p. 199). Virgil, like Lucretius, must often have felt keenly the confining pressure of the *patrii sermonis egestas*. But he discovered ways all his own of transmuting the base metals at his disposal—common, worn words like *magnus*, *ingens*, *vastus*—into poetic gold.

With one exception, the role of symbolism in the *Aeneid* is seldom more than alluded to in passing. But an excursus on Hercules and Cacus (pp. 103-14) stresses the symbolic import of this story. What Hercules accomplished by slaying the monster Cacus, Aeneas will achieve by overcoming the *furor impius* of Mezentius and Turnus. I refrain from commenting on the last chapter where the debt of Tasso and Milton to Virgil is assessed. This field has been well worked over by specialists. Recently, D. P. Harding, in *The Club of Hercules* (Urbana, 1962), finds that *Paradise Lost* is pervaded, both in structure and in diction, by Virgilian reminiscence.

While this book does not open up new vistas or explore critical areas previously untrodden, it does much to sensitize our awareness of what is uniquely Virgilian in the "form" of the *Aeneid*. To this reviewer, probably the most illuminating chapters are those which analyze Virgil's style in minute detail. It is good for us to be reminded every now and then that a poem like the *Aeneid* works its wonders with words, now with "lonely" words (like epithets), now with words woven into curiously effective patterns by syntax and versification. For this reason and for others mentioned in the course of this review Worstbrock's book deserves an honorable place on any shelf of Vergiliana.

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ARNOLD WYCOMBE GOMME. *More Essays in Greek History and Literature*. Edited by David A. Campbell. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962. Pp. ix + 229; frontispiece. 45 s.

Some of the best writing by the late Professor Gomme is to be found in his notes and articles rather than in his great books. For Gomme had a highly individual style, he liked to argue things out his own way, and he loved scholarly controversy. His first volume

of collected papers, *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1937) is a classic, and we are fortunate in having the present companion volume, planned by himself, but edited after his death by Mr. David A. Campbell. It contains, beside a bibliography of Gomme's writings, twelve papers, seven previously published between 1938 and 1954, and five new ones. Together they constitute the most significant papers written by Gomme after *Essays*.

The longest and most important of the reprints is the article entitled "The Old Oligarch," which appeared originally in the Ferguson volume of *H. S. G. P.* (1940). "Athenian Politics, 510-483 B. C.," is the first part of an article entitled "Athenian Notes" (*A. J. P.*, 1944). "Herodotus and Marathon" (1952) attempts to solve two notorious difficulties in Herodotus, the delay of 5-6 days and the absence of the Persian cavalry. "Four Passages in Thucydides" (1951) discusses some Thucydidean statements which may be considered late additions (II, 65, 6-10; 65, 11; IV, 81, 3; VI, 15, 3-4). "Thucydides and Cleon: The Second Battle of Amphipolis" (1954) is a paper not easily accessible before. "Aristophanes and Politics" (1938) vindicates the playwright as a dramatist rather than a political propagandist. "The Working of the Athenian Democracy" (1951) deals primarily with the functions of the *boulê*.

The papers published for the first time are not, perhaps, as significant as the reprints. This is natural, since they are recent lectures not yet worked up into final form. The editor has left them more or less as they were written, but has added a few references and footnotes. The first, "Homer and Recent Criticism" (1957), is to this reviewer one of the weakest. In this Presidential Address to the Classical Association of Scotland, Gomme upholds a strict unitarian view against Milman Parry, E. R. Dodds, and D. L. Page. Unfortunately, Gomme did not understand the theory of oral composition, against which he raises two objections. First, he thinks that Parry and his followers deny individual authorship to the Homeric poems and that they conceive of their composition in terms of memorization (with some improvisation: see pp. 7-8). Neither Dodds nor Page fell into such elementary errors. In Parry's view oral poems are not memorized, but are entirely improvised, each time by an individual poet. Secondly, Gomme objects to the analysts, treating them together with the school of Parry as one and the same phenomenon. Here it is true that Page exhibits a certain confusion (as it seems to this reviewer) between separatist theories and the theory of oral composition, both in his book on the *Odyssey* and his later *History and the Homeric Iliad*. Dodds, however, understood well that the oral theory superseded earlier separatist theories (in Platnauer's *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, p. 16). In fighting the combination of oral and separatist theories, Gomme was attacking a chimæra (pp. 11 f.).

Three other lectures take us closer to the center of Gomme's interests. "Thucydides and Fourth-Century Political Thought"¹

¹ One of the J. H. Gray lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1954 (p. 122); cf. Gomme, *Greece and Rome*, 2d ser., V (1958), pp. 45-51, and H. D. Westlake, *C. R.*, n. s., XIII (1963), p. 320.

is a rather loosely organized speech, in which a comparison is made between Thucydides and Plato. Gomme discusses those passages in the *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, and *Republic* which are commonly cited in the controversy over Platonic indebtedness to Thucydides (cf. now H. F. Cherniss, *Lustrum*, IV [1959], nos. 236-40, and V [1960], p. 585), and he argues that the passages do not prove any such indebtedness. He concludes with a brief consideration of the *Politicus*, where the definition of oratory, like the earlier definition in the *Gorgias*, is influenced by Pericles, but not by way of Thucydides. Gomme does not wish to consider the problem of whether Plato was unaware of Thucydides or pointedly ignored him (see p. 134). It seems to this reviewer that Plato, supposing he knew Thucydides, would have chosen to ignore him, and that this complicates the problem of verbal echoes enormously. In the allegory of the cave Plato allots a fixed place to the Thucydidean statesman among the prisoners whose shackles have not been loosened: "And if there had been honors and commendations among them" (i. e. the prisoners) "which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and coexistences, and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he" (i. e. the philosopher) "would be very keen about such rewards and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them (*ἐνδυναστεύοντας*) . . . ?" (VII, 516 C-D, tr. Shorey). Note that the passage comes shortly before the allusion to the death of Socrates (517 A). It describes thus both sophist and politician, Thucydides' Themistocles as well as Antiphon. This passage is not an imitation of Thucydides, but the very anonymity of the description could be a deliberate slur on the defenders of sophistic and democratic politics, and Thucydides might well be included among them.

"Concepts of Freedom" is a lecture which deals primarily with personal freedom, or the question of human rights in the ancient city state. On p. 144, Gomme analyzes two statements in Nicias' last speech at Syracuse (VII, 69), in which he reminds the Athenians of "their country, the freest of the free" (*πατρίδος . . . τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης*), "and of the right which all enjoyed there to live their own lives subject to no dictation" (Gomme's translation, on p. 144, of the words *τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίκαιαν ἐξουσίας*). The first of these statements is probably misunderstood by Gomme, for in Thucydides the superlative *ἐλευθερώτατος* seems to have reference to imperialism (see J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'imperialisme athénien* [Paris, 1947], p. 74, n. 2). As for the second, there is a slight shift in meaning in Gomme's translation of *τῆς . . . ἀνεπιτάκτου . . . ἐξουσίας*, which could also mean "uncontrolled license." Nicias' statement bears a resemblance to VIII, 68, 4, in which Thucydides couples freedom and imperialism. In desperation Nicias is telling his democratic soldiers, not what he himself believes, but what they most want to hear. Gomme then turns to Plato and finds in the *Crito* a clear statement concerning individual liberty: Socrates' refusal to leave Athens means that as an Athenian citizen he had the right of free movement. The *Crito* is thus an encomium of Athens (pp. 146-7). In Plato's later works Gomme finds a much less

enthusiastic defense of human rights, although in the *Politicus* the right of free inquiry is stressed (*Polit.* 299 B-E). Gomme posits in Plato a conflict between the keen political observer and the philosophical theorist. However that may be (and to the reviewer the dichotomy seems false), the question of an Athenian "bill of rights" cannot now be discussed without taking into account the controversies aroused by E. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven, 1957). In the *Crito*, as well as in other ancient writings, including the *Epitaphios*, individual freedom appears, not as a basic right, but as a concession by the state. Freedom is thus usually defined in a negative way, and is connected with pleasure ("to do as one likes"). The notion of pleasure is the theoretical weakness of liberalism for Plato, and, I feel also, for Thucydides. We must distinguish here between theory and practice: there was no doubt a substantial amount of individual freedom in Athens, but there never was an adequate theory to justify it. In the *Crito*, for example, Socrates describes himself as a good Athenian citizen, and nothing more.

"International Politics and Civil War" bears a misleading title and is a rambling and somewhat obscure paper. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle's failure to mention Thucydides in the *Poetics* or the *Rhetoric*, and then turns to a discussion of Thucydides' treatment of Athenian imperialism. In a digression it discusses the incompleteness of Book VIII and returns to the question of imperialism in both Thucydides and Plato. Finally, the paper ends with praise of Thucydides as a writer and historian. Here the treatment of Athenian imperialism is influenced by an implicit comparison of the Athenian and British empires. As an example, we may cite Gomme's opinion that Diodotus' arguments in the Mytilenean debate were reasonable; this opinion is surely not Thucydidean.

The last paper, "Aristotle and the Tragic Character," turns to another favorite subject of Gomme. He tries to adjust Aristotle's theory of *hamartia* to conform to tragedies like *Antigone* and *Hamlet*, in which the main character shows no *hamartia*, in Gomme's interpretation. He thinks that Aristotle meant to say that "the word *hamartia* does not fit all tragic heroes and heroines, but responsibility for the natural and necessary consequences which follow their choice of action does" (p. 209). This paper is fully discussed by K. v. Fritz in *Gnomon*, XXXV (1953), pp. 327-8.

The essays, published and unpublished, are stimulating and will continue to arouse controversy: in this, I feel sure, their author would take pleasure. The printing of the book is good and on the whole accurate (there are some lapses in Greek). The editing, while tasteful, leaves something to be desired. In reprinting old papers, the editor should bring the bibliography up to date; in printing lectures which were composed for oral delivery, their dates and occasions should always be given, and bibliographic footnotes should be added more fully than has been done here; finally all notes added by the editor should be in square brackets. Yet the editor has simply followed the practice common for such volumes. He has furthermore added two good indices.

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PIERRE BOYANCÉ. *Lucrèce et l'épicurisme*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. Pp. 348; Bibliography. (*Les Grands Penseurs*, Collection dirigée par P.-H. Schuhl.)

The Directeur de l'École Française de Rome here presents what might have been a very useful and valuable work. Although it contains little that is new, it does gather together better than any other book now in print much of the important work in the field, with which the author is well acquainted and to which he has contributed a considerable number of articles. The central part of the book consists of six chapters, each devoted to one book of the *De Rerum Natura*. More important are the three chapters that precede and the two that follow.

In the first chapter, "Lucrèce et l'épicurisme romain," Boyancé points to the two groups of Epicureans in Rome—those who eagerly accepted the doctrine of pleasure as presented to them in Latin and the more learned Greek-speaking school represented by Piso and Philodemus—with neither of which Lucretius seems to have had any contact (pp. 7-12). He discusses the life of the poet (pp. 13-26), and argues that Lucretius' words to Memmius, *patrii tempore iniquo* (I, 41), are conditional rather than temporal and therefore cannot be used as evidence for date (p. 14). His effort to explain why Lucretius dedicated his poem to Memmius, certainly no sympathizer with the Epicureans, is not very successful (pp. 26-32).

Chapter II, "Lucrèce et son maître," after discussing the veneration of Epicurus as a hero, suggests that the prologues of I, III, V, and VI may echo the annual celebrations of the cult (p. 37). On page 54 he describes the *Letter to Herodotus* as a "compendium à l'égard du profane ou du débutant," which contradicts Epicurus' own statement at the beginning of the letter.

In the next chapter, "Lucrèce et son poème," after showing that the taste of the day welcomed popular treatments of scientific subjects in verse, Boyancé makes the interesting suggestion that, in view of Epicurus' attitude toward poetry, Lucretius' use of verse shows that his literary personality had been formed before his conversion to Epicureanism (p. 61). The reply to the theory of Bailey and others that I, II, and V were composed before III and IV is not altogether convincing (pp. 79-83). At times Bailey is misunderstood; and both the argument and, still more, the supporting notes need careful revision.

As indicated above, the next six chapters are devoted to the six books of the poem, each containing a somewhat detailed analysis with discussion of problems as they arise. Much of this is interesting and useful, but little of it calls for comment here. One point I would question is Boyancé's insistence (p. 227) that of the several possible causes for celestial phenomena only one is actually operative either in this world or elsewhere. He ignores Lucretius' statement (V, 527-30) that he is telling what can take place and does take place (*quid possit fiatque*) throughout the universe, and then paraphrases the next two lines (*e quibus una tamen siet hic quoque causa necessessest / quae vegeat motum signis*): "Entre toutes il ne peut y en avoir qu'une, en ce monde ou ailleurs, qui fasse mouvoir nos étoiles," where the words "ou ailleurs" are an arbitrary addition.

Of the two remaining chapters the last, "La gloire de Lucrèce,"

contains little that cannot be found in Hadzsits, *Lucretius and his Influence*, which indeed seems to have been Boyancé's chief source for this portion of the book. Chapter X, "La poésie de Lucrèce," is the most important and most original part of the work. In it Boyancé first discusses the connection between the Epicurean emphasis on sensation as the source of knowledge and the keenness of Lucretius' own perceptions, and the similar connection between Epicurean reasoning by analogy and the poet's use of his imagination (pp. 288-91). This leads naturally to a consideration of the figures used in the poem, especially those drawn from light and darkness, and from sea, rivers, and springs (pp. 291-8). It is then pointed out that in Lucretius we have perhaps the only genius in the history of philosophy who wished to remain a disciple and did so remain without ceasing to be a genius (pp. 299-300). Boyancé then treats the poet's portrayal of emotion, particularly of anguish, and asks how far this represents the feeling of the poet himself, concluding that if Lucretius no longer feels anguish in mind, he at least has a vivid recollection of past suffering, and that Lucretius' zeal for winning Memmius indicates that he himself is not far from the fears he is trying to dispel from another (pp. 300-7). The chapter ends with an excellent discussion of the familiar and the ironic elements in Lucretius' poetry (pp. 307-15).

As I said at the beginning, Boyancé's book might have been a very useful one; but it has serious faults that greatly reduce its usefulness. There is no regard for the convenience of the reader. Both in the Bibliography and in the notes, periodicals are sometimes cited by volume, sometimes by year, and sometimes by both; and where volume number is given, it may be in Roman or Arabic numerals. The same variation between Roman and Arabic is found in citations of classical authors. References to Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, are given in at least three different ways and are not to the latest edition. Footnotes such as "Studies in honor of H. Collitz, Baltimore, 1930, p. 53" (which should be p. 63) with neither author nor paper named are not frequent; more common are those in which a writer's name and a page number are given but the book or article is not named until some subsequent note. Citations of Lucretius are in many forms. For example verse 50 of Book V might be cited in any of the following ways: Ch. V, v. 50; V, v. 50; V, 50; and, where the book need not be mentioned: 50; v. 50; and V. 50 (the last sometimes misprinted as V, 50). In some of the chapters on individual books references are common, in others they are all but completely lacking. Chapter IV has a section A but no B or C; and Chapter V has a section III but no I or II. These are annoyances; more serious are the many erroneous references and inexact quotations. In Chapter X, the most important in the book, there are about 150 references to classical works. Of these at least 25 are incorrect. In this same chapter there are five errors in the 15 lines of Lucretius quoted. Finally, how could any man with an ear for Latin poetry have passed for the press as a line of Ovid (*Amores*, II, 15, 23) what appears on the third page of this same chapter ("La poésie de Lucrèce") in the form

Carmina tum sublimis sunt peritura Lucreti?

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MASON HAMMOND, ARTHUR MACK, WALTER MOSKALEW, edd. T. Macci Plauti Miles Gloriosus. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. vii + 202.

In 1925 the late E. H. Sturtevant published an annotated school edition of the *Mostellaria*. In 1932, in collaboration with F. E. Brown, F. W. Schaefer, and J. P. Showerman, he issued an edition of the *Pseudolus* that followed the same format. In 1933, Mason Hammond and W. Moseley adopted the pattern for a text of the *Menaechmi*. The work under review makes a fourth, as it were, in the series.

Like its predecessors, this edition has a comprehensive introduction (much of it taken unchanged from Hammond and Moseley's *Menaechmi*) covering the nature of Greek and Roman drama, the producing and staging of plays in the ancient world, and Plautus' meters and language and text history. There follows a well-printed text with notes, in double column, at the foot of each page.

Again like its predecessors, the prime purpose of this edition is to provide a text undergraduates can read easily and with enjoyment. It realistically envisages an undergraduate who brings less to the subject than his counterpart of thirty and more years ago: in this text every foot and not just the dipodies bears a written ictus; the grammar is carefully explained; metrical aberrancies are carefully noted. All this is welcome: students need help with Plautus' metrics, and the grammatical material will lighten the burden for poorer students and hence increase their pleasure, and supply a useful review for better students. Equally welcome are the plentiful stage directions and explanations of stage business.

In the three earlier works, the notes, by and large, were lean and meaty, limited to what was more or less strictly needed to elucidate the text. The commentary of the work under review runs almost 30% longer than, e.g., that of Hammond's *Menaechmi*, and the added bulk is not always meat: there is a tendency to pack in miscellaneous information either only peripherally relevant or not really called for (cf., e.g., notes to lines 93, 668, 858, 923, 1014, 1265), and there is some unnecessary speculating on what Plautus may or may not have taken from his original (notes to lines 14, 164, 181, 747, 813). Moreover, much of the expansion of the commentary results from extended treatment of textual matters; despite the editors' wishful thinking (page v), this is material for the teacher or the scholar and would have been better off placed in an appendix.

The extremely full introduction has excellent sections on Plautus' language and metrics; the latter, a model of clear exposition, provides a first-rate introduction to a subject that is often made needlessly overcomplicated. My only cavil is with the section on the nature of drama, where some of the remarks, it seems to me, are either misleading or highly debatable. I wonder whether we can confidently say that Old Comedy "became important only in the second half of the fifth century" (p. 5) in view of the fact that it was an official part of the festival of the Greater Dionysia as early as 486. I would argue vigorously against the view that Aristophanes was "faithful to the old, with no really constructive insight into contemporary problems" (p. 5). And the description

of New Comedy as "dealing largely with the contemporary demi-monde of Athens," as a form of theatre in which "the stage had descended from the heavens of the gods and heroes to the back streets of Athens and had ceased to be 'quite respectable'" (p. 8) does not, I think, do justice to the nature of either Greek tragedy or Greek New Comedy. Greek tragedy deals not with heaven and heroes, but with murder and misery, gall and passion; New Comedy sets its scenes not in back streets, but in substantial upper middle class neighborhoods, and respectability lies at its very heart: its most frequent point is to show what fools these respectable Athenian fathers and sons be.

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GERHARD SCHÖNBECK. *Der Locus Amoenus von Homer bis Horaz*. Köln, Gerd Wasmund, 1962. Pp. x + 328.

This book falls into two parts which have little to do with each other. The first 185 pages have as their aim the compilation of the topoi of the ideal landscape, from Homer to Horace and the wall paintings of Primaporta and Pompeii. The second part, some 120 pages, is devoted to examining ten odes of Horace in light of the tradition of nature and landscape set forth in the first part. The grouping of the topoi in the initial section of the book is a work of industry; the discussion of Horace is a confection of previous scholarship, not assimilated into a new view, and not convincingly related to the preceding chapters of the work. The lamentable lack of an index makes the book virtually unusable for the student seeking to compare, for instance, Sappho's and Theocritus' use of breeze, brook, fountain, river, and so forth. Alexandrian scholarship of our day, aware of detail and blessed with patience, again deceives; this Inaugural-Dissertation assembles many facts, does its homework, and passes its academic requirements, but does not enrich the reader's mind. If it were either a crisp work of reference, or a discursive explication of certain recurring themes in early European literature, it would serve a purpose and find an audience. As it stands, it has many resources (which could be better arranged), little continuity, and no general theory of exposition to which a myriad of details may be referred.

Perhaps the chief defect of this work (which will surely not inhibit its usefulness at the hands of many scholars) is the fact that all of the specifics of landscape, the hills, Zephyrs, the country sleep, the cicadas, are normalized into common recurring elements. Individual motifs are flattened into types and examples. This is surprising in a student who commands and understands so well the modern critical scholarship on Horace. (Unfortunately this work was written before Steele Commager's *The Odes of Horace* [Yale, 1962] was available; also, Viktor Pöschl's latest work on *Bildersprache* will no doubt cover some of this ground.) In his desire to catalogue "von Homer bis Horaz" Schönbeck fails to suggest any differences in the sophistication or economic development of the audi-

ences of Homer and, e.g., Theocritus. A tree for him seems to be a tree, whether or not it is of great economic value or purely ornamental. However, lest one think that the author is insensitive to the individual implications of the texts which he studies, it must be pointed out that he seeks to harmonize his texts with their immediate generic contexts. For example, he says in reference to Plato, *Phaedrus*, 230 B-C: "Ich glaube aber, dass Platon in der Beschreibung dieser Ideallandschaft weniger daran gedacht hat, hier ein Bild der Natur zu entwerfen, das mit dem einer bestimmten Jahreszeit genau übereinstimmt. Viel mehr beabsichtigt er . . . eine ideale Szenerie zu schaffen, die das philosophische Gespräche in dem Raum einer höheren Wirklichkeit stattfinden lässt" (p. 107). To this we may compare his remarks on Theocritus, *Id.* 7, 131-57: "Bevor ich auf die Frage eingehe, in welche Zeit dieses Fest fällt . . ." (p. 114).

What is lost to sight here is that poets do not merely manipulate or juxtapose conventions. They create anew through them, and are liberated by conventions so that they can express what is of moment to themselves and their public. It is dangerous to isolate the canon of an *Ideallandschaft*, described after encountering it in poets of a given literary tradition. It is more misleading still to avoid stating that any ideal landscape worth representing is discovered anew by each poet. He communicates its discovery through conventional means; but the important contours of his discovery are unique and new. To be sure, it is incontestable that the motif of the *locus amoenus* became an "Ausdruck . . . eines umfassenden Lebensgefühls." But what is of significance is what differentiates one poem, one genre, one style of life and letters, from another, rather than what congeals as a topos, running for seven centuries. Would a candidate for the doctorate in English or Romance Philology prepare a thesis on gardens and landscape from the Anglo-Saxon *Chronicle* to Kerouac, or from the *Vie de St. Alexis* to Robbe-Grillet? Schönbeck proposes no less a span for his scope. The conventional elements are surely and completely elicited by Schönbeck's systematic study. They are even minutely divided one from another. For example, in reference to Vergil's fourth bucolic poem, he ascertains "wie das Italisch-Bäuerliche von dem Bukolischen abzugrenzen ist" (p. 150, n. 1). However, these elements' relative importance to one another, their changing role and their specific functions in the texts he cites are not sufficiently explored to balance the space lavished upon interpreting criticisms of some Horatian odes.

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CHARLES GUIRAUD. Les verbes signifiant "voir" en latin. Étude d'aspect. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1964. Pp. 96. (*Études et Commentaires*, XLIX.)

This monograph is devoted partly to the assembling of data from the texts of Plautus, Terence, Lucretius, Catullus, Cicero, Caesar, Sallust, Vergil, Horace, Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid, and partly to the interpretation of the data in relation to questions concerning the aspectual value of verbs of seeing. Greek, the author points out

on the first page, made verbs from three roots relating to vision: **derk-*, **spek-*, and **okw-*. Latin made verbs of seeing from **spek-* and **weid-*, the latter a root familiar in several languages, but with the meaning 'know.' Latin was therefore less close than Greek to the conditions which must be assumed for the parent speech, though Greek and Latin, partly through semantic shifting, each developed several additional verbs of vision, which Guiraud lists at the top of page 8. It might be well to add that the recognition of **derk-*, **spek-*, and **okw-* as the main sources of verbs of seeing in the parent language rests (like so much of the reconstruction of proto-Indo-European, at least among nineteenth century scholars) largely on Greco-Sanskrit agreements.

Guiraud includes in his treatment *cerno*, *considero*, *contemplor*, *lusto*, *servo*, and *tueor*, verbs which secondarily or in part acquired the sense 'see,' but even if he had limited himself to the derivatives of **spek-* and **weid-*, the history of the various forms would still be quite complicated, not only because of the prepositional compounds, but also because of the existence of multiple stem-types from each root: -*spicio*, -*spicor*, *specto*; *video*, *viso*, *visito*. Guiraud does not include a theoretical treatment of the problem of aspect, but he gives references to several works which are important for aspect in Latin, and he lists several pairs of terms applied to the two principal contrasting aspects, which he himself designates through the course of his work as *duratif* and *punctuel*. An additional aspect, of much less frequent occurrence, is the *duratif-résultatif* (pp. 55-6), which supposedly resembles the aspect of the Greek perfect (state achieved after the completion of a process), but which, to this reviewer, seems not clearly enough defined to deserve full recognition. Between *video* and *specio* the aspectual difference is reflected in the fact that the former is only rarely compounded with a prefix, the latter almost never used without one. The disinclination of *video* to make compounds is so striking as to have elicited attempts at explanation from Vendryes and Ernout-Meillet, which Guiraud cites on pp. 8-9. Though somewhat differently expressed, their substance is essentially the same: *video*, unlike *specio*, denoted the fact of visual perception without modifications, including that of *aspect déterminé*, which prefixes would be inclined to impart to it. The almost complete restriction of *specio* to compound forms is associated with its strong predilection for the punctual aspect ('apercevoir'), a feature of its meaning which is all the more surprising in view of the durative aspect which characterized Indo-European -*yo*-stem verbs in general and Gk. *σκέπτομαι*, Skt. *paśyati(-e)* in particular. Guiraud is no doubt right (pp. 56-7) in tracing the origin of the change of aspectual value in Latin to contrast with *specto* ('contempler, être tourné vers,' p. 22), which remained durative even in compounds, but in some of the instances of *circumspicio* (p. 71) we should probably admit the possibility that the old durative aspect of **spek-yo-* had survived, rather than been introduced anew, since *circum-* had too clearly defined a local force to become merely a means of marking punctual aspect. It is also necessary to take account of the tense usage in the relevant passages: *circumspicio* in Ter., *And.*, 357 is "historical" present, but not so *circumspicit* in Cic., *Div.*, II, 72. Occasionally one may disagree with the author's identification of the

verbal aspect in an individual passage, as is natural when dealing with a language where the expression of verbal aspect never developed into a full and orderly system of distinctions. In Catullus, 64, 233 *ut, semel ac nostros invisent lumina colles* the translation is given "Dès que tes yeux verront nos collines, . . ." after a remark that "invisō a le sens pur et simple de 'voir.'" The Budé translation of Lafaye (Paris, 1922) has 'reverront.' Riese (Leipzig, 1884) in his note glosses 'ansichtig werden'; Horace Gregory (New York, 1956) 'Soon as your eyes discern our hills'; E. Stampini (Turin, 1921) 'a quest' occhi tuoi quando i nostri si mostrino collini' with inversion of subject and object but preservation of what I believe is the true aspect. *simul ac* is followed usually by a tense belonging to the perfect system, and it is altogether likely that *invisent* here has the value of *viderint*.

Guiraud closes with a plea for similar studies of other verbs, in the expectation that a comparison of the results might show to what extent aspect in Latin must be admitted or rejected. The suggestion is a sound one, and might well be carried out first by a study of verbs indicating other types of sense perception and of mental activity, before passing on to less closely related semantic categories. Moreover it is to be hoped that Guiraud, having performed a service to Latin scholarship in the present judicious and interesting work, may himself undertake more studies of this kind.

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APEX AND SICILICUS.

The handbooks of epigraphy all assure us that two distinct diacritical marks are found in Roman inscriptions: a phonetic sign, the *apex*, shaped like an acute accent ('), which was placed above a vowel-letter to show that the vowel was long and not short; and an orthographic sign, the *sicilicus*, shaped like a small inverted c or a modern comma ('), which was placed above a consonant to show that the consonant should be doubled (e.g., $\bar{s} = ss$).¹

Such is the canonical doctrine. It represents, of course, an attempt to reconcile and coördinate two different kinds of evidence. Diacritical signs first appear on inscriptions of the last decade of the second century B. C.² But there is no mention of such signs in any extant writer older than Quintilian, and although we may be morally certain that they must have been discussed in many of the lost works of earlier *grammatici*, we have no specific reference to mention of them by any writer

¹ Aemilius Hübner, *Exempla scripturae epigraphicae Latinae* (Beroni, 1885), pp. lxxvif.; René Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine*, 4^e éd. (Paris, 1914), pp. 27 f.; James C. Egbert, *Introduction to the Study of Latin Inscriptions* (New York, 1906), pp. 29 f., 69; John Edwin Sandys, *Latin Epigraphy*, revised by S. G. Campbell (Cambridge, 1927), p. 53; Pedro Batlle Huguet, *Epigrafia latina* (Barcelona, 1946), pp. 26 f.

² Since some transcriptions of the famous *fibula Praenestina* (e.g., Sandys-Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 38) show FHE·FHÁKED, it may be worth while to remark that one needs only to examine the fibula with a good glass to see at once that the engraver, after cutting the second digamma, began to cut an A, and then, perceiving his error, cut the double square of the aspirate over it. That accounts for the supposed apex and also for the two diagonal marks that appear inside the aspirate.

earlier than the time of Nero.³ After Quintilian, we have a few brief references in writers from Velius Longus in the second century to Isidore in the seventh—and half of these references are antiquarian, since the practice of marking letters became obsolete in the third century. These writers, furthermore, do not mention inscriptions; they are grammarians interested in written books, and when they cite evidence at all, it is the evidence of books preserved from ages in which the diacritical signs were in current use.⁴ Furthermore, the pertinent passages in the grammarians were particularly exposed to corruption in the course of manuscript transmission, and we read most of them with editorial emendations, some of which were obviously made to bring

³ Nisus, frag. 5 Mazzarino < Velius Longus, p. 79 Keil. On the probable date of Nisus, see A. Mazzarino, *Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta* (Augustae Taurinorum, 1955), pp. 332 f.; cf. Schanz-Hosius, §475a. It is true that Lachmann and Usener divined that what Terentius Scaurus had to say about the apex came from Varro, but Funaioli, although sometimes extravagantly hospitable to fragments of doubtful authenticity, refused to include in his Teubner edition of the *Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta* (1907) a "fragment" for which there was no evidence at all. Not only does Scaurus make no mention of Varro in or near the passage in question, but it is by no means certain that Scaurus knew Varro's work, except at second (or third or fifth or tenth) hand. I cannot argue the point here, but I submit that a comparison of Scaurus' criticism of Varro's reported criticism of Lucilius (Varro, frag. 272 Funaioli < Ter. Scaur., p. 18 Keil) with a relevant fragment of Lucilius (322 Lachmann = 369 Marx = 10d Funaioli) will convince anyone that something is seriously wrong.

⁴ In the fourth century, Marius Victorinus, speaking of the *sicilicus* (p. 8 Keil), appeals to the evidence, not of inscriptions, but of written books: *sicut apparet in multis adhuc veteribus ita scriptis libris*. He may, of course, have taken that statement from an earlier grammarian, but I do not see that we are entitled categorically to deny that he could have seen documents written in the first century B. C. or even earlier. In the first century of our era, Annaeus Cornutus (frag. 2 Mazzarino < Cassiodorus, *Orthog.*, p. 148 Keil) implied that he had seen *libelli* in which the digamma was used for consonantal V, that is to say, written records older than the so-called *lapis niger* (which is "not later than the fifth century B. C.") and at least coëval with both an inscription which may have the digamma (*C. I. L.*, I², 2658 = *Inscriptiones Italiae*, IV, 1, 1; Degrassi reads the supposed digamma as a mutilated E; cf. his *Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae* [Firenze, 1957], No. 5) and the *libri lintei* that Livy (IV, 7, 2) says Licinius Macer cited for the events of 444 B. C. *Quod neque affirmarim neque negarim*. But I do believe Victorinus; see note 54 below.

the passages into conformity with the canonical doctrine, which they were then cited to support.⁵ It will not be amiss, therefore, to reëxamine briefly the evidence on which our handbooks' dogmatic pronouncements must rest.

The apex is found in thousands of inscriptions, and also in the few surviving papyri and wax tablets, of the last six decades of the Republic and the first two centuries of the Principate, after which it becomes increasingly rare. The innumerable occurrences of it make it obvious that its function was to distinguish long vowels.⁶ That function, moreover, is attested by ancient grammarians, of whom the earliest and most authoritative is Quintilian (*Inst.*, I, 7, 2), who further informs us that *longis syllabis* [!] *omnibus adponere apicem ineptissimum est*, and lays down the rule, also stated by Terentius Scaurus and Isidore, that the apex was to be used only where the quantity of the vowel distinguished between two words or inflections spelled with the same letters.⁷

Quintilian's rule, which is the only one stated by an ancient writer, seems to us eminently sensible. We all agree, surely, that to mark every long vowel in Latin would be, if not *ineptissimum*, certainly *laboriosissimum*; whence it follows that in ordinary writing we should mark only those vowels which distinguish between homographs and thus should be marked *ne legens dubitatione impediatur*, as Scaurus somewhat inelegantly puts it. That

⁵ For glimpses of Buecheler at work with an ax on the texts of Priscian and Velius Longus, see *A. J. A.*, LIII (1949), pp. 253 f., 249 f.

⁶ I note, as a curiosity, that as late as the middle of the last century the obvious was not obvious to the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, whose guess that the apex might mark an "accent tonique" was refuted by P. Raffaele Garrucci, *I segni delle lapidi latine volgarmente detti accenti* (Roma, 1857). The standard work, of course, is the dissertation by J. Christiansen, *De apicibus et I longis inscriptionum Latinarum* (Husumi, 1889), which is now greatly in need of revision and expansion. Why the needed revision would be an Herculean task will be apparent from the meticulous observations of Arthur E. Gordon in his and Mrs. Gordon's *Contributions to the Palaeography of Latin Inscriptions* (Berkeley, Calif., 1957), especially pp. 186 f.

⁷ Scaurus, p. 33 K.: *Apices ibi poni debent, ubi isdem litteris alia atque alia res designatur, ut VENIT et VÉNIT, ARET et ÁRET, LEGIT et LÉGIT, ceteraque his similia*. Isid., *Etym.*, I, 27, 29, uses as an example *pōpulus/pōpulus*. Quintilian's are *mālus/mālus*, *pālūs/pālūs*, and the inflectional -ā/-ā of the first declension.

seems so obvious to us that we tend to assume that Quintilian's rule was *the* rule, and that violations of it merely show that the violators were ignorant or careless. And we do not stop to reflect that our assumption is tantamount to a declaration that *every* surviving specimen of Latin writing containing apices was the work of ignorant or careless men.

If we are daunted by a conclusion so sweeping and drastic, our alternative is to conclude that Quintilian's rule was unknown when apices came into general use almost two hundred years before he wrote, and that the rule, while probably older than Quintilian, was formulated too late to affect a practice that had been established on the basis of quite different considerations and had become habitual.

Quintilian's seems to be a rule of common sense, and although common sense is a rather uncommon faculty in human beings, one risks absurdity when one seeks a source for an idea that could occur to any reflective mind. But I am nevertheless unwilling to dismiss as a mere coincidence the fact that Quintilian's rule is the Latin counterpart of the rule that evidently governed the use of diacritical marks in the famous papyri that have preserved for us some of the works of "difficult" Greek poets, notably Bacchylides, Pindar, Callimachus, and Herondas. Although most, or all, of those papyri were probably written in the second century and are thus later than Quintilian,⁸ Bernhard Laum, in his fundamental (and, I am sorry to say, often neglected) study of *Das alexandrinische Akzentuationssystem*, has shown that those papyri follow a system formulated at a much earlier date. Laum begins, however, by deducing the rule empirically from the usage observed in the papyri, and that rule is that the diacritical marks were to be used only where the reader might be impeded, at least momentarily, by uncertainty as to which of two locutions, identical in spelling but differing in pronunciation, was intended. Usage, he says, shows "daß die Akzentsetzung überhaupt und allgemein zu dem Zwecke

⁸ I find the various arguments for placing the papyri in the second century convincing, particularly in the light of C. H. Roberts' *Greek Literary Hands* (Oxford, 1955), but I see no need for discussing them here. For the purposes of the present study, indeed, if any, or all, of the papyri are as old as the first century A.D. (or even older!), so much the better.

erfolgt ist, an zweifelhaften Stellen Verlesen zu verhüten."⁹ In practice, this means that the markings are used at those points—and only at those points—at which an educated reader might at first sight be confused, even though a careful analysis of the passage might show him that, after all, only one meaning was possible.¹⁰ It is needless to remark that the Greek practice of *scriptura continua* (to say nothing of the loss of the written aspirate and the multiplicity of dialectical forms used by the poets) made such points far more numerous in Greek than in Latin, a language in which words were separated by interpuncts in all but the most slovenly work before the time of Hadrian, and *scriptura continua* did not become common before the third century.¹¹ It is only reasonable to assume that the Greek rule was known to whatever Latin grammarian first formulated the rule for apices stated by Quintilian.

That grammarian's good sense and authority—to say nothing of Quintilian's—must have impressed and convinced a great many Romans, and I am quite prepared to believe that they applied the rule in everything that they wrote or copied with care, just as I think it highly probable that Quintilian applied the rule in his own writing; but no recognizable scrap of papyrus or other material bearing a text so written has survived.

Quintilian's rule, in fact, has *no* relation to any ancient writing that has been preserved to our time—not even a negative one. If we are justified in inferring that what Quintilian stigmatizes as inept, the marking of all long vowels, was a rule or practice followed by some writers of Latin, all specimens of their work also have perished. There is no Latin inscription or other document of more than a few words in which all the long vowels are marked.¹² And on the other hand, as is much more signifi-

⁹ B. Laum, *Das alexandrinische Akzentuationssystem* (Paderborn, 1928), pp. 430 f.

¹⁰ It is true that Doric $\bar{\alpha}$ is sometimes marked where there could be no ambiguity, so far as we can see, but presumably the readers of these papyri appreciated help with dialectical forms; cf. the example given with note 46 below.

¹¹ Cf. *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXII (1951), p. 242.

¹² John C. Rolfe, *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, LXI (1922), pp. 85 f., reported that his exhaustive search had disclosed only two inscriptions in which all the long vowels are marked (with an apex or *I-longa*). Of these, one (*C. I. L.*, VI, 30805a) contains six complete words and

cant, there is no Latin text of any considerable length in which Quintilian's rule is observed even to the extent that *all* vowels that discriminate between words or inflections have been marked.¹³ But in every inscription, papyrus, or wax tablet in which we find apices at all, we find that the greater part of those signs mark long vowels where there was no corresponding form with a short vowel. We even find a very considerable number of apices—too many to be either chance errors by overly enthusiastic lapidaries or blunders by semi-literate writers—placed over diphthongs.¹⁴

the other (XII, 2925), four. In the small fragment of a text of Cicero (*P. Iand.*, 90) that is our only specimen of an ordinary (as distinct from calligraphic) book of *ca.* 20 B. C., the marking is the most thorough that I have seen, but the portions of the text that are not too torn or abraded to make the exact readings uncertain contain nineteen long vowels, of which fifteen are marked and four are not.

¹³ To make this sweeping statement, I have had, in a very few instances, to apply the rule with a legalistic precision that may seem extravagant; for example, I could include the papyrus fragment of Cicero only because the final vowel in the adverb *maxime* is evidently unmarked. I grant that only an extraordinary dunce could mistake the adverb for the vocative *maximē*, but still this is a technical infringement of Quintilian's rule. When one allows infringements because the meaning should be clear from the context, it is hard to know where to draw the line. On the Monumentum Ancyranum, for example, we may grant that in *pagina* I, line 22, ΠΛΥΡΙΣ may be sufficiently identified as accusative plural by the following ΤΡΙΥΜΦΟΣ; in VI, 22, however, the omission (doubtless by the inscriber's negligence) of an apex in QVOQVE misled many modern scholars until the error was pointed out by F. E. Adcock, *J. R. S.*, XLII (1952), pp. 10 ff. But we *could* argue that they *should* not have been misled.

¹⁴ For a conjecture about one such usage, see *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), p. 195; see also note 73 below. We may think it absurd to mark the quantity (or was it *quality*?) of one vowel in a diphthong, but the ancients obviously did not. Not only do we find apices above diphthongs in many good inscriptions of the Imperial period, but the Alexandrian system of accentuation marked vowels in diphthongs as either long or short (!). For example, the text of Pindar from the middle of the second century A. D., *P. Oxy.*, V, 841, not only writes α with a macron and iota adscript (e. g., ΑΦΟΔΙΤΑΙ), but places a breve above normal α, e. g., in frag. 128, ΜΟΙCΑΙΑΙC (= *Mosalaia*, Pindar, *Paean.*, 9, 39 Turyn). To us, the notation ΑΙ or ΑΙ would indicate diaeresis, but obviously the macron and breve did not have such an implication in Greek notation. It follows, therefore, that we should not read our conventions into Roman inscriptions; we have no reason for supposing that a Roman of the first century would have thought it incongruous

In short, so long as we think in terms of Quintilian's rule, we must regard nine-tenths of the apices that we observe in extant texts as completely otiose and utterly useless.¹⁵ And inevitably, although we may be too polite to say so, we regard the authors of those texts as rather stupid.

The authors of those texts simply did not have the purpose which we in our wisdom (after reading Quintilian) think they should have had. The oldest dated inscription with an apex was set in a wall by the magistrates who had authorized and supervised the construction of it; they surely did not mark the long vowel in *mūrum* to avert a suspicion that they had built something called a **mūrus* or a **mūs*! While the author of the noblest of all Latin inscriptions could conceivably have written *ORNAMENTIS* lest some nincompoop think the word derived from *ōrnus*, he cannot have supposed that there was a word **virtūs* from which he needed to distinguish *VIRTVS*.¹⁶ The crafty embalmer of the Roman Republic was a man of some learning and doubtless had secretaries more humane than he; they cannot have imagined that they were averting ambiguity or misunderstanding when they marked the vowels in the very first words of the famous inscription, *RERV·M·GESTARV·M*. One could collect many thousands of similar examples.

The use of the apex in inscriptions makes it obvious that, from the very first, the function of the apex was to show the correct pronunciation of words that, presumably, were sometimes mispronounced in current speech. There must have been *some* rule or principle governing its use by educated and intelligent men

or wrong to place an apex above one of the vowels in a diphthong. Our task is to find out (if we can) what he meant by so doing.

¹⁵ A. E. Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 149, after reviewing the many inscriptions containing apices that he and Mrs. Gordon studied, remarks that "in hardly any of them is it [the apex] really necessary."

¹⁶ Quite apart from its literary and historical value, the inscription usually and falsely called the *Laudatio Turiae* is, in my opinion, our best single text for determining usage. It was set up, at great expense, by a man of high culture as a tribute to a noble and beloved wife, and we may be sure that he supervised the work himself. It is not likely that any serious error in that text could have escaped the author's scrutiny or would have been permitted to stand uncorrected. In contrast, the Monumentum Ancyranum was inscribed in a remote province, where Latin was a foreign language, at the orders of a governor who must have grinned cynically when he read the defunct deity's attempt at self-justification.

(as distinct from semi-literates, who, we may believe, were as capable of gross errors in antiquity as they are today) during the two centuries that preceded Quintilian. Of that governing principle or guiding consideration, we find no mention in any extant Latin author, and I shall not venture to guess whether or not it could not be deduced from the indications in extant inscriptions and the few other examples of contemporary writing. J. C. Rolfe,¹⁷ whose investigation represents the farthest advance thus far made, noted the frequency with which the apex was used to mark long vowels in unstressed syllables (e.g., CŌNSVLTO, CVRÁTIONEM), where, of course, the correct pronunciation was most likely to be lost through correction or corruption. And I suspect that we should be much less supercilious about many apices that seem to us otiose, and about some that we call blunders, if we were less arbitrarily dogmatic in assuming that in Latin a vowel-letter, such as E, could represent *only* two sounds, one short in time and open in quality (ĕ) and the other long in time and close in quality (ē). If we paused to reason either *a priori* or by analogy from the differences that we have noticed in the pronunciation of "Tuscan" Italian in various regions of Italy or in the pronunciation of the vernacular in any large city, such as New York, London, or Paris, we should see the probability that spoken Latin had, in the mouths of some not illiterate speakers, at least, vowels corresponding to the Periclean Greek ε (short and close) and η (long and open). Is it even likely that in the Ciceronian age, for example, the Latin spoken in Rome (to say nothing of the rest of Italy) had only two vowel sounds, ĭ and ī, while Oscan, which was by no means a dead language, had four, viz. open and short (ɪ), open and long (ɪ̄), close and short (ɪ̄), and close and long (ɪ̄̄)?¹⁸ Should we ignore the testimony of Quintilian, who, presumably after hearing the speech of his most cultivated contemporaries, assures us that (in his time) a sound 'intermediate' between e and i was heard in certain common words?¹⁹ And when we know, on the best

¹⁷ In the *Proceedings* cited in note 12 above, pp. 80-98, and in *A. J. P.*, XLVIII (1927), pp. 1-9, Rolfe may have carried the study as far as the evidence permits, but see Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 221, n. 2; p. 227, second n. 1.

¹⁸ C. D. Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian* (Boston, 1904), §§31, 38, 44, 47, 166.

¹⁹ If we take seriously what Quintilian (I, 4, 8) has to say about

authority,²⁰ that there was a very marked difference between the 'urban' and 'rustic' pronunciations of words that are usually spelled with *AE*, can we really be certain that that combination of letters always stood for only one diphthongal sound, and that the fairly numerous persons who placed an apex above it in carefully cut inscriptions were just fools?²¹ It is probable that, at any one time, there were distinct variations in orthoëpy among members of the upper classes in Rome, to say nothing of their wealthy or poor inferiors; and it is not impossible that even in the mouth of one man a given vowel or diphthong had in some words a pronunciation different from that which it was given in others. And the *litteratores* and *grammatici*, if anything, added to the confusion.²² I think it likely, therefore, that many apices

heri/*here*, and then note that in the poets of the Empire from Ovid to Juvenal the scansion seems to be either *herī* or *herē*, a glance at the phoneticians' "vowel-triangle" will show us that the simplest explanation is that the sound lay somewhere between long open *i* (= *ī* prolonged to the time of a long vowel) and short close *e* (= *ē* shortened to the time of a short vowel).

²⁰ Varro, *De ling. Lat.*, VII, 96; cf. V, 97. For this work one should use, in addition to the standard text by Goetz and Schoell, the edition by Roland G. Kent in the Loeb series.

²¹ Even if we disregard inscriptions, we cannot overlook *P. Oxy.*, 30, a small fragment of an important historian (Pompeius Trogus?), which has *PBΔEFFECTI*. This is a scrap from a vellum codex of ca. 100 A.D., when such *livres de luxe* were expensive and presumably produced with care. On the date, see *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXII (1951), p. 241, n. 16, and Jean Mallon, *Paléographie romaine* (Madrid, 1952), pp. 77-80.

²² We know, for example, that some grammarians held that the letter K was an objectionable redundancy; that others taught that it should stand before A (presumably it was their pupils who put *KARISIMVS* and the like on so many inscriptions); and that Velius Longus (p. 7 K.) reports a rule that the letter should be used only before *ā*, thus making the letter a kind of diacritical mark, since if one always wrote, for example, *KAPVT* and *CARVS*, the reader would automatically know that the first *a* was short and the second long. *P. Mich.*, 429, tentatively assigned to the third century on palaeographic grounds, is a fragment of a grammatical treatise that holds that the Latin diphthong should be written *AI* instead of *AE*; that belated disciple of Claudius, whoever he was, did not teach in vain, for we do find *CAISAR* on a Roman milestone of 217-218 A.D., published in *J. R. S.*, XXIX (1939), p. 190. That late example, however, should not lead us to depreciate the earlier grammarians. As a youth, I studied under a very learned man, who insisted that the *w* in 'answer' *must* be pronounced

which we regard as capricious were placed *à bon escient* and for reasons which would be readily intelligible to us, if we knew precisely what pronunciations were current among the author's contemporaries. I shall not be so temerarious, however, as to predict whether or not an exhaustive and critical study of the available evidence would enable us to deduce the rule or rules that must have been in the minds of the person or persons who introduced the use of apices in Latin, and also in the minds of the more intelligent persons who used those marks during the three centuries that passed before they became obsolete.²³

The apex primarily marks a long vowel, but how did it come to be used for that purpose? The name, obviously, merely indicates that it was a distinguishing mark placed on the head of a letter just as an *apex* was placed on the head of a flamen to distinguish him from lesser priests and the laity. We are accustomed to the use of diacritical marks to supplement the alphabet in virtually all European languages; the Romans were not. In all the languages known to them, if I am not mistaken, long vowels, if graphically distinguished from short vowels, were indicated by writing an *h* after the vowel, as in Umbrian,²⁴ or by iterating the letter, as in Oscan,²⁵ or, most prominently, by

to show that word's relation to 'swear.' Linguistically and logically, of course, he was absolutely right: the only thing wrong with his precept is that other orthoëpists teach a quite different doctrine.

²³ I strongly suspect that what we really need (and, alas! are most unlikely to find) is a first-century book—or enough of it to give us a hundred lines or so of continuous text.

²⁴ Numerous examples in the *Tabulae Iguvinae*; see De Voto's edition (Romae, 1940), pp. 64, 70, 76, 79, 82, 87, 94. Note that the usage was not consistent.

²⁵ If Oscan phonology is correctly reconstructed by Buck (*op. cit.*, pp. 102 f.), the gemination shows the length (prolongation) of a vowel rather than a distinction between open and close qualities. The Oscan usage may well have been derived from the earlier Messapic writing, in which gemination was used to show long vowels; see Joshua Whatmough in Conway-Whatmough-Johnson, *The Prae-Italic Dialects of Italy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), II, p. 595. Messapic is also distinguished by "the careful writing of double consonants" (*ibid.*, p. 597), a practice which, according to tradition, was introduced into Latin by Ennius, who was a native of Messapic territory and even claimed descent from the eponymous king. In all probability, therefore, Festus was merely guessing—and mistakenly—when he said (p. 412 Lindsay) that Ennius introduced the doubling of letters in Latin *utpote Graecus Graeco more usus*. Cf. note 78 below.

inventing new letters of the alphabet, such as η and ω , which, in their ancient forms, H and Ω , will incidentally remind us that 'invention' usually consisted of giving a new function to obsolete or unneeded letters. It is not too much to say that in the Mediterranean world in Roman times such 'new' letters were the *normal* means of discriminating between vowels previously represented by a single letter. One thinks of the various innovations in the epichoric alphabets of the archaic period recorded in the recent and magistral work of Miss L. H. Jeffery,²⁶ such, for example, as Sicyonic ∇ for both ϵ and η , which left E free to represent exclusively spurious ϵ . One thinks also of the introduction into Boeotian at a slightly later period of the vowel-letter $\vdash$, which was then borrowed by several Italic languages, including Oscan, and, I believe, eventually (though ephemerally) added to the Latin alphabet by the Emperor Claudius.²⁷ Another example is the final letter of the Oscan alphabet, often represented by $\hat{u}$ in modern transliterations, which was not, as we are sometimes mistakenly told,²⁸ a mere "differentiation" of V, but was taken by the Oscans from older alphabets²⁹ that had utilized as a vowel-letter the otherwise useless Chalcidian χ , Ψ , which the Romans had used to represent a numeral and eventually reduced to the form L.³⁰ We could multiply examples of 'new' letters; many of them represented consonants, rather than vowels, and of that kind of innovation writers of Latin had a clear example in their own letter G. Although tradition

²⁶ *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961).

²⁷ A. J. A., LIII (1949), pp. 249-57.

²⁸ Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁹ On the "East-Italic" alphabets and their priority to Oscan, see Whatmough, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 214 f., 520-7. The same author, by the way, suggests (p. 528, n. 1), as a "possibility to be considered," that the two forms of "East-Italic" A, one with a long, and the other with a short, vertical bar, "may indicate a variation in vowel-length and vowel-quality." That would give us an almost unique instance of real differentiation, but contrast Whatmough's comments on a "marked peculiarity" in the engraving of "East-Italic" script (pp. 525 f.), and on the forms of Ψ at Novilara (p. 213, n. 1).

³⁰ If a Roman did not recognize the Oscan letter as a form of his own numeral, he would have regarded it, not as a "differentiation" of V, but as an inversion of the "colonial Latin" form of A, which appears in a fair number of early inscriptions and evidently remained in use as a symbol for *asses*.

may be wrong in identifying Spurius Carvilius as the heurist, since the letter was almost certainly in use before the year 523/231,³¹ writers of Latin at the time that the apex was introduced cannot have forgotten that innovation in the alphabet, for the old use of C for *g* persisted, at least as a conscious archaism, to the end of the Republic and for some little time thereafter.³²

It would have been logical and in keeping with tradition and precedent for Romans who wished to discriminate between vowel-sounds to 'invent' new letters. A diacritical mark, to be used with existing letters, was a far more startling innovation, and one for which there was really no precedent. Of all the languages of Italy, so far as I know, only Venetic used a supplemental mark, and that was an interpunct that was placed before and after the final letter of a syllable on which the stress accent fell.³³ That certainly could not have suggested either the form or the function of the apex. Diacritical signs were not used in the normal writing of Greek, nor, for that matter, in Punic, and it would seem fantastic to look farther afield.³⁴

It appears, therefore, that the only precedent for the use of a diacritical mark that a Roman of the late second century B. C. could have had before him was the accentuation which, we believe, was used in certain special texts of certain Greek poets, and could therefore have been used in books that could have been brought to Rome by some teacher or student of Greek literature.

³¹ The letter appears on a bronze label in a Northern Oscan dialect found at Rapino; see R. S. Conway, *The Italic Dialects* (Cambridge, 1897), I, p. 254.

³² An interesting example of perhaps official archaism is *C. I. L.*, I², 591, which has *REGIONIBVS* and *PAACO* (= *pago*) as well as some examples of *I-longa*. Of course, the abbreviations *C.* and *CN.* would suffice to remind every literate person that *G* was an addition to the older alphabet.

³³ See R. S. Conway in Conway-Whatmough-Johnson, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, I, pp. 25, 191-7.

³⁴ Conway, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, I, p. 196, thinks it "unlikely to be an accident" that the Venetic system of interpuncts "bears a distinct resemblance" to the accentuation in the Pada-text of the *R̥g-Veda*. One could also find a certain similarity in form between the Latin apex and the Sanskrit *svārīta*, and perhaps some analogy of function between the apex and the *avagraha*, but how, prithee, could there have been any communication, however indirect, between India and Italy, except through the Hellenistic world?

Of such books, unfortunately, there is no surviving trace,³⁵ and when we try to determine what they were like, we must have recourse to papyri of the second century A. D. But although we have no early specimens, Laum has shown with great probability that written accents in Greek go back to the Alexandrian age—not, indeed, to Aristarchus, who disdained such concessions to impatient or unlearned readers, but to Aristarchus' great precursor, Aristophanes of Byzantium. Partly through an analysis of the scholia on Homer, and partly by vindicating the accuracy of the information given in an interpolation found in two late Byzantine manuscripts,³⁶ Laum leads us to the conclusion that "Aristophanes die Zeichen erfand und in die Praxis einföhrte προς διαστολην της αμφιβολου λεξεως."³⁷

At least three of the diacritical signs invented by Aristophanes, the acute, grave, and circumflex,³⁸ were known in Rome in the time of Varro,³⁹ and it is only reasonable to assume that the others, including the macron and breve, were also known, since Laum has shown, with as much certainty as we can hope to attain in default of illustrative papyri from the Alexandrian age, that they were part of Aristophanes' system. And if the signs were known to Varro, we must grant that they could have been known much earlier.

There are, however, very good reasons for denying that the Alexandrian markings could have suggested the Roman apex.

(1) The diacritical signs, although used to avoid ambiguity by discriminating between words or groups of words of identical

³⁵ Laum, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 33-41.

³⁶ This short tractate, sometimes known as Pseudo-Arcadii *De accentibus*, is edited by Laum, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-102. L. Cohn in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. "Arkadios" (II, col. 1155), attributes the little work to a sixteenth-century forger, but, as Laum points out, such a forger would surely have described the Byzantine system which we still use (with slight modifications), and not one of which we had no actual examples before the great discoveries of papyri in the nineteenth century.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 452. Laum's omission of accents in his own writing of Greek incidentally reminds us how seldom we need them for differentiation when the words are separated.

³⁸ A more complicated system was advocated by Glaucus Samius, who used three different kinds of circumflex; see J. P. Postgate, "On Greek Accentuation," *Proc. British Academy*, XI (1925), p. 8, where the three forms of the circumflex are shown. We—or our printers—may be glad that the system did not come into general use.

³⁹ Varro, frag. 84 Goetz-Schoell = 282 Funaioli.

spelling, were signs of prosody, and are so described in all of our ancient references to them. They were devised to facilitate the reading of difficult poetic texts, were not intended for use with prose, and, so far as we know, were never used at all in prose texts before the later part of the second century A. D.⁴⁰ Now it seems very unlikely that a Greek system of prosodic and melic notation would have suggested diacritical marking of vowels in the curt, simple, and strictly factual prose of Latin records.

(2) Aristophanes' system was evidently designed for editions of Homer and extended to some other poets who were equally difficult because they used unusual or dialectical forms. But the system did not come into *general* use. We have enough fragments of Homeric papyri, at least, to be certain that the ordinary copies of Homer⁴¹ had no diacritical signs. Books containing those signs must have been both expensive and rare. To be sure, it is likely that at Rome, where Greek was, after all, a foreign language, the signs were freely used to assist students of Greek literature, just as we know that in Egypt in the fifth century of our era Greek accentuation was provided in texts of Vergil and Juvenal⁴² (but not, it would seem, in prose works⁴³) to

⁴⁰ Even the occasional use of prosodic signs for differentiation in Greek prose texts appears to be late. No signs appear in the Florentine papyrus of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia from the end of the second century (see V. Bartoletti's preface to his Teubner edition, p. viii), and markings were very rarely used by the first scribe of the London papyrus, which comes from the end of the second century or the early part of the third (*ibid.*, p. ix; cf. C. H. Roberts, *op. cit.*, No. 17b). *P. Oxy.*, 1016, a *Phaedrus* of the early third century, has "occasional accents and marks of elision."

⁴¹ E. g., the quite respectable copies of Homer from the late first century B. C. and the first half of the second century A. D. that may conveniently be inspected in Roberts, *op. cit.*, Nos. 9c, 12b.

⁴² In *P. S. I.*, 21 (fifth century), a fragment of a Vergil obviously intended for school children in Egypt, the ictus is marked for each foot and certain long vowels (ἔστ) are marked for meaning. The leaf from a parchment codex of Juvenal (ca. 500 A. D.) published by C. H. Roberts in the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, XXI (1935), pp. 199-209, contains part of the seventh satire with markings that are less systematic and sometimes incorrect (line 183 ends ΟΝΑΤΤΟΣΟΛΕΜ; in 158, ΟΟΕΝΤΙΣ is genitive), but both macron and breve are used (193, ῥῶῤῥῥῥῥῥῥ). Both texts may now be found in Robert Cavenaile, *Corpus papyrorum Latinarum* (Wiesbaden, 1958), Nos. 11, 37. The editor, however, has not transcribed all of the signs that are clearly visible in the plates that accompany Roberts' publication of the Juvenal.

⁴³ In Egyptian copies of Latin texts, the only mark that is used in

help students of a foreign literature. In effect, however, that would have made diacritical marking seem a characteristic of school books and hence even more unlikely as a source of a general practice in writing Latin. It would be as though Americans who learned the international phonetic alphabet while studying French were to start writing, for example, *the:ology* to show the correct pronunciation of that word.

(3) If we waive these objections, a Roman wishing to differentiate vowels in his own language and having Aristophanes' system as a model before him would surely have borrowed for his purpose the signs for long and short vowels, that is to say, the macron and breve, which, so far as we know, always had the forms (¯ and ˇ) that they have retained to the present day.⁴⁴ But although a sign for a short vowel would have been decidedly useful in Latin for purposes of differentiation (so long as *all* long vowels were not marked), there is no indication that such a sign was ever used or even suggested. In every example of τὸ μακρόν that we find in Greek papyri,⁴⁵ it has the form of an horizontal line above the long vowel, e. g., KATEBĀN and ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤĀI (= Ἀφροδίτη).⁴⁶ That would have been the obvious form to use in Latin. (At the time that the apex came into use, there would have been no possibility of confusion with the supralineate bar used with certain abbreviations, since that bar did not come into use before the Imperial age.⁴⁷) But the apex is never found in that form, except in a very few very late and low-grade inscriptions.⁴⁸

prose, so far as I recall, is the macron (sometimes negligently written, so that it resembles a circumflex); that is used but rarely, and then chiefly (though not exclusively) over monosyllabic pronouns (e. g., *P. RyL.*, 477, 2v: ITACONTRĀMĒLLEDICET).

⁴⁴ Except, of course, the odd form of the breve when written above an acute accent in some papyri.

⁴⁵ A quick way to find some examples is to take the available photographic reproductions of papyri of Callimachus and to refer to them from the apparatus in Peiffer's edition, in which such marks are scrupulously reported.

⁴⁶ *P. Oxy.*, 841, containing Pindar, *Paeon*, 5 (lines 13 and 4) Snell = 6 (lines 9 and 2) Turyn.

⁴⁷ Arthur E. Gordon, *Supralineate Abbreviations in Latin Inscriptions* (Berkeley, Calif., 1948), pp. 62 f., found "no good indication of any Republican use" of the bar.

⁴⁸ Cf. R. O. Fink, *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 251 f.; cf. note 100 below.

The pristine form of the apex in Latin closely resembled the Greek sign called *diastole*, and later *apostrophos*, although there was the important difference that the apex was placed above a letter, whereas the Greek sign was placed after all letters except Δ, where some hands fitted it into the vacant space to the right of the triangle. Aristophanes used this sign to separate in *scriptura continua* words which might otherwise be taken as forming a single word; in the *Iliad*, XXIV, 377, for example, it was used in writing ΔΕΞ'ΕΞΣΙ (= δ' ἔξ ἔσσι)⁴⁹ to save the reader from thinking of some form of ἔξεσι. It also marked elisions—not (as you have noticed) all of them by any means, but only those where ambiguity might result or a strong break in sense might be overlooked. A good example on a widely available photographic reproduction may be found in Bacchylides where the papyrus has ΧΛΑΜΥΔ'ΟΜΜΑΤΩΝ for χλαμύδ' ὀμμάτων.⁵⁰ This is, in fact, the mark which, in a changed position, survived until the present century in printed Greek texts in which it was used to distinguish δ,τι from δτι. Such a sign, certainly, would not suggest a mark for long vowels.

Shortly before—or, possibly, after—the fall of the Republic, the apex was *sometimes* written in the form of a diagonal bar (/) of varying length, usually extending over the letter to the right of the one marked, and thus resembling the Greek acute that is generally found in our papyri. Apart from the obvious fact that a later form cannot explain the origin, we need only remember that the acute marked a rising pitch or tone and had nothing to do with the length of the vowel or diphthong over which it was placed.

It therefore seems highly improbable that the Alexandrian diacritical marks could have been a source of the Latin apex.

If, now, we turn to the other epigraphic sign mentioned in our handbooks, we find a comparable difficulty in accounting for its origin—and a greater uncertainty regarding its use, because it is so comparatively rare. Whereas there are many thousands of examples of the apex, I should be astonished if the total number of extant examples of the *sicilicus* exceeded a score.⁵¹ There are,

⁴⁹ Laum, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

⁵⁰ See Plate I in Jebb's edition (Cambridge, 1905); in Snell's editions, the line in question is *Dith.*, 18, 54.

⁵¹ I speak, of course, of the sign used above letters, and therefore

however, enough examples to support the definition given in our handbooks⁵² by showing that the mark was indeed used to indicate double consonants, as was stated by the handbook's primary source, Isidore, who says that the *veteres* "ubi litterae consonantes geminabantur, sicilicum superponebant, ut CELA, SEŖA, ASERES."⁵³ Inscriptions of the late Republic and early Augustan period do show SABELIO for *Sabellio*, OŖA for *ossa*, MVMIAES as the 'archaic' genitive of *Mumma*, and possibly VETIVS for *Vet-tius*.⁵⁴ The sign may also have been used to show the gemination

disregard the *sicilicus* that expresses the fraction $\frac{1}{48}$ and measures derived therefrom, and I also disregard the similar sign that is used as a mark of punctuation.

⁵² To which add Oskar Viedebantt in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *s. v.* "sicilicus": "Es ist in der älteren Schrift . . . als Zeichen der Konsonantenverdoppelung verwendet worden."

⁵³ *Etym.*, I, 27, 29; we must either restore the mark in Isidore's examples, as I have done, or emend to read *ut* <in> 'cella,' etc. Isidore is the basis for the emendations in Velius Longus, p. 80 Keil: *quia iuxta productam vocalem <geminata> consonans progredi non soleat, et quoniam antiqui non geminaverint <consonantes>, sed loco geminationis notam superposuer{u}<i>nt*. This is part of a statement reported by Velius from Nisus (= frag. 5 Mazzarino). The text of Velius, which reached us in a single manuscript now lost, is extremely corrupt; cf. A. J. A., LIII (1949), pp. 249 f., 256 f. From what precedes the quotation above, it seems clear that Nisus, though doubtless a pedant attempting to restore some antiquated usage, had perceived a linguistic phenomenon in the early development of Latin, the reduction of original *ss* to *s* after a long vowel or diphthong, that is recognized in modern reference works (e. g., Leumann-Hofmann, §160; Kent, *Sounds of Latin*, §165.iv). It is not likely, therefore, that he was the complete fool that the text of Velius, as it appears in Keil's *Grammatici Latini*, makes him seem.

⁵⁴ Respectively, *C. I. L.*, I², 2212 (cf. V, 1361); VI, 21736; X, 3743; VI, 28668 (cf. Hübner, p. lxxvi). In the last of these, the editors of the *Corpus* read VETIVS, assuming that the mark, which appears four times above the family name but over no other word, is an apex displaced to the right of the vowel. It should be noted, however, that use of the sign to show double consonants was evidently most common, or persisted longest, in personal names, as in two of the three examples given above, and as in *all* of the examples (Annius, Lucullus, Marcellus, Mummius) given by Marius Victorinus (p. 8 Keil, with my correction).

Victorinus' testimony is unimpeachable, for if Osann and his successors, instead of deciding that fourth-century grammarians who claim to have seen old books are liars, had devoted two minutes of serious

of abbreviations that stand for plurals, e. g., $\acute{m}$ (instead of mm) for *menses*, and $\acute{v}\acute{v}$ for *virgines Vestales*.⁵⁵

For the use of a mark superimposed to show the doubling of a consonant, I know of no precedent in any Italic or 'Pre-Italic' dialect, in Greek, or, for that matter, in any language that could even remotely enter into consideration.⁵⁶ It must be a coincidence that the Latin sign resembles in shape the Greek *diastole*, which we have already mentioned, and an even greater coincidence that there are a very few occurrences of that mark in papyri of the fourth century or later (when the Alexandrian system of marking had passed from current use⁵⁷) in which the sign seems to be used within a word to separate double consonants or, at least, two gemmas, although it is hard to guess why anyone should have wished to separate them.⁵⁸ It is signifi-

thought to the text, they would have recognized at once what *vetus liber* Victorinus had before him. It was a table of consuls, and Victorinus, beginning with the year 601/153, found in three successive years $\mathbf{ANIVS}$, $\mathbf{MARCELVS}$, and $\mathbf{LVCVLVS}$. Then, to find another name that contains a double consonant, he ran his finger down the list to 608/146 and found $\mathbf{MVMIVS}$. Victorinus' *liber* probably was an old one. In the Capitoline Fasti, double consonants are written in full, although an archaism is preserved in $\mathbf{AIMELIVS}$ (which may have been a "family" spelling).

⁵⁵ E. g., *C. I. L.*, VI, 27556, 32414, 32418. Of course, the mark is also used (by misunderstanding?) above abbreviations that cannot signify plurals.

⁵⁶ Even the Sanskrit *anuvāra* would be a very remote analogy; it shows that the consonant above which it stands precedes a consonant (from which it is separated by a written or unwritten vowel) before which should be read a nasal of the same class as that consonant. Only where the second consonant is itself a nasal would the *anuvāra* indicate gemination—and in such collocations it is extremely rare.

⁵⁷ On the "Verfall des alexandrinischen Systems," see Laum, *op. cit.*, pp. 453-68. V. Gardthausen, *Griechische Palaeographie*, 2. Aufl. (Leipzig, 1913), II, pp. 397 ff., cites two examples of the *Häkchen* from a papyrus of 236 A. D.

⁵⁸ Laum's best example is a woman's name in a fragment of Sappho (95 Lobel-Page = 95 Reinach = 97 Diehl), $\Gamma\mathbf{O}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}$ (*sic*; I correct what must be one of Laum's very rare typographical errors by reference to the critical editions and the transcript by Blass and Schubart in *Berliner Klassikertexte*, V). This is from *P. Berl.*, 9722, which all authorities place in the seventh century A. D. and which contains *no accents* at all. The next example, $\mathbf{CAAIHITOC}$, is from *P. Oxy.*, 1080,

cant that we never find the *diastole* thus strangely used in conjunction with the normal Alexandrian accents, but even if we grant what is highly improbable, that that use was part of Aristophanes' system and thus known to Romans of the Republic, it would remain unlikely that a mark used to separate or distinguish double gamma (and, possibly, other double consonants) would have been used in Latin to show that a consonant written but once should be read as though it had been written twice.

The specific Latin name for the mark, *sicilicus*, will not help us. Although it is not found, so far as I know, in any extant author older than the fourth century,⁵⁹ the term is doubtless much older, and could well have been applied to the mark when it was first introduced. But *sicilicus* is obviously derived from *sicilis*, and thus properly designates a sickle-shaped mark.⁶⁰ The

of the fourth century, which, as Laum should have noted, is not a poetic or even literary text; it is a leaf from a "pocket-size" Christian codex that contained the Book of Revelations. There are no accents, but a few marks of elision (e.g., ME[̇]TEMOT). Such examples certainly do not prove a connection with Alexandrian accentuation. Laum's half-hearted suggestion that the sign may distinguish Π' from Π would make it no more of a diacritical mark than the dot over our *i* or the two dots over *iota* in Greek uncial and minuscule hands.

⁵⁹ Marius Victorinus, p. 8 K.

⁶⁰ On the derivation, see the latest editions of Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet, *s. v.* The only argument against that derivation is the scansion *sicilicus* in the late and barbarous verses *De ponderibus* (*Anth. Lat.*, 486 Riese), which is sufficiently explained by the corruption of *sicilis* to *sicilis* in vulgar Latin, whence came the Romance derivatives. The derivation of the word from Σικελικός, with the suggestion that the latter may have some relation to the Semitic shekel, proposed by Viedebant in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *s. v.* "sicilicus," is simply fantastic. The coincidence of weights noted by Friedrich Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (Berlin, 1862), p. 111, where the derivation is suggested (cf. 2. Aufl. [Berlin, 1882], p. 145, n. 3), is meaningless. At any time after Rome acquired Sicily—to say nothing of the time of Nero!—one would expect local standards to accommodate themselves to those of the dominant power. The real source of that notion, I feel sure, is the typical Mediaevalism found in some of the late and interpolated manuscripts of Isidore, *Etym.*, I, 27, 29: *Sicilicus, quia in Sicilia inventus est primo*. Friedrich Osann, *Analecta critica* (Berolini, 1816), pp. 13 f., may be pardoned for taking that passage seriously, for he found it in what was in his day a reputable edition, but the manuscripts which contain the insertion are so obviously adulterated that Lindsay does not even mention them in his, the first critical edition of Isidore (Oxonii, 1911).

term was applied to the mark either directly, because it was originally shaped like a sickle and appears in that form until late in the Republic, or indirectly, because it resembled the arithmetical symbol that gave its name, somewhat oddly, to the fraction $\frac{1}{48}$.⁶¹ It would obviously be idle to speculate whether the direct or the indirect derivation of the name is the more probable, so long as we know neither (a) when the term was first applied to the mark, nor (b) when the arithmetical symbol first came into general use.⁶² But whatever the respective dates, it is clear that there could be no relation of meaning between an arithmetical fraction and a sign to show gemination of consonants. The only possible relation is the purely adventitious one that the symbols were similar or identical in shape.⁶³

The origin of the *sicilicus*, therefore, remains as obscure as that of the apex. Could both riddles have been created by our preconceptions?

Although, as we have noted, there are examples which show that the *sicilicus* was used to mark double consonants, there are two considerations which should arouse very serious doubts concerning the definition in our handbooks, viz.:

(1) If we accept the doctrine stated in the handbooks, we must regard at least half of the extant examples of the *sicilicus* as errors. In those examples, the mark is used to show either (a) a consonantal *v* followed by a vowel *ū*: *SERVVS*, *SERVVM*, *VLVS*, *SALVM*; ⁶⁴ or (b) gemination of the vowel *ū*: *SVM* for *suum*,

⁶¹ But other small fractions, *scriptulum* and *siliqua*, have names that have no numerical significance.

⁶² I think it a reasonable assumption that by the First Punic War, if not earlier, Roman surveyors and engineers would have needed to use—and hence write—so common a fraction as $\frac{1}{48}$. The standard system of notation of fractions was obviously in current and familiar use before 649/105, when it is used without apology in the specifications for the construction authorized in *C. I. L.*, I², 698. It is true that the smallest fraction in that inscription is ϵ (*semuncia*), but surely by that time it was necessary to express half of that amount. So far as I know, however, no example of such earlier notation has been found.

⁶³ A fairly good analogy is our word 'solidus,' which we use in typography and generally to designate the diagonal bar (/), although, strictly speaking, that is a misnomer except when the bar is used as the sign of a unit of British money.

⁶⁴ Respectively, *C. I. L.*, XII, 1598; XII, 2522; XIII, 1880; XII, 3499. In the last, note that the mark in both occurrences has the same form as the apex in *VENIRE* and *IRE*.

AEDŪS for *Aedrus*, and AEDITŪS.⁶⁵ It is obvious that in such occurrences the sign indicates that the *letter* should be doubled, regardless of whether it represents a consonant or a vowel.

(2) The *sicilicus* is not a sign that can be identified by its shape. In some occurrences (which we have shown by ' above) it is distinctly sickle-shaped, but in others (') it is not. There is *no* example of this mark that can be distinguished from an apex by any criterion other than its presence above a letter that is not a long vowel.

Although we conventionally represent the apex by printing an acute accent above the letter, every epigrapher—and, for that matter, everyone who has examined a few inscriptions from the great age of Rome—well knows that, with only rare exceptions, our printing misrepresents the shape, the size, and the position of the apex. In only a very few inscriptions⁶⁶ do we find apices that resemble acute accents in shape and proportional size, and even these are seldom directly above the letter. As a generalization, it is safe to say that *most* apices are more or less curved, vary in length from about half the height of a letter to more than the height of a letter, and are displaced toward the right of the vowel they modify. For a quick conspectus of the varieties of apex found in early post-Republican inscriptions,⁶⁷ the reader will find the excellent photographs in the Gordons' *Album of Dated Latin Inscriptions* even more convenient than the drawings in Hübner, and in less than five minutes he will have recognized at least six distinct forms of the apex, all slanting upwards toward the right and usually displaced toward the right, but differing in length, curvature, and shape, viz.:

(1) a short, straight mark that does resemble an acute accent, e.g., No. 9 (line 35), VISÓLVS; No. 28b, ÉVOCATVS.

⁶⁵ *C.I.L.*, III, 371; XII, 3325; VIII, 12652. Cf. note 100 below.

⁶⁶ One of these, the inscription on the base of the obelisk now in the Piazza del Popolo (*C.I.L.*, VI, 701 = Hübner, No. 52), has had a very great influence; it not only passed into the handbooks as a stock illustration, but has been read by virtually every literate visitor to Rome since the sixteenth century.

⁶⁷ In the Gordons' *Contributions*, p. 148, commenting on the stones shown in their *Album*, I (Berkeley, 1958), A. E. Gordon notes that "there is great variety in the shape and size of the apex in our Augustan-first century group—short to long; straight, curved, hooked; almost horizontal to almost vertical; shallow to deep cut, . . . and often varying within the same inscription."

(2) a comparatively short, curved mark, e. g., No. 33a, FLÓRVVS; No. 28a (line 3), ÉMISSA.

(3) of medium length, with approximately the curvature of our sign *v*, but, of course, inclined, e. g., No. 28a (lines 7, 9), CLEMENTIÁ, DOMVS; No. 112 (line 9), IVLIVS.

(4) very long, moderately curved, with a distinct hook at the top, e. g., No. 28a (line 2), ÓRNAMENTIS; No. 35 (line 11), NÓNO.

(5) long, approximating in shape and comparative size our numeral 7, e. g., No. 36 (line 13), CÓGI.

(6) long, straight, approximating our diagonal /, e. g., No. 36 (line 10), FÁRI; No. 39 (line 7), SACRÁVIT.⁶⁸

All of the foregoing examples, of course, are post-Caesarian. They do not include the form of the apex that was most common in Republican times.

The oldest precisely datable occurrence of an apex to mark a long vowel is MVRVM in a fragment which bears a date equivalent to 104 B. C.⁶⁹ That apex is a sickle-shaped mark with the sickle in approximately vertical position and displaced toward the left (not right) of the center of the v, so that the bottom, or handle, of the sickle joins the upper left of the letter. It is virtually identical with the sickle-shaped apex that was placed, some sixty years later, in the phrase DIVO IVLIO on a pedestal that most visitors to the Vatican galleries will have seen and will remember.⁷⁰ That inscription, which cannot be earlier than 45 B. C.,⁷¹ is the latest *datable* example of an apex in the form of a vertically placed sickle that I can call to mind. It would

⁶⁸ The reader will have noticed that, for example, the first four varieties occur in No. 28, where, presumably, they are the work of the same *designator* and, perhaps, the same stone-cutter.

⁶⁹ *C. I. L.*, I², 679; cf. X, 3780. Note, from the editors' comments, that the drawing in Ritschl's *Priscae Latinitatis monumenta epigraphica* (Tab. LXIIIc) is not reliable.

⁷⁰ *C. I. L.*, I², 797; Gordons, *Album*, No. 4.

⁷¹ Caesar officially became a god before his death; see Lily Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, Conn., 1931), pp. 268 f. The date of the tribunate of Rufrenus, one of the more obscure *fantoques* used by the Dictator to manipulate the *faex populi*, is still uncertain.

seem that, for some reason, the form that was common under the Republic became obsolete soon after the Romans began their descent into servitude.⁷²

Now, one inscription from the late Republic⁷³ used the sickle-shaped apex in such words as $\overset{\curvearrowright}{A} \overset{\curvearrowright}{P} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \overset{\curvearrowright}{A}$, $\overset{\curvearrowright}{F} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{C} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{T} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{D} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{C} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{M}$, $\overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{R} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{P} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{T}$, $\overset{\curvearrowright}{O} \overset{\curvearrowright}{R} \overset{\curvearrowright}{N} \overset{\curvearrowright}{A} \overset{\curvearrowright}{T} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{M}$, etc., but employed another method of indicating long vowels in the phrase $\overset{\curvearrowright}{M} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \cdot \overset{\curvearrowright}{D} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{C} \overset{\curvearrowright}{O} \overset{\curvearrowright}{R} \overset{\curvearrowright}{A} \overset{\curvearrowright}{A} \overset{\curvearrowright}{T} \cdot \overset{\curvearrowright}{S} \overset{\curvearrowright}{T} \overset{\curvearrowright}{O} \overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \overset{\curvearrowright}{A}$, in which the verb is obviously the rare contraction of the third-person singular perfect (*decorât* for *decoravit*).⁷⁴

⁷² One consideration, of course, may have been the amount of space above the line occupied by a sickle-shaped apex of the kind seen on the pedestal mentioned above; in any line but the first, this would force wider spacing of the lines than would otherwise be necessary. There may also have been an aesthetic objection to a mark so prominent. On a coin of 45 B. C. (*C. I. L.*, I², App. 345), which has the name $\overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \cdot \overset{\curvearrowright}{F} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{R} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I}$, the sickle has been reduced to a gentle curve that prolongs upward the left stroke of the v. Presumably, the *sicilicus* as the sign of a fraction, although standing vertically on the line in place of a letter, was also reduced in size and curvature. In an inscription of 81 A. D. (*C. I. L.*, VI, 2059), as will be apparent from the excellent photograph in the Gordons' *Album* (No. 144), the signs showing the fraction are neither larger nor more curved than apices of the third variety in my list above, and are only slightly larger than the curved apex in $\overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \overset{\curvearrowright}{V} \overset{\curvearrowright}{C} \overset{\curvearrowright}{O}$ in the same inscription.

On the other hand, the sign for the fraction is of the same height as normal letters and as curved as an 'antisigma' in an inscription of ca. 77 A. D. reproduced in André Piganiol's *Les documents cadastraux de la colonie romaine d'Orange* (Paris, 1962), to which Professor James H. Oliver calls my attention. Indeed, the lapidary seems to have made no clear distinction between the *sicilicus* that stands for a fraction (e. g., p. 340, T4 and T5) and the reversed C that stands for *centesima* where interest-rates are reported (e. g., p. 371, T55; p. 374, T60).

⁷³ *C. I. L.*, I², 1570; it is unfortunate that the stone was not preserved, but fortunate that we have independent transcriptions. The use of the apex over supposedly monophthongal *ei* may seem bizarre, but see note 14 above. Note that the apex appears in $\overset{\curvearrowright}{B} \overset{\curvearrowright}{O} \overset{\curvearrowright}{N} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{S}$ (= *bonis*) and $\overset{\curvearrowright}{D} \overset{\curvearrowright}{O} \overset{\curvearrowright}{M} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{N} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{S}$, but not in $\overset{\curvearrowright}{I} \overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \overset{\curvearrowright}{L} \overset{\curvearrowright}{E} \overset{\curvearrowright}{I}$ (nominative plural). The sound need not have been the same. Lucilius (323 Lachmann = 369 Marx = 10d Funaioli) specifically assures us that the final vowel-sound in the nominative plural, which he writes *illei*, is (or should be) *pinguius* than in the dative singular, *illi*. I know that it is usual to dismiss Lucilius' observations as *vertilos* wherever they contravene modern theories of uniform linguistic evolution, but, after all, he was there and we were not.

⁷⁴ As in Lucretius, I, 70; VI, 587.

That reminds us, of course, that the earliest method of indicating long vowels in Latin was by gemination of the letter, obviously in imitation of Oscan, which, in turn, probably derived the practice from Messapic. Our handbooks, to be sure, dogmatically declare that gemination of vowel-letters was invented by the poet Accius (170-ca. 35 B. C.), although no ancient source says anything of the sort, unless made to do so by drastic emendation. Our best single authority, Quintilian, explicitly says that the usage was much older than Accius.⁷⁵ The *only* other ancient writer who indicates a date for the usage seems to say that gemination was practiced by the very founders of Latin literature, Naevius and Livius Andronicus.⁷⁶ It would be absurd to speculate about the possible sources of an implausible statement in the corrupt text of a fourth-century grammarian, but when we remember that the grammarian was interested in the usage exhibited in old books, not inscriptions,⁷⁷ we may note that the writers who most needed to distinguish long vowels graphically were those who imposed quantitative metres on a language in which verse had always been accentual.⁷⁸

What our ancient sources do say is that Accius advocated the gemination of vowel-letters according to a system that is not

⁷⁵ He says (*Inst.*, I, 7, 14) *usque ad Accium et ultra porrectas syllabas geminis . . . vocalibus scripserunt*, which I take to mean that the more ancient usage lasted "down to the time of Accius and for some time after his death."

⁷⁶ The text of Marius Victorinus (p. 8 K.) is undoubtedly defective. I read:

Accius, cum scriberet 'anguis,' †anguies†, 'angul{e}<u>s,' <***> imponebat. Idem nec Z litteram nec Y in libros suos rettulit <***> qui{a}, quae ante fecerant Naevius et Livius, cum longa syllaba scribenda esset, duas vocales ponebant, praeterquam quae in I litteram inciderant: hanc enim per E et I scribebant.

In the first lacuna, of course, was lost a reference to Accius' system of writing *gg* to represent the *agma*. In the second, there must have been some transition from consonants to vowels, and probably some statement of Accius' system, which was then compared with earlier practice. Of course, there may be further corruption; *quae inciderant* is particularly suspect.

⁷⁷ Notes 4 and 54 above.

⁷⁸ Ennius the poet would have had the best of reasons for writing *De litteris syllabisque* and *De metris*. Whether there was a grammarian of the same name is, as Schanz-Hosius remark (§39a), "sicher problematisch."

employed in extant inscriptions. Here again, our handbooks report as eternal truth the efforts of Ritschl, Buecheler, and others to hammer the texts of the grammarians into conformity with the gratuitous notion that Accius was the *auctor* whose prestige determined epigraphic usage. Just because oo is very rarely found in inscriptions, we are told that Accius did not—or probably did not—think of geminating that letter because it does not occur in the Oscan alphabet. And because EI so frequently represents *i* in Republican inscriptions, we are assured that that must have been Accius' idea, too. Therefore, he advocated gemination of only A, E, and V! I am reminded of the comment that Mommsen impolitely made in a quite different connection: "*haec igitur addent qui volent collectaneis de incredibilibus philologorum.*"⁷⁹ For all of our ancient references to Accius' system imply, and our second best extant source specifically states, that what he advocated was the gemination of *every* long vowel in a Latin text⁸⁰—and since there is no inscription in which that is done,⁸¹ the only legitimate deduction from the evidence is that Accius' precepts, though doubtless observed by himself and others in writing on papyrus that perished long ago, were not followed in any engraving on stone or bronze that has survived to our time. And since our sources not only agree that *Accius geminatis vocalibus scribi natura longas syllabas voluit*,⁸² but further agree in giving no hint that any *vocales* were excepted, they say—and presumably mean—that Accius advocated gemination of all five of the Latin vowel-letters, including, of course, the letter I.⁸³ To be sure, that means of indicating

⁷⁹ *T. Livii Ab urbe condita lib. III-VI quae supersunt in codice rescripto Veronensi* (Berolini, 1868), p. 208.

⁸⁰ Velius Longus, p. 55 K.: *nec Accium secuti sumus semper vocales geminantem ubicumque producit syllaba.*

⁸¹ Gemination seems to have been used with the same apparent inconsistency as the apex; in this respect, at least, Quintilian was right in saying (I, 4, 10) that the *veteres: geminatione . . . velut apice utebantur.*

⁸² Terentius Scaurus, p. 18 K.

⁸³ That seems startling because we have been nurtured on the accepted dogma, which has passed into virtually all accounts of the development of the Latin language. For example, Leumann-Hofmann (§8) state categorically that Accius did not geminate I, and Roland G. Kent, *The Sounds of Latin* (Baltimore, 1940), §22, i, not only assures us that "Accius . . . advised EI as a spelling to show length of *i*," but ex-

i is not common in inscriptions: there are very few clear examples from the Republican period,⁸⁴ and probably the number of unimpeachable examples from high-grade inscriptions of the early Empire does not exceed a hundred,⁸⁵ but those examples suffice to prove that there was nothing unnatural or outrageous about that means of representing *i*, and, as we have already said, Accius' rules were not consistently followed in any inscription. It is simply fantastic, therefore, to equate his precepts to whatever was most commonly done by his contemporaries on the comparatively few bits of stone and bronze that have come down to us. Despite the rarity of geminated *I* on Republican inscriptions, that form of notation must have been generally known and accepted by the time that Cicero's Pythagorean friend, P. Nigidius Figulus, recommended its use to distinguish inflections.⁸⁶ He urged that *amicī*, for example, should be written AMICĪ (or AMICI) when genitive singular, and AMICIĪ (or AMICII) when nominative plural.⁸⁷

The oldest example of a geminated vowel-letter than can be precisely dated is the stock example in the handbooks, PAASTORES, from an inscription of 132 B. C.,⁸⁸ in which it may be worthy of note that, as in so many later examples of the apex, the long vowel is indicated in an unaccented syllable. There are, of course, many other examples, including inflectional endings, such as the ablatives FAMAA and MAGNAA in an inscription of 102 B. C.⁸⁹

plains what was in Accius' mind when he did so. But the statement rests *only* on (1) Ritschl's certainty—see his *Opuscula philologica* (Lipsiae, 1878), pp. 142-63—that the writers of Republican inscriptions must have been doing what Accius told them to do, and (2) a rewriting of the passage I quote in note 76 to make Victorinus agree with Ritschl.

⁸⁴ *C. I. L.*, I², 594, ii (SACRIIs); 2388 (INGENViIs). When the two vertical marks are of the same length, as in 370 (IVNONII), it is always assumed that we have the "cursive" form of E.

⁸⁵ Excluding DIIs, DIIs, DIIs, which are, of course, very common. For some examples of gemination in other words, see below, Appendix, note 23.

⁸⁶ Frag. 10 Funaioli < Gellius, XIII, 26, 4.

⁸⁷ All traces of *I-longa* in the quotation from Nigidius would, of course, have been lost in the manuscript transmission of the text of Gellius.

⁸⁸ *C. I. L.*, I², 638.

⁸⁹ *C. I. L.*, I², 2662; cf. Sterling Dow, *Harvard Stud. Class. Philology*, LX (1951), pp. 81 ff.

The handbooks state that the gemination of vowel-letters became obsolete about 75 B. C., and on that point they do not contradict Quintilian, who says that the usage passed into desuetude some time after the death of Accius. The statement, however, is not exactly true. The usage survived for centuries after that date, and is sporadically found in inscriptions whose authors cannot be suspected of antiquarian affectation. Gemination was certainly not an archaism when, shortly before the destruction of Pompeii in 79 A. D., a relatively high-class prostitute advertised hopefully her professional name as SPEES,⁹⁰ and the author of a satirical scribble, who uses the cursive form of E, wrote FVIIIIRII for *fuēre*, although he used an apex to mark a long O.⁹¹ The latest datable example of gemination of the vowels A, E, O, and V that I have noticed is TOTIVS EXERCITVVS, which must belong to the period between 222 and 235 A. D.,⁹² although there are occurrences that seem to be as late as the fourth century (AARA, AARAM).⁹³ The latest datable example of the gemination of any vowel that I have noticed is VII IGNIS·CONSVMPRAS in an official inscription that is later than 312 A. D. and earlier than 323.⁹⁴

On the whole, however, it is true that in the last decades of the Republic the indication of long vowels by gemination of the letter was gradually superseded by a more compendious notation, which, so far as we can tell from extant inscriptions, was almost as old. Instead of writing the vowel twice, the engraver cut it but once and placed above it a sickle-shaped sign that was identical with the sign that indicated the gemination of consonants.

The reader will have anticipated the conclusion which, in my opinion, should be drawn from the evidence before us: the *sicilicus* as a special "Zeichen der Konsonantenverdoppelung" is

⁹⁰ *C. I. L.*, IV, 5127. The lady may have wished to show that she was not unlearned, for she advertises herself as *moribus bellis* and charges a fee four times greater than that demanded by some of her neighbors.

⁹¹ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1939.

⁹² *C. I. L.*, VI, 230.

⁹³ *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, LXI (1937), p. 418. In estimating the date, note the adjective *memoriaeus*.

⁹⁴ *C. I. L.*, III, 4121. The gemination is not a stonecutter's error; cf. V, 5795: VII IGNIS·ABSVMTVM; XIV, 113 (196 A. D.): VII·TEMPEST(atis)·CONFRACTAM.

just a philological myth. And so, for that matter, is our usual conception of the apex as a diacritical mark invented by some learned grammarian⁹⁵ for the specific purpose of distinguishing long vowels.

At some time before 104 B. C., some man or *collegium* introduced a graphic symbol for which, so far as we know, there was no precedent in any language likely to have been known in Italy. The function of the sign was purely graphic and, so to speak, mechanical: it indicated that the letter above which it stood was to be read twice. The purpose of the invention was probably the quite utilitarian one of saving space and time in writing.⁹⁶ The mark was accordingly used above both consonants and vowels without regard for the nice linguistic distinction that a double consonant was to be pronounced twice, whereas a geminated vowel was to be pronounced but once, though protracted in utterance.⁹⁷

Since we have no reference to the mark before the time of Nero, we really do not know what it was called when it first came into use. We have no reason for doubting, however, that it was early described in terms of its function as the *geminæ fractionis nota* or *signum geminandi*⁹⁸ and also, with reference to its shape, as a *sicilicus*.⁹⁹ How much before the time of Quintilian the term *apex* came into general use, we do not know. Even a guess concerning the likelihood that the term came into

⁹⁵ Usener, *Rh. Mus.*, XXIV (1869), p. 107, thought that the apex had been invented by Nigidius Figulus, who must have been a mere child (or unborn!) in 104 B. C., the date of our earliest example.

⁹⁶ This would be particularly important in such things as a consular list, in which it would be desirable to place the full names of both consuls on one line, but a rough calculation will show that a continuous text in which the *nota* is used for all long vowels and double consonants would be about fifteen per cent. longer, if gemination were used instead of the mark.

⁹⁷ This difference, however, may have something to do with the comparative rarity of the mark above consonants. Long vowels, furthermore, are more frequent in Latin than double consonants.

⁹⁸ Of course, neither *geminatio* nor *geminandi* is attested in this sense at so early a date, but the verb *geminare* is used by Lucilius (330e Lachmann = 381 Marx = 13 Funaioli) of the doubling of a letter.

⁹⁹ I assume that the word must be as old as the sign for the fraction $\frac{1}{4}$; cf. note 62 above. Of course, the origin of *that* sign is obvious: the Greek antisigma, which served as a sign for one-quarter of an obol, just as a *sicilicus* is one-quarter of an *uncia*.

use early would have to be based on a preliminary determination of (a) the probability that Romans would have applied the word to a sickle-shaped ornament on the head of a letter, and (b) the earliest date at which the mark was used with little or no curvature. Neither determination seems feasible at the present time. It is easy to see, however, that *apex* would (1) tend to replace *sicilicus* as the similarity to a sickle became less and less obvious, and (2) tend to replace *geminatiois nota* as the grammarians began to speak of the mark as the indication of a long vowel rather than as a notation of gemination.

Although the use of the term *apex* was the source of our confusion, it is unlikely that the ancient grammarians were themselves confused. No ancient source says *explicitly* that there were two different signs; that is a conclusion that we have read into our texts because we drew it from the too concise statement of Isidore, who tried to condense into three sentences the information he derived from his doubtless respectable and accurate sources. In the first sentence he mentions use of the apex to discriminate (as Quintilian directed) between homographs. In the second, he speaks of the apparently unconnected custom of the *veteres*, who used a *sicilicus* instead of writing a consonant twice. Had he at that point spared a few words to indicate what the *veteres* did with vowels, we should never have been misled. But instead, he completed his section with his third and final sentence, which, when interpreted strictly, is strictly accurate: *Veteres enim non duplicabant litteras, sed supra sicilicos adponebant, qua nota admonebatur lector geminandam esse litteram.*¹⁰⁰ It did not

¹⁰⁰ Velius Longus, p. 8 K., defines the *sicilicus* as a *signum geminandi* which was placed *supra litteram quam geminari oportebat*. He does not limit its use to consonants, although, to be sure, he mentions it in connection with the use above consonants.

An illustration of the use of the *geminatiois nota* may be found in *O. I. L. Supplementa Italica* (= *Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei*, 1888), Romae, 1884 [sic], No. 732, in which an almost horizontal mark appears above EXIGVS (*exiguus*), CASSVS (genitive), and NVMI (which is probably an error for NVMI = nummi, although a variant pronunciation and spelling, *numus*, cannot be excluded, since the derivative word, *nummularius*, is spelled with a single *m* in *O. I. L.*, VI, 9706, 9714, 9744, 33875). The date of the inscription, which contained fifty-four or more lines of verse, is uncertain. Buecheler thought it not later than the time of the Antonines. It could be earlier. The metrical and syntactical errors may be explained by the passions of the author, who

matter whether the *littera* represented a vowel or a consonant.

Here, as so often happens in studies of a remote or even a recent past, we must reason from admittedly fragmentary data. But until the gods vouchsafe us more evidence, we must use what we have. And that evidence, as it now stands, requires us to wield Occam's razor and slice off two distorting excrescences that now disfigure handbooks of epigraphy and histories of the Latin language: the special vowel-sign and the special consonant-sign. There was only a *germinationis nota*.

APPENDIX

I believe the foregoing to represent a conclusion that is as certain as any conclusion that must be based on incomplete data. In what follows, I indulge in speculation, constructing an hypothesis for which I can offer no concrete support other than a few indications that are too ambiguous to be called data. This I offer, *faute de mieux*, only because discussion of the apex seems to call for some mention of a complementary sign in Latin epigraphy, the *I-longa*.

Considered *a priori*, that sign is a remarkable and even improbable innovation. In the very early Latin inscriptions, the relative size of a letter had no significance.¹ Indeed, given the great irregularity of the lines of writing, which may have been dictated by aesthetic considerations as much as by lack of mechanical skill,² only an extreme variation of size would have been noticed by a reader. When mechanical regularity in engraving became both feasible and pleasing, two styles emerged, both of which should have excluded the *I-longa* as a significant symbol. In one style,³ the aim is to place all letters between two

curves an unfaithful wife whom he had earlier honored with a statue; the poor workmanship and crude engraving are sufficiently explained by the author's statement that the aberrant lady defrauded him of all his property.

¹ On the so-called *lapis niger*, for example, the O in QYOI (line 1) is half the size of the same letter in QYOS (line 7).

² In the well-known epitaph of L. Cornelius Scipio, the son of Barbatus, (*C. I. L.*, I²: 8-9), we cannot claim that technical skill was wanting to make the large painted letters of the first two lines at least as regular as the smaller incised letters of the subsequent lines.

³ *C. I. L.*, I², 49, may be the earliest certain example.

horizontally ruled lines, thus making all letters of the same height and precluding on aesthetic grounds the protuberance of I (or any other letter) above the upper line. The alternative style, in which occasional letters are made taller than others either to please the eye or to lend emphasis to a word, is illustrated by the first words of *Caput LXXII* of the *Lex Vrsonensis* of 44 B. C.: QVOTCVMQVE·PECVNIAE·STIPIS·NOMINE·IN·AEDIS·SACRAS·DATVM·INLATVM·ERIT. . . .⁴ In such a context, a tall I could have no significance as a sign of linguistic or phonetic value.

There was, furthermore, a special reason why, of all the letters of the Latin alphabet, I was the *least* suited for discrimination through mere tallness. An abnormally tall A, E, O, or V could have been easily recognized as a special symbol, but so long as cursive writing continued to use II for E, the only way of distinguishing the combination *ii*, so common in Latin, from *e* was by making the second letter I taller than the first. And in the cursive style, furthermore, wherever the combination *ei* occurred, the only way to avoid puzzling the reader, at least momentarily, was to make the I taller; thus we find, for example, VIIICINIII (*veicinei* = *vicini*).⁵ Although cursive E is only rarely found on inscriptions after the third century B. C., it presumably remained in common use in ordinary writing on wax tablets and the like, and was therefore probably the reason why there is a distinct tendency on inscriptions to write two *i*'s as II rather than as II, which might be mistaken for a symbol for *e*. Thus a tall I as an indication of a long vowel was a peculiarly inept and ambiguous device.

But although it is easy to prove that the Romans should not have tried to use a tall I to represent *i*, they, as a matter of fact, did do so. It is a symbol of considerable antiquity. The oldest precisely datable example of it is EIVS from 111 B. C.,⁶ but the

⁴ *C. I. L.*, I², 594.

⁵ *C. I. L.*, I², 2540. We must assume that "cursive" E remained in use on business documents and the like throughout the period in which we are interested; it appears, for example, on a Dacian wax tablet of 139 A. D. (*C. I. L.*, III, p. 937), as in the first line: FVILLAM.

⁶ *C. I. L.*, I², 585 f. There is no reason, therefore, for doubting that the symbol was known to, and used by, Lucilius, who is believed to have died ca. 652/102. Velius Longus, p. 56 K., says *alii vero, quorum est item Lucilius, . . . in iis quae producerentur alia per I longam, alia per*

presence of the symbol there could have been a reflection of the cursive usage of which we spoke a moment ago. There seems to be no doubt, however, about the indication of the long vowel in *PLAS* in an inscription which may also come from 111 B. C. or may be one year or twenty-two years or even twenty-four years older.⁷

When we speculate concerning the possible origin of so inept a symbol, for which, again, there seems to be no precedent in other languages, we wonder whether tall I could have been a simplification of a *geminatiois nota* placed over an ordinary letter (i). So far as I know, however, we can adduce in support of such a surmise only the following:

(1) A milestone of 132 B. C. bears the name of the consul, P. POPILLIUS.⁸ The mark has the shape of a comma, and while it is not so large and conspicuous as the sickle-shaped apex in *MVRVM* and other early examples that we mentioned above, it could be such a mark adapted in size to the narrowness of the letter above which it stands. The mark is certainly not an upward prolongation of the I, since it rests on the top of that letter, which is finished with distinct serifs. Ritschl, rightly, rejected the inscription as an example of *I-longa*,⁹ while the editors of the *Corpus* dismiss the mark as an accidental chipping or a flaw in the stone, since it obviously does not conform to the *ductus* proper to a tall I.¹⁰

(2) An inscription purportedly set up in a remote village in 58 B. C., written in oddly archaic Latin, and evidently engraved

Et I notaverunt. Ritschl, characteristically, changed *longam* to *solam* to make Velius agree with him.

⁷ *C. I. L.*, I², 673; see the editors' commentary for a list of possible dates.

⁸ *C. I. L.*, I², 637; shown in Ritschl's *Prisc. Lat. mon. epig.*, Tab. LIV, but somewhat more clearly in the volume of *Tafeln zu F. Ritschl's epigraphisch-grammatischen Abhandlungen* (Leipzig, 1878), Taf. XIII, a-A.

⁹ *Opuscula philologica*, IV, pp. 355 f., 368-75, 382-5. He saw that the mark looked like an apex, but since only someone "der in epigraphischen Dingen nicht genug zu Hause wäre" could believe that a Roman could have known about such things in 622/132, he decided that the mark must have been added by some mischief-maker.

¹⁰ Of course, it doesn't. That is precisely what may make this stone, which is twenty years older than our oldest dated example of an *I-longa*, particularly significant.

by a stonecutter who certainly did not understand the text that he was trying to copy on stone, has thirty-seven occurrences of the letter I surmounted by a roughly circular dot.¹¹ This dot was placed above about one-third of the total number of I's in the text without the slightest regard for the length of the vowel (one finds, for example, *idvs*, *hoivs*, *vtei*, *peqvnia*, *erit*). In that context the mark is meaningless, but unless we are dealing with a modern mystification, someone in the ancient village must have believed that it was elegant to place marks above the letter I. And, so far as I can see, the only thing that could have suggested such an idea was the kind of mark that appears in *POPILLVS*.

(3) The well-known fragments of the *Carmen de bello Actiaco* found in Herculaneum were necessarily written before 79 A. D. and after 31 B. C. There are some tenuous reasons for supposing that the date is near the earlier limit.¹² In that papyrus, according to Hayter's apographs on which we must now principally rely,¹³ *ī* was indicated in two distinct ways: by a tall letter and

¹¹ *C. I. L.*, I², 756. Mommsen (see his comment on IX, 3513) decided that the points were added by a later hand. I grant that they seem meaningless, but, in fairness, we must note that every instance of the dotted I could be matched with a tall I in some inscription somewhere in the *Corpus*; cf. note 52 below.

¹² The roll was part of the collection that included the works of Philodemus, and it seems to be generally assumed that the latter were copied during the lifetime of Philodemus, who was a member of the Epicurean circle that included Rabirius, the poet to whom the latest editor, Giovanni Garuti (Bologna, 1958), attributes the poem. The most that can be inferred from that is that if the papyri of Philodemus are as old as is generally supposed, it is possible that the copy of the Latin poem was also a century or more old at the time of the eruption of Vesuvius.

¹³ Hayter's apographs have been criticized—nay, denounced—by Mallon, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 174 f., because Hayter, working with a sharp pencil, drew the letters in outline without showing their *ductus*. That is true, but Hayter was preserving a text, not producing an illustration for a handbook on palaeography; and a careful examination of Mallon's own Plate IV will show that Hayter did not misrepresent the shape of the letters. He copied the papyrus fragments soon after they were unrolled at Naples and before they sustained severe damage; see Garuti's edition, p. xvi, and Walter Scott, *Fragmenta Herculaneusia* (Oxford, 1885), p. 9, n. 3. The accuracy of Hayter's patient work will be apparent from Theodore Gomperz's edition of *Philodemi De ira* (Lipsiae, 1864),

by a letter of normal height surmounted by a vertical mark hooked at its upper end. The latter form is far too common to be merely a correction of an error made by writing a normal I in place of a tall one. In the best preserved fragment,¹⁴ there are two clear instances of tall I (VENENI, LAQVEIS) against four of normal I surmounted by the vertical mark (CERVICIVS, LIBIDINE, ARTIS, PRESSIS).¹⁵

(4) As is well known, there are fairly numerous inscriptions in which a normal I with an apex above it is used as an alternative to, or substitute for, a tall I.

The foregoing indications certainly do not prove that the tall I as a symbol for *i* had its origin in a *geminatiois nota* placed above a normal letter. Obviously, therefore, unless better evidence should be forthcoming from new discoveries or reexamination of extant Republican inscriptions,¹⁶ my suggestion must remain merely an hypothesis.

Inscriptions are texts written by a great many persons of widely varying degrees of literacy and among whom even the best educated had received their training from *grammatici* who taught different systems of orthography.¹⁷ The texts were incised by lapidaries of widely varying degrees of conscientiousness and skill, and furthermore followed different "styles," even within the confines of a single workshop on approximately the same day.¹⁸ Inevitably, therefore, whatever generalization we may make to explain observed usage will be subject to exceptions which must be attributed to ignorance, negligence, or, occasionally, conscious eccentricity. But, *ceteris paribus*, the explanation

in which Hayter's copies, lithographically reproduced, may be compared with the readings of the subsequent Neapolitan apograph.

¹⁴ Hayter's Plate F (in the appendix to Scott's *Fragmenta Herculanensia*) = frag. VI Garuti = *Anth. Lat.*, 1, 44-52.

¹⁵ Probably also TENVĪ. The long vowel in *immersis* seems to be represented by a normal I; that in *venis* may or may not be tall.

¹⁶ The Gordons have shown (*Contributions*, pp. 186 f.) that in such details the *Corpus* (alas!) is not infallible; a new study would have to be based on ocular inspection of the stones or, at least, carefully made squeezes.

¹⁷ Cf. note 22 above.

¹⁸ A clear example in the Gordons' *Album*, Plate 20; cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), p. 197.

which leaves us with the fewest exceptions of that kind is, I believe, the most probable.

On two previous occasions, I have attempted to list the uses of tall I,¹⁹ which I have described as a "distressingly polysemous symbol." Let me try again, using the categories and examples that I used before, but with additions, chiefly from occurrences that I previously regarded as mere blunders.

According to the present hypothesis, there are two different kinds of tall I, viz. (a) the letter that is made tall where two I's (whatever their phonetic value) occur together, to avoid the ambiguity that was possible so long as cursive II represented *e*, and (b) the tall I that is a simplification of the letter with a *geminatiois nota* (i) that indicated gemination of the letter (whatever the resulting phonetic value). We are speaking, of course, of significant letters. We must be prepared to encounter, but cannot hope to explain by rules, (c) the letter I made tall, as were other letters, for emphasis, symmetry, or variety. Thus in an official Republican inscription which reads *INGENVIIIS QVI AD SVBFRAGIA DESCENDVN'T*,²⁰ the initial I is no more significant phonetically than the final T. This accounts for *IMPERATOR*, *ITEM*, and similar occurrences of tall I, which have been exhaustively studied by the Gordons,²¹ who conclude that "individual taste and preference seem to determine practice."

We may accordingly summarize the uses of tall I thus:

A. Tall I appears in the combination II (sometimes Ii), which represents:

(1) normal *i*, as in *ingenuis* in the inscription quoted above and in the very common forms *diI*, *diIs*, and *diIs*.²² A few other examples are *SACRIIs*, *LARIBVS AVGVSTIIs*, *FATIIs*, *LENTVLIi*,

¹⁹ *A. J. A.*, LIII (1949), pp. 255 f.; *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), pp. 195 f.

²⁰ *C. I. L.*, I², 2388.

²¹ *Contributions*, pp. 192-9.

²² Assuming, of course, that, as is generally believed, the pronunciation was monosyllabic; see E. H. Sturtevant, *Contraction in the Case-Forms of the Latin io- and iā- Stems and of deus, is, and idem* (Chicago, 1902). The other examples of this spelling strengthen the view that those forms of *deus* were monosyllables. So far as I can see, there is no way of proving that *diis* could not have been a common pronunciation, but surely no literate person could ever have said *ingenuis*!

DIVIL, SYBIL (= *sūbi*), CVRIIS (from *cura*), QVIL, and SVILS,²³ to which we should probably add IPSILVS.²⁴

(2) *i* as the second member of a diphthong plus a following consonantal *i* (*j*), as in CVILVS, ELIVS, ELIVS, POMPEILVS.²⁵ We are here dealing, of course, with what appears to have been a common, if not standard, spelling of the Ciceronian age, for we know, on the authority of Quintilian, that Cicero wrote *aio*, *Maia*, etc., and Caesar appears to have commented on the spelling *Pompeii*,²⁶ which presumably represented the pronunciation *Pompēijī*; what we are not told is which of the iterated letters they made taller than the others.—It should be noted that although the two ways of writing the double letter seem to be mere variations, the form ELIVS would suggest that tall *I* was the proper sign of a diphthong (see B, 5 below), while the form ELIVS would suggest that it represented *j* (see B, 6). As I shall suggest in the latter connection, it is possible that the spellings COILVX and COILVNX should have been included here.

(3) *i* + *j*. I now feel fairly certain that the most reasonable explanation of the common spellings of *prius* and *pius* on inscriptions, which seem to indicate that the vowel was long (cf. B, 3 below), is that these words were commonly (if not universally) pronounced with a *j* following the short vowel. Such a sound was originally present, if we may trust the linguists who give **priyos* and **puɛyos* as the original forms,²⁷ and it is

²³ Respectively, *C. I. L.*, I², 594, lxxii (44 B. C.); VI, 36809 (2 B. C.); VI, 30975 (1 A. D.); XI, 7285 (before 10 A. D.); VI, 9005 (43 A. D.); VI, 29896 (hexameter); XIV, 2888; XIV, 2780 (middle of first century); *ibid.*

²⁴ *C. I. L.*, VI, 2042, 38 (58 A. D.); one could think of a pronunciation *ipsijus* on the analogy of *huijus*. but that seems improbable.

²⁵ *C. I. L.*, II, 1953; 4157; 1953 (c. 1065: EIVS); IX, 3748.

²⁶ Caes., frag. 15 Funaioli < Prisc., I, p. 14 K. Priscian says specifically that the form is genitive and trisyllabic. So far as I know, this form has not been found on inscriptions, although the parallel feminine form is not uncommon (e. g., II, 1960: POMPEILAE). By far the most common spelling of the masculine genitive is *Pompei* (with or without a tall *I*), and even POMPEII (VI, 1824) is comparatively unusual. Likewise, the common genitive of comparable family names is *Coccei*, *Fontei*, *Luccei*, etc. See note 32 below.

²⁷ Ernout-Meillet and Walde-Hofmann, *s. vv.*; Kent, *Sounds of Latin*, §181.v.

noteworthy that the Oscan equivalent of the dative *pīo*²⁸ is, if expressed in the Latin alphabet, either *pīhjoī* or *pījōī*.²⁹ The stem-vowel, whether close or open, was certainly short in Latin. I am particularly impressed by a good inscription in which *PIIA*, nominative plural, appears in an hexameter in which it must be scanned as dissyllabic with the first syllable short and the second long.³⁰ To the author, who, although no poet, was certainly not illiterate, the second syllable must have sounded in such a way that he could take it for a diphthong. And unless we postulate some sound outside the known range of Latin phonetics, the pronunciation underlying that writing must have been *pīja*. We shall return to this point below.

(4) genuine *ii*. Presumably the combination could have been used to represent *īi*, as in *abiit*, but I can find no instance in which the combination need be dissyllabic rather than monosyllabic, as in one of the examples given under (1) above. In the expression of *īi*, this form of tall *i* cannot be distinguished from the normal *i-longa*, except when the usual order is reversed, as in *AVSPICIS* and *II* (nom. pl.).³¹

B. Tall *i* as a simplification of *ī*, and hence representing a geminated letter, duplicates the uses of the combination we have just discussed. It represents

(1) normal *ī*, as in *VIKIT*, *DIUI*, etc., probably including *IPSIUS*. This, of course, is its most common and notorious function.

(2) the *i* of a diphthong plus *j*, as in *CVIVS*, *ELVS*, *POMPEIVS*, *MAIA*, *MAIOR*. We may include here, although the usage does not seem entirely consistent, the genitive *POMPEI*.³²

²⁸ Conway, *Italic Dialects*, No. 175, b. Oscan, of course, is not Latin, but Sturtevant, *Pronunciation of Greek and Latin* (Philadelphia, 1940), §116 f, regards Oscan forms as acceptable evidence when their indications agree with those of Romance derivatives. Although the *i* in *pīus* was certainly short, it could have been more close than normal *ī*, and that would adequately account for the Romance derivatives.

²⁹ On whether *h* had significance in the Oscan spelling, see Buck, *op. cit.*, §83a.

³⁰ *C. I. L.*, VI, 20502.

³¹ *C. I. L.*, I², 594; XIV, 4508. I assume that the latter is the equivalent of the older spelling *II* (e. g., I², 593, 24).

³² *Monumentum Ancyranum*, pagina VI, 37-8. Although Horace (*Carm.*, II, 7, 5) has the vocative *Pompeī*, it seems scarcely possible

(3) $i + j$. If the explanation suggested above is accepted, we shall no longer have to convict of ignorance the authors of inscriptions that have PRIOR, PRIVS, and PIVS. Although PIS-SIMVS and PISSIMVS³³ are mere variants, it may be worthy of note that in the latter, strictly speaking, the tall letter stands for $j\ddot{i}$.

(4) genuine $i\ddot{i}$. Here again I find no certain example of $i\ddot{i}$, but tall I for $i\ddot{i}$ is not rare, being found in the plurals of family names, such as IVLI, AELI, CLODIs, SERVILIs,³⁴ and of common nouns, such as FILIs, VIs (from *via*), and COLLEGIs (from *collegium*).³⁵ Whether it is also found in the nominative plural pronoun, I,³⁶ will depend on whether the pronunciation could have been $i\ddot{i}$.

To the foregoing, which may be regarded as proper for a symbol representing a geminated letter, we must add two usages that must be derivative:

(5) the i of a diphthong with no j following, as in DIOICESI, HVIC, DEINDE.³⁷ This could have been readily, and indeed logically, suggested by the usage noted under A, 2 above.

(6) the consonant j , as in IANVARIVS and CONIVNX.³⁸ Here, of

that a dissyllabic genitive was intended by this, the common spelling, which is certainly anomalous, if the pronunciation was *Pompēij*; cf. note 26 above. I do not know whether the analogy of family names in *-ius* could have produced a differentiation between the genitive singular and the nominative plural of names in *-eius*. *C. I. L.*, XIII, 2036, a good inscription of probably the early second century, in which the genitive of *ingenium* is INGENI, has VIREI as the genitive of Vireius, but VIREI for the nominative plural.

³³ E. g., *C. I. L.*, VI, 15454; XII, 816. Cf. Gordons, *Contributions*, p. 191. The superlative, of course, is determined by the positive, which appears in the form PIVS at least as early as 80 B. C. (I², 733).

³⁴ Gordons, *Album*, No. 112; *Inscriptiones Italiae*, IX, 1, 26; *C. I. L.*, X, 3851; V, 3425.

³⁵ *P. S. I.*, 1183 (a carefully written document of 47-48 A. D.); *C. I. L.*, VI, 3509; XI, 6520.

³⁶ *C. I. L.*, IX, 1618; XIV, 4449; 4503.

³⁷ *C. I. L.*, I², 2663; X, 3943; VI, 32386.

³⁸ The Gordons, *Contributions*, pp. 194-200, have analyzed the occurrences of tall I for j and i . Since there are comparatively few Latin words that have an internal j , most of the occurrences of the consonant are in initial position, and it is very hard to tell when the tall letter was really intended to indicate a consonant rather than the respect or emphasis that is presumably indicated when it represents initial i , as in IMPERATOR.

course, there can be no question of gemination, and the usage must be explained either as an independent one, which seems improbable, or as a derivation from a "correct" usage. A symbol for *j* at the beginning of a word was quite unnecessary, of course, since initial *I* is always a consonant when followed by a vowel, except in a very few foreign words. In a medial position, however, discrimination of the consonant was, perhaps, desirable in some common words, especially *coniunx* and compounds of *iacio*. In the absence of real evidence, one can conjecture that the usage arose when the *n* of *con-* was lost before *j*, producing a sound that could be spelled *coi*.³⁹ Thus we find on what is evidently a very early inscription⁴⁰ the form *COIVCI*, in which the double letter could have been quite properly indicated in the form *coIVCI* that we find in some post-Republican inscriptions.⁴¹ And when *n* was restored as the correct spelling, the symbol could have been illogically retained to produce the commonly found form *CONIVCI*.⁴² Likewise, Velius Longus mentions, apparently with reference to the Ciceronian age, the spelling *coiicit*,⁴³ which probably represents *coijicit* and certainly could have been written either **coIICIT* or **coIICIT*. With the former, restoration of the *n* without compensation would have left the tall letter a consonant,⁴⁴ thus confirming the apparent value of the letter in such forms as *EXIVS* mentioned above.

³⁹ It seems unnecessary to attempt to establish the precise nature of the sound. Leumann-Hofmann, §148e, transcribe it as a consonant (i. e., *cojjugi*, *cojjicit*), but if we have correctly reconstructed the sound of Latin *j* (see Sturtevant, *Pronunciation*, §§ 156-64; Kent, *Sounds*, §§36, 60), I do not see how the resulting sound could differ from that of diphthongal *oi*.

⁴⁰ *C. I. L.*, I², 1597 ("litteris vetustissimis"); cf. XIII, 8338: *COIVCI*.

⁴¹ *C. I. L.*, VI, 2495; VII, 8; IX, 5546; XIV, 4917.

⁴² E. g., *C. I. L.*, VI, 8921; 13299; XIV, 4948; 5009; 5208. The *Carmen de bello Actiaco* (Hayter's plate D = frag. 4, 4 Garuti = *Anth. Lat.*, I, 31) has *CONIVNX* (with a simple tall *I*, not *Ī*).

⁴³ P. 54 K.

⁴⁴ The statement oft-repeated in our handbooks (e. g., George M. Lane, *Latin Grammar* [Cincinnati, 1903], §104c) that "the spelling *-iicio* . . . does not occur in republican inscriptions" loses its impressiveness when we note that, according to the *index vocabulorum* in *C. I. L.*, I², all occurrences of the present stem of the words *ab-*, *ad-*, *con-*, *de-*, *e-*, *in-*, *ob-*, *pro-*, *re-*, and *sub-icere* total precisely seven, of which two have the transitional spelling *-iec-*, thus leaving only five

The foregoing hypothesis explains, more adequately than any other that I have been able to devise, the observed uses of tall I. It fails to explain at least three uses that are too frequently found on good inscriptions to be dismissed as mere errors made by ignorant writers or negligent lapidaries, viz.:

(a) the form *VIr*, which is found even in Republican inscriptions.⁴⁵ Here I can suggest only the *peregrinus sonus* attested by Velius Longus (p. 54 K.), but since we have no means of knowing what that sound was, it would be idle to speculate as to whether or not it could have been properly represented by a geminated letter.

(b) the form *DIēs*,⁴⁶ which may or may not be related to the following.

(c) the tall letter found in many proper names and some common nouns: *CLAVDIA*, *SALVIA*, *PLOTIA*, *FLAVIA*, *MEMORIAE*, *PVDICTIA*.⁴⁷ One of my earlier suggestions, an aping of Greek by fashionable ignoramuses, is untenable, for the letter is found in *IONIVS·Q·R* in an inscription that is one of the "antiquissima ex Latio" and contains the archaic form *MERETOD*.⁴⁸ Explanations which seem possible, therefore, are (1) a peculiar quality of antevocalic *i*⁴⁹—which, given the early occurrence of tall I, could scarcely be explained in terms of my hypothesis; (2) synizesis, giving in the speech of some persons the pronunciation *Claudja*, etc.,⁵⁰ which would make the tall letter a consonant; and (3) the "glide sound which naturally intervenes between *i*

examples of *-ic-*. These come from three inscriptions, two of which (594, 698) are usually regarded as late copies rather than the original Republican inscriptions. That leaves just one certain Republican example of *-ic-* (*COICITO*), and that comes from an inscription (583) that also has *-ieo-* (*CONIECIANT*).

⁴⁵ *C. I. L.*, I², 1911; 1274. The tall I in 992 is an error, according to the Gordons, *Contributions*, p. 187.

⁴⁶ E. g., *C. I. L.*, VI, 7527; 27845. The Romance derivatives indicate a close vowel.

⁴⁷ *C. I. L.*, VI, 8921; 24627; 24346; 38183; 36058; III, 403. For additional examples, see the Gordons' *Contributions*, p. 200. A few occurrences may be merely decorative, as in I², 1330: *SALVIA·SERVIA·M·L*.

⁴⁸ *C. I. L.*, I², 32; I assume that this is older than the year 646/108, the date of I², 675, which has *AVRELIO*.

⁴⁹ Sturtevant, *Pronunciation*, §§118 f.; Kent, *Sounds*, §32, n. 3.

⁵⁰ Sturtevant, *Pronunciation*, §117c.

or *u* and a following vowel,"⁵¹ which would give the pronunciation *Claudija*, etc., and so make the tall letter a sign of gemination. Unfortunately for my hypothesis, however, the *naturalness* of such a glide sound is, at best, problematic: phoneticians whom I have consulted all assure me that there is no reason (other than habit) which would make a glide sound, as in *-ija*, more "natural" than the distinct articulation of two vowel-sounds, as in *-ia*. The use of the tall I in that position, though too frequent to be a mere error, is not, I think, sufficiently frequent to show a characteristic of Latin as a whole. The sign probably represents some mispronunciation current or fashionable in one or more dialects, rustic or megalopolitan.

The foregoing discussion, I believe, covers all the classifiable uses of *I-longa* on respectable inscriptions; what is left is a small number of inexplicable occurrences, such as *NOMINE* and *FVERIT*,⁵² which, I think, we may dismiss as mere lapses of pen or chisel and decently sweep under the rug.

The two conceptions of tall I that I have outlined under A and B above are, of course, contradictory. Both, however, appear to have been retained and even taught by some *litteratores* and *grammatici* down to the time at which the significant use of the letter became obsolete. In the second quarter of the third century we find a perfect example of confusion when two secret service agents (*frumentarii*), who must have been men of some education, record that they *STATIONEM·COLLEGIIS·*(= *collegis*) *SVIS·IMPENDIS·*(= *impendiis*) *FECERVNT*.⁵³ This was inscribed only a few years before 256 A. D., the date of the latest example of phonetically significant tall I found by the Gordons.⁵⁴

Tall I was certainly obsolete long before the earliest of our great vellum codices in rustic capitals and uncials were written, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that they suppress every trace of the *I-longa* which, as our scanty but adequate evidence shows, was used in books of the Classical age. That suggests an interesting—I almost said, distressing—possibility. If, for example, good first-century copies of Vergil had the form *CONICIT*, repre-

⁵¹ Buck, *op. cit.*, §31.

⁵² *C. I. L.*, VI, 2043; I², 591 (*IECERIT*). Cf. *LAPIDE* and *ERIT* in the odd inscription cited in note 11 above.

⁵³ *C. I. L.*, VI, 230.

⁵⁴ *Contributions*, p. 188.

senting the *conjicit* that is required by the meter, that form would have automatically been reduced to the *conicit* found in our venerable rustic-capital codices and hence in our critical editions. But speculation along those lines would lead to the question whether Gellius (IV, 17; cf. Quint., I, 4, 11) may not have been right, and Brambach and Neue-Wagener⁵⁵ wrong. I shall not pursue a thought so horrid.

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⁵⁵ One has only to review the evidence adduced in Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre*, 3 Aufl. (Leipzig, 1902), II, pp. 863-5, to see that the current rule that in writers of the Golden Age we must spell *-icere* but pronounce *-jicere* depends on the readings in the "best" manuscripts, which, of course, were copied long after both the pronunciation with a *j* and the use of tall *I* had become obsolete.

VIRGILIAN PASTORAL AND ROMAN LOVE POETRY.*

Prima Syracosio dignata est ludere versu
nostra neque erubuit silvas habitare Thalea.
(*Ecl.*, VI, 1-2)¹

This is the young Virgil's brief but unequivocal claim to priority in a new poetic genre. With the clear reference to his predecessor, the Syracusan, Theocritus, Virgil immediately establishes a frame of reference for his hearers, who would be thus alerted to look for recognizable allusions to and willed variations of the Greek model. There is an implicit awareness, too, on the part of the poet that his adaptation or *translatio* will be measured against already existing Latin forms, not least among which were various kinds of love poetry, whether ramifications of the neoteric tradition or vague beginnings of Roman love elegy. What I should like to put forward is that the *Eclogues* in a certain sense are also a species of love poetry. Virgil's shepherds are shepherds in love, albeit the love poetry proper to Arcadia is something quite apart from the more effusive types of love poetry prevalent in Rome in the first century B. C.

It seems certain that no one in Latin letters before Virgil conceived of writing bucolic poetry on a full scale. At most, there may have been some tangential influence of the erotic-bucolic tradition in the poetry of those anticipators of the neoteric movement who are usually associated with Lutatius Catulus. The innovation of these poets had been to oppose to the sweetness and light of the Scipionic circle a more vigorous dose of Hellenism imbibed from the erotic themes of an Antipater of Sidon or a Meleager. A fragment of Porcius Licinus, one of their number, preserved in Gellius (XIX, 9, 13), may betray a certain note of pastoral, but this is completely submerged in the strong erotic intent and the strained epigrammatic conceit,

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¹ All quotations from the *Eclogues* are according to the edition of Castiglioni-Sabbadini, *P. Vergili Maronis Bucolica-Georgica* (Corpus Paravianum, Torino, 1959).

incendam silvam, pecus, pastorem."² Here is a truly devastating lover, whose passions reach out to every part of the pastoral world, but his sentiments are a far remove from the *otium* that became in Virgilian hands the distinctive hallmark of the pastoral. If this single fragment is at all symptomatic of the state of early bucolic poetry, Virgil's honor of creating the Latin pastoral can certainly not be very much endangered.

An even more distant relation of bucolic poetry is a work by a certain Seius, who, according to Macrobius (III, 18, 10) wrote an "Idyll" called the *Moretum*, from which the Virgilian exegete quotes eight lines on the genesis of the peach.³ In this instance, any identification with bucolic is surely peripheral, resulting merely from Macrobius' loose interpretation of the term idyll.

Whatever the feeble attempts that were made in the direction of acclimatizing bucolic in Rome, it remains to reckon with the far more important literary movement usually known as the neoteric school and its relations with Virgilian pastoral. The assignment of the adjective *neoterici* to describe them derives, of course, from Cicero's remarks to Atticus in a letter of 50 B. C.: *Hunc σπονδαίζοντα εἰ cui voles τῶν νεωτέρων pro tuo vendito*. Cicero, as an amateur poet himself, seems rather bemused by the stylistic tricks of these poets of the new generation although, as a matter of fact, his own taste for neologisms in his dilettante poetic activities was akin to theirs.⁴ The usual fashion

² These fragments are newly discussed by Luigi Alfonsi, "Da Valerio Edituo a Porcio Licino," *Rh. Mus.*, CIII (1958), pp. 254-6. He considers the lines from Licinus "erotico-pastorale."

³ There is a brief attempt at identifying Seius in Schanz-Hosius, I, p. 271. The name of Valgius Rufus is also sometimes associated with bucolic, but again with insubstantial evidence. A fragment of his poetry preserved by Philargyrius at *Geo.*, III, 177, smacks more of the rusticism of Tibullus:

sed nos ante casam tepidi mulgaria lactis
et sinum bimi cessamus ponere Bacchi.

Rostagni quotes a longer fragment of Valgius contained in the *Scholia Veronensia* (Hagen-Thilo, p. 39f), and inclines to the view that he wrote poems similar to those of Tibullus. Cf. Augusto Rostagni, "Virgilio, Valgio e . . . Codro. Chi era costui?" in *Studi in onore di Luigi Castiglioni* (Firenze, 1960), pp. 809-33.

⁴ Antonio Traglia assigns Cicero to a middle position between neoterics and traditionalists: "Era lo stesso equilibrio che portava

of regarding all of these young poets as forming a "school" derives also in part from Cicero's lumping them all together in this famous reference. The truth is quite otherwise, for there are many evidences of divided opinions among them, both in matters of style and subject matter, as might well be expected of recusant men of letters.⁵ There was obviously more than one way of interpreting Alexandrianism in Rome. Perhaps their only common cause was a strong antipathy for the more traditional writers like the Volusius lampooned by Catullus and others like him, "all the poison in bulk" (*omnia venena*; 4, 19) as the poet refers to them. Furius Bibaculus voiced his hostility to Valerius Cato, grammarian and poet and acknowledged authority of the new movement, *peridoneus praeceptor* (Suet., *De gramm.*, 11). There were those who leaned more to the side of Apollonius of Rhodes and those who favored Callimachus in that literary squabble. Thus we hear of both longer epyllia and shorter elegies and epigrams among the output of these writers. An attraction for bizarre and even atrocious myths as evinced in the *Smyrna* of Helvius Cinna was another characteristic of the new wave. Perhaps this aspect more than anything else led to Cicero's last bitter denunciation of the neoterics as *cantores Euphorionis*. Cicero, for patriotic and conservative reasons, preferred the more dignified poetry of Ennius as standing for the hallowed traditions of republican poetry, but his stand by the time of this outburst (44 B. C.) was ineffectual and obscurantist. The revolution had already taken place. It is no exaggeration to say, I think, that this was the most profound change ever wrought in Roman letters. By the time that Cicero deigned to make this wholesale condemnation, at least two of the chief representatives of the new writers, Calvus and Catullus, were already dead, but their ideas were only just beginning to

Cicerone nel campo dell' oratoria a temperare l'esuberanza di un naturale asianismo e a prendere come letterato e scrittore in versi una posizione intermedia fra neoterici e arcaizzanti" (*La lingua di Cicerone poeta* [Bari, 1950], p. 112).

⁵ "N'imaginons pas un cénacle. La réalité est plus belle: nous trouvons des hommes, unis contre leurs ennemis communs, mais divisés entre eux par des animosités personnelles ou—ce qui vaut mieux—par des divergences sur la conception de l'oeuvre d'art" (Henri Bardon, "Réflexions sur les poètes nouveaux," *Rev. Belge*, XXVI [1948], p. 960).

make an impact. A writer like Varro of Atax illustrates the various phases of their influence. He started out by writing a *Bellum Sequanicum* in the style of Ennius, converted to the new manner in a re-elaboration of Apollonius' epic, and then towards the end of his life took up love poetry dedicated to his Leucadia, *Leucadiae maxima flamma suae* (Prop., II, 34, 86).

One of the immediate results of the neoteric movement was a sudden impetus to the composition of love poetry. It had become fashionable even for statesmen to dabble in this pastime. To mention but a few of the more well-known among them, as enumerated in Pliny's famous letter: Memmius and his friend Cinna; Cornificius, Caesar's officer in Cilicia in 46 B. C.; Cornelius Nepos, and Q. Mucius Scaevola.⁶ The *gravitas* of older Roman epic poetry was abandoned for this new indulgence in amorous battles and love clichés engaged in as an intellectual *lusus*. Gradually there emerged from this welter of inspiration a new kind of poetry which combined the brief and often conceit-filled love epigram with the longer embellished tale of love devoted to a mythological subject. The subjective love elegy, as it has come to be called, was the result of a long but steady evolution. The poems of Catullus are our main document for this gradual transformation of the elegy as it was inherited from the Alexandrians. Poem 76, for example, presents a kind of confusion of epigram and elegy, for while in its length it resembles the latter genre, it has the personal note of epigram of a very intensely felt and introspective type.⁷ The struggling towards a new mode of existence for the love elegy is seen most eloquently in Catullus, 68, which combines so many different elements that it conforms to no single genre.⁸

If Catullus can be considered the bridge into the Roman elegy as we understand it in the three great elegiac poets, Gallus, from the few hints given us by Virgil in the Tenth Eclogue, must be regarded as the founder of the new poetry.⁹ The role played

⁶ Pliny, *Epist.*, V, 3, 5 and Ovid, *Tristia*, II, 433.

⁷ Barber, in the introduction to Propertius, compromises by calling poems 119-121 elegiac epigrams (*The Elegies of Propertius* [Oxford, 1933], p. lix).

⁸ Georg Luck says "it is a poetic epistle, a mythological poem, a love-elegy and a dirge at the same time" (*The Latin Love Elegy* [London, 1959], p. 50).

⁹ Jacoby gave strong support to the thesis of Gallus as the founder

by Gallus in this poem sheds much light both on what his poetry must have been like and on the distinctiveness of Virgil's poems in the face of the experimentations in the new genre. There can be no doubt that Virgil was intimately bound up in the literary trends that followed in the wake of the neoteric movement. His *Eclogues* are just as truly a "residuary legatee" of neotericism as the amatory elegy.¹⁰ His close friendship with Gallus and probable acquaintance with Parthenius, the influential literary personality whose collection of strange love stories was dedicated to Gallus, assures us that he had direct contact with the new poetry.¹¹ Virgil makes open profession of linking himself with the modernists when he gives Pollio's name as a precedent for his own experiments: *Pollio et ipse facit nova carmina* (III, 86). Asinius Pollio, although a friend of Gallus,¹² does not seem to have shared the latter's literary views, according to the description of his poetry made by Horace. His own productions, both in prose and verse, seemed to lean towards the traditional school. Tacitus castigates his stilted, archaic style in the *Dialogus* (21, 7), as does also Quintilian (X, 2, 17). What were these *nova carmina* then? Servius glosses them *magna miranda*, and from this hint they have been thought to refer to an epic of Pollio.¹³ It would be more reasonable, it seems, to conjecture that these were Pollio's contribution in the new style of poetry, perhaps some of the erotic poems that Pliny attributes to him in his previously mentioned apology for his own *nugae* in this genre. What makes this belief even more possible is the antithetical couplet that follows on it very closely. Here Virgil takes up the bludgeon himself in a memorable condemnation of

of subjective elegy in his influential "Zur Entstehung der römischen Elegie," *Rh. Mus.* (1905), pp. 67 ff.

¹⁰ The phrase is used by Brooks Otis, "Horace and the Elegists," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), p. 190.

¹¹ Rostagni calls Gallus a *banditore* of things Alexandrian ("Parthenio, Cinna e i poetæ novi," in *Virgilio Minore* [Torino, 1955], p. 49). Macrobius in commenting on a line of the *Georgics* composed entirely of Greek names says: *versus est Parthenii, quo grammatico in Graecis Vergilius usus est*. Some interpret this as meaning that Parthenius was Virgil's Greek tutor.

¹² Pollio refers to Gallus as a *familiaris* at Cic., *Ad fam.*, X, 32, 5.

¹³ This is the view, to my mind erroneous, of Clarence Mendell, "Asinius Pollio and Epic," *Yale Class Stud.*, I (1928), pp. 195-207.

two poetasters who falsely aped the Ennius tradition.¹⁴ Thus Virgil virtually allies himself with the tradition of the neoterics. It is too often forgotten that these first published poems of Virgil are an essay in the new poetry, although very distinct, to be sure, from any other Roman poet's efforts. It is not necessary to posit anything from the *Appendix Vergiliana* to account for Virgil's streak of neotericism. Virgil never professed the open and intransigent aversion for this kind of poetry that Horace insisted on. In the latter poet's famous characterization of Virgil's bucolic style, *molle atque facetum*, there is more than a hint of condescension. He seems to regard the *Bucolics* somewhat like his own *sermones* as lowly and of no great rank *qua* genre.¹⁵ It is no coincidence surely that the adjective *molle* which is often used by Horace and other poets to describe the manner of the love poets is used here to describe pastoral.¹⁶

An even clearer proof of the identification of pastoral as love poetry is the testimony of Propertius at the end of the second book, where he reviews his predecessors in the fine art of erotic poetry.

non tamen haec ulli venient ingrata legenti
sive in amore rudis sive peritus erit.

Propertius playfully refers to the enviable state of affairs in this poetic domain where the stakes of love are a handful of apples or a young goat just weaned from its mother, and where the wood-nymphs are won over without any struggle to the ways of love. To him the *Bucolics* were an inspired paradise of love poetry. Ovid, too, in that passage of the *Tristia* (II, 537-8)

¹⁴ It may or may not be that Horace shared the same violent enmity towards Maevius. Fraenkel does not think that Horace is speaking explicitly of Maevius in his *Epode*: "It is a fair guess that the name Maevius was chosen to give pleasure to Virgil and his friends, who despised the poetaster of that name" (*Horace* [Oxford, 1959], p. 31).

¹⁵ Cf. Otis, *op. cit.*, p. 130, n. 9.

¹⁶ The adjective is employed in the usual sense in Domitius Marsus' famous epigram on the deaths of Tibullus and Virgil (*P. P. L.*, 111):

ne foret aut elegis molles qui fleret amores
aut caneret forti regia bella pede.

The other adjective is also choice, giving praise but with some reserve. It implies a certain urbanity. Horace uses the same adjective of Lucilius (*Sat.*, I, 4, 10).

where he seeks to palliate the lasciviousness of his Muse by adducing other reputable poets of love, accords the *Eclogues* full priority as amorous verse:

Phyllidis hic idem teneraeque Amaryllidis ignes
bucolicis juvenis luserat ante modis.

There are many levels of love poetry in the *Eclogues*. The simplest is expressed in the short verses tossed off by the shepherds in their poetic competitions. Despite their epigrammatic brevity which, if handled inexpertly, could lead to a certain aridity of expression, these miniature love ditties have a vigor and freshness. There is no ironic twist at the end to pull up the listener and give piquancy to the composition. Owing to the fiction so ably maintained of the simplicity of the singers and of their unfailing store of metaphors and comparisons drawn from nature, a certain artistic naturalness is preserved. In the exchange between Menalcas and Damoetas in the Third Eclogue the *estro* of inspiration seems to transfer the singers into a pure sphere of poetry. The cavilling remarks of the prelude are completely forgotten. In the corresponding Idyll of Theocritus the extreme virulence of tone with which the shepherd and the goatherd attack each other is kept up even in the midst of their poetic contest. Virgil's shepherds launch into their song inspired with the beauty and fecundity of nature that envelops them, *nunc frondent silvae, nunc formosissimus annus* (III, 57). When they have finished with their singing, Palaemon symbolically gives orders that the sluices be closed, for the meadows have drunk to their fill: *claudite iam rivos, pueri: sat prata biberunt* (III, 111). Their flood of poetry, as it were, has refreshed nature just as the florid season on its part had first given them their creative impetus. This is love poetry of a very special sort, detached from the experience of love. The singer does not so much detail or communicate the passion of love as lose himself in the poetizing of the simpler vicissitudes and effects of love. The natural manifestations and tokens of affection, set against the background of nature, lend an attractiveness to the portrayal that is denied the ranting and fanciful extravaganzas of the more subjective love poet. Virgil saw well that in borrowing and enlarging on the bucolic form inherited from Theocritus he could situate his love poetry in the midst of nature in intimate con-

tact with the Muses themselves, that is, the nymphs of the Italian countryside who were identified with the Greek sisters. Virgil always speaks of them in this guise when they are involved as inspirers of bucolic poetry: *Camēnae* (III, 59); *silvestrem musam* (I, 2); *rusticam* (III, 84); *agrestem* (VI, 8). He calls them nymphs directly at VII, 21, thus specifically identifying them with the denizens of the woodlands that are the *mise-en-scene* of the *Bucolics*. They are the personification of nature itself, which thus communicates itself to man, and from this interaction is born poetry.¹⁷ Valéry as a fellow poet sensed this intuitively when he translated the *Bucolics* and he expresses the feeling in the introduction to his translation or *Variations sur les Bucoliques*, as he entitles them: "et il se fait ainsi entre elles (things) et l'homme un commerce de mystère et de services, que nous ne pouvons plus concevoir que nous ne pensions 'poésie,' -c'est à dire, en faisant évanouir tout le valeur et le sérieux de ce système d'échanges."¹⁸

One of the earliest if not the very earliest of the *Eclogues* is frankly love poetry—the story of the shepherd Corydon's ardent love for the beautiful Alexis. It is usually with reference to this Eclogue that later poets speak of Virgil's flirting with the themes of love. The poem takes its cue from Theocritus' amusing portrayal of Polyphemus, the enamoured giant, and the elusive sea nymph, with this significant variation, that the Virgilian piece has as its protagonist a non-mythical figure, a plain country bumpkin, and his *objet d'amour* is a pampered, citified *puer*

¹⁷ The idea of the Muses embodying nature itself is eloquently expressed in a recent article: "Die Musen sind nichts anderes als das tönende Organ der Natur und der Dichter der ihnen lauscht, ist der wahre Naturkündige, der die Berechtigung, ja die Pflicht hat, über alle Lebens Gebiete auszusagen dessen Schaffen aber unmöglich ist ohne die Huld der Musen . . . Denn da sie selber ein Stück Natur verkörpern, kann ihre Erscheinung bei Hesiod nichts anderes bedeuten, als dass die Natur nun auf einmal sprachbegabt und sprachmächtig sich selbes aussagt. Was unter der Oberfläche immer da war, jetzt es Wort und Ton, und der Schimmer des Langstgewesenen, des Unendlichfernen steht gegenwärtig da als starkes Licht" (Georg Luck, "Die Musen in der römischen Poesie," in *Horizonte der Humanitas—Freundergaben für Walter Wili* [Stuttgart, 1960], pp. 79 and 82).

¹⁸ Paul Valéry, "Variations sur les Bucoliques," an introductory essay to *Traduction en vers des Bucoliques de Virgile* (Paris, 1961), p. 35.

delicatus. The type of love depicted is strictly conventional, although this was lost on many Virgilian commentators, ancient and modern.¹⁹ The staging of the country swain's amorous outburst, however, is very new: *montibus et silvis studio iactabat inani* (II, 5). The woods and mountains are Corydon's audience, not the reader, nor the *amasius*, nor any other. The correspondence between man and nature is made even more complete than in the rustic contests of III, for here nature is the recipient of the poetry she herself inspires. It soon becomes clear too that Corydon's love for the woodlands and the life there enjoyed is stronger than his ephemeral desire for Alexis. As he holds out these natural pleasures to wean the young boy from his comfortable existence, Corydon betrays more and more his own strong attachment to that life. In this respect, Virgil has changed considerably the tone of Polyphemus' promises to Galatea, where there is no hint of a great personal love for the things proffered nor for the freedom of the way of life thus envisaged, nothing, certainly, like Corydon's *nobis placeant ante omnia silvae* (II, 62). In the end the harmonious symbols of the close of the day—oxen carrying home the turned up plough, the thickening shadows—recall Corydon from his intemperate revery and he upbraids himself for his negligence in his rustic duties towards nature. The diction changes abruptly from that of amorous supplication to the homely and prosaic language of menial tasks. This is not an ironic twist, like that at the end of Horace's *Beatus ille* where an extrinsic or surprise matter is suddenly introduced, but it is only the re-assertion of what was always implicitly present, a restoring of the equilibrium and *otium* that was temporarily disturbed.

Virgil probes more deeply into the theme of *indignus amor* in the Eighth Eclogue, and approaches still more in his treatment the manner that would be associated with the elegiac love poets. Damon's song, like Corydon's, is a pastiche of Theocritus III and XI, but any comic relief is now completely stifled. Perret conjectures that perhaps Virgil wished in this more sober account of love's torments to approximate more closely the mode of love poetry adopted by his friend Gallus.²⁰ Yet in the seeming

¹⁹ Servius' comments are well known. Conington's are even more condemnatory: "We should be glad to believe it purely imaginary, though even then it is sufficiently downgrading to Virgil."

²⁰ "Il est possible que l'amitié de Gallus (cf. B10, 73-74), poète

rapprochement here as well as more explicitly in the Tenth Eclogue, the fundamental breach between the bucolic mood and the alien muse of erotic poetry is made more manifest. In the introduction to the two competitive songs of this Eclogue, Virgil presents a strange picture of nature stupefied and immobilized (VIII, 4-6):

immemor herbarum quos est mirata iuvenca
certantis, quorum stupefactae carmine lynces,
et mutata suos requierunt flumina cursus.

The scene not only prepares us for the disjointed utterances that follow, but also symbolizes the bewilderment of nature in the face of the chaotic effects of passionate love. The unnaturalness of each lover's predicament is emphasized in the one case by Damon's repeated use of *adynata*, the wish to have confirmed in nature, as it were, the turmoil that besets him, and in the other in Alphesiboeus' references to the black arts, whereby unnatural changes are induced upon nature in order to effect the illicit desires of the lover. The tension between the tranquillity idealized in Virgilian pastoral and the disquieting promptings of love is very conspicuous in Damon's song. The peace of which passion robbed him eludes him even here in Arcadia. He asks of his pipe intermittently to intone the verses proper to Mt. Maenalus, thus recalling the land of Pan, where love is carefree, but his own song is anti-Arcadian. The sophisticated accents of the elegiac tradition come to predominate more and more in his song. He begins with the idyllic, Theocritus-inspired vignette of the innocent birth of love in childhood (and here Virgil enlarges on his original with the lovely evocation of a child's straining efforts to reach the fruit on the lowest branches): *nam fragilis poteram ab terra contingere ramos*" (VIII, 40). Then inexorably the singer plunges into heavy, emotion-charged imprecations against love. The shepherd suddenly loses his former simplicity of language and turns to elevated, rhetorical, and learned utterance (VIII, 43-5):

nunc scio, quid sit amor: duris in cotibus illum
aut Tmaros aut Rhodope aut extremi Garamantes
nec generis nostri puerum nec sanguinis edunt.

élégiaque, ait ramené Vg vers les problèmes sentimentaux" (Jacques Perret, *Les Bucoliques* [Paris, 1961], p. 85).

The harsh indictment of love's cruelty continues and the excesses to which it drives men's minds is illustrated by the extreme example of those monstrous victims of passion who were goaded by love's prickings to stain their hands with the blood of their own offspring. Many commentators have remarked on the preciousness and idle repetition of the lines (VIII, 49-50):

crudelis mater magis, an puer inprobus ille?
Inprobus ille puer, crudelis tu quoque, mater.

I should rather interpret this rhetorical emphasis as a further mockery of the vain conundrums and diseased imaginations of the love poets.

Damon's farewell to the woodlands is couched in the rhetorical figure of *adynaton*. His words are almost hallucinatory, mounting to a vertiginous frenzy. The familiar bucolic landscape is engulfed in a cataclysmic vision, in which all semblance of order and peace vanish. The humble objects of the pastoral scene are imagined to take on a bizarre aspect—the rough oaks bear golden apples; the alder blooms with narcissus; the tamarisks, symbols of the lowliness of the pastoral Muse, exude precious amber. It is significant that some of these same phenomena occur also in the coming of the Golden Age (IV, 30), but the distinctiveness of VIII lies both in the rhythmical effect, which is harsh and precipitous, and in the cumbrous piling up of the images, so that they become a kind of caricature of the dream sighed after in the Fourth Eclogue. The rush of one delirious vision upon another is in keeping with the suicidal wish of the impassioned lover. A non-logical nexus carries over from one image to the next in his emotional outburst.

sit Tityrus Orpheus,
Orpheus in silvis, inter delphinas Arion.
Incipe Maenalios mecum, mea tibia, versus.
Omnia vel medium fiat mare.

(VIII, 55-8)

Tityrus, the humble shepherd, becomes Orpheus the Thracian bard, and by association the name of Arion comes to mind, which in turn suggests the vision of despair, in which everything is swallowed up in the vortex of ocean (VIII, 58). This is Virgil's very graphic way of representing the turmoil and disruption effected by the forces of love unleashed. The sea is frequently

employed by ancient poets as a symbol of disorder and of the irrational, and here its anarchy is an effective foil to the usual calm of the pastoral situation. The bottomless whirlpool of passion, *barathrum amoris*, is often the scene of the lover's last act of despair, as in the stories of Euphion and in the attempted death of Britomartis in Valerius Cato's *Dictynna*. In the same way, Damon's last wish is a fitting climax to his despair, and leads inevitably to his choice of suicide, to throw himself into the waves. His farewell to the bucolic world is addressed to the woodlands, the constant image of untrammelled pastoral existence: *Vivite, silvae*. Life will go on there undisturbed, but he through his yielding to passion must renounce this dream forever. The Maenalian song is ended.²¹

The ultimate confrontation of erotic poetry and Arcadian ideals is explicitly made in the Tenth Eclogue. To have a noted love poet appear in the guise of a shepherd in a totally unfamiliar atmosphere is in reality a daring dramatic contrivance. This contrast of erotic and bucolic poetry is the predominant theme of the Eclogue, and were we to mistake it, the poem would take on too tragic a character. Gallus is a concrete representation of the unregenerateness, as it were, of erotic elegy. Even in Arcadia he cannot alter his mode of perception and fatalistic attitude towards love (X, 69),

Omnia vincit Amor, et nos cedamus Amori.

The pathetic *smarrimento* of the love poet in the alien land of Arcadia is relieved by more than one hint of Virgilian urbanity in the narrative. Virgil purposely juxtaposes some of the more ludicrous features of his convention beside the more pretentious postures of the serious love elegy. He resolves to sing of the more tormentuous loves of Gallus, *sollicitos Galli dicamus amores* (X, 6), but the circumstances are hardly an inducement to such subject matter; *dum tenera attendent simae virgulta capellae* (X, 7). Something of the splendor of sound

²¹ We ought not to believe that Damon actually ends his life. I interpret the form *deferar*, line 60, as subjunctive, not future. Its passive mood inclines us to that interpretation, for the strong determination of a future tense would more reasonably be framed actively. In this way the wish of Damon would accord with the previous subjunctives and there would be a grammatical relation somewhat like the *sic asseverative* formula.

and imagery used by Theocritus to declaim the death of Daphnis is imparted to the loneliness of Gallus in Arcadia, but this elevated diction is followed immediately by a parade of the very humblest denizens of the pastoral world. Virgil goes out of his way, using words never seen before or since in poetic contexts, to emphasize the lowliness of his Muse (X, 19-20)

venit et upilio, tardi venere subulci,
uvidus hiberna venit de glande Menalcas.

Yet with all this show of simplicity, one cannot help noting the elaborate tricolon with which these humble folk are described. The quaint pictures of Silvanus and Pan continue the exaggerated sequence of bucolic buffoonery. Pan's words are expressive of the bewilderment of the audience at this sight of a victim of love. *Ecquis erit modus?* (X, 28). Similar sentiments came to the mind of Corydon in his perplexity (*quis enim modus adsit amori*, II, 68), but he divined the truth of the insatiability of love and returned to his humble tasks. The bucolic equations (they are not similes, but actual identifications of the realm of nature with that of man) used by Pan about the undying appetite of nature are lost on Gallus. He neither understands nor speaks this language, a point which is brought out forcefully in his own response. The one solace that he can hope for from the dwellers of Arcadia is that their pipes will give immortality to his love (and as fate would have it, Virgil's Arcadian version of Gallus' love poetry survived the original). In the lines assigned to Gallus, Virgil cleverly contrasts the language of elegiac with that of bucolic. The sophisticated poet in shepherd's clothing gives himself away. He sighs after the idyllic life that might have been his and dreams of sporting with pleasant shepherdesses like Phyllis or youths like Amyntas, or (and here his own erotic vocabulary incongruously slips in) with *quicumque furor* (X, 38). The inconcinnity of this expression with *fuscus Amyntas* could not be more blatant.

The dream of an Arcadian idyll vanishes quickly before the ever-present vision of Lycoris, who now intrudes upon the scene, as Virgil had promised in his introduction. Again the vocabulary is charged with emotions too violent for the pastoral, *hic ipso tecum consumerer aevo* (X, 43). The verb has connotations alien to Arcadian bliss and simplicity. Gallus is present

physically in Virgil's world but his mind, distracted by an *insanus amor*, is with Lycoris on a far-off frontier, where he imagines she is dallying with another soldier. It seems probable from later regular recurrences of this theme in the elegiac poets that this was a commonplace proper to the genre as invented by Gallus. Once more the language is that of love elegy, *a, dura, —me sine,—teneras plantas*.

At this point Gallus recovers himself momentarily and resolves once more to modulate his pipe to the Sicilian mode. But his determination to follow the pastoral way of life is misdirected. What he conceives of as Arcadian simplicity is quite another thing. It is a kind of hardy primitivism, an *askesis*, which he hopes will serve as an antidote for his passion and a reintegration of himself. His psychological motivation is in reality not too far removed from the virile escapism of a story like Hemingway's "Big Two-Hearted River." His vision, understandable coming from a man used to the hardships of militarism, is that of the excitement of the hunt, the trapping of the quarry, sounding thickets, Cretan arrows, Parthian bow. Such a *medicina amoris*, the surrender to one ecstasy in place of another, is in perfect antithesis to the life of the Arcadian. Gallus submits to love's all-conquering and ubiquitous power. He abandons his brief sojourn with the Hamadryads. In the epilogue to the poem, with the disappearance of Gallus, Virgil returns to the serenity of the pastoral, where the poet may sit and weave a rustic basket: *dum sedet et gracili fuscillam texit hibisco* (X, 71). The key word is *gracili*, symbolic of his *carmen deductum*.

Thus Virgil more subtly and with more finality than in VI asserts the independence of his Muse and the integrity of his vision of the pastoral, which becomes for him a sublimation of love poetry. In the Sixth Eclogue, after specifically renouncing the higher themes of epic poetry, he indirectly showed his aversion for the more lurid aspects of mythological love elegy that were probably featured in Gallus' poems, if, as it seems certain, the latter followed in the path of Euphron and utilized the material supplied him by Parthenius. Virgil's skilful condensation of various unnatural mythological love affairs is not merely evidence for his conversance with Alexandrian allusive technique nor is it meant solely as an exhibition of his own virtuosity. One can detect a strong trace of ironic humor

throughout Virgil's whole light-hearted and peripheral treatment of these myths. It might be put down as merely another instance of the Virgilian quality of *facetum* that runs through the Eclogue but it seems to imply a distaste for the subject matter itself. The central place of this part of Silenus' song is given to one of the most hideous of mythological *amores*, the infatuation of Pasiphae. Virgil's version of the myth is distinctly ludicrous in his picture of the mad queen chasing the bull over the mountains, while her impassive lover, cushioned on soft hyacinths, ruminates imperturbably in the meadow. There is a certain wryness of expression even in the presentation of the fateful story: *et fortunatam, si numquam armenta fuissent, / Pasiphaen* (VI, 45-6). In many ways Virgil's presentation resembles Ovid's conception of Pasiphae as the extreme illustration of woman's *furiosa libido* compared with the milder drives of the male (*Ars Am.*, I, 289-326). The only thing lacking is the latter poet's complacency in the tale and customary indulgence of his own genius in the detailing of Pasiphae's lust. In the compendious allusions to other myths, too, there is more than one trace of the Ovidian manner. Certainly the vivid description of the daughters of the sun turning into alders, with the mossy bark covering them over is very much in the blasé spirit of the *Metamorphoses*. Virgil shows his indifference even to the superficial veracity of these mythological horror stories, by confusing the two Scyllas. His description of the sea monster re-echoes that of Lucretius at V, 892, and it is not unlikely that some of the scorn of that notorious non-believer is also implied: *Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstribus* (VI, 75).

The scene of Gallus' poetic investiture in the lower reaches, as it were, of Helicon is introduced both to do homage to the love poet by associating him with Hesiod, the acknowledged patron of mythological poetry, and to draw him more closely into the fold of the pastoral. The whole episode is strongly bucolic, with both mythical and non-mythical poets in the guise of shepherds. Even more strikingly Virgil presents Hesiod in the role of Orpheus, calling the trees down from the heights of the mountains. In place of the laurel which Hesiod had received from the Muses, Virgil substitutes *calamos*, "pro fistula," as Servius remarks, thus bringing Gallus' consecration more into

the sphere of bucolic, as if his etiological poem on the grove of Gryneion were to be an essay in pastoral. The fact too that the shrine to be celebrated is one dedicated to Apollo emphasizes the affinity of Gallus' poetry with the new poetic mode which Virgil had heralded at the beginning of this Eclogue. In his Syracusan chant, however, Virgil explores the pastoral realm more deeply, and emphasizes the Apollonian origin of song, now recaptured by his pastoral Muse. The primeval music of Apollo, its echo in Silenus, and ultimately the humble piping of the shepherds are all part of the unending song of the universe. Virgil adumbrates another kind of universal harmony, not confined to the spheres, but echoing through nature and reverberating again from the valleys to the stars (VI, 82-4):

Omnia quae, Phoebus quondam meditante, beatus
audiat Eurotas iussitque ediscere lauros,
ille canit; pulsae referunt ad sidera valles.

As Virgil in the Fourth Eclogue had boasted of his possible victory even over Pan, at least in the fervor of his song, so here he links up the pastoral framework with Apollo himself. It is significant that of the two patrons of music and pasturelands,²² only Apollo is mentioned in the *Eclogues*. The absence of Cyprian Hermes, rightful lord of Arcadia, can only be explained, I think, by the fact that Hermes in his first thievery forfeited his heirloom of song, which he transferred to Apollo, and he himself became a simple *theos novios*. His prowess on the pipe was passed on to his son, Pan, whose flutings filled the woodlands of Mt. Maenalus and thence became synonymous with the rustling music of all woodlands, the Greek counterpart of the Sanskrit *pavana*, the sensed presence of nature's spirit.

The grander view of nature perceptible throughout the *Eclogues* is linked up with this exaltation of the power of song. The loftiness of both of these themes, which Virgil sets at the heart of his pastoral, overwhelms the lesser, more insignificant matters of love. The shepherds' singing of their rivalries in love, the monologues of *Liebessschmerz*, the drama of the confiscated lands, the song of Silenus, and the prophecies of the Fourth Eclogue are all subordinated to this universal framework. The sensuality and subjectivism that had invaded the decadent,

²² Cf. the study of Du Chemin, *La houlette et la lyre* (Paris, 1960), *passim*.

watered-down parody of post-Theocritean bucolic, has no part in Virgil's revivification and sublimation of the genre.

These traditions did carry over, however, into certain versions of Roman love elegy, and it would be opportune to note the distinction between these and true pastoral as it was conceived by Virgil. The first to have consciously introduced this blend of bucolic and erotic onto the Roman literary scene may well have been M. Corvinus Messala, the chief patron of the elegists. It seems very certain that he composed, in Greek, a poem in this mixed genre using the bucolic framework for erotic poetry.²³ The composition is mentioned in *Catalepton* IX, which is an extended eulogy of Messala's achievements both in war and in letters. Using the opening lines of Virgil's *Eclogues*, which evidently had already become the password of bucolic poetry, the author praises Messala's prowess in that genre (*Cat.*, IX, 17-20):

molliter hic viridi patulae sub tegmine quercus
Moeris pastores et Meliboeus erant.
dulcia iactantes alterno carmina versu.
qualia Trinacriae doctus amat iuvenis.

In the following lines, however, the bucolic motif clearly shows itself as an inorganic framework for a love poem, and the poetic competition referred to must have been meant in homage to a single *herois* or *puella*, in the more common terminology of love elegy (*Cat.*, IX, 22-3).

certatim ornabant omnes heroida divi,
certatim divae munere quoque suo.

Another singular composition which seems to confuse the two styles is the second part of the *Dirae*, usually called the *Lydia* by modern editors.²⁴ Here again the erotic element is uppermost

²³ Rostagni argues also for the identification of Messala with the Codrus of VII, 26, and as the initiator of the bucolic genre, to whom Virgil expresses his indebtedness both in the passage in VII and in *Catalepton* IX (which Rostagni of course attributes to Virgil). I agree with his interpretation of lines 21-2, although I am more uncertain about the authenticity of the poem. "In ogni caso si vede chiaro che i *carmina* di Messala fondevano insieme l'elemento bucolico degli idilli teocritei e post-teocritei, esprimendosi soprattutto nella forma del certame (*iactantes alterno carmina versu*) e l'elemento erotico-dotto dell'elegia alessandrina (*certatim heroida diva*, etc.)" (Rostagni, *Studi in onore di Luigi Castiglioni*, p. 829).

²⁴ The attribution of the *Lydia* to Valerius Cato began with Scaliger,

and any bucolic affinities, it seems to me, derive solely from imitative-Virgilian expressions interspersed through the predominantly Catullan language and inspiration of the poem. The juxtaposition of the two becomes very awkward at times, as at line 116, *inter varios, Veneris stipendia, flores*, where a Virgilian phrase is coupled with a very un-Virgilian appositive. Another extremely unhappy pseudo-bucolic effect is the projection of feelings of jealousy towards the lands which deprive the lover of his Lydia: *invideo vobis, agri formosaeque prata*. Even the bull's marital security is regarded with envy (*Divae*, 131-3):

felix, taure, pater magni gregis et decus, a te
vaccula non unquam secreta cubilia captans
frustra te patitur silvis mugire dolorem.

The characteristic vocabulary is decidedly elegiac and Catullan—*mea voluptas, domina, dulcia gaudia, libido*.

The anomaly of the *Lydia* betrays a still immature poetic technique, but the bucolic tone of many of Tibullus' poems, especially the first elegy of the first book, is more practiced. It is very likely that Tibullus owes something to the experiments of his literary patron, Messallæ, who, as we have seen, gave the example for a species of pastoral erotic poetry. Students of Augustan poetry have often debated what it is that distinguishes the spirit of the bucolic simplicity desiderated by Tibullus from that of the *Eclogues*. In a word, it is more a rusticism than a bucolicism, as Solmsen acutely observes.²⁵ Moreover, it is a feigned, amateurish rusticism as Tibullus gives us to understand: *ipse seram teneras maturo tempore vites/rusticus*. The holding over of the word *rusticus* seems to imply that this is

but has often been seriously called into question. Luck assigns the poem to the neoteric poet without any comment: "Valerius Cato wrote the *Lydia*, a curious mixture of bucolic and erotic poetry" (*op. cit.*, p. 43). It is obvious that he does not give much thought to the matter, and indeed his sentence seems but a literal echo of a statement in Butler and Barber's *Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford, 1933), p. lvi, "a curious compromise between Bucolic Idyll and Erotic Elegy." The authorship of Valerius Cato is denied categorically in Godo Lieberg, *Die Gestalt der göttlichen Geliebten bei Catull im Zusammenhang der antiken Dichtung* (Amsterdam, 1962), p. 62.

²⁵ Friedrich Solmsen, "Tibullus as an Augustan Poet," *Hermes*, XC (1962), p. 303.

only a part he is playing, for we all know he is not really a peasant. Virgil's shepherds, first of all, are not the poet himself transported into the country, but true personifications of man living in close contact with nature. They do not aspire after a *vita iners* (Tib., I, 5) with the comfort of the blazing hearth and someone by the fire. The *otium* of Virgil's shepherds is of a more profound type, a reconciliation with nature and the abiding peace which it brings. The idyllic dream of Tibullus is strictly bound up with the presence of his beloved. The true emphasis of the poem is contained in lines 45-8, which impress themselves memorably upon our mind:

Quam iuvat immites ventos audire cubantem
et dominam tenero continuisse sinu
aut gelidas hibernus aquas cum fuderit auster
securum somnos igne iuvante sequi!

Any grander vision of life in the midst of nature is done to death by this cogent picture of a cozy interior. Thus, Tibullus' version of the joys of country life is a dream opposed to the sad realities of his experience. The tension of his poetry is constituted by the opposition between "love as he wished it were and love as it turned out to be," as Professor Elder points out.²⁶

In the tradition of the elegy and the epigram the tone is personal and subjective. The Golden Age that Tibullus sighs after is "too much with us." For this reason it lacks the notes of a true idyll, which portrays an ideal as *real* either in the past or in the future.²⁷ Since Tibullus sighs after a present rustic bliss which is unattainable (Elder calls attention to the multiplied subjunctives of the poem),²⁸ his deluded hopes result in an undefined and hazy "dreamlike world of escape." Paradoxically, the strictly speaking less real world of the *Eclogues* is poetically more believable, because Virgil presents it to us as objectively, though only fictionally, existing. There are many other differences that separate these two idyllic worlds. The contrast in Tibullus is between peace in the country in the arms of his beloved and the harshness of military life. Such also was

²⁶ J. P. Elder, "Tibullus: Tersus atque elegans," *Critical Essays on Roman Literature*, ed. J. C. Sullivan (London, 1962), p. 83.

²⁷ Friedrich Schiller gives this as an essential trait of the idyll, which for him is the third type of sentimental poetry, in his essay, "Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung."

²⁸ Elder, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

Gallus' mistaken interpretation of bucolic in Virgil's representation of him in Arcadia. The *otium* of Virgilian pastoral, as we have seen, is of a grander scale. There is too much sweetness and rustic contentedness²⁹ in Tibullus' idealized countryside, as summed up in the concluding lines of the first elegy:

composito securus acervo
dites despiciam, despiciamque famam.

This kind of rural *aurea mediocritas* is completely foreign to the spirit of pastoral.

Virgil's reversion to the origins of the bucolic genre, in my view, is a conscious reaction to the degenerate forms of bucolic that prevailed in later Greek imitations and to the conflation of the bucolic and the erotic which had submerged the larger feelings inherent in a poetry of nature. He went back to the true bucolic atmosphere at its uncontaminated source in Theocritus, and developed what was only latently present in these poems. The crude eroticism of the Sicilian shepherds gives place to a more tenuous idealization of love. Virgil's Arcadia is not so much a land of love as a place where there is leisure for love and freedom to sing of love. In going back to the dramatic form which Theocritus had instituted for the bucolic, Virgil tones down the excessively personal note which characterizes the poetry of love. More care is given by the shepherd poets to the exquisiteness of their verse than to the vivid painting of their emotions. This was Virgil's form of love poetry, weaned of its subjective throbbings and existing in an idealized world of song. The simple characters of the bucolic world and their *histoires d'amour* have a freshness that is foreign to the *praeceptores amoris* and the tragic fatalism they affect before the power of love. All venality of love, and its tawdry purveyors, *sagae* and *lenae*, have no place in the world of *viles amores*, purchased with a gift of apples (Prop., II, 34b, 69). As a vivid, final dramatization of this difference between his pastoral version of love and elegiac love poetry, Virgil composed the Tenth Eclogue in honor of his friend Gallus.

The vicissitudes of love are tempered and given their true perspective against the vast canvas of nature that Virgil creates for the *Eclogues*. The strong colors of Theocritus and the

²⁹ Schuster, *Tibull-Studien*, observes that there is no word in Tibullus' poetry to express the opposite notion of *tener*.

exuberance and fervor of subjective love poetry are muted in this world, existing outside of space and time. The desire of the love poet to give permanence and immortality to his passion is a vain ambition, for passion is by its essence a most ephemeral human feeling. This fleetingness becomes even more apparent when pitted against the larger rhythms of the universe. Virgil sets nature as a kind of continuous balance, as a constant against the unbalanced promptings of passion. It is not so much the inexorable progress of nature that is stressed, as in the *Odes* of Horace, as its insistent presence. Passion is basically inimical to the mood of the pastoral, for it shears away self-deception and forces us out of the habit of seeing things as we would like them to be. Virgil cannot allow his shepherds to fall victim to this marauder of their tranquillity. The love poet tries to catch at the impermanence of his experience and express it in lasting verse. The poetry of Virgil's shepherds, too, is a striving to "eternizar el momentáneo," in the words of the modern Spanish poet, Antonio Machado,³⁰ but their song has more chance of survival, destined to echo through the woodlands and be heard by future generations of lovers. Gallus admits this efficacy of the Arcadian song when he consoles himself with the thought that his love will be the subject of their song (X, 33-4):

O mihi tum quam molliter ossa quiescant,
vestra meos olim si fistula dicat amores!

The rugged edges and spirit of *agon* rampant throughout the *Idylls* are softened into the larger harmonies of Arcadia. Virgil's own yearnings after a true Messianism reflecting man's eternal nostalgia for a time when man and beast lived at peace in the midst of nature come to fruition in the poetry of the *Eclogues*. Music and song, the incantatory aspect of shepherds piping to their flocks and following in the footsteps of the gods Apollo and Pan, who were both shepherds and musicians; Tityrus in the shade, warding off harm from his flocks with his sweet pipings—these are the symbols of Virgilian pastoral, among which greater themes the more anarchical aspects of love can have no place.

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³⁰ For this theme in the poetry of Machado see Diego Marín, *Poesía española* (Mexico City, 1958), pp. 312 ff.

WORDPLAYS INVOLVING *BOVILLAE* IN CICERO'S LETTERS.

Two passages in Cicero's *Letters*, namely *Fundum audio te hunc Bovillanum velle retinere* (*Ad Q. fr.*, III, 1, 2 [3]), and *Post Leutricam pugnam die septingentesimo sexagesimo quinto* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 26), appear to have been misunderstood or incompletely understood. In this paper I wish to make some suggestions which may help to give a better understanding of these passages. As plays on words are concerned, I shall first consider some of Cicero's remarks on the subject of wit, and then give some characteristic and pertinent examples of his witticisms, before coming to a discussion of the two passages themselves.

There can be no doubt that Cicero considered wit to be an important element in speaking and in writing. This may be deduced from the amount of space he devoted to the topic of wit in *De Orat.*, II, 216-89. A belief that jokes should be regarded as a normal part of a letter is implied by his statement, *Plane deest quod scribam; nam nec quod mandem habeo . . . , nec quod narrem . . . , nec iocandi locus est; ita me multa sollicitant* (*Ad Att.*, V, 5, 1), as Tyrrell and Purser point out in their note on *Ad Fam.*, VII, 10, 2. Cicero's ideas about jokes in a letter are further illustrated by a short passage from the second *Philippic*, where Cicero relates that Antony, after receiving a letter from Cicero, made it public without first getting Cicero's permission. Denouncing Antony for this ungentlemanly behavior Cicero says, *Quam multa ioca solent esse in epistulis, quae prolata si sint, inepta videantur* (*Phil.*, II, 7). Here Cicero seems to suggest that more latitude in jesting may be conceded to a letter-writer than to a person writing for publication, and that jokes in a private letter should be judged by a less exacting standard than jokes in a published work.

Cicero had a high opinion of himself as a wit. In a letter written from Cilicia to Volumnius Eutrapelus in Rome, Cicero complains, with mock ruefulness, that Volumnius has been a neglectful deputy in defense of Cicero's "salt-mines," that Volumnius has allowed the witticisms of all sorts of persons, even including Sestius, to be falsely attributed to Cicero in his ab-

sence; Cicero had flattered himself that his jokes possessed an unmistakable character of their own; cf. *Quibus in litteris omnia mihi periucunda fuerunt praeter illud, quod parum diligenter possessio salinarum mearum a te procuratore defenditur. Ais enim, ut ego discesserim, omnia omnium dicta, in his etiam Sestiana, in me conferri. . . . Equidem sperabam ita notata me reliquisse genera dictorum meorum, ut cognosci sua sponte possent* (*Ad Fam.*, VII, 32, 1). Similarly, in a letter to Paetus he declares that his witticisms have such a special and characteristic flavor that Caesar, who has just finished writing a book on pointed sayings, can tell a genuine *bon mot* of Cicero's from a spurious one; cf. *sic audio Caesarem, cum volumina iam confecerit ἀποφθεγμάτων, si quod adferatur ad eum pro meo quod meum non sit reicere solere* (*Ad Fam.*, IX, 16, 4).

A collection of Cicero's witticisms was published by Gaius Trebonius, who sent a copy of the work to Cicero, and was thanked by Cicero in gracefully appreciative terms (cf. *Ad Fam.*, XV, 21, 1-2). Another such collection was attributed to "Tiro or someone else" by Quintilian; cf. *Utinamque libertus eius Tiro aut alius, quisquis fuit, qui tris hac de re libros edidit, parcius dictorum numero indulgissent* (*Inst. Orat.*, VI, 3, 5). According to Macrobius, some persons thought that the *alius* was Cicero himself; cf. *Cicero autem quantum in ea re valuerit quis ignorat, qui vel liberti eius libros quos is de iocis patroni composuit, quos quidam ipsius putant esse, legere curavit?* (*Sat.*, II, 1, 12). Also, Quintilian records that Cicero's contemporaries criticized him for sometimes making dull jokes; cf. *Quem tamen et suorum homines temporum incessere audebant ut . . . in salibus aliquando frigidum* (*Inst. Orat.*, XII, 10, 12), a criticism which Quintilian considers unjustified; cf. *Falsum utrumque* (*op. cit.*, XII, 10, 13). In another passage Quintilian says that Cicero had a reputation for trying too hard to be funny, both in the courts and outside, and again Quintilian disagrees with Cicero's critics, stating that he considers Cicero to have possessed a remarkably keen wit; cf. *Noster vero* (i. e., Cicero) *non solum extra iudicia, sed in ipsis orationibus habitus est nimius risus adfectator. Mihi quidem . . . mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas*¹ (*op. cit.*, VI, 3, 3).

¹ For Quintilian's use of *urbanitas* in the sense of refined, urbane wit, cf. E. S. Ramage, "Urbanitas: Cicero and Quintilian, a Contrast in Attitudes," *A. J. P.*, LXXXIV (1963), pp. 406-7.

Some examples of Cicero's witticisms will now be cited. Proper names form the basis for many of his jokes. After Paetus has entertained Balbus at dinner, Cicero, hinting for an invitation, writes and asks Paetus not to think more highly of stutterers (*balbos*) than of brilliant speakers (*disertos*, i. e., such as Cicero); cf. *peto a te ne pluris esse balbos quam disertos putes* (*Ad Fam.*, IX, 19, 2). In *Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 25 Cicero reports that five portrait busts of Roman married ladies have been found among the possessions of a disreputable individual named Vedius. One of the ladies compromised by this discovery was a sister of Brutus, another was the wife of Lepidus. Cicero's words are: *In his inventae sunt quinque imagunculae matronarum in quibus una sororis amici tui hominis 'bruti' qui hoc utatur et illius 'lepidi' qui haec tam negligenter ferat*. Shuckburgh neatly translates: "In this (i. e. Vedius' baggage) are found five small portrait busts of married ladies, among which is one of the wife (the translator made a slip here, unless he departed from the usual text) of your friend—"brute," indeed, to be intimate with such a fellow! and of the wife of Lepidus—as easygoing as his name to take this so calmly!" In his letters to Trebatius, Cicero indulges in constant banter. An outstanding and brilliant example is *Treviros vites censeo. Audio capitales esse; mallem 'aere, argento, auro' essent* (*Ad Fam.*, VII, 13, 2). Here Cicero is playfully warning Trebatius, now on Caesar's staff in Gaul, not to come into contact with the Gallic tribe of the Treviri, who are likely to be deadly (*capitales*) adversaries; this contains a punning reference to the *Tresviri capitales* at Rome, who were a board in charge of prisons and executions. The words *mallem . . . essent* refer to another board at Rome, the *Tresviri aere argento auro flando feriundo*, who were in charge of the mint. In other words Cicero would rather have Trebatius deal with the sort of *Tre(s)viri* who could make his fortune for him. We should note in this example that only one of the two words played upon, i. e., *Treviri*, is explicitly mentioned; the other word, *Tresviri*, is understood by implication.

A number of Cicero's plays on words involve the Greek language. He jokingly expresses a fear that Atticus may be misled by his name into a hyper-Attic position respecting his oratorical tastes; cf. *Quamquam vereor ne cognomine tuo lapsus ὑπεραττικὸς sis in iudicando* (*Ad Att.*, XV, 1a, 2). Terentia's steward Phi-

lotimus, whom Cicero considers untrustworthy, is castigated twice for his φιλοτιμία (reprehensible ambition); cf. Παραφύλαξον, *si me amas, τὴν τοῦ φυρατοῦ φιλοτιμίαν αὐτότατα* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 9, 2) and *ut videres, ne quid φιλοτιμία eius, quem nosti, nobis noceret* (*Ad Att.*, VII, 1, 1). Philotimus' name, as we see, is not expressly mentioned. In the letter to P. Volumnius Eutrapelus previously cited (see above), Cicero makes a play on his correspondent's cognomen, as follows: Cicero has recently received a letter from this Volumnius, who did not write his full name in the salutation; Cicero declares that at first he wondered whether this letter might not be from another Volumnius, a senator, but the letter's εὐτραπεία (nimble wit) soon convinced him that the writer must be P. Volumnius Eutrapelus; cf., *Quod sine praenomine familiariter, ut debebas, ad me epistolam misisti, primum addubitavi an a Volumnio senatore esset, . . . deinde εὐτραπεία litterarum fecit ut intellegerem tuas esse* (*Ad Fam.*, VII, 32, 1). Later in the same letter Cicero plays bilingually on Greek and Latin designations of the goddess who typifies grace, i. e., Κυθέρεια—Venus; cf. *sed quoniam tanta faex est in urbe ut nihil tam sit ἀκύθηρον quod non alicui venustum esse videatur* (*op. cit.*, 2), which Shuckburgh translates, "But as there is so much scum in the city, that nothing can be so graceless as not to seem graceful to some one. . . ."

Cicero describes and illustrates a type of pun which involves a slight alteration in the spelling of a word, a type called παρονομασία by the Greeks; cf. *Alterum genus est, quod habet parvam verbi immutationem, quod in littera positum Graeci vocant παρονομασίαν, ut "Nobiliorem mobiliorem" Cato* (*De Orat.*, II, 256); that is to say, Cato considered Fulvius Nobilior to be rather fickle (*mobiliorem*). Cicero himself perpetrates some uncommonly lame specimens of this type, e. g. *sed incurrit haec nostra laurus non solum in oculos, sed iam etiam in vocularum malevolorum* (*Ad Fam.*, II, 16, 2), "But these laurels of mine not only attract the eyes, but now even excite the cries of my ill-wishers," Jeans; and again in his description of the consul Piso as *facie magis quam facetiis ridiculus* (*Ad Att.*, I, 13, 2), "Laughable rather from his *expression* than his *expressions*," Pretor. Cicero's excellent play on *Treviri* (see above) may also be classed as an example of παρονομασία.

The passages which have been cited are only a very small

sample of the witticisms that abound in Cicero's *Letters*. It is scarcely an exaggeration when Tyrrell and Purser say, in their note on *Ad Att.*, V, 5, 1, "We shall hardly ever go wrong in ascribing to Cicero a jest in his letters, especially if it take the form of a play on a name." The particular examples which have been given should demonstrate that Cicero's jokes are often concerned with proper names, that they may be bilingual in character, and that one of the two words involved in a pun may be understood and not explicitly expressed.

Against this background we may now consider the first of the two passages with which this paper is concerned. An estate near Arpinum has been purchased for Quintus Cicero, during his absence in Gaul. As Quintus has not yet seen the estate, Marcus sends him a description of it in *Ad Q. fr.*, III, 1, 2 (3), written in the year 54. The letter reads, in part, *profecti sumus in Fufidianum fundum, quem tibi proximis nundinis Arpini de Fufidio . . . emeramus*. Cicero then adds a few sentences describing various features of the estate. After this he writes *Fundum audio te hunc Bovillanum velle retinere*. The word *Bovillanum* has been a puzzle. Why should an estate near Arpinum be described as *Bovillanum*? The only town named Bovillae now known to us is located on the Appian Way, eleven miles from Rome (cf. Hülsen, *R.-E.*, III, cols. 798-9), and this is a long distance from Arpinum. It seems to be generally agreed that Quintus' *fundus Bovillanus* can have no connection with this Bovillae, but I have seen no good explanation of what Cicero means by *Bovillanum* as applied to Quintus' estate. Roby in *C. R.*, I (1887), p. 67 takes Arpinum in the letter to be merely "the place of purchase," but he evidently supposes the estate to be somewhere in the neighborhood of Arpinum, for he says "Arpinum and (the known) Bovillae are many miles apart, so that the meaning of *Bovillanus* is uncertain."

The text which I have given is the vulgate. Two points must be discussed. *Bovillanum* is Lambinus' correction of *bobil(l)ianum* and *bovillianum* found in the manuscripts. L.-A. Constans, however, in the Budé edition of the *Letters* (Paris, 1950) emends to *Fufidianum*, thus designating the estate by the name of its former owner, as Cicero did at the beginning of the passage. Constans' emendation is accepted in the Paravia edition of H. Moricca (Turin, 1955). This seems too drastic a solution

to the difficulty raised by the word *Bovillanum*. Watt retains *Bovillanum* in his Oxford text of 1958. Another textual matter concerns *hunc*, for which there seems to be a poorly attested variant reading *nunc*. Watt's *apparatus* cites "*cod. nescioquis ap. Or.*"¹ (i. e., Orelli's edition of 1826-31) as the authority for *nunc*. Tyrrell and Purser read *hunc* but their note suggests that *nunc* may possibly be the correct reading, in which case Cicero's meaning would be "'I have bought you this beautiful estate: but I understand that you now wish to keep your suburban residence at Bovillae' (which he probably intended to sell in order to get the purchase-money for the *Fufidianus fundus*)." This suggestion is unattractive, for the reading *nunc* is not well attested, and the interpretation assumes the existence of an otherwise unknown estate of Quintus at the known Bovillae. Also, I think we shall see that when *Bovillanum* in the letter is correctly understood, there is no difficulty with *hunc*.

I should like to suggest that Cicero is using *Bovillanum* here in a jesting sense which, in our time, has not been completely understood. Harper's *Lexicon* cites an adjective *bovillus*, meaning "of or pertaining to oxen or cows." The *Lexicon*, s. v. *Bovillae* B, 1, lists an adjective *Bovillanus*, meaning "of *Bovillae*," used with *pugna* in Cicero, *Ad Att.*, V, 13, 1 with relation to the killing of Clodius; in this passage the *Lexicon* sees "a play on the word *bovillus*." I fail to see any play on *Bovillanus-bovillus* in this passage, but I do think that this wordplay was in Cicero's mind when he wrote *Ad Q. fr.*, III, 1, 2 (3), the passage now under discussion. Let us look at the beginning of Cicero's account in this passage: *Ex eo loco recta Vitularia via profecti sumus in Fufidianum fundum, quem tibi . . . emeramus*. From this we see that the estate was situated on the *Vitularia via*. Undoubtedly, the road was so named because cattle were driven along it to market;² cf. *vitulus* and *vitula*. For an inveterate punster like Cicero what would be more natural than to designate an estate on a *Vitularia via* as *Bovillanus*? The adjective *bovillus*, suggesting *Bovillanus* in form and *Vitularia* in

² Cf. W. G. Williams, *Cicero, the Letters to his Friends* (Loeb Classical Library), III, p. 550. Another road with a name derived from its use was the *Salaria via*, along which salt was conveyed; cf. *sicut apparet ex nomine Salariae viae, quoniam illa salem in Sabinos portari convenerat* (Plin., *H. N.*, XXXI, 41, 89).

meaning, would be an obvious connecting link. We should not, then, understand *Fundum hunc . . . Bovillanum* (*Ad Q. fr.*, III, 1, 2, [3]), as "this estate at Bovillae," with reference to a place named Bovillae otherwise unknown to us, but rather, in view of its situation on the *Vitularia via*, as "this estate at Bull Run."

The second problem I wish to consider is raised by the words *Post Leuctricam pugnam die septingentesimo sexagesimo quinto* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 26, written in 50). These words, coming at the end of the letter, are intended to give its date, i. e., "the 765th day after the battle of Leuctra." The "battle of Leuctra" is Cicero's designation of the skirmish near Bovillae in which Clodius lost his life. Why did Cicero describe this skirmish as the "battle of Leuctra"?

Before proceeding to try to answer this question, I should like to consider two other passages from the *Letters* which pertain to this problem. One of them is the beginning of the letter under consideration, *Accepi tuas litteras a. d. quintum Terminalia Laodiceae* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 1). This passage is pertinent as illustrating Cicero's use of an unconventional dating formula, here "the fifth day before the Terminalia," i. e. February 19th. On other occasions Cicero similarly gives a date in terms of a festival, apparently for the sake of variety, e. g. *secundis Saturnalibus* and *tertiis Saturnalibus* (*Ad Att.*, XIII, 52, 1, written in 45); also *Saturnalibus* (*Ad Att.*, V, 20, 1, written in 51), and *Saturnalibus tertiis* (*ibid.*, 5); this letter also contains several dates conventionally expressed, e. g. *a. d. VII Kal. Septembris* (*ibid.*, 2), and *a. d. V Kal. Ianuarias* (*ibid.*, 8). In *Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 1, however, Cicero had a particular reason for using the Terminalia in his reckoning of the date. The explanation was given long ago by Ideler, who, according to I. C. G. Boot in his Amsterdam edition of 1865, *ad loc.*, pointed out that Cicero avoided the ordinary dating expression because he did not know whether an intercalary month was to be inserted before the first of March. Boot also directs attention to section 12 of the letter. Here the words *Ea sic observabo quasi intercalatum non sit* show that the possibility of intercalation was in Cicero's mind. In the Budé edition of L.-A. Constans and J. Bayet (Paris, 1950), IV, pp. 105-6, it is suggested that Cicero's ignorance about an intercalation may be real or assumed, and that his words may contain a sly dig at the authorities at Rome, by insinuating that only

three days before the critical date (the letter was written on February 20th) the question of an intercalation had not yet been settled. The other pertinent passage is *Ephesum venimus a. d. XI Kal. Sext. sexagesimo et quingentesimo post pugnam Bovillanam* (*Ad Att.*, V, 13, 1, written in 51). Here the *pugnam Bovillanam* is, naturally, the fight near Bovillae in which Clodius was killed. This passage is significant in showing that Cicero has taken the death of Clodius as the beginning of a new era, with reference to which he may date subsequent events, an era described by Constans-Bayet (*loc. cit.*) as "un calendrier privé, ou, mieux . . . une ère toute personnelle." Possibly in *Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 1 and certainly in *Ad Att.*, V, 13, 1 Cicero is writing in a humorous vein.

Returning now to *Post Leuctricam pugnam die septingentesimo sexagesimo quinto* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 26) we see Cicero again jestingly employing his new era which begins with the death of Clodius. This passage is almost immediately preceded by a sentence in which Cicero alludes to certain *Romana mysteria*. Tyrrell and Purser think it likely that these *mysteria* are a celebration in honor of the Bona Dea; if so, Cicero's thoughts will have turned to the earlier celebration profaned by Clodius; and thus, with a reminiscence of Clodius now fixed in Cicero's mind, it can be seen how Cicero happened to use his new era based on Clodius' death. Constans-Bayet point out in a note on the passage that Clodius was wounded in front of a sanctuary of the *Bona Dea* (cf. *Pro Mil.*, 86), thus showing another possible connection between the *mysteria* of the letter and the death of Clodius. All this is entirely plausible as explaining why the new era appears at the end of *Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 26. But in *Ad Att.*, V, 13, 1 the new era began with the "Battle of Bovillae"; why should this now become the "Battle of Leuctra"?³ Tyrrell and Purser, in their note on *mysteria* (*Ad Att.*, VI, 1, 26), simply say "we know not why." Presumably they were not favorably impressed by the earlier suggestion of Boot, in his note on the passage, to the effect that Cicero called the fight at Bovillae "the battle of Leuctra" because the death of Clodius restored peace to

³ A. Haury, *L'ironie et l'humour chez Cicéron* (Leiden, 1955), p. 265, n. 5, remarks, with regard to Cicero's *pugnam Leuctricam*, "L'anarchie du calendrier romain à cette époque autorisait par ailleurs cette plaisanterie." This statement is unexceptionable as far as it goes, but I do not find it very enlightening.

Rome, just as the original battle of Leuctra crushed the power of Sparta and ended her domination. F. F. Abbott, *Selected Letters of Cicero* (Boston, 1897), in his note on the passage, agrees with Boot, giving a more precise formulation of Boot's supposition, and remarking on the jocose character of Cicero's *pugnam Leuctricam*. Boot and Abbott seem to be on the right track, but they leave much unexplained. Let it be agreed that Cicero's new era based on the death of Clodius is a joke, that part of the humor lies in the comparison of a minor event with a major one, and that the fights at Bovillae and at Leuctra are comparable in having a common outcome of deliverance. Still, I must ask, how did Cicero come to choose the battle of Leuctra to be his symbol of deliverance? Did not Greece experience a greater deliverance in the Persian Wars? Would it not have been more pointed for Cicero to liken the scuffle at Bovillae to the battle of Plataea; or to the battle of Marathon, with Hippias in the background as a potential tyrant to serve as the analogue of Clodius? I strongly suspect that Cicero saw a special connection between the words *Bovillanum* and *Leuctricum*, which led him to ignore such possibilities as *Plataeum* and *Marathonium*, when he was considering battles which resulted in deliverance from tyranny.

Let me indicate a possible train of thought which, passing through Cicero's mind, could have led him to regard the word *Leuctricum* as in some sense an equivalent of the word *Bovillanum*, on the strength of certain common connotations. In the first place, the geographical adjective *Bovillanus* could easily have suggested the ordinary adjective *bovillus* (see above, p. 197). Now the adjective *bovillus* is an extremely rare word. Outside of a few occurrences in late medical writers, the only instance of it that I can find cited anywhere is Livy, XXII, 10, 3, but the word is much older than Livy, as we shall see. In XXII, 9, 7 ff. Livy, relating the events that followed the disaster at Lake Trasimenus, tells how Q. Fabius Maximus, on assuming the dictatorship, persuaded the Senate to adopt certain measures designed to appease the anger of the gods. The Senators then recommended, among other things, that a *Ver Sacrum* should be vowed. A vote of the people was needed for the authorization of the *Ver Sacrum*. Livy, in archaic, formulaic, religious language quotes the proposition that was laid before the people, in part as follows: *ratum donum dedit populus Romanus Quiritium*,

quod ver attulerit ex suillo oville caprino bovillo grege, quaeque profana erunt, Iovi fieri (Livy, XXII, 10, 3). It seems not unlikely that Livy has preserved the original language of the resolution. We learn from Livy, XXXIV, 44, 1-3, that the rites were not celebrated until 195 B.C., and that they were repeated in 194 B.C., and that the animals sacrificed were those born between March 1 and April 29. Many of these animals must have been white. Now it is obvious from such passages as *Cat. M.*, 10-13 and *Off.*, I, 84 that Cicero admired Q. Fabius Maximus and knew much about his career. Cicero, in the course of his reading about Fabius, may well have found an account of this *Ver Sacrum*, an unusual event for which Fabius was largely responsible, and thus Cicero may have become acquainted with the rare word *bovillus*.⁴ It is likely, then, that the word *bovillus* had, for Cicero, a religious connotation, suggesting an animal to be sacrificed. Such animals, of course, were often white; for example, along with the *Ver Sacrum* just mentioned, other rites were vowed at Rome, including sacrifices of white oxen to many gods; cf. *multis aliis divis bubus albis* (Livy, XXII, 10, 7). The generally auspicious character of the color white is well attested by such references as *candidi . . . soles* (*Cat.*, 8, 8); *lapide . . . candidiore* (*Cat.*, 68, 148); *candidiore nota* (*Cat.*, 107, 6). And so, if the word *Bovillanum*, as related to such an auspicious event as the death of Clodius, did conjure up in Cicero's mind a conception of a sacrificial animal, that animal would naturally be white.⁵

Passing now to the Greek language let us consider the adject-

⁴ A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* (Leipzig, 1941), p. 140, believes that Valerius Antias was the source of Livy, XXII, 10, 3, the passage where *bovillus* is used. Whether or not this is correct, it was probably not in Antias that Cicero found the word *bovillus*. For Cicero nowhere mentions Antias by name, although Antias was available to Cicero, if Velleius, II, 9, 6 is trustworthy; and in particular Cicero fails to include Antias among the historians mentioned in *Leg.*, I, 6-7. This suggests that Cicero never read Antias, or that he did not consider Antias important, if he did read him.

⁵ There is a possibility that the name of the town itself, *Bovillae*, had, for Cicero, a sacred connotation. We read some extraordinary ancient etymological speculations on the origin of the name *Bovillae*; cf. *Hillas intestina veteres esse dixerunt: unde Bovillae, oppidum in Italia, quod eo bos intestina vulnere trahens advenit* (Nonius Marcellus, 122, 6 [M]), and *Bovillae sunt vicus ad undecimum lapidem Appiae Viae, quia aliquando in Albano monte ab ara fugiens taurus iam*

tive λευκόθριξ, "white-haired, white." This compound word is rather less rare than the Latin *bovillus*, and its two constituent Greek words are, of course, extremely common. The word λευκόθριξ, like *bovillus*, had sacrificial connotations. White animals were usually appropriate as offerings to celestial and to beneficent deities; black animals were commonly sacrificed to chthonic and to awesome divinities; cf. Hom., *Il.*, III, 103-4; Ar., *Ran.*, 847; Verg., *Aen.*, III, 118-20; Servius on Verg., *Aen.*, III, 118. In particular we find in Ar., *Av.*, 971 a proposal to sacrifice a λευκότριχα κριόν to Pandora. I venture to suggest, then, that the word *Bovillanum* with its connotations caused the word λευκότριχα with its similar connotations to occur to Cicero's mind.⁹ Next, it may be supposed that Cicero, starting with the word λευκότριχα, and allowing his punning instincts free rein, suppressed the omicron, removed the aspiration from the chi, added a faint nasal consonant at the word's end, and so came back into the Latin language with the word *Leuetricam*. The play on λευκότριχα—*Leuetricam* would be an example of παρονομασία as described by Cicero in *De Orat.*, II, 256 (see above, p. 195). As in the *Treviri* joke of *Ad Fam.*, VII, 13, 2 (see above, p. 194) only one of the two words involved, *Leuetricam*, is explicitly mentioned. Such a pun as λευκότριχα—*Leuetricam* does not seem too far-fetched to be attributed to the writer who delivered himself of *oculos-voculas* (*Ad Fam.*, II, 16, 2) and of *facie-facetiis* (*Ad Att.*, I, 13, 2 [see above, p. 195]).

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consecratus, ibi comprehensus est. Inde Bovillae dictae (*Gloss. Vet. in Persium*, on VI, 55). These variorings, of course, cannot now be taken seriously; nor can we now trace them back to Cicero's time. Nevertheless, it is within the bounds of possibility that they were in existence then (cf. Nonius' *veteres*); if they were known to Cicero, they could have reinforced in his mind the sacrificial connotation of the word *Bovillanum*.

⁹ Cicero's familiarity with the word λευκόθριξ would have come more probably from his general knowledge of Greek than specifically from Ar., *Av.*, 971. His writings do not indicate that he had a particularly detailed knowledge of Aristophanes' comedies. In his original version of *Orat.*, 29 he alluded to the description of Pericles' thundering which occurs in Ar., *Ach.*, 530-1, but he mistakenly attributed the passage to Eupolis. In *Ad Att.*, XII, 6a, 1 Cicero, after discovering his error, asked Atticus to change Eupolis to Aristophanes in his copy of the *Orator*. Our manuscripts give the text as corrected.

ANTHEMOCRITUS AND THE MEGARIANS.

W. R. Connor has argued (*A.J.P.*, LXXXIII [1962], pp. 225-46) that the death of the Athenian herald Anthemocritus in the Megarid and the vengeful Decree of Charinus which followed this incident, assigned by Plutarch (*Pericles*, 30, 3; *Moralia*, 812 d; cf. Schol. Ar., *Pac.*, 246) to the period immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War, belong in fact to the period 352-349.

The argument is attractive, and its attraction is enhanced by Connor's lucid and modest presentation of it. The difficulties of reconciling the mission of Anthemocritus and the provisions of the Decree of Charinus with the narrative of Thucydides, I, not to mention the impossibility of identifying the Decree with the Megarian Decree of Thuc., I, 139, 1 f. and Ar., *Ach.*, 496-556 (cf. 729-835), are notorious. Charinus provided for the *invasion* of the Megarid twice a year; and whatever the Megarian Decree said or intended, it was not a declaration of war. The positive pointers to 352-349 are:

(i) As we see from *I.G.*, II², 204, the Athenians concerned themselves in 352/1 with the fixing of new boundaries for the *orgas*, the land on the borders (*sc.* of Attica and the Megarid; the inscription comes from Eleusis). Dem., XIII, 32 refers to a decision to "march out and stop the accursed¹ Megarians encroaching on the *orgas*." Didymus, *ad loc.*, cites Androtion (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 324 F 30) and Philochorus (328 F 155) as evidence that the Athenians implemented this decision in 350/49.

(ii) The *Letter of Philip* (XII in the Demosthenic corpus) refers (4) to Anthemocritus as having been killed by the Megarians, and says that the Athenians erected a statue of him "in front of the gate." Isaeus (fr. 21 [Thalheim]) and Pausanias (I, 36, 3 f.) also mention this statue (*ἀνδριάνς* in Isaeus, *μνῆμα* and *στήλη* in Pausanias), and Plu., *Per.*, 30, 3 says that Anthemocritus was buried by the Thriasian Gate. The *Letter of Philip* cites only events recent at the time of its "dramatic date,"

¹ The Megarians are not the only people called *κατάρπαι* by Demosthenes; the Euboeans are so described in XIX, 75.

except in 7 and 20 f., where the reference to a more remote past is made entirely explicit.

(iii) "There is no known parallel to the Anthemocritus statue from the fifth century. What evidence is available suggests that the practice of awarding public honorary statues became common only later" (Connor, p. 246, after a review of the evidence on this point).

(iv) The name Anthemocritus is known only from the fourth century.

(v) At least one Charinus was active in politics ([Dem.], LVIII, 37 f.) in the third quarter of the fourth century.

Connor is rightly tentative in using items (iii)-(v), and an additional reason for hesitancy in accepting them as significant may be found in the consideration that the statue of Anthemocritus was presumably intended not to express the gratitude of the Athenians towards a benefactor but to remind future generations of Megarian wickedness (cf. *Letter*, *loc. cit.*); the question of precedents thus loses its relevance.² As for the *Letter*, whenever it was composed, it seems unlikely that its composer had any knowledge of Plutarch's source for the Decree of Charinus. It was in his interest to magnify to the fullest extent Athenian reactions to the death of a herald; yet he says only that the Megarians were debarred from the Mysteries, whereas Charinus, according to Plutarch, provided for the invasion of the Megarid twice a year and the killing of any Megarian who entered Attica. I do not see how it can be maintained both that the Decree of Charinus was passed *ca.* 350 and that the composer of the *Letter* was well acquainted with the history of that time.

Item (i) remains solid, and Connor's argument could be considered in the light of that alone, but for one datum, not discussed by him at all, which at least imperils and may perhaps destroy his argument.

This datum is Plu., *Per.*, 30, 4, which says: "The Megarians, denying the murder of Anthemocritus, put the blame" (*sc.* for the Peloponnesian War) "on Aspasia and Pericles. They refer to those famous and widely-known verses of the *Acharnians*" (and quotation of Ar., *Ach.*, 524-7 follows).

Now, unless Plutarch in saying "denying" means "*implicitly*

² The burial of Medgar Evers at Arlington is in some respects similar.

denying"—and this I would be reluctant to believe, since nothing would have been easier for him than to say "the Megarians do not mention Anthemocritus"—Plutarch himself was not the first person to associate the death of Anthemocritus with the beginning of the Peloponnesian War; the association had already been made by "the Megarians." Plutarch presumably means by "the Megarians" what he means by *οἱ Μεγαροῦθεν συγγραφεῖς* in *Thes.*, 10, 2—cf. *οἱ Ναξίων συγγραφεῖς* in *Mul. Virt.*, 254E and "Sammelzitate" in Hellenistic authors generally, from Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Pausanias—and therefore allows us to infer that (a) he knew of at least two Megarians who had composed *Megarica*, and (b) at least one of these assigned the death of Anthemocritus to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

We know the names of four Megarian historians: Praxion (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 484), Dieuchidas (485), Hereas (486), and Heragoras (486 F 3). Of these four, "Heragoras" (cited only by Schol. Ap. Rhod., p. 26, 17 [Wendel]) may be the same as Hereas. There are some grounds for dating Hereas (cited by Plu., *Thes.*, 20, 2; 32, 7; and *Sol.*, 10, 5) not later than the early part of the third century B.C.³ A Megarian named Dieuchidas son of Praxion was one of the temple commissioners at Delphi in the 330's (*S. I. G.*,³ 252 N 31 al.). Granted, we do not know for certain that the historians Praxion and Dieuchidas were the father and son of the Delphian inscription;⁴ nor is it certain that Heragoras was Hereas, or that Hereas was as early as has been suggested; nor, again, do we know whether the *Megarica* of these historians included historical events of the fifth century. But against these uncertainties we must set three facts:

³ Wilamowitz's statement (*Homerische Untersuchungen* [Berlin, 1884], p. 259, n. 22) that Plutarch's knowledge of Hereas was through Hermippus as an intermediary in *Sol.*, 10, 5 and through Istros in *Thes.*, 20, 2 is a fairly plausible inference from *Thes.*, 34, 3; *Sol.*, 6, 7 and 11, 2, but it does not quite deserve the dogmatic status accorded to it by Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, IIb, p. 394.

⁴ J. A. Davison, *C. Q.*, N. S. IX (1959), p. 221, reminds us that "X son of Y" may occur more than once in a Greek community, and he revives the attempt of D. W. Prakken (*A. J. P.*, LXXI [1941], p. 348, n. 2) to get rid of the putative historian Praxion by emending the text of the *Suda* (σ 623). It would, however, require an emendation of Harpocration (s. v. σκίπων) to abolish Praxion, and neither Prakken nor Davison seems to me to offer anything like rational grounds for this procedure (cf. also Jacoby, IIb, no. 484, n. 2).

(i) There is not a particle of positive evidence for the existence of any Megarian historian at any date later than the third century B. C.

(ii) Megarian polemics against Athenian historical claims must in any case have begun by the fourth century B. C., because Aristotle (*Poetics*, 1448a 29—1 2) refers to the Megarian argument against the Athenian claim to have invented comedy; and this polemical strain is apparent in Praxion (F 1), Dieuchidas (F 2a and 6), Hereas (F 1) and Plutarch's "writers from Megara" (487 F 1).

(iii) There is no reason why a Megarian writer in the fourth century B. C. should not have cited Aristophanes as historical evidence. Ephorus did so; for in Diod. Sic., XII, 40, 6 quotations from Aristophanes and Eupolis round off a passage which begins (38, 1) "it is necessary and germane to my History to set forth the causes of the war" and ends (41, 1) "such were the causes of the Peloponnesian War, as described by Ephorus."

I cannot therefore see any rational alternative to the assumption that at least one Megarian historian in the fourth or early third century B. C. referred to the death of Anthemocritus in connection with the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Since it is not credible that this historian back-dated an event of *ca.* 351 by eighty years, we must make a fresh attempt to reconcile Plu., *Per.*, 30, 4 with the silence of Thucydides and the attitude of Aristophanes.

Thucydides' silence is adequately explained by recognition that although the Spartans had chosen to treat the Megarian Decree as the crucial violation of the Thirty Years Peace, so that they could say to Athens "repeal the Megarian Decree and there will be no war" (Thuc., I, 139, 1), the Athenians did not intend the mission of Anthemocritus as a justification or explanation of the Megarian Decree or as an attempt to avert or delay war.⁵ If it was a consequence of renewed Megarian encroachment on the *orgas* in the winter of 432/1, it was a mission which would have

⁵ Cf. P. A. Brunt, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), p. 278, n. 21. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², II, i, p. 293, n. 1, makes the characteristically cavalier statement that the Decree of Charinus has "nothing to do" with the Megarian Decree or the death of Anthemocritus; astonishment at the second part of this proposition does not preclude agreement with the first part.

been undertaken whatever the diplomatic relations between Athens and Sparta. The *orgas* was sacred land, and a Greek state champions the cause of "its own" deities not only to enhance its righteousness in the eyes of other states but also to avoid the anger of those deities. If Thucydides judged that the mission was irrelevant both to the causation and to the conduct of the war, it is not surprising that he said nothing of it; and if this was his judgment, it was surely right. Athens and the Peloponnesians were committed to war, and the fate of Anthemocritus could neither delay nor accelerate the process. The Decree of Charinus, in providing for the invasion of the Megarid twice a year, only provided for an operation which Athens would obviously have executed even if there had been no encroachment on the *orgas* and no herald's mission. Thucydides records the military fact (II, 31, 3 and IV, 66, 1); why should he record the decision?

The second provision of the Decree of Charinus, that any Megarian who set foot on Attic soil should be killed, would have been notable in time of peace, but in time of war meant no more than that the Athenians would receive no herald or envoy from Megara. Since Megara was not fighting the war on her own, but as one among the many allies of Sparta, it is, again, not surprising that Thucydides made no mention of this provision. A parallel for Thucydides' suppression of formalities in favour of facts is to be seen in VI, 44, 3 and 46, 2, where he describes the Athenian demand on Rhegium for help, and the considerable moral effect of Rhegium's lukewarm response, without mentioning that a treaty of alliance between Athens and Rhegium actually existed (*I. G.*, I², 51); Thucydides was aware that the help given by one state to another is determined by sentiment and interest at the time when the help is required, not by promises which were the product of sentiment and interest at a different time.

There were several reasons why the wave of anger and hatred which produced the Decree of Charinus should have subsided by the time of the *Acharnians*. Athens ravaged other territories besides the Megarid, and suffered no injury from Megara which she did not suffer on a greater scale at the hands of others; thus the course of events itself submerged in the general malice against the Peloponnesians whatever special malice had been felt against Megara in 431. By the summer of 424 Athens was able to

exploit political antagonisms within Megara (Thuc., IV, 66 ff.), and these antagonisms were not of a kind which springs up overnight; the practicability of securing Megara by betrayal from within will have contributed, more than anything else could have contributed, to the unobtrusive discarding of a decision to pursue ἀκήρυκτος ἔχθρα against all Megarians alike.⁶ We must also take account of the possibility that the death of Anthemocritus was mysterious, and that several years' reflection diminished the Athenians' original conviction that the state of Megara was to blame.

The importance which Spartan diplomacy attached to the Megarian Decree had a powerful effect on tradition. In Aristophanes' *Peace*, 500-2 the Megarians are "hated by Peace" as the cause of the war, even though in the same play (609) the Megarian Decree is only the "little spark" with which Pericles lit the fire. Andocides, III, 8 says of the Archidamian War: "we went to war because of Megara." It was therefore inevitable that a Megarian historian should discuss Megarian relations with Athens in 432/1 as a whole, comprehending the Megarian Decree, the alleged murder of Anthemocritus, and the ferocious Decree of Charinus, and treating this complex of events as an occasion for justifying the conduct of Megara and denigrating that of Athens. We cannot say for certain whether any historian went so far as to identify explicitly the Megarian Decree with the Decree of Charinus. The identification is complete in Schol. Ar., *Pax*, 246, where μήτε γῆς μήτε λιμένων Ἀττικῶν ἐπιβαίνειν τοὺς Μεγαρέας blends μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ (Thuc., I, 139, 1) with δὲ δ' ἂν ἐπιβῇ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Μεγαρέων, θανάτῳ ζημιῶσθαι (Plu., *Per.*, 30, 3); but since garbling of historical data in the scholia on Aristophanes is not uncommon, all we can deduce from the scholion is that at least one historian mentioned the Decree of Charinus (Χαρίνου is a certain emendation⁷ of χάριν τοῦ in the text of the scholion). This historian was not Plutarch, for, so far as our evidence goes at present,⁸ the scholia vetera on Aristophanes nowhere show any acquaintance with any work of Plutarch.

⁶ A parallel, on a grand scale, for the rapid diminution of vengefulness under the pressure of self-interest in provided by the attitude of Thebes and Corinth towards Athens during the decade 405-395.

⁷ Cf. Connor, p. 228.

⁸ This proviso is required by the fact that scholia vetera which are

Ephorus, to judge from Diod. Sic., XII, 39, 4, must be declared innocent of any confusion. Since Schol. Ar., *Vesp.*, 875 mentions Dieuchidas by name, it is conceivable that Schol. *Pax*, 246 comes from him too, but it is improbable that Plu., *Per.*, 30, 2-3 can also be ascribed to a Megarian source; the antithetical relation between 30, 2-3 and 30, 4 seems too plainly to reflect a transition from an Athenian account to a Megarian account. Serious consideration should be given to the possibility that the mission of Anthemocritus and the Decree of Charinus were summarily described by Androtion (and thereafter by other Attidographers) under the archon-year 432/1, and that an Attidographer is the source of Plu., *Per.*, 30, 2-3; we know from F 30 and F 39 that Androtion was interested in questions affecting sacred land, and from F 30 that he recorded the proposers of decrees.

The writer of the *Letter of Philip*, as we have seen, knew nothing of the Decree of Charinus; but he may be right in saying that in consequence of the death of Anthemocritus Megarians were debarred from the Eleusinian Mysteries for a period (how long?)—presumably after the cessation of hostilities. If he derived this fact from the *περὶ Μυστηρίων* of Melanthius (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 326),⁹ an author known to Harpocration (*s. v.* γρυπάνιον)—and his knowledge of the statue from a commentator on Isaeus (*cf.* Harpocration, *s. v.* Ἀνθεμόκριτος)—his ignorance of the political and military aspects of the herald's death is understandable.¹⁰

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mutilated or omitted in R and V sometimes survive intact in fourteenth century manuscripts which had not been examined when the scholia were edited by Dübner.

⁹ The *Letter of Philip* transmitted to the Middle Ages differs considerably from the *Letter* known to Didymus (*In Dem.*, col. 10, 24 ff.). Wendland argued (*Hermes*, XXXIX [1904], pp. 431 ff.) that Didymus' *Letter* is the original, our *Letter* the work of Anaximenes of Lampascus. If he was right, the possibility that Melanthius is the source of the *Letter's* statement about the mysteries is diminished, but (*cf.* Jacoby, IIIb, i, pp. 196 f.) not removed. The hypothesis that our *Letter* is a rhetorical work much later than Anaximenes must, I think, be kept open.

¹⁰ I am grateful to Dr. G. E. Rickman for his comments on the first draft of this article; all errors are mine.

REVIEWS.

Cn. Naevii Belli Punici Carminis Quae Supersunt. Edidit, fragmentorum ordinem constituit, apparatu critico atque commentariolo metrico instruxit WŁADYSŁAW STRZELECKI. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1964. Pp. xxxix + 40. DM. 7.30. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

The fragments of the *Bellum Punicum* of Gnaeus Naevius appeared twice in Teubner volumes before the publication of the edition which is the subject of this review. In both of them they were included in general collections: Baehrens' *Fragmenta Poetarum Romanorum* of 1886 and Morel's *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum Epicorum et Lyricorum* of 1927 (reprinted in 1963). There was, of course, no space in these collections for more than the fragments themselves and a concise apparatus, which touched only occasionally on the interpretation of their contents. In Baehrens' edition the fragments and apparatus cover about eight pages; in Morel's, about ten and a half. Strzelecki has now given us a Teubner volume of seventy-nine pages devoted exclusively to the *Bellum Punicum*.

The Preface begins with a page on the general character of the edition, to which we shall return below. It is then divided into two chapters entitled I, "De Naeviani Belli Punici apud posteros memoria" (pp. VIII-XX) and II, "De singulorum librorum argumentis" (pp. XX-XXXII). The Preface is followed by these three sections: 1, Conspectus Editionum et Studiorum (pp. XXXIII-XXXIV) containing two lists: one of twelve editions of the fragments from the *princeps* of the Stephani (1564) to that of Barchiesi (1962) and another of nineteen learned articles; 2, an Index Philologorum Qui in Notis Afferuntur (pp. XXXV-XXXVI) with thirty-seven names, of which ten also appear in the Conspectus; 3, Sigla Codicum (pp. XXXVII-XXXIX) identifying the principal manuscripts of the works in which the fragments of the *Bellum Punicum* are preserved. The text of the fragments themselves occupies pages 1-30. It is followed by comparative tables (pp. 31-5) showing at a glance the relation between Strzelecki's fragment numbers and those of Morel, Marmorale, and Mariotti. An Index Verborum closes the book (pp. 36-40).

At first sight, we are immensely grateful to the Teubner Press for having given Strzelecki the opportunity to equip his edition so lavishly. But some comparative study tempers our gratitude with disappointment. On the first page of his Preface (VII), Strzelecki informs us that the present Teubner edition is an abridged version of an earlier edition of the *Bellum Punicum* which he published in 1959: *Cn. Naevii Belli Punici Carminis Quae Supersunt edidit, prolegomenon capita duo praemisit Ladislaus Strzelecki* (Polska Akademia Nauk, Komitet Nauk o Kulturze Antycznej, Archiwum Filologiczne II [Wrocław, MCMLIX]). He then explains briefly how he went about his work: he transferred the text of the fragments proper from the old to the new edition without change, except for the correction of some slight errors; he added the Sigla Codicum,

Index Philologorum, and Index Verborum in order that the Teubner edition should contain something new; finally, he made excerpts from the two chapters of Prolegomena to the earlier edition, removing the names and arguments of other scholars, and used them as the Preface to the later one. The reader is referred specifically to the 1959 volume for more detailed information.

No one can quarrel with Strzelecki's decision to repeat the text of the fragments verbatim together with the textual and metrical comments which accompany them. For, presumably, he had established a text and apparatus which satisfied him (his one addition to the critical apparatus will be discussed below). The bibliography of the 1959 edition contains ninety-two items, which are followed by the titles of fourteen editions of other ancient authors which Strzelecki consulted. It is clearly far more comprehensive than its counterpart in the Teubner edition. On the other hand, the Index Philologorum and Sigla Codicum are additions which are particularly useful in understanding the critical apparatus of the fragments. The Index Verborum is also a welcome new element in the Teubner edition. It is the first complete Index of the poem.

Our disappointment in the Teubner edition springs chiefly from the way in which the Prolegomena of the 1959 edition have been transformed in the Teubner Preface. The corresponding chapters in Prolegomena and Preface bear the same titles and treat the same subjects. But comparison shows that the chapters of the Prolegomena were not only curtailed, but largely rewritten before being reused and that the original notes which supported the text with solid documentation were entirely suppressed.

These curtailments and omissions do not damage the value of the first chapter on the *memoria* as severely as they do that of the second on the contents of the several books. When Strzelecki published his edition of 1959, no one as yet had written a history of the vicissitudes through which the *Bellum Punicum* passed in antiquity. There was no occasion to argue with predecessors and the subject in itself invited description rather than controversy. Moreover, between the publication of the 1959 and Teubner editions, Marino Barchiesi brought out his *Nevio Epico* (Padova, 1962) in which he treats the same subject exhaustively (pp. 12-117). Scholars will now be inclined to turn to Barchiesi for detailed information and discussion.

The loss of the documentation of the second chapter of the Prolegomena and its curtailment are far more serious matters for the following reasons. Our conclusions regarding the contents of the several books depend quite naturally on our interpretation of the individual fragments and the idea which we have of the order in which they originally appeared in the poem. This is particularly true of the books containing the legendary material. Here the way in which the fragments are treated not only determines the contents of the books, but also the relation between the legendary and historical parts.

In his famous monograph of 1935, *De Naeviano Belli Punici Carmine Quaestiones Selectae* (Polska Akademia Umiejetności, Rozprawy Wydziału Filologicznego, T. LXV, 2 [Krakow, 1935]), Strzelecki laid the foundations for a new reconstruction of the first three or four books by adhering to the principle that all fragments should remain in the books to which they were assigned by the sources in

which they were preserved. This principle produced a poem which began with the historical war, but went over to the legendary part within Book I. The latter part continued into Book III at least. Wherever it terminated, at the end of III or even within IV, the account of the historical war was resumed.

The general lines of this reconstruction were adopted by many scholars. But widely divergent conclusions were reached regarding the contents of individual fragments and the order of events. A comparison between the treatment of the legendary material in Marmorale's *Naevius Poeta* (Catania, 1945; Firenze, 1950) and Mariotti's *Il Bellum Punicum e l'arte di Nevio* (Roma, 1955) shows what different concepts of the order and nature of events in this part of the poem could be held by two outstanding students of Naevius. It was probably inevitable that Strzelecki's most important conclusion, i. e. that the poem began with the historical war, should eventually be challenged. Karl Büchner did just this in 1957, when he published his chapter, "Der Anfang des *Bellum Punicum* des Naevius" (*Humanitas Romana* [Heddelberg, 1957], pp. 13 ff.).

So far Strzelecki had not brought forth an edition of the *Bellum Punicum*, having been deterred, as he confesses, by Mariotti's edition. But the time had come for him to defend his original views or to let students of Naevius know to what extent the arguments of others had caused him to modify or discard them. The opportunity to do this was offered by the second chapter of the 1959 Prolegomena. To discuss the contents of the books imposed, as we have said above, an examination of the individual fragments and their order in the narrative. It also imposed a scrutiny of the considerable mass of scholarship on the *Bellum Punicum* which had been stimulated by Strzelecki's monograph of 1935.

Strzelecki stated his views again in a detailed and fully documented discussion which took into account the views of other scholars. Thus, the second chapter of the Prolegomena of the 1959 edition not only contained a critical survey of scholarship on the *Bellum Punicum* since 1935, but also represented the last word at the time of the scholar who had done the most to illuminate this subject. Stripped of the documentation which gave the text substance and of the discussion of the work of others on controversial points, Strzelecki's fine chapter appears now in the Preface of the Teubner edition in a form which has lost much of its original value and quality. It is particularly unfortunate that this chapter was not reproduced verbatim because the 1959 edition is not easily obtained, as this reviewer—nor he alone—can testify (cf. V. Buchheit, *Gymnasium*, Beihefte, III [1963], p. 23, n. 38). Incorporation *in toto* in a Teubner volume would have assured Strzelecki's discussion the wide audience which it deserves. The skeletal version of the Teubner edition is far better than nothing, but it is also a poor substitute for the discussion which it supplants.

Strzelecki's treatment of the fragments is firmly based on the principle which he proclaimed in 1935 that fragments must be kept in the books to which they are assigned by the ancient sources. This allows him to follow the same broad lines which he previously established. Frg. 3 (the fragment numbers are Strzelecki's), assigned to Book I by Charisius and describing a military campaign of 263, is interpreted as certain proof that the poem began with the his-

torical war. Frg. 4, with its mention of a gigantomachy, is still thought to refer to the gigantomachy on the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum, and the transition from the historical to the legendary part is assumed to be connected with the fall of Troy depicted on the same building. Strzelecki is now convinced, in spite of his earlier doubts, that the mention of Prochyta in frg. 13 can be interpreted most reasonably as indicating that Aeneas and his Trojans landed at the bay of Naples and consulted the Sibyl there (frg. 12), before being blown off their course toward the mouth of the Tiber to North Africa by a storm. He still believes that Dido is the speaker in the very controversial frg. 23, assigned to Book II by Nonius, and that the relations between Dido and Aeneas were set forth by Naevius as the original cause of the historical enmity between Carthaginians and Romans. He, of course, keeps frg. 25 (mention of Anchises) and frg. 26 (mention of Amulius) in Book III, where they are said to belong, and thus extends the legendary part of the poem into that book.

There is only one change in the order of the fragments of the legendary part which this reviewer would make. Büchner (*op. cit.*, pp. 27 f.) has convinced him that the person mentioned in frg. 16, *ei venit in mentem hominum fortunas*, can be no other than Dido (cf. the end of Dido's gracious speech in *Aeneid*, I, 628 ff.). If this identification is correct, the fragment, attributed to Book I by Priscian, should be put at the end of this book after frgs. 17 and 18 which clearly belong to Venus' complaint to Jupiter about the dangers threatening Aeneas in the storm at sea (frg. 14). From this position we should have to conclude that Aeneas and Dido first met in Book I, as they do in the *Aeneid*.

To come now to the historical fragments, there is not much difference from Book IV on, where Strzelecki allows these fragments to begin (Morel thought that they began with Book III), between his edition and that of Morel. Both editors keep fragments assigned to specific books within these books. Morel distributes five fragments without book numbers between Books IV-VII, Strzelecki four. But Morel also gives three fragments without book numbers to Book III. In identifying the historical events to which the fragments refer, both editors are equally dependent on Cichorius' study, "Die Fragmente historischen Inhalts aus Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*" (*Römische Studien* [Leipzig, 1922], pp. 24 ff.). But between the publication of Strzelecki's 1959 and Teubner editions, the historical fragments were carefully restudied by Altheim. So Strzelecki added to his study of these fragments in the Preface to the Teubner edition footnotes referring to Altheim's new identifications (Strzelecki's references are to the pages of Altheim's article in *Romanitas*, III (1961), pp. 85 ff.; it is republished in the same author's *Untersuchungen zur römischen Geschichte*, I [Frankfurt am Main, 1961], pp. 100 ff.). Finally, Strzelecki changed his mind about the place in the *Bellum Punicum* where Naevius spoke of himself. He now believes that he did so at the end of the poem and, consequently, assigns the pertinent fragment (44) to the end of Book VII.

Strzelecki's identification of the legendary fragments is still the most important part of his Teubner edition. What can we say about it now, some six years after the publication of the 1959 edition which it reflects? As we have seen above, Büchner could not accept

Strzelecki's conclusion, based on frg. 3, that the poem began with the historical war. He did, however, allow frgs. 25 and 26, which mention legendary events, to remain in Book III to which they are assigned by our sources. In his article, "Das Epos des Gnaeus Naevius" (*Göttingen Nachr.*, Ph.-H. Kl., 1960, pp. 41 ff.) Will Richter, who does not mention Strzelecki's 1959 edition, detaches himself even further from the main lines of the Polish scholar's reconstruction. He moves frg. 3 to Book III, frg. 25 to Book I and frg. 26 to Book II, after removing Amulius from it. This allows him to assume that the poem began with the fall of Troy and that the end of the legendary material, the founding of Rome, coincided with the end of Book II. Thus he returns substantially to the structure of the poem which prevailed before 1935. Barchiesi, acknowledging the influence of Büchner, also refuses to believe that the poem began with the war, but agrees that the legendary part extended into Book III (*op. cit.*, p. 218, n. 1090; pp. 391 ff.).

But hardly had Büchner published his article, when Erich Burck stated that he was not convinced by Büchner's arguments regarding the beginning of the poem (*Gymnasium*, LXV [1958], p. 130, n. 28). He did not state his reasons, but Altheim, who shared his opinion, did so vigorously (*Untersuchungen*, pp. 100 f.). In the most recent detailed treatment of the legendary part of the *Bellum Punicum*, Buchheit states his approval of Strzelecki's method and adopts the conclusions that must be drawn from it in regard to the beginning of Book I (the historical war) and the presence of legendary material in Book III (*op. cit.*, pp. 23 ff.).

This reviewer is as firmly convinced now as he was in 1947, when he reviewed the evidence on which Strzelecki based his views (*A.J.P.*, LXVIII [1947], pp. 21 ff.), that Strzelecki's adherence to the book numbers in the sources is methodically correct and that not only the main conclusions to be drawn from it are sound, but also that his identification of most of the individual fragments is the most probable that can be made on the basis of existing evidence. It is admitted at the same time that this aspect of the subject, that is, the inner organization of the legendary part, is still a very controversial subject and is likely to remain so for many years to come. For example, Strzelecki, followed by Marmorale and this reviewer, believes that the speaker referred to in frg. 23 (assigned to Book II) is Dido and that Book II was largely devoted to Aeneas' visit to Carthage and his relations with Dido there. On the other hand, both Mariotti and Buchholz place all of Aeneas' visit to Carthage in Book I and identify the speaker in frg. 23 as someone in Latium. This lets them fill Books II and III with events in Latium. The problem here goes far beyond the identification of the speaker in frg. 23. It is concerned with the reason for the very existence of the legendary part. To reduce the meeting of Dido and Aeneas to a secondary episode and not to see in it the legendary cause or poetic action of the historical war is to discard, in the opinion of this reviewer, one of the most valuable insights into the poem which Strzelecki has given us.

Such differences of opinion are bound to exist, where the evidence is so sparse and so much is left to subjective interpretation. What was important was to have Strzelecki state his views once again, even in skeletal form, in a place where they were readily available to all

scholars. We now have four sets of numbers for the fragments: Morel's, Marmorale's, Mariotti's, and Strzelecki's. It is fervently to be hoped that scholars from now on will cite those of Strzelecki's Teubner edition as the standard edition which represents the structural relation between the legendary and historical parts that most Naevian scholars now accept as true.

Strzelecki publishes sixty-five fragments as coming from or referring to the *Bellum Punicum*. Of these only two are new, in the sense that they are not included in Morel's edition. Frg. 58 reads *cum tu arqitens, sagittis pollens Dea<na>*. It follows in Macrobius, VI, 5, 8, a fragment (20) which is specifically assigned to Book II, and is itself introduced with the words *idem alibi*. Strzelecki's investigation of Macrobius' use of the formula *idem alibi* shows that it indicates provenience from the same work, but not necessarily from the same book which has earlier been named (*Eos*, XLIX [1957-1958], pp. 65 ff.). Unfortunately, the reference is in the Prolegomena of 1959, but not in the Teubner Preface.

The same situation prevails in regard to frg. 65. It is preserved in the *Epitome* of Paulus, s. v. *aerosam* (p. 18 Lindsay) and reads *aerosam appellaverunt antiqui insulam Cyprum, quod in ea plurimum aeris nascatur*. We are told in the note below the fragment that Lindsay² thought of Naevius, comparing *Aeneid*, I, 622, or of Ennius. Lindsay² is *Glossaria Latina*, IV, Festus. In the Preface (p. XI) Strzelecki merely states that he considered it safe to add this entry together with its two neighbors in Festus, *Aenesi* and *Aenarium* (figs. 63 and 64), to the *fragmenta incerta*. The latter two had already been attributed to the *Bellum Punicum* by Buecheler. It is only in the Prolegomena (p. 23) that we are informed of the reasoning behind the attribution and given, in addition, the complete reference to Lindsay's text (p. 116). The reasoning is convincing.

The famous fragment *atque prius pariet Lucusta Lucam bovem* appears in Morel's edition under the heading *ex ignoto libro*. It has rightly been placed by Strzelecki among the *fragmenta incertae sedis* of the *Bellum Punicum* (frg. 60; cf. Prolegomena, p. 15). There has never been sufficient reason for taking Morel's frg. 34, *apud emporium in campo hostium pro moene*, away from Ennius, to whom it is assigned by Festus, and giving it to Naevius. Strzelecki corrects this arbitrary attribution of C. O. Müller. Finally, following Festus, s. v. *topper* (p. 482, Lindsay), where the names *C<n>*. *Naev<ius>* are attested beyond reasonable doubt, Strzelecki reclaims for Naevius frg. 59, *topper capesset flamma[m] Volcani*, which Morel had given to Livius Andronicus (Morel, *F. P. L.*, p. 15, Livius Andronicus, frg. 39). So much then, for what is new in the contents.

With regard to the text of the fragments, it can be said that by the time of Morel's edition the work of many scholars from the Renaissance humanists on had resulted in a *textus receptus* which Morel reproduced. Marmorale adopted this text virtually without change in both editions of his *Naevius Poeta*. Mariotti in his *Il Bellum Punicum e l'arte di Nevio* showed greater independence, but of the six fragments in which divergencies from Morel's text appear, two differ only in verse divisions (33; 60), one in acknowledging a *crux* (18), and three in having slightly different readings, which do not change the meaning of the passages (8; 26; 43). If we ignore as trivial that in frg. 37 Strzelecki has *contemtim* for Morel's

contemptim, we find only two places where his text differs from that of Morel: the *Lucam bovem* passage (frg. 60) is differently divided and Reichardt's restoration of the word *vasa* is kept in frg. 22. In other words, Strzelecki was satisfied to reproduce the *textus receptus*. He records W. Richter's attempt to eject Amulius from frg. 26 (*Nachr. Ak. Göttingen*, Ph.-H. Kl., 1960, pp. 64 ff.)—the most recent radical alteration of the accepted text—but keeps the new reading judiciously in the critical apparatus with the comment *via probabiliter*. Since then both Buchheit (*op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.) and Barchiesi (*R. F. I. C.*, XLI [1963], pp. 312 ff.) have shown the untenability of Richter's new reading. Finally, it may be mentioned, for the sake of completeness, that the reading *urbi* for *ubi* in frg. 6 is the only significant change in the wording of the *textus receptus* which M. Barchiesi made in his edition of the fragments which appeared between the 1959 and Teubner editions of Strzelecki (*op. cit.*, pp. 549 ff.).

Whereas Morel placed the varied information which he wished to give about the provenience, text, book number, and contents of each fragment in a single notice below it, Strzelecki, having already identified the fragments in his Preface, divides the apparatus under each fragment into two or three parts. The first indicates the provenience of the fragment and the context in which it stood. We are usually given more of the latter than we find in Morel. The second contains the textual apparatus proper: variant readings, modern emendations, etc. Here, thanks to the Sigla Codicum, we can conveniently identify the manuscripts to which Strzelecki is referring, although we shall still have to turn to a discussion of the *traditio* of the immediate source to ascertain their relation to each other and their relative value. In this section, we also find more information than is given by Morel about the readings, emendations, or restorations adopted by other editors. Thus we see more clearly in the present Teubner edition than in its predecessors the elements out of which the text of each fragment is composed.

The third part of the apparatus is devoted to metrical analysis, where it exists, for it is entirely lacking under certain fragments and under others it is applied only in some of the verses or even cola. Moreover, in some instances, the scansiones are given schematically, in others the pertinent part of the text is reproduced with indication of the quantity of the syllables, and in still others a reference alone is given to the same or a similar metrical structure in some other Saturnian or to Leo's discussion of it in his classic *Der saturnische Vers*. Strzelecki depends heavily on this work for his metrical analyses. In fact, this reviewer was not able to find a single piece of scansion, including the ictus marks, that was not virtually identical with that of Leo.

In view of this, it may not be too ungracious to ask if Strzelecki would not have done better simply to refer to the pertinent pages in Leo than to give us the commentariolum which we have. Its desultory and arbitrary character—it is difficult to perceive why some cola are analyzed and others not—tends rather to irritate the reader than to instruct him. Or Strzelecki could have followed Mariotti's procedure of scanning each fragment completely and given references to Leo for the discussion of the particular metrical form and its parallels.

In discussing this volume, this reviewer has always kept in mind the incalculable debt that classical scholars owe to Strzelecki for his work on the *Bellum Punicum*. It not only opened up a new era of Naevian scholarship, but gave us insights into the unique quality of the first Roman epic which we had not had before. If this Teubner edition proved disappointing to this reviewer in ways which he has indicated above, he may have expected more than Teubner policy could readily concede. On the other hand, he would be the first to admit that the practical advantage of having at long last a text which is up-to-date in the order of the fragments by the master of Naevian studies outweighs by far any shortcomings. Strzelecki has once more deserved well of Naevius and Naevian scholarship.

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CARLO PRATO. I canti di Aristofane. Analisi, commento, scoli metrici. Rome, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1962. Pp. xv + 369. L. 4,500. (*Studi di metrica classica*, I.)

This volume, the initial effort in a new series on ancient metrics,¹ is the first attempt at a complete metrical analysis of the lyrics of Aristophanes since Otto Schroeder's palmary work (*Aristophanis Cantica* [Leipzig, Teubner, 1930²]). It presents the Greek text and metrical schemes on facing pages (only the strophe of corresponding passages is given), using the Budé text of Coulon. As a kind of apparatus to the Greek text there are some notes on metrical interpretations of other scholars and very sparse indications of the MS readings. Below the apparatus Prato has added the metrical scholia from White,² pp. 397 ff. with the supplements of Thiemann and Hense, together with other scholia from Zäcker, Dübner, and Koster. The metrical analyses are subjoined by the author's comments, citations of analogous passages in lyric and Greek tragedy, reasons for particular interpretations, metrical associations, etc. This commentary which aims at "illustrating and historically justifying the interpretations defended or proposed" (p. viii) is often very illuminating, but sometimes misleading. At the end of the book is an index of important references. This section is incomplete and often arbitrary in its choice of entries.

Prato prefaces his study with a brief introduction, stating the principles he intends to follow. He intends to present only a de-

¹ A second volume has recently appeared: L. E. Rossi, *Metrica e critica stilistica* (Rome, 1963).

² The following abbreviations will be used in this review: Dale = A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama* (Cambridge, 1948); Mass = Paul Maas, *Greek Metre* (Oxford, 1962); Schroeder = Otto Schroeder, *Aristophanis Cantica* (Leipzig, 1930²); Snell = Bruno Snell, *Griechische Metrik* (Göttingen, 1962³); White = J. W. White, *The Verse of Greek Comedy* (London, 1912); Wilamowitz = U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Griechische Verskunst* (Berlin, 1921).

scription of the metrical forms of the Aristophanic choruses. Though he admits one cannot eliminate subjective interpretation, his hope is to give a presentation sufficiently objective to allow any scholar to reevaluate and reexamine the material without regard to the particular metrical solutions proposed.

Both the scholia and the selection of modern interpretations are intended to give a general historical survey of ancient and recent work on Aristophanic meters. Except for very controversial cases, the apparatus limits itself to the citation, and not discussion, of divergent opinions, especially those of Schroeder.

Periods are determined by strict application of two criteria of Boeckh, namely that period-end is marked either by *anceps* (*sc. brevis in longo*) or hiatus. Prato combines various rhythmical unities into verses or longer periods where other considerations do not prevent it; he does not divide the text *per cola*. His bibliography includes the major editions of Aristophanes, and a fair selection of works concerned with Greek metrics in general and Aristophanic meters in particular, without any attempt at being exhaustive.

Outside of the usual symbols, Prato has symbols for word-end (used exclusively to indicate diseresis either between metra or cola), period- and strophe-end, elision, hiatus, and catalexis. These are fairly straight-forward and simple to follow. For *syllaba anceps* he uses the symbol $\approx$ and $\times$ for "sillaba indifferente." It would have been helpful had he explained his distinction. What it amounts to is that *syllaba anceps* is used at period-end to indicate *anceps* (*sc. brevis in longo*) and $\times$ is used for the *anceps* as it appears, for example, at the first element of the iambic metron, the fourth of the trochaic metron, and at the beginning and end of Aeolic forms. In these simple cases, this usage causes few problems. It is annoying to find this symbol used in passages where three or four responding passages are considered. Since we are given only the first of the Greek passages, we have to guess where $\times$ will equal a short or long in the corresponding places. Even more confusing is a line like *Lys.*, 787 (p. 229) where $\sim \sim \times \sim$ represents the responsion of $\sim \sim \sim$ to $\sim \sim \sim$, or *Lys.*, 262 (p. 215) where in the second half of an iambic metron we meet $\times \sim \sim$ as representing the responsion of tribrach and dactyl. It requires a note in each case for the author to explain to us what is going on.

This is a minor matter compared with the general difficulty which arises because Prato, like Schroeder, gives only the first of the responding sections. We have no idea of what the responding text looks like (Prato's few citations of readings give the impression of a far better lyric text than we possess³), and so we must have Coulon's text before us to make proper use of the book. In Aristo-

³ His lack of fuller textual apparatus is misleading in other ways. At *Ach.*, 274-6 (p. 7) he analyzes as $\dot{\alpha}\dot{\iota}\alpha|\dot{\alpha}$ and states (p. 6) that Dale regards this as $\dot{\varsigma}\dot{\alpha}$. He neglects to mention that Dale's text is different from his, and that elision and lack of word-end are the exigencies that bring her to her analysis. *Pax*, 116 $\epsilon\mu'$ is an emendation, and Dale's analysis of 114 ff. deserves more than a passing comment (p. 129). *Pax*, 775 ff. (p. 142) is not presented in Coulon's colometry, a fact which ought to be stated more clearly and more positively than it appears in the apparatus (p. 142). *Aves*, 1752 apparatus (p. 208): what Fraenkel and Schroeder read is the MS text. *Aves*, 1763 app. (p. 210): Wilamowitz, p. 355, n. 4 has the reading of RVTS; Prato's

phanic lyric this is more confusing than in tragedy, for the responding passages are often at some distance from the "base." Further, consider his indications of hiatus: at *Ach.*, 284 ff. Prato indicates hiatus (and so period-end) for the three cola; by checking his text we realize that hiatus occurs in cola 1 and 3 only in the antistrophe, but we have no way of telling short of checking the complete text that in the second colon hiatus occurs both in strophe and antistrophe. This may seem a minor matter, but after years of using Schroeder, it is a disappointment to find that one must again scramble through two books at once to examine metrical structures.

Prato might also have discussed word-end at greater length, and indicated the principles he observes in the use of the term and the use of his symbol for it. It becomes apparent soon that for Prato word-end is useful only as an indication of colon- or metron-end and is to be mentioned only where it is useful to support his choice of a name for the line. He mentions caesura only once in his index. At *Vesp.*, 752 (p. 111) he cites W. J. W. Koster, *Traité de métrique grecque* (Leiden, 1953²), p. 156 for an exceptional caesura in an anapaestic dimeter (viz., within the metron). He neglects to tell us that Koster regards the caesura exceptional because it occurs in march-anapaests (in lyric it is common enough). He might well have added a note to *Aves*, 536, mentioned on the same page in Koster, a line without caesura. His insistence on marking word-end only at diaeresis leads to some strange results. The following are all dactylic hexameters with the names given them by Prato: *Ran.*, 674 hem enh(oplion), *Ran.*, 814=818=822=826 alem(anian) reiz(ianum), *Ran.*, 876 ff. alem adon(ic); the last group within three pages of text. We can add to this *Ran.*, 1266 and 1276 (again in Prato) alem adon both of which lines exhibit a penthemimeral caesura, as does *Ran.*, 674. *Ran.*, 814 and 822 have caesurae after the seventh element, 818 and 826 caesurae after the first short of the sixth element. These are quite common caesurae in the hexameter (see Maas, pp. 59 f.) and there is no reason to go into more complicated terminology.

Prato is particularly given to using line names very loosely. We may forgive reiziana whose forms include --- (Eq., 1273), --- (Nub., 466), --- (Eccl., 909) among five syllable types⁴ but in addition to what is generally considered a reizianum x---x we find among six-syllable types: --- (Vesp., 302). In spite of Gentili, whose practice Prato follows, I believe Prato might have read Dale, p. 132, n. 4, and at least taken issue with her. But let us grant that Wilamowitz and others have used reizianum in too free a way. What justification can be found for adonics of the form --- (e.g., Nub., 280) and adonic dicola of the form --- (Pax, 114-16, Thesm., 315)? Or prosodiacs which range from --- (Thesm., 326 and Aves,

is that of AU. Thesm., 352, 354 (p. 248): here Prato refers to "cod., Dale" presumably because she here specifically says (Dale, p. 79) the text is not to be emended, although Prato does not add this. Thesm., 990 (p. 266): although Prato prints Coulon's text he should have indicated that we have Wilamowitz's emendations here. Changes in the antistrophe (995-1000) are not even adumbrated.

⁴ There are also catalectic reiziana: --- (Nub., 465) and --- (Nub., 466).

1314) to ~~~~~ (Aves, 929), ~~~~~ (Aves, 1723),⁵ ~~~~~ (Aves, 1763), and ~~~~~ (Lys., 479, 480)? The author goes to extremes to unify passages even when he must name them in terms of metra whose structure is agreed upon by metricians. Thus, in a passage in ionics (*Thesm.*, 101-29) we find ~~~~~ (120), ~~~~~ (122), and ~~~~~ (125) all listed as catalectic ionic dimeters.

Another term that gives Prato a good deal of trouble is choriambic dimeter. It is not at all certain that Prato knows what this is. The term is an unfortunate coining of Wilamowitz, and both Maas and Snell have urged substitution of the term "wilamowitzianus," but this is too clumsy to be accepted outside the land where scholarly *pietas* has influence. Perhaps we ought to settle for White's "poly-schematist." In any case it is not a dimeter (Snell, p. 29) and may not be choriambic. Prato nevertheless insists on equating choriambic dimeters with two choriambs. At *Vesp.*, 531 (p. 107) Prato speaks of the choriambic dimeter responding to a glyconic; in the sigla to the line the dimeter is described as *ch ia* (cf. Maas, p. 26); at *Vesp.*, 1450-61 where choriambic dimeters are described as *ia ch*, in the commentary (p. 123) Prato goes out of his way unnecessarily and wrongly to suggest that the first metron (*sic*) of his tetrameter at 1460 (actually two choriambic dimeters) is a choriamb of four longa and the third "metron" is of the form $\times - - \times$. His parallels would be confusing to anyone who rightly believed a choriamb to be ~~~~~-. The truth is that the choriambic dimeter has the general structure ~~~~~-~~~~- (Snell, p. 29), i. e., the first four elements having free form. In Genesis 2 God brings the creatures of the earth before Adam that he may name them, and by and large we agree he did a good job. Until metricians receive such a command, it might be better to accept the sad fact that lyric does not lend itself to this process. Prato's book is the best argument for the Maas-Snell system of sigla that I have seen recently. If Prato had given a synopsis of cola similar to that in Dale, pp. 205-7, he would, I believe, have avoided these pitfalls.

The theory of metrical word ("Wortbild" in Snell, p. 56) is not dealt with by Prato, although he often indicates diaereses at surprising places. For purposes of articulation of metra and cola he will place the relative, as well as words like δ , $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ and $\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ before such a break, or before line-end. This can be justified from Maas, pp. 85 f., but it is wrong to place prepositives such as $\tau\epsilon$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ at the beginning of a line (Maas, pp. 86 f.).⁶

Some comments on specific lines and passages:

Pp. 10-11: *Ach.*, 284 ff. In the amoebaeon between Dicaeopolis and the Chorus, the former speaks or sings in catalectic trochaic tetrameters and the Chorus replies in cretics except for the notorious line 285 = 336. Dale (p. 56) calls this an anapaestic pentapody and says that it is an unparalleled length. Prato, following Steurer and Schroeder, interprets it as 5 σ comparing *Aves*, 333-5 ~ 349-51

⁵ In his note (p. 205) Prato further confounds the reader by suggesting this may be a contracted choriambic dimeter.

⁶ At *Aves*, 1760, Prato divides between $\sigma\eta\nu$ and $\chi\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha$. At *Thesm.*, 1143 Prato indicates a diaeresis between $\acute{\omega}$ and $\tau\upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ just to get ~~~~|~~~~- when the pattern is clearly the same as 1144: ~~~~|~~~~-.

where ~~~~~ but in the line under discussion the response is identical in strophe and antistrophe, and no cretics appear at all. It might be added that the line is not unparallel, cf. Ibycus, 287, 7 *P. M. G.*, in a dactylic context.

Pp. 46-7: *Eq.*, 551 ff. ~ 581 ff. Because there is no word-end at 559 (Prato indicates break between δ and δελφίνων, however) Eduard Fraenkel, *Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes* (Rome, 1962), p. 194, assumes these lines to be ionics, not "minor aesclepiads catalectic" as Prato. 559 f. are easiest to understand, perhaps, as transitional units moving from preceding choriambic dimeters to Aeolies and might be noted in Snell's terminology as ph^o (so Rosenmeyer, *Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry* [London, 1963], p. 33).

P. 59: *Eq.*, 1273 ~ 1299. Prato's desire to maintain multiform reiziana leads him to cite misleading parallels to prove his case. Here, ~~~~~ (the break in 1273 is after the fifth element; in 1299, after the seventh) is cited as reiz ith. Of the passages cited to parallel this, Archilochus, 112, 2 D³ is better taken as catalectic 3ia (cf. Horace, *Odes*, I, 4; also Snell, p. 15); Sappho, 117 LP is corrupt, but may also be catalectic 3ia; Sophocles, *Ant.*, 592 is catalectic 3ia and *O. T.*, 471-2 shows reiz in form ~~~~~.

Eq. 1295: on ἀνερ- [stem with ā] see L-S-J s. v. ἀνῆρ for proper statement of the rule.

P. 67: *Nub.*, 285 (and p. 77: 570), etc. Prato does not accept Dale's distinction (pp. 32 ff.) between dactyls κατὰ μέτρον and κατὰ συζυγίαν; thus, he has to find ways around lines of 5 dactyls (or any odd number). In these two cases he writes hem reiz,⁷ citing Anacreon, 416, 3 *P. M. G.* as a parallel. The Anacreon line is, however, an encomiologus (D x e x in Maas' terminology).

P. 73 with its strained terms indicates how much simpler Maas' terminology for dactyloepitrites is.

P. 77: *Nub.*, 563-74 ~ 595-606. In his note to 572 Prato states that choriambic consisting of four longa are very common in tragedy. I examined some of the Sophoclean examples he gives and found that *Ajax*, 1189, *El.*, 121, *Phil.*, 1081 were choriambic dimeters, and *Ant.*, 811 a choriambic dimeter with ~~~ as the opening in the antistrophe (828). Prato ought to have referred to Dale's analysis of this passage (pp. 130 f.). She sees the passage as one employing iambo-choriambic rhythm to summon Zeus and Poseidon, dactylic to summon Aether, and Aeolic to summon Helios. Because he has ignored the words of the Greek text, Prato offers a most unsatisfactory analysis.

Pp. 82 f.: *Nub.*, 955 ~ 1030 for ~~~~~ also in Anacreon, 388 *P. M. G.* (cited by Prato), cf. Maas, p. 26 where the form of the line should read oo~oo~oo~x~ (oo indicates interchange of x - and - x), and Snell, p. 25.

P. 99: *Vesp.*, 301-2. Parallel of Sophocles, *O. T.*, 491 ff. shows clearly that Prato's reiz of 302 is impossible. The line is certainly ionic, either ion_Λ ba or a type of abbreviated anaclast. So also at *Ran.*, 331-2: ion_Λ ion| ion_Λ ion.

⁷ At *Nub.*, 459, in a trochaic context, he also writes hem reiz, but 459-60 (astrophic) can be regarded as 4da 2 tro.

P. 117: *Vesp.*, 1234-5. For "Aeolic (dactylic) pentameters" see D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford, 1955), p. 318. These units are perhaps better described as extended glyconics by the insertion of internal "dactyls" (gl^{2d} in Snell's notation). A note should be added to line 1235: ". . . μέγα κράτος." The long *a* is further evidence that this passage is a parody of Aeolic verse since generally (cf. Snell, p. 55) mute + liquid does not make position in comedy, as it almost always does in Sappho and Alcaeus.

P. 129: *Pax*, 114 ff. — — — — — cannot be an adonic; an adonic is a clausula and cannot end on double short. It is perhaps best to take the passage (114-18) as 4da | 4da | 4da | 4da | 6da || (= 4da + 2da), etc. Period ends on *brevis in longo*, followed by hexameters (see Dale, p. 27).

P. 183: *Aves*, 910 and 914. — — — — — is called reiz doch(miac) by Prato. This unit is simply penthemimer or "iambic hemiepes" (3ia to the common caesura: x — — — x). Prato compares Anacreon, 391 *P. M. G.*, which Gentili (*Anacreon* [ed.], 1958, p. 111) regards as hem reiz, but which is simply an encomiologus (in Maas' terminology D — e —; see Maas, p. 4), n. 2).

P. 185: *Aves*, 929. The prosodiac — — — — — is clearly a telesillean. The parallel offered by *Lys.*, 479 f. is anapaestic in form, and the prosodiac at *Ran.*, 374 consists of 6 longa! The suggestion made by Prato in his commentary that anapaests and prosodiaes are found together needs better support than these passages offer. So also at *Aves*, 941 the prosodiac indicated is again a telesillean, but the entire line is better regarded as essentially iambic.

P. 217: *Lys.*, 295. Line should read — — — — — (sync. 2ia). καπνοῦ cannot be scanned — —. The comparison which Prato makes with *Nub.*, 320 proves the opposite of what he wants, for there one finds a parody of the tragic style (cf. Snell, p. 55; Maas, p. 76).

P. 225: *Lys.*, 659 f. commentary. Although two ithyphallics are combined in Sappho, 127 LP, neither of the ithyphallics has the second element long (Sophocles, *Trach.*, 524 are probably synopacted iambs). At *Lys.*, 683 Prato parallels his ithyphallic with long fourth element with Sappho, 116 LP. Both in this example and the other line in Sappho of the same form (129, 2 LP) we find the scheme — — — — x — — — — —; see Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, 322.

P. 231: *Lys.*, 1202 commentary. The Sophoclean example *Ant.*, 106-122 shows — — — — —, but a) text may be corrupt, and b) first half of line is not part of a lecythion; cf. Maas, p. 29.

P. 235: *Lys.*, 1267-70. Prato's 3tr ^ | 2ia (= 2epitr) seems out of place here; perhaps 2 tro | 3 tro ^ || with colon junction after τᾶν.

P. 237: *Lys.*, 1279-90. The bewildering variety of colon names here truly deserves Dale's comment (p. 89), "We may label 1284 'aeolic dactyl,' 1288 and 1290 'ibycean,' and the rest dactylic tetrameters, lekythia, and the like; but the result would serve only to obscure the real homogeneity of the rhythm. It is clear that this is a dance to a skipping three-time measure in which the first step is given double the time of the second. . . ."

P. 249: *Thesm.*, 355. This has the form of an anaclost, which forms

a good transition to the choriambic dimeter, and the choriamb which follow and lead into the Aeolics.

P. 251: *Thesm.*, 435. In the context, the line is better 2tro than hipp(onactean); see Dale, p. 90.

P. 266. At *Thesm.*, 990 we do not have the MS reading, but Wilamowitz's emendation. In regard to the commentary to this line on p. 267, it should be noted that Prato's argument for the correspondence of pherecratean in 990 and aristophanic in 995 cannot survive the following facts: a) Sappho, 141 LP quoted in evidence has an uncertain text and b) a similar responsion in Euripides, *El.*, 168 = 191 is stated specifically by Dale (p. 132 and n. 1) to rest on incorrect colometry. Since Prato accepted Wilamowitz's emendation at 990, he might also have read his statement concerning this entire passage (p. 476, note): "Was dann folgt [*sc.* 990 ff.], dithyrambische Anrufung des Dionysos, in ein Strophenpaar zu zwingen, ist unbedachte Willkür."

In a book of this type and length there are bound to be some minor misprints. I list a few here I caught.

P. 3 commentary: read 61 for 43. P. 11: *Ach.*, 299: at line end, read ~ for ~. P. 57: *Eq.*, 1114: hiatus in "2, 3." P. 101: *Vesp.*, 331: read ---- | P. 147: *Pax*, 856: for . . . - x - . . . read --- . . . (correct also White, p. 262). P. 149: commentary: for 944 read 945. P. 183: *Aves*, 906; read -- ~ P. 215: *Lys.*, 258-9 ~273-4: line-end should read =||; so also *Lys.*, 264-279. P. 225: *Lys.*, 659: for ---- ~ read ---- - x P. 231: *Lys.*, 1056-1202: double short belongs on third element. P. 257: *Thesm.*, 685: a breve has dropped off at the beginning of the line. Pp. 266-7: text, apparatus and commentary. All other texts I have seen begin *Thesm.*, 990 one line lower than Prato. P. 267: *Thesm.*, 990: schema should read: x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. P. 302-3: *Ran.*, 542: Μιλησιους = . . . x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ || (correct also White, p. 79, § 217).

The greatest omission in the book, next to the absence of anti-strophic texts, is the complete lack of any discussion of how Aristophanes constructs his strophes. Although in the few pages she devotes to the subject (185 ff.) Miss Dale indicates that no complete system can be developed, she indicates that some of the stanzas of Aristophanes are susceptible to analysis. It would have been useful to see an attempt made here.

These deficiencies are part of a more general indictment which one might raise against Prato's study. The juxtaposition of text and metrical analysis on adjoining pages only points up how little Prato realizes that metrics must involve the interplay of words.⁸ The results of a "pencil-and-paper" metrics were never more clearly presented than here. In spite of the typographical difficulties, there is a great deal in favor of printing the Greek texts with the metrical symbols immediately below the lines, for the articulation of the verse then becomes apparent almost at once. It is also worth noting that the best discussions of lyric meters, those of Wilamowitz and Dale, give far more emphasis to the text than to mere analysis in terms of longs and shorts.

This work of Prato's will be an important and necessary instru-

⁸ For an example, see my comment on *Nub.*, 563 ff. above.

ment of research for all future students and scholars who are concerned with Aristophanes. We must all be grateful that we now have available a study whose value is in no way diminished because we take issue with it on many points. May it lead others to interpret the artistry and technique of Aristophanes as a lyricist.

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LEUMANN-HOFMANN-SZANTYR, *Lateinische Grammatik*. München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1963. (*Müller's Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, II, II.) I. MANU LEUMANN, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre*. Pp. XVI + 391. II. J. B. HOFMANN, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, neubearbeitet von ANTON SZANTYR. Pp. VI + 842.

Since its appearance in 1928 Leumann-Hofmann has had no rival as a comprehensive Latin grammar having a strong historical emphasis and incorporating the results of intensive investigation in Indo-European linguistics down through the first quarter of the present century. The appearance of a new *Syntax und Stilistik* is a welcome event, and the long expectations of scholars will not be disappointed, for we have here a greatly enlarged revision, the product of enormous erudition and industry. According to a prefatory remark by Professor Bengtson, general editor of the series, and the C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, a revision of the *Laut- und Formenlehre* is to be expected after a certain length of time. The present *Laut- und Formenlehre* is a reprint of the 1928 edition, provided with its own index.

Where matters of morphology are touched upon in the *Syntax* the views adopted sometimes differ little from what was current doctrine around the turn of the century and illustrate the conservatism of present-day German linguistic scholarship as contrasted with that of many French and American linguists. For example, the view that the future in *-sio-* was the standard IE type is in essential agreement with von Planta, II, p. 318, and yet this future type is actually attested only in Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic, while Greek, Oscan, Umbrian, early Latin, and Celtic provide evidence for a type in *-so-*. The failure of this type to win recognition along with futures of the type of Skt. *dāsyāmi*, Lith. *duosiu*, is no doubt due to the fact that the former are easily explained as original subjunctives of *s*-aorists which secondarily developed the function of showing future time, but, in a formal sense at least, we should probably see here an instance of suffix-alternation *-so/syo-* which may call for further study in connection with such similar alternations as present tense suffix *-o/yo-* (Skt. *pacāmi*, L. *coquo*: Gk. *πέττω*), dat.-abl. pl. ending *L. -bus* < *-bhos* (cf. Gaul. *matrebos*): Skt. *-bhyas* < *-bhynos*, gen. sg. pronominal and *o*-stem ending *-so* in Goth. *dagis*, OCS *česo*: *-syo* in Skt. *vrkasya*, Hom. *λύκοιο*, with Attic *λύκου* in doubt as between *-so* and *-syo*. Turning to the moods, we find (pp. 325, 329) the

traditional recognition of indicative, subjunctive, optative, and imperative moods. The doctrine which has now been gaining some favor, that IE possessed no really distinct subjunctive forms, may be traced in part through H. Pedersen, *Tocharisch vom Gesichtspunkt der indoeuropäischen Sprachvergleichung*, pp. 191 f.; E. A. Hahn, *Subjunctive and Optative*, p. 34; G. S. Lane, *Lang.*, XXXV (1959), p. 158.

The present *Syntax und Stilistik* is so much more comprehensive than the 1928 edition that it is no less fully entitled to be regarded as an essentially new work than the *Griechische Grammatik* of Schwyzler and Debrunner in relation to its predecessor, the 1913 Brugmann-Thumb. Far greater attention has been devoted to such late Latin texts as the works of Ammianus, the Latin fathers, the *Italia*, the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae*, and thorough use has been made of work done during the past three decades on late Latin, including that of such eminent Swedish scholars as Löfstedt, Svennung, and Axelsson. Care has been taken throughout to assign various usages to the proper period, genre, level of style, etc. Not only is the distinction between poetic and prose style constantly kept in mind, but there are frequent references to the language of religion and law, of technical treatises, of Vergil in contrast to Horace, of one epic poet in contrast to another, of Cicero's early style and his mature style, his *genus sublime*, *mediocre*, and *tenuis*, his epistolary and his oratorical style, the style of Tacitus in his *Annales* and in his earlier works or in the earlier and later portions of the *Annales*, and so on. References to Livy occur with the frequency which we should expect in the case of so important an author, but it is quite clear that the authors follow the traditional view, promoted especially by Wölfflin and Stacey, that the first decade was much more strongly colored by poetic diction than the other decades; so, for example, p. 521 B) *qua . . . qua* as an archaism in the first decade; p. 543 (in *Zusatz*) *haud scio an*; p. 560 (middle) *quippe qui* followed by indicative; p. 585 (bottom) *quia*; p. 738 (below middle) short, asyndetic sentences especially in the first decade after the usage of the annalists; p. 770 (below middle) echoes of Ennius especially in the first decade, the immediate source being again the annalists. Here we come face to face with the thesis of Konrad Gries, *Constancy in Livy's Latinity* (New York, 1949), that the stylistic differences between the first and the later decades are a reflection of Livy's sources and not of a deliberate change of diction adopted as he passed from legend to history. Surprisingly, however, Gries' monograph is apparently nowhere mentioned. Since it is unlikely that Szantyr was unaware of its existence, it is possible that we have here an echo of the disfavor shown by Haffter, *Gnomon*, XXIV (1952), p. 48, contrasting with the much more sympathetic reviews of certain French and American scholars (for example, Marouzeau, *R.E.L.*, XXVII [1949], p. 309; R. J. Getty, *Phoenix*, III [1949], pp. 115-18; R. G. Kent, *C. W.*, XLIII [1950], pp. 203-4; J. Whatmough, *C.P.*, XLV [1950], pp. 125-6). Passing from the special problem of Livy's first decade to archaism in general, we find the references to it as frequent as we should expect, especially to the deliberate archaism of such writers as Aulus Gellius, Fronto, and Apuleius. Less notice is taken of the striking agreement often shown between early and late Latin which is associated with the avoidance by Cicero and the

Augustans of certain words and constructions which had really not passed out of spoken usage but were regarded as unliterary. Observe, however, p. 179, § 104 d), on the inflected use of *cuius* 'wem gehörig,' and p. 789 *Zusatz b*), on *ambo duo*, Romance survivals being used in both cases as evidence that the expressions in question belonged to the spoken language. Related to archaism is the phenomenon known as hyperurbanism. It had received some attention in the 1928 edition, and the new edition also includes some scattered instances of it: p. 88, some late uses of genitive for dative; p. 100, dative for *ad* + accusative (after Löfstedt); pp. 378-9, *ad* + gerund in place of *ad* + infinitive; p. 448 *e*, *ne quidem* for *nec*; p. 560, some uses of the subjunctive by the continuators of Caesar with no justification under the normal rules of syntax; p. 658 *β*), late use of *sic* for *si* reflecting the phonetic change of *sic* to *si*; p. 672 *Zusatz a*), subjunctive after *etiamsi* as a possible hyperurbanism in the speech of a freedman in Petronius, 46,5; 71,1. Much more prominent is the question of Greek influence on the syntax of Latin, instances of which are noticed so frequently that it would be out of the question to attempt to list them fully here. A few of the more interesting types are: p. 36, the type of *vestem induitur* in poetry and occasionally in prose of the Empire, in contrast to the type with *pf. pass. pepl.*, which is the only type in early Latin, despite the existence in Umbrian of *perca arsmatiam anouihimu* with a finite verb; p. 37, accusative of respect with intransitive verbs and with adjectives; pp. 77, 80, genitive with certain adjectives; p. 430 (near bottom), the change from second to third person in Ennius, *Ann.*, 620 *vosque Lares tectum nostrum qui funditus curant* as a possible grecism; p. 443 (*Zusatz*) incongruence of gender and number in Lucr., I, 86 *ductores Danaum delecti, prima virorum*; Ovid, *Am.*, I, 9, 37 *summa ducum Atrides*; p. 519 (*Zusatz a*), use of inflected forms of *solus* in the construction *non solum . . . sed etiam*. It should not be supposed, however, that grecisms are admitted with undue freedom. In a number of cases Szantyr has rejected the views of earlier scholars who saw Greek influence in certain peculiarities of Latin syntax. Moreover, many of the examples of grecism are from ecclesiastical literature, where the Latin expression and its Greek original may be compared (e.g., *potare aliquem aliquid* = *ποτίζειν τινα τι* p. 45, or *percussit in virga* = *ἐπάταξε . . . ἐν τῇ ῥάβδῳ* p. 126, where the ultimate source is apparently Semitic.

As one would expect in view both of the size of the work under review and its exceptional importance, a number of isolated matters call for brief comment, either because a questionable position has been maintained, a certain topic has been inadequately treated, certain bibliographical material has been missed or omitted, or for some other reason.—On p. 6, § 11, Umb. *peico*, *peica* are listed as if they made a pair analogous with L. *deus* : *dea*, *servus* : *serva*; these augural birds must be identified with L. *picus* 'woodpecker' and *pica* 'magpie,' cf. Ernout-Meillet,⁴ s. v. *pica*.—On p. 17 several different sources of the "poetic plural" are admitted, including the original identity of the neuter plural with the feminine singular and the desire to distinguish poetic from prose diction, as well as the need for more short syllables in Latin verse; rightly so, no doubt, but to the three earlier University of Pennsylvania dissertations (Gum-

mere, Herr, and Glenn) on the neuter plural and short syllables should be added Elizabeth G. Zenn, *The Neuter Plural in Latin Lyric Verse* (Baltimore, 1948) and G. J. Siefert, Jr., *Meter and Case in the Latin Elegiac Pentameter* (Baltimore, 1952).—P. 38, § 44: E. A. Hahn, *T. A. P. A.*, XCI (1960), pp. 221-38 is now part of the essential bibliography on the "Greek accusative."—On p. 132 the ablative of cause is taken to be derived solely from the instrumental component of the Latin ablative, with no evidence admitted for a "true ablative" except in Indo-Iranian. Schwyzer-Debrunner, p. 133, in treating the Greek genitive with verbs of emotion, admit both ablative and genitive origin, the instrumental construction having naturally passed over in Greek into the dative. Instrumental and "true" ablatives at least seem both to be reasonable sources for a causal construction, so that one is perhaps not justified in taking quite so narrow a view of it as Hofmann-Szantyr have here taken.—The relation between ablative of quality and genitive of quality is well treated on pp. 117-19; somewhat less so the relation between ablative of quality and ablative of respect. At the bottom of p. 134 under the ablative of respect there is a cross-reference to § 78 for the concurrent ablative of quality, but a cross-reference in the opposite direction might also be helpful. The essential point about the two constructions seems to be that, while both had their roots in the IE instrumental, the growth of the ablative of respect at the expense of the other construction was favored by the prevalence of short nominative endings, which is well illustrated by such passages as the second line of Verg., *Aen.*, I, 71-2 *sunt mihi bis septem praestanti corpore nymphae, / quarum quae formā pulcherrimā Deiopea*.—P. 152 β): to the references on the Latin use of compound adjectives might be added E. Norden, *Aen.* VI, pp. 176-7 on *Aen.*, VI, 141.—The contrasting use of *hic . . . ille* is treated on p. 182, with notice of the inverted usage where *hic* is 'the former,' *ille* 'the latter.' Brief mention might be made, however, of the rare usage whereby something near at hand (*hic*) is identified with something long known (*ille*): Verg., *Aen.*, IV, 675 *hoc illud, germana, fuit?*; VII, 272-3 *hunc illum poscere fata / et reor et . . . opto*; Tib., I, 3, 93-4.—P. 185 d): Umb. *esmei* is not from the stem contained in Latin *is*, Skt. *iha*, but from **e-* and cognate with Skt. *asmai*, cf. Buck, *O.-U. Grammar*, pp. 142-3; Thumb-Hauschild, *Hdb. d. Skt.*, II, p. 143.—P. 236, § 128: to the cognates of L. *ob* may now be added Mycenaean *opi*, cf. Vilborg, *A Tentative Grammar of Mycenaean Greek* (Göteborg, 1960), pp. 48, 121.—In the syntax of the verb the preoccupation with aspect is noticeable, the more so in the case of a language where it is a less prominent feature than, for example, in Greek, and the treatment of it is in general excellent, though sometimes the designation of a verb as *perfektiv* or *imperfektiv* almost creates the impression that one is reading a description of a Slavic language (so, for example, p. 307, § 172; p. 317, *Zusatz b*; p. 611 c on *dum*-clauses). The propriety of using these two terms with reference to Latin verbs was explicitly upheld in the 1928 edition. Since, however, Latin has no orderly and thoroughgoing system of contrasts between imperfective and perfective aspects, one is forced to rely on his sometimes rather subjective impression of an action as in progress or as constituting a complete event. It is in fact recognized on p. 304 that *Perfektivierung* in Latin is a tendency rather

than a closed system. The prominence of the preverb *com-* in this connection is given due recognition, so that one need feel less surprise if it appears to have been overlooked at the point where the preposition *cum* was treated (p. 259; the sections on the prepositions *ad, de, per* include a treatment of their effect on the meaning of the verb with which they are compounded).—On p. 364, II, the two passages Plaut., *As.*, 382 *Demcenetus ubi dicitur habitare* and Ter., *Andr.*, 796 in *hac habitasse platea dictumst Chrysidem* are used to illustrate a principle whereby the personal construction is said to be preferred with simple passive forms of *dico*, etc., the impersonal with combinations of participle plus auxiliary. For a discussion of this question as it appeared in the 1928 edition see G. Calboli, *Studi grammaticali* (Bologna, 1962), pp. 107-10, who in general distinguishes between the personal construction as the one which emphasizes the subject about whom the statement is made and the impersonal construction as the one which emphasizes the fact of the allegation being made. Yet perhaps the two explanations are not really irreconcilable but represent two different aspects of the same basic principle, since the subject may be somewhat more prominently in view with the present verb than with the past.—Pp. 367-8 contain a comprehensive treatment of the historical infinitive, in which it is stated that *perfektive Aktionsart* is frequent in this construction. This is highly questionable, since one of the commonest uses of the historical infinitive is to describe the behavior exhibited by an individual or group in a given situation, especially a dramatic or critical situation, a use which rather favors verbs of iterative sense. Admittedly the individual actions taken in isolation may be of the type associated with perfective verbs, but in at least one instance, Plaut., *Rud.*, 606 *illa animo iam fieri ferocior*, cited on p. 368, the verb may more easily be taken as indicating process than attainment.—On pp. 429-30 both the accusative and the nominative types of sentence-apposition are recognized, but the instances cited to illustrate the nominative type are neuter, and hence ambiguous. Cic., *Tusc.*, I, 65 *iusta causa*, 107 *magna culpa*, cited by reference but without the text, are unambiguous, except that the second example seems capable of being construed as an ablative.—The prefatory section of the *Stilistik* (pp. 685-8) is conservative and not essentially different in doctrine from the corresponding part of the 1928 edition; while it discusses a number of aspects of the problem of defining style, it takes the same position that stylistics treats the same material as grammar but from the viewpoint of selection among the resources of language. In the course of the section on style no topic of any importance, including vocabulary, appears to have been missed. Atticism and Asianism, being complex aggregates of stylistic features, could not be treated in a work where the arrangement is by separate features, and yet a number of allusions to Asianism are scattered through the *Stilistik* in connection with alliteration, rhyme, antithesis, etc.—Pp. 763-4: to the references on Greek words in Roman comedy should be added T. Frank, *Life and Literature in the Roman Republic* (Berkeley, Calif., 1930), pp. 69-71 (many men in Plautus' audiences had learned Greek through military service in Greek-speaking regions of southern Italy).—P. 781: to the bibliography on metaphor should be added Dorothy May Paschall, *The Vocabulary of Mental Aberration in Roman Comedy and Petronius* (Baltimore, 1939).

One of the merits of the work under review is that, apart from its abundant bibliographical references, it frequently takes notice of problems on which more work remains to be done. Among those cited as insufficiently investigated are: fluctuation between "movable" and "immovable" object, as illustrated by *circumdare aliquem aliqua re* vs. *c. aliquid alicui* (p. 35); *liber mei* vs. *liber meus* (p. 61); objective genitive vs. possessive pronoun (p. 66); replacement of *hic* and *nunc* by *ille* and *tunc* upon change from *oratio recta* to *obliqua* (p. 182 γ); encroachment of construction with *de* on the ablative of separation (p. 264 c); use or omission of prepositions in appositives to local expressions, e.g. *Albae . . . in municipio fidelissimo* (p. 427 γ); possible use of *uter* for 'which' (of many), reversing the occasional use of *quis* for 'which' (of two) (p. 459 e); the validity of the Schrijnen-Mohrmann thesis that Christian writers, apart from the period of Cyprian, used *aut* in religious connections, *vel* in secular (p. 500 β); disjunctive indirect question after adjective, e.g., *securus, cadat an recto stet fabula talo* (p. 547 β); validity of De Jonge's theory, based on Ammianus, that tense sequence is more rigidly observed in negative final clauses than in affirmative (p. 552 d); question of mood with *quod*, *quia*, and *quoniam* after verbs of saying and thinking in late Latin (p. 577 β); *nam* with interrogative particles and pronouns (p. 584, n. 1); the formulas *ut . . . ita, ut . . . sic* (pp. 633-4); anaphora involving repetition of more than one word (pp. 694-5); the extent to which heroic clausulae and other rhythmical forms proper to poetry were used as a conscious stylistic device in prose (p. 715); history of clauses on the second level of subordination in the construction of the sentence (p. 732 a); stylistic value of abnormally long words (p. 757); litotes in late Latin (p. 778).

The book shows a freedom from typographical errors which is all the more remarkable in a work of such size. The following may be briefly noticed: p. 150, line 13, read *Cretae*; p. 486, third line of § 259, for Lang. 24 read Lang. 29; p. 819, line 6, for J. A. Hahn read E. A. Hahn.

While the preceding portion of this review was in manuscript, the *Dritte Lieferung* reached this office. It contains, first, twelve pages of additions and corrections—chiefly additions, including in a few cases references to bibliographical material the omission of which I had noted earlier in the course of preparing this review,—then a subject index and word index to the *Syntax und Stilistik* by Margarete Szantyr. It was accompanied also by pages I-XCVIII in loose sheets, consisting of the preface, table of contents to the *Syntax und Stilistik*, a concordance equating the sections of the forthcoming *Laut- und Formenlehre* with the pages of the 1928 edition, a list of abbreviations, and bibliographies of general and special works, material on individual Latin authors, and literature on mediaeval Latin.

The remainder of the *Dritte Lieferung* is an introduction to the entire grammar, including the revised *Laut- und Formenlehre* which is promised for a later date. It corresponds then to pp. 3-35 in the 1928 edition and treats the same rather varied range of topics: scientific study of the Latin language from antiquity to modern times, Vulgar Latin, *Umgangssprache* and *Schriftsprache*, linguistic method,

the main divisions of grammar, the tasks of word-study, etymology, semantics, etc. Yet the new introduction has been expanded to considerably more than twice the length of the old. Pages 4-9 are devoted to the history of the scientific study of the Latin language in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern period; the last topic, however, is still treated very briefly, and the reader will need to supplement the information contained there from the standard histories of Classical Scholarship. The entire section on the prehistory of Latin (pp. 10-39) is excellent and of exceptional interest; it contains a detailed account of the Indo-European languages, their interrelationships, the place of Latin among them, and the languages with which Latin had connections or contacts in the Italian peninsula, not omitting such poorly attested dialects as the "Euganian" of the Val Camonica (p. 31) and the "proto-Sabellian" of Picenum (p. 35). Hittite not only receives due treatment (p. 11) but its relation to Latin is illustrated by several well-chosen etyma (e. g. *genu, genua*, "knee, knees" in both languages). The laryngeal hypothesis, however, is treated with the same disfavor which generally characterizes German works on Indo-European comparative and historical grammar: introduction of laryngeals into reconstructed forms is regarded as unjustified in the present state of our knowledge of these phonemes, and reconstructions based on Brugmann are preferred. Yet in other important respects the new introduction strongly shows the influence of doctrines and methods which have been prominent during the past few decades—internal reconstruction, the relation between sound-change and analogy, the nature of the phoneme and the recognition of alterations in the phonemic system as of greater importance than the individual sound-changes in the language (p. 64, with principles outlined largely after the Prague School).

The introduction here briefly reviewed will be no less heartily welcomed than the *Syntax und Stilistik* itself, and should increase the eagerness with which Latinists will await the appearance of the new *Laut- und Formenlehre*.

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C. O. BRINK. *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pp. xi + 300. \$8.50.

This is a very impressive work, part of a larger project which, when completed, should be of major importance. Assembling the material for a commentary on the literary epistles of Horace, Brink realized that it was necessary to produce a sizable introduction to Horace's use of tradition. This book is the introduction.

As it turns out, Brink devotes most of his attention to the *Ars poetica*, for he regards it as the high point of Horace's literary criticism and dates it after *Epistle II, 1*. Therefore, although he briefly discusses the other literary epistles—and the literary satires, for that matter—he does so only to show how Horace in the *Ars* improved on their methods. The *Ars*, of course, has long been a field

of controversy. Brink has thoroughly immersed himself in that dispute, and he announces as one of his main purposes the intention "to peel the crust of scholarly controversy off some fresh and engaging works of poetic art."

The argument of the book is put together with architectonic mastery. First, Brink gives a brief analysis of the *Ars*, starting at the end, and he elicits a tripartite structure: after an introduction (1-40), there is a section on order and style (40-118), one on organization and the major genres involved (119-294), and finally one on general questions of poetic criticism (295-476). Having once established his scheme, he proceeds to expose the inadequacies of his manifold predecessors in this field. Next, he attempts to place Horace's poem and its tripartite structure in the context of tradition. Since Norden's theory that Horace followed the bipartite scheme of a rhetorical *Disagoge* or Introduction has now been rejected, Brink replaces that scheme with one which he attributes to Neoptolemus of Parium. From the few fragments of Neoptolemus which Philodemus' treatise on poetry, itself fragmentary, has preserved, it is apparent that Neoptolemus analyzed poetry under three headings or categories: 1. *poema*, which may be roughly interpreted as style; 2. *poesis*, subject matter and composition; 3. *poeta*. Now, Porphyryon, in one of his first comments on the *Ars*, states that Horace assembled in the poem the precepts of Neoptolemus *de arte poetica*, though not all, only the most distinguished. Although we have none of Neoptolemus' precepts today, Brink takes advantage of Porphyryon to exco-
gitate an elaborate treatise of the Parian, which he assumes provided the necessary link between Horace and the modified Aristotelian criticism which the *Ars* presents. He argues not only that Neoptolemus produced a tripartite treatise, but also that the treatise established the fashion, which Horace in turn copied, for discussing *poema*, *poesis*, and *poeta* in that order. In several important chapters on Aristotle, by playing Horace off against the Peripatetic, he filters out the distinctive qualities of Neoptolemus' treatise, both its heavy debt to Aristotle and its serious attempt to compromise with the Hellenistic doctrine of literary criticism advocated by Callimachus.

This is the first half of the book. Because of the nature of the evidence, it is almost inevitably subject to serious criticism. To begin with, the tripartite structure of the *Ars* is far from self-evident. The only decisive break that Horace imposes on his *sermo* comes at 306 ff., where the poet lists a number of items which he will discuss. I agree with Brink and others that the transition to this final section begins at 295. However, for any previous divisions, Brink is open to attack. Two Germans, who had not seen this book, published studies of the *Ars* in 1963 also.¹ Becker finds a quite different tripartite scheme: 1-40, 41-250, and 251-476; and he explains this structure by an appeal to Neoptolemus too. The central section, 41-250, he claims, represents the precepts of Neoptolemus, whereas the initial and final parts voice Horace's personal views on poetry. Attempting to modify Becker's ideas, Händel argues that in fact Horace was

¹ C. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (Göttingen, 1963), pp. 64-112; P. Händel, "Zur Ars Poetica des Horaz," *Rh. Mus.*, CVI (1963), pp. 164-86.

mainly concerned with drama in the *Ars*, that Horace constructed his poem independently of Neoptolemus, following his personal themes. He insists that we should not try to extend the literal meaning of Porphyry's simple comment: Horace used Neoptolemus only for *praecepta*. Händel's analysis will satisfy few, I suspect, but here is the result: 1-88, recommendations to poets in general; 89-152, transition to drama and first rules; 153-201, details of dramatic presentation; 202-308, further ideas on drama; 309-476, on the dramatic poet. I cite these two studies, to show that others, grappling with the same problems as Brink, have reached diverse opinions on the structure and the relevance of Neoptolemus to the structure. In my opinion, at any rate, Brink creates an artificial division at 118. Nor do I feel that 118-294 hold together so well as he claims. Perhaps instead of a tripartite scheme, we should settle for a loose bipartite structure: a variety of ideas on the poem (1-294), then various ideas on the poet (295-476). Clearly, though, Horace has been at pains to wipe out the impression of any formal rhetorical structure.

If there is no tripartite structure—or at least no luminously clear tripartite structure—in the *Ars*, it becomes doubtful that a supposed tripartite structure of Neoptolemus' treatise on poetry exerted so decisive an influence on Horace as Brink would have us believe. Furthermore, what Brink labels an introduction causes problems. According to Brink, the first 40 lines lie outside the part of the *Ars* influenced by Neoptolemus and his structural scheme. Some previous scholars, such as Jensen, Rostagni, and Immisch, have seen in the precepts of those lines—which are highly prescriptive—precisely the kind of general statements which Neoptolemus would have uttered under the heading of *poema*. Becker and Händel, cited above, argue strongly against Brink's kind of introduction, each in his own way. Even Brink believes that the ideas expressed in 1-40 are traditional and "likely to be Neoptolemic."

This book should not be judged by its vulnerable spots. In dealing with these doubtful combinations, Brink does not try to mystify the reader. If he tends to overvalue and overinterpret Porphyry's comment about the use of some, not all, of Neoptolemus' *praecepta*, he consistently expresses due caution as he weighs the evidence. Much of what he infers may indeed be correct. However, it would not be impossible, it seems to me, that Horace, like Vergil, knew his way among more ancient criticism than we can imagine, that, like Vergil, he rarely depended upon a single source. Possibly, then, we could reconstruct some of Neoptolemus from Horace's *Ars*, but, when we lack so much of Neoptolemus and of other Hellenistic criticism, we run grave risks in affirming that Horace was so dependent on one source as Brink argues.

The second half of the book concentrates on more secure evidence, namely, the works of Horace himself. For while Brink wishes to stress the traditional qualities of Horace's literary criticism, he keeps protesting against those who see the *Ars* only as a storehouse of traditional ideas. Poets, he observes, may resort to literary criticism for either of two motives or for the two motives combined: they may wish to argue the methods of their craft in polemic manner and so limit themselves to the particular verse under discussion; or

they may adopt a more objective manner and attempt to develop systematic ideas on poetry in general. In his literary satires, Horace inclined towards the first, the polemic manner; in the *Ars*, Horace went to work in his uniquely personal manner on "a consistent, and in a sense systematic, critical philosophy." Reviewing each of the literary satires and epistles, Brink reaches sound conclusions as to the literary criticism there employed; it is that of a poet-critic, traditional, selective, concerned with *ars*, at odds with both archaists and certain modernists. The *Ars poetica*, which Brink inclines to date after 13 B. C., combines these personal interests of the poet-critic with a more comprehensive theory of poetry. To put it in Brink's own words, "The *Ars* turns out to be the work of a poet and critic who for once aspired to the objective canons and rigorous principles of the philosophers while yet insisting on his rights as a poet" (p. 233).

Some will feel that the distinction which Brink draws between the other literary poems and the *Ars* is far too sharp, that the systematic and philosophic elements should not be stressed in this manner. Becker, for example, who dates the *Ars* to 18 B. C., interprets it in close relation with the epistles of Book I and II, 2. In my own reading of the poem, I do not detect so marked an aspiration for the "objective canons and rigorous principles of the philosophers." Horace did take as the occasion of this *sermo* the desire of some inexperienced men to write grand poetry, an occasion which sufficiently differs from that of all his other literary criticism to justify his more general exposition. Otherwise, his passionate concern with the craft of poetry remains pretty constant from the literary satires to the *Ars poetica*.

Brink has not perhaps peeled all the crust of scholarly controversy, as he intended. However, he has suggested some excellent solutions to old problems and helped to right the emphasis in our attitude toward the *Ars poetica*. As literary criticism, it is a curious blend of traditional ideas and the beliefs most passionately cherished by Horace. The other major element which now remains to be considered is the poetry of the *Ars*. On the basis of the following words, I think we can look forward to Brink's treatment of that, too, as an important event: "A line-by-line commentary may help to gain or regain that intimate understanding, now lost, of a poet who could make the stuff of poetry out of his own reflections on poetry. For the *Ars* is not only literary criticism versified. It is more than that—a poem that in many essential features exhibits the qualities which it debates: a poetic mirror of the ancient view of poetry (p. ix)."

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BRUNO SNELL. *Scenes from Greek Drama*. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1964. Pp. vii + 147. \$4.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 34.)

This volume of Sather Lectures is described in the preface as a minor result of the author's long preoccupation with the fragments of the Greek tragedians. It is more, however, than a collection of

random notes on scraps of lost plays. As Snell puts it, with humorous self-disparagement, he has mounted again his "old hobby horse: tracing modern concepts to their first appearance in Greek poetry" (p. v). "Geistesgeschichte" has long been one of Snell's main concerns, and those familiar with his earlier articles and books on the subject will recognize here some repetition and development of judgments already published. The literature dealt with includes Aeschylus' *Achilleis* trilogy, Euripides' two *Hippolytus* plays, Euripides' *Antiope*, and Python's *Agon*. Each play presents a different set of problems, but certain topics recur: the importance in tragedy of the act of decision, Euripidean doubts about the efficacy of knowledge, and the antithesis between different ideals and ways of life as a dramatic theme.

The first chapter, "Shame and Guilt: Aeschylus' Achilles," contrasts Homer's ethical presuppositions with those of Aeschylus. Snell's argument is that the ideals of Homer's Achilles, who lives in a "shame culture" (for explanation of the term, see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* [Berkeley, 1951], p. 17), are defined by the esteem of his fellows, not by a personal conviction of right and wrong. Hence glory is the motive for Achilles' actions in Homer, whereas in Aeschylus "the right is the important thing" (p. 17). This "right," personally felt and, if need be, maintained against authority or the opinion of one's peers, often requires the Aeschylean character to set shame aside. Snell goes on to say that this lack of an inner criterion of choice in Homer is coupled with lack of a genuine power of decision or sense of personal responsibility. In all this, he is paraphrasing arguments that he has urged elsewhere, notably in *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York, 1960), where he stated that in Homer "mental and spiritual acts are due to the impact of external factors" (p. 20). In support of this judgment, he there cited the occasional explicit statements that a god has guided a human decision, and Homer's supposed failure, inferred from his vocabulary of psychic functions, to conceive man as a psychic whole. Moreover, the "stereotype form" in which the epic describes moments of decision seemed to him to reflect no awareness of "subjective choice, not to speak of an internal struggle" (*Discovery*, p. 103). The discussion of the *Achilleis* in the present book is built on this same theory, which remains to my mind unconvincing. It is true that Homer's gods often intervene in the affairs of men, and a claim of divine intervention is therefore a natural excuse for those in the epic who wish to avoid blame or politely acquit others of it (as at *Iliad*, XIX, 86 ff. and III, 164). The formulaic style, moreover, does tend to make decisions seem stereotyped. One may even agree that Aeschylus has given the act of decision and the "internal struggle" a new importance. But Snell's distinction between what is Homeric and what is Aeschylean fails in passages such as *Odyssey*, XIX, 524 ff. It fails too in the example which he has chosen in both books to bear the principal weight of his argument, the choice of Achilles. "Nowhere does Homer mention Achilles' own conscious decision to make the nobler choice" (*Scenes*, p. 1; cf. *Discovery*, p. 105). Perhaps not, but the wavering of Achilles in *Iliad*, IX (356 ff., 619, 650 ff.) must mean that he is reviewing, with anguish, his choice of a life, at a moment when Agamemnon has altered, and perhaps nullified, its significance.

If Homer's Achilles lacks inner control and merely reflects the play of external forces, the Achilles of Aeschylus marks for Snell a distinctly new phase in the evolution of the Greek spirit. Unfortunately, the remains of the Achilles trilogy are few, and the papyrus fragment on which Snell relies most heavily may not be Aeschylean at all (Pack², no. 34; Lloyd-Jones, in the Loeb *Aeschylus*, II, pp. 590 ff., discusses the problem of attribution). In this fragment, Achilles, who has withdrawn from the battle, expresses his anger and his defiance of the Achaeans. Snell finds the principal non-Homeric note in line 12 (τοῖον] δ' ἀφείναι τοῦτος οὐκ αἰδώς μ' ἔχει), which seems to him the explicit assertion of a personal right over against the state, an assertion made all the bolder by the fact that the Greeks have lodged a charge of treason against Achilles (inferred from mention of a threat to stone him, and the word *προδοσίαν* in a mutilated context). Even if one should grant that the papyrus is Aeschylean (and the new argument on pp. 6-7 seems to me to fall well short of proof), it still would provide too narrow and feeble a base for Snell's conclusions. To take one example, Achilles' modest enough claim, that the other Achaean leaders are no nobler than he, is taken to prove a more than Homeric self-esteem and moral independence (p. 7). Here and elsewhere (cf. p. 16) intrinsically weak or ambiguous evidence must be wrung hard before it can be made to yield the desired meaning.

Three chapters are about Euripides, the first being devoted to the lost *Hippolytus I*. Snell's basic supposition is that Seneca's *Phaedra* can be used with confidence as a source for *Hippolytus I*, since it "is based to a large extent on the lost drama of Euripides" (p. 24). W. S. Barrett, whose more cautious treatment of this problem was known to Snell, has shown how hazardous it is to reconstruct *Hipp. I* from Seneca, since the latter had as possible sources, besides his own imagination, the two plays by Euripides, one by Sophocles, and one by Lycophron (ed. *Hippolytus* [Oxford, 1964], p. 17). Snell, nevertheless, has undertaken to sketch for the *Phaedra* of *Hipp. I* a psychological portrait, one for which the materials scarcely exist. Did *Phaedra* in the first play desire to go hunting as she does in the second play? No quotation exists to prove this, and one must therefore resort to the argument that a supposedly inartistic repetition in Seneca is a result of absent-minded copying of the same theme from both plays rather than a careless invention (p. 34). At this point, source-hunting becomes a chase in the dark, and Snell himself warns that the matter "may not be clear" (p. 38). But one thing that he finds quite clear is the meaning of frag. 430 (Nauck²): ἔχω δὲ τόλμης καὶ θράσους διδάσκαλον / ἐν τοῖς ἀμηχάνουσιν εὐπορώτατον, / "Ἐρωτα, πάντων δυσμαχώτατον θεόν. He argues that these ἀμήχανα refer to a "state of moral helplessness" (p. 34), and he concludes that "Euripides—even in the first version—had motivated *Phaedra*'s action not solely as a reaction to an action which befalls her but deduced it from her psychological state of mind" (p. 40). This may be true, but then again the word ἀμηχάνουσιν may only refer to external difficulties, and if it does, an elaborately drawn analogy between this fragment and the plot of Seneca's play is undermined (p. 33). Yet the fragment is "the most important evidence for the Euripidean origin of the plan of Seneca's *Phaedra*" (p. 26). In

fact, the path which leads from Seneca to *Hipp. I* is everywhere slippery. For example, fragments 437 and 438 are probably from a conversation between Theseus and Hippolytus (as Barrett supposes) and not from one between the nurse and Phaedra. Snell rejects the former supposition, arguing that Theseus could not have said of Hippolytus that in his case wealth begat ὕβρις. But what Theseus (if it is he) says is that εὐπραγία often begets ὕβρις, and εὐπραγία may mean no more than "well-being" or "good fortune." Since Barrett's attribution is the likelier one on other grounds, the supposed dependence of Seneca, lines 204 ff., on these lines remains unproved. In short, Barrett's recommendations for extreme caution in reconstructing *Hippolytus I* still hold good.

Chapter 3, which deals with *Medea* and *Hipp. II*, is an expansion of the article "Das früheste Zeugnis über Sokrates," *Philologus*, XCVII (1948), pp. 125-34. Snell argues that Medea's reflections at lines 1077 ff. of the *Medea* ("I know what evils I am about to do, but my θυμός is stronger than my βουλεύματα") had evoked from Socrates the protest that knowledge is sufficient for right action. In response, says Snell, Euripides wrote the extended, seemingly anti-Socratic reflections of Phaedra at *Hipp.*, 380 ff. Therefore, "Euripides in *Hippolytus* is engaged in a dispute with Socrates" (p. 63). Snell invites us to see in their exchange the origin of the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, which would then have appeared shortly after 431 B. C., as Socrates' way of protesting against the errors of Medea's self-analysis. But the hypothesis involves two doubtful assumptions. The first, which admittedly has a venerable status in Euripidean studies, is that this dramatist was also a philosopher (or religious thinker, or political commentator) who did not hesitate to abandon dramatic verisimilitude in order to introduce his personal views. But it is not obvious that Phaedra's speech is digressive and out of character (see Barrett *ad loc.* and Snell, p. 61, n. 20), even if it does show an acquaintance with Socratic ethics. On the other side, to make that ethics a reaction to the *Medea* is to settle out of hand a problem of priority and of inspiration that is as dark as anything else in the Socratic Question. Snell rejects the defensible view that Socrates' doctrine was formulated in opposition to the sophists by saying that it must have been a reaction (antithesis) to an anti-intellectualist ethical thinker (thesis), and that Euripidean fits the latter description more closely than do the sophists. He also argues that Socrates was not known to have been anti-sophistic during the 420's (see *The Clouds*), or likely to have waged that particular crusade for thirty years. In spite of his argument, some doubt may remain that the biography of Socrates can be written by combining Hegelian logic, Aristophanic humor, and the argument from τὸ εἶκος.

A chapter is devoted to Euripides' *Antiope*, and here too Snell's principal interest lies in the value of the fragments as a key to the intellectual life of contemporary Athens. Two passages command his attention. In the first, Antiope says that her troubles are made worse by the fact that she understands them (τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι γὰρ ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινὰ / νοσοῦντα, κέρδος δ' ἐν κακοῖς ἀγνωσία, frag. 205). Here, says Snell, is a reference to the Socratic theory that "Man can win true happiness by intellectual efforts. To this Antiope answers, as

Phaedra did: Life in reality is quite different" (p. 81). Euripides' "opposition," he adds, is directed as well against the sophists (p. 82). Now it is true that frag. 205 offers pointed praise of ignorance in an age when praise of knowledge had achieved a new intensity and variety. But to characterize the fragment as evidence of opposition to Socrates or others is to turn an epigram into a form of academic disputation. Moreover, if we delve beneath the flash of paradox, Euripides' supposed argument falls flat, simply because the knowledge which Antiope finds irksome and useless has nothing to do with the Socratic or sophistic knowledge of how to achieve one's ends. The second scene discussed is the debate between Amphion and Zethus, and here Snell's long and learned discussion provides us with a valuable commentary. He does not hesitate to state, however, that "it cannot be denied that *Antiope* fell into two very different parts, one rather sophisticated [the debate], the other an exciting action of primitive *coups de théâtre*" (p. 98). This judgment, which far outruns the sparse evidence, betrays a fundamental assumption about Euripides that not all of us can share. Only if we assume, as Snell does, that Euripides was always ready to forsake drama for personal disquisition need we believe that in his plays he engages in "discussions" and "disputes" (pp. 63, 67).

In the last two chapters Snell turns to quite a different subject, the fragments of Python's *Agon*, performed in the 320's, of which eighteen lines survive in Athenaeus. This "little satyr-play," as Athenaeus describes it, concerns the relations of Harpalus, one of the most powerful officials in Alexander's realm, with two courtesans, each of whom Harpalus visited with extravagant honors. The *Agon* touches the lighter side of a serious issue, viz. What were the honors and prerogatives proper to the "divine humanity" of Alexander himself (p. 135)? This was to be a special Hellenistic form of the old question which earlier Greeks had pondered too, "the relationship of man to the gods" (p. 138), and so it finds a place in this set of lectures.

This is a varied, learned, and interesting book by a man who in the past has taught us much about the Greek mind and whose views still rightly command our attention, even when we must disagree.

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A. D. LEEMAN. *Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators, Historians, and Philosophers*. 2 vols. Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1963. Pp. 558. Fl. 58.

In an impressive looking two-volume work Leeman, Professor of Latin at the University of Amsterdam, has undertaken an historical study of Latin prose style, both practice and theory, from the mid second century B. C. to the mid second century A. D. Volume one is divided into four main parts: The Archaic Period; The Classical Period; The Early Empire; The Classicist and Archaist Periods. Each of these parts is further divided into from three to five chap-

ters. Ordinarily in each part there is attention to the theory and criticism of style, to oratory, to historiography, and to philosophy. The principal authors discussed are Cato, *Auctor ad Herennium*, Cicero, Caesar, Sallust, Livy, Seneca the elder and younger, Quintilian, Tacitus, Pliny, Fronto, Gellius, and Apuleius, but there is considerable attention to the style of fragmentary orators, historians, and philosophers. The novel and technical treatises (except Cato's) are passed over as sub-literary by Roman standards; there is no discussion of the relationship between prose and poetry: Atticism as it applies to poetry, for example, or the discussions of style in Horace as they apply to prose, or the relation of Ovid or Lucan to contemporary rhetoric are ignored; nor is there very much on the relation between style and the work of Roman grammarians. Both fragments and portions of extant works are extensively quoted in Latin in the text, while an English translation, often from the Loeb Classical Library, is supplied in notes which are conveniently available in the smaller second volume. The notes consist solely of these translations and of references to ancient authorities. The second volume also includes a brief selective bibliography, an *index nominum*, an *index rerum et verborum ad litteras pertinentium* (Latin, English, and Greek with a number of omissions and mistakes) and an *index locorum potiorum*.

The obvious standard against which Leeman's work might be compared is that of Eduard Norden's *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, as he acknowledges himself in the introduction. Leeman criticizes Norden for over-estimation of the role of rhetoric and for too ready simplification. In contrast his own aims, he says, are a more limited historical coverage, fuller interpretation of relevant passages, and a more didactic exposition of the material by means of extensive quotation. All of this he certainly attains. The great virtue of the book is its impressive collection of significant Latin texts on prose style, quoted in full, often compared and contrasted with other texts, and often accompanied by perceptive comments.

Leeman is apologetic on two scores, for his English and for his selectivity. His English he describes as a *lingua franca*. We may be grateful for it: it is generally quite idiomatic and adequate, though there are small misprints which an English proof-reader might have noticed. Leeman's second doubt, however, leads to a real problem in the work. It is not the selectivity which is at fault; naturally Leeman had to be selective. It is the lack of balance in the selection between theory and practice and to some extent the tendency to treat either very broad questions of the philosophy of rhetoric or very specific details of stylistic practice and nothing in between. The book furnishes a good historical account within the limits it defines of the theory of Latin prose style. The sub-title, however, claims to furnish a history of Latin prose in practice, and the table of contents raises hopes of a comprehensive account. These hopes are disappointed. There is a good deal on the practice of writers known only from fragments; there is not an adequate account of the stylistic practice of major extant Roman authors or of the application of theory to practice.

This is especially true in the case of Cicero. In a sense a similar objection could be made against Norden's discussion of Cicero. Norden was aware of it and pleaded lack of secondary materials on

which to draw. He outlined five different areas in which Cicero's stylistic theory, practice, and development should be studied. It would have been valuable if Leeman had taken up these five points and in an orderly way shown what progress has been made by classical philology in the last sixty-five years. This is not what he chooses to do, however. He comments on a number of relevant matters in the course of his own discussion, but his account of Cicero's style treats only one period of its development. There is a chapter entitled "Cicero and Asianism" which contains a rather detailed discussion of Cicero's oratorical style in his early years with some mention of the speeches down to 63 B. C., though the great set of Verrine orations is shabbily treated. The next chapter, however, turns to a survey of Cicero's oratorical theory, quite an adequate survey, and Leeman never returns to discuss the subsequent stages of Cicero's development. The account is thus frustrating in terms of the announced objective of the book or the picture of the history of Latin style which one would like students to get. There is no analysis of the greatest speeches of the greatest Latin stylist. What is needed is not thorough coverage but balanced selectivity, here for example stylistic analysis of at least one middle and one later oration to match what is done for Cicero's earlier oratory. Furthermore, these analyses should if possible bring out the variations in style within a speech. There is throughout the discussion of Cicero what seems to be a lack of imagination, a failure to recognize the excitement of oratory to Cicero, a rather Romantic suspicion of artificiality, and a tendency to look at Cicero's works in a narrow way without considering the relation of their style to their structure, subject, or specific occasion. Cicero is after all the overwhelming central figure in the history of Latin style, both as theorist and practitioner. Leeman verbally acknowledges his importance, but seems to resent him: he offers (p. 219) to trade ten of his orations for one of Hortensius and ten more for one of Pollio. He claims (pp. 123 and 206)—falsely I think—that Cicero did not understand the quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, more justly perhaps that he misrepresents the influences upon himself (p. 110) and the attitudes of the Atticists (p. 165), though earlier (p. 44) Leeman admired Cicero's "insight into the nature of the Atticist movement." Even Cicero's contribution to philosophical Latin is grudgingly treated (p. 211).

These criticisms bring out a central feature of the work, that it is not, despite some appearances, a systematic or comprehensive history. It is a series of texts with observations thereon, very much as might be delivered in the lecture room. The tone is that of the lecturer rather than that of the essayist or historian. Problems are rarely stated and defined, but are elicited from discussion. Thus Atticism and Asianism are repeatedly referred to before they are explained. The decision to omit secondary sources except for the short selective bibliography is part of the same tendency. No doubt it made writing the book easier; it equally makes the book less useful. Given the nature of the subject, which involves a great deal of attention to small details and thus needs the support of specialized studies, the decision was regrettable. It is furthermore carried out in a singularly annoying way with phrases like "it has even been argued that" (p. 11) cropping up from time to time without any further identification.

Leeman's lack of sympathy for Cicero is counterbalanced by a greater feeling for some other writers. There is a good discussion of Thucydidean Atticism at Rome, centering around Pollio and Sallust. The latter's prologues are approached (p. 185) with sympathy as attempts to define historiography within the categories of Roman *virtus*. His style, it is claimed (p. 184), sounded much more "poetic" to the Romans than it does to us, chiefly because of its archaism, which links it with Roman epic and tragedy. The chapter on the orators and rhetoricians in the early empire contains some small confusions. The first note (p. 219) is lacking; there is no evidence that Seneca the elder spent sixty years in Rome (p. 224), though his visits there spanned sixty years; Seneca does not claim to have heard 170 declaimers (p. 227): I count 108, but it is difficult to be exact and 110 (misread as 170?) is a good round number. Somehow the 200 orators referred to on page 43 seem to have been reduced to 170 on page 227 to match the non-existent 170 declaimers. The account of Theodoreanism (p. 238) is not accurate (cf. G. M. A. Grube in this Journal, LXXX [1959], pp. 337 ff.). The main discussion of Livy in chapter seven is rather brief, though something had already been said about his style in chapter three in comparison with earlier historiography. Leeman plausibly argues (p. 195), following Lundström, that Livy is rather a loyal admirer than a part and product of Roman history. Except in speeches he never uses *nostri* to mean the Romans and in fact may have spent very little time in Rome. Personally I rather like the passage from Velleius Paterculus which Leeman quotes (p. 250) as an example of "abominable Asianistic deviation," but which he says he will leave to the reader to analyze. A student of Roman rhetoric should not be offended at an apostrophe to Mark Antony on the death of Cicero, he ought to relax and enjoy the game. The treatment of Seneca deals principally with his theories of philosophical style and with the influences upon his style, which Leeman thinks (p. 283) are principally those of rhetoricians. Quintilian's criticisms of Seneca are quoted and carefully explained, and Quintilian himself is praised as the first person fully to realize the differences between Latin and Greek (p. 296) and as a Ciceronian who had at the same time "a wide ranging appreciation of what had been achieved up to his own day" (p. 320). There is very little discussion of the style in which these writers write; Tacitus' style is however given some attention as are his literary attitudes. Leeman's general position on Tacitus is not unlike that of Syme and other modern critics. He claims (pp. 321 and 346) that Maternus in the *Dialogus* is Tacitus himself; just as Maternus has given up oratory for tragedy, so in the period between 100 and 105 A.D. when Leeman thinks the *Dialogus* was written Tacitus is giving up oratory for what Leeman calls "tragic" history. The revival of classical ideals by Quintilian and others in the late first century "made men painfully aware that they lived and worked in a different sphere of life in which the role of the individual was confined to a narrow range of possibilities" (p. 323). That this is an overstatement is clear from Leeman's admission that Quintilian and Pliny did not see it this way, and also from the fact that the *locus communis* on the decline of oratory had been developed earlier. Leeman thinks that Tacitus always hated to be specific, that he found in *obscura brevitatis* a mask for his real personality (p.

337), and finally that this use of a character as a spokesman for the author, seen also in Cicero's *De oratore*, though derived from the Greek dialogue, is a characteristic feature of Roman literature. He calls it allusionism (p. 346).

Despite the title of the work Leeman has not produced an authoritative history of the theory and practice of Latin prose style. He has assembled an impressive collection of texts and published a series of interesting and informative observations on them.

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FRANCESCO PAOLO RIZZO, S. J. *Le fonti per la storia della conquista pompeiana della Siria*. Palermo, Fond. Mormino, 1963. Pp. 101. (*Supplementi a "Kókalos,"* II.)

The history of Pompey's conquest of Syria consists of scraps of information drawn from writers of the Imperial period. From what primary sources did this scattered information come? To that question Father Rizzo addresses himself in the present monograph.

Ancient references to the conquest itself are so meager that any analysis of them must widen its focus to include the general history of Lucullus' and Pompey's campaigns against Mithridates and Tigranes. Rizzo begins his study by summarizing Cicero's *De imperio Cn. Pompei*. He remarks that the oration was not especially offensive to the optimate party, and eventually helped to inspire the favorable picture of Pompey painted by Livy and others who idealized the Republic. Chapter II lists the Latin historians (Sallust excepted) of the Late Republic who dealt, or may have dealt, with Pompey's Syrian campaign. A score of names, but few solid facts emerge: if, for example, Saufeius the historian is the same as L. Saufeius, *eques*, his history, if it touched on these matters, must have presented Pompey's eastern achievements in a favorable light. Turning to Sallust, we are reminded that his *Histories*, which did not come down beyond 67 or 66 B. C., praised Lucullus at the expense of Pompey, and were used by Plutarch in his biography of Lucullus. Two Greek writers of the same period receive attention in Chapter IV. The epic poem of Archias of Antioch glorified *non modum L. Lucillum . . . verum etiam populi Romani nomen*. Rizzo finds it significant that, so far as we know, Archias made no mention of Lucullus' arrangements for Syrian "independence" and a restoration of the Seleucid dynasty. As Lucullus had his Archias, so Pompey had his Theophanes of Mytilene, whose biography of Pompey scholars have detected behind the accounts of several later historians.

A survey of proven and possible primary sources is useful, but little in these chapters is new. The worth of this monograph must be established on the basis of what follows. And here, in an attempt to find links between the primary sources and the later authors, Rizzo offers little more than a number of questionable, if imaginative, hypotheses. Chapter V deals with the Livian tradition, VI with Justin's fortieth book, VII with Plutarch and the "Strabonian tradition," and VIII with Appian's *Syriake*.

If one may judge by the *periochae*, Florus, Eutropius, and Orosius, Livy spoke as favorably about Lucullus as he did about Pompey. This suggests that in supplementing his annalistic sources Livy used consecutively a pro-Lucullan writer (perhaps Sallust) and a pro-Pompeyan writer, such as Theophanes. This is likely enough. Rizzo goes along with the conventional view that Dio Cassius reflects Livy in his account of Pompey's eastern campaigns, but ventures upon a new tack in proposing that Dio's chapters on Lucullus and the Manilian proposal were based on the *Annals* of Hortensius. The author finds that the interests of Dio's sources were "costituzionali e più propriamente politici." But, as Rizzo himself admits, we cannot be sure that Hortensius the orator, who did oppose the Manilian Law, is the same Hortensius who wrote a history. Secondly, the sole fragment of these *Annals* (Vell., II, 16) refers to the Social War; they may not have covered the period with which we are dealing. Finally, would the optimate orator have written the statements which we find in Dio? The damning appraisal of Cicero's character defects (XXXVI, 43-4) must have been written after Cicero's death, or at least after 50 B. C., and is reminiscent of Livy's criticism of Cicero. Rizzo makes much of his observation that, while all other historians insist that his soldiers' mutiny prevented Lucullus from ending the war, Dio says that Lucullus did not wish to end the war. This, supposedly, is an accusation which the orator Hortensius might have voiced. In fact, Dio, XXXVI, 2, 1, the single passage in question, reports this charge as having been made by some citizens; and both Appian (*Mith.*, 90) and Plutarch (*Luc.*, 24, 3) say much the same. There is little reason to accept Rizzo's Hortensian hypothesis.

Justin's book XL is a 200 word digest of Trogus' book XL. In addition, we have the *prologus* to Trogus XL. This is hardly enough to indicate clearly what Trogus actually said about Pompey's conquest of Syria, but Rizzo finds enough evidence to posit two sources for Trogus: Strabo's *Historical Commentaries* and an "eyewitness report" furnished by Trogus' uncle, who was one of Pompey's cavalry commanders in the campaign against Mithridates. The author contends that only by assuming an inept combination of two sources can we account for the contradiction between XL, 1, 1 (where we read that before Tigranes' occupation of Syria . . . *et reges et regnum Syriae consumptum esset*) and XL, 2, 2, where we find that a Seleucid is still around and, in fact, had been named king of Syria by Lucullus. Rizzo would have Strabo supplying Trogus with the (erroneous) information that the Seleucid dynasty had disappeared by 83 B. C.; the correct report came, then, from Trogus' uncle. In answer we might note that 1) Trogus and Strabo were contemporaries, and we do not know that the *Historical Commentaries* were available to Trogus, 2) the fragments of Strabo's history give no indication whatever of his account of the last Seleucids. On the other hand, Rizzo's "eyewitness" hypothesis makes it necessary to suppose that 1) Trogus' uncle volunteered his information after Trogus had already written the first version (otherwise the contradiction would hardly have occurred), at which point the uncle would have been approximately 100 years old, 2) Trogus did not bother to remove the contradiction, nor did Justin notice it. All this, of course, can be explained by translating the *consumptum* of XL, 1, 1 not

as "liquidated" but as "weakened," precisely the meaning it has in XXXIX, 5, 5, where we read that Syria and Egypt, *adsiduis proeliis consumpti, in contemptum finitimorum venerint*. The prologus does state that Tigranes entered Syria, *extincta . . . regum Antiochorum domo. . .*" But this merely shows that the author of the prologue had not read all of XL before he wrote this sentence; and so, like Rizzo, understood *consumptum* (or Trogus' equivalent) in its extreme sense. The ocular-avuncular hypothesis must be rejected.

The author has done well, however, to note Trogus' sympathy for Tigranes. Some of this material, as Rizzo argues, may have derived from the *Mithridatica* written by historians at the Pontic court. But that this information was channeled to Trogus by way of Strabo remains questionable. We know only that Strabo made use of Timagenes' pro-Seleucid *History of Kings*.

In his study of Plutarch's *Lucullus*, Rizzo plausibly suggests that Plutarch drew from Archias' epic, as well as from Sallust and Livy. In Plutarch's description of Pompey's campaign the author discovers the same "Mithridatic" material and viewpoint which he found in Trogus' work, and concludes that this information, as well as the Timagenes citation in *Pom.*, 49, was transmitted to Plutarch by Strabo. This "Strabonian tradition," therefore, was at an opposite pole from the pro-Pompeyan tradition of Theophanes. This thesis is, at the least, quite fragile: five of the seven extant fragments of Theophanes come down to us by way of Strabo!

The analysis of Appian's *Syriake* is more cautious and useful. Rizzo inclines toward the opinion that Timagenes was Appian's principal source. The manifestly anti-Roman bias in paragraphs 45-51, as well as the detailed knowledge of the later Seleucids, does bring Timagenes to mind.

Rizzo says nothing about Josephus' reference to Pompey in Syria, and nothing about Nicolaus of Damascus, who must have had opinions of his own about Pompey's provisions for Syria, and who, like Strabo, was well acquainted with Timagenes' history. Of course, a thesis built on Nicolaus would have been at least as tenuous as that built on Strabo. *Quellenforschungen* are, at times, quite valuable. But they are means to an end; if they can establish one writer's dependence upon another we can, hopefully, go on to say something about both writers. The monograph here reviewed establishes too little. What might have been worthwhile as an article is insubstantial in its present form.

Errors in typesetting are distressingly frequent. Read *δημαγωγοί* for *δημαγωγὴ* on p. 42; *Antiochus* and *Antiochorum* for *Antiocus* and *Antiocorum*, p. 58; *daturum* for *datarum*, p. 68, n. 55. Most disconcerting is the omission of a line on p. 70, in the midst of what had promised to be a thoughtful criticism of Trogus' attitude toward Rome. Read *ἀφρηῆσθαι* for *ἀφρηῆσσαι*, p. 85, n. 40; *contrappongono* for *contrapppongono*, p. 90.

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- E. LOBEL. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XXVIII. Edited with Notes. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1962. Pp. xii + 89; 11 pls. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 40.)
- DENYS PAGE. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XXIX. Edited with a Commentary. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1963. Pp. x + 53; 10 pls. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 41.)

In Part XXVIII Lobel presents 46 fragments, derived from 25 different papyri ranging in date from the first through the third century of our era, attributable with greater or less certainty to the category of Hesiodic Catalogue poetry. These must be added to the fragments collected by Rzach, the papyrus fragments previously published by Merkelbach (*Die Hesiodfragmente auf Papyrus*) and by Schwartz (*Pseudo-Hesiodica*) to get a complete picture of the by now impressive array of remnants of this handbook poetry which obviously enjoyed a great popularity particularly in the first three centuries of our era at Oxyrhynchus. The number of papyri here published exceeds the total assembled by Merkelbach, although the texts are not so extensive.

As was to be expected, there are coincidences between the texts published here and previously published fragments, but these coincidences go, in some instances, beyond all expectation. The reconstructed text of 2481, Fr. 5(b), Col. ii is made up from parts of five apparently separate and independent papyrus rolls (*Berol.*, 9777 and *Ox.*, 2075, 2481, 2483, 2493) and for one small spot in the text (lines 14-17) if one were to stack the papyri represented on top of one another they would be three deep. The coincidences within this collection are also remarkable. On page 23 a reconstruction of parts of 35 lines is made up of three separate papyri (2481, 2484, 2485). 2485, Fr. 2 and 2486 coincide for at least one third of the width of the column for 26 lines, are backed up by Rzach 14 for eight lines, and have an initial coincidence with 2481, Fr. 2. The faultless editing of such texts is a feat of patience and ingenuity to be expected only of Lobel. Yet the economy of his editing is so rigid that it is possible to follow what he is doing only with the most scrupulous attention to his every word and with the use of about five additional books. His indifference to the needs of all but specialists is pushed to the extreme in his failure to explain the significance of references such as F3A, which are to Merkelbach's designation. The process of study and combination went on so close to the time of printing that the assignment of some numbers is not what the editor would otherwise have chosen. Technically one may observe that the conventional signs become inadequate to the demands made upon them by this kind of text. On pages 13 and 59 angular brackets do not appear to represent "a mistaken omission in the original" as explained in the Note on Method of Publication, but a little study will show what they do mean.

It is difficult to sum up briefly the positive contribution of these texts. The editor questions his attribution in only ten cases where there is no coincidence with Rzach fragments or other papyrus fragments whose ascription is not in question. Most generally interesting, perhaps, is the text reconstructed on page 9, where Cly-

taemnestra and Timandra are given as descendants of Leda, and Clytaemnestra's children by Agamemnon as Electra, Iphimede, and Orestes. Iphimede is a new variant on Iphigenia and we read, immediately following reference to her sacrifice by the Achaeans, that she was made immortal by Artemis and that men call her "Ἀρτεμὺν εἰνοδί[ην]. Very little can be done in assigning fragments to the five books of the *Catalogues*. 2481, Fr. 3 belongs to book one but represents no great gain. 2494A combines with 2355 of Part XXI and, like it, gives an unbroken transition from lines preceding the Alcmena ἢ οἶη (= *Aspis*) and so must be assigned to Book IV of the *Catalogue* according to the hypothesis A to the *Aspis*. 2481, Fr. 1(a), Col. iii has an *eta* in the margin which Lobel interprets as indicating 'Line 700.' He also points out that the *beta* opposite line 56 in Merkelbach's H should likewise be understood as meaning 'Line 200' rather than 'Book Two.' It was hardly likely in any case that a book would begin with a dangling relative, as this line does, rather than with an ἢ οἶη. We have one such beginning (ἢ οἶαι) in 2481, Fr. 5 (b), Col. 3, 5, where the otherwise unknown genealogy of the three daughters of Porthaon starts. Other than proper nouns the index shows only three words indicated as new (*διαβάλεω*, *εὐσχεθῆς*, *κρήνω*); a testimony to the standardization of the vocabulary of this body of poetry.

Part XXIX gives us fragments of a work dealing with the lyric poets edited by Page on the basis of preliminary studies by Lobel. The work is preserved in a papyrus of the second century A. D., and while the fragments do not all necessarily belong to the same roll (p. 1) they do belong to one papyrus (p. v), or perhaps for the sake of clarity one had better say one copy of one and the same work.

Page cautiously and judiciously labels the work "Comment on Lyric Poems" for it is not a commentary in any normal sense of the word. It deals with passages from Aleman, Stesichorus, Sappho, and Alcaeus and cites as authorities Aristotle (?), Chamaeleon, Di-caearchus, and Aristarchus while referring to Aeschylus, Homer, Hesiod, Epicharmus, Sophron (?), and quoting Euripides. Only fragments 1, 5, 26, 77, 98 of the total of 176 scraps give any continuous text of which sense can be made, while many of the others are extremely minute. But these five fragments are of considerable interest.

Fr. 1, almost the full length of a column, is concerned, as was 2389, Fr. 9, with Aleman's disputed nationality and seems to favor the theory of his Lydian origin, arguing that the Lacedaemonians still do entrust the choral training of their sons and daughters to foreigners and that Aleman speaks of himself as a barbarian and Lydian, but the text is incomplete and the arguments cannot be followed with certainty.

Fr. 5 quotes two new passages from Aleman and the discussion centers on the age of a choregus named Agesidamus, but I would suspect that the real concern was with Aleman's age or what could be inferred about it.

Fr. 6 has a real surprise. It cites Chamaeleon as authority for the statement that Stesichorus wrote not one but two *Palinodes* and quotes the beginning line of both from him. The general interest of this passage is in Stesichorus' use of variant versions of myths and

his influence on later poets such as Aeschylus in the *Choephoroi* and Euripides in the *Orestes*, for the latter of which parallel passages are quoted.

Alcaeus is the subject of Fr. 77 which begins with a restorable mention of Pittacus and continues with three quotations from Alcaeus apparently marshalled to illustrate the poet's relation with an unknown person for whose death an Amardis had suspected Alcaeus of being responsible. Fr. 93 has to do with Alcaeus' *third* exile and return, referring to the poet's brother Antimenidas in a "battle at the bridge," and ends with tantalizing suggestions of war between Astyages and Alyattes.

Frs. 44, 47, 48, 59 all clearly have to do with Sappho and there are possible references made to known members of her family but the pieces are so scant that nothing useful can be extracted from them.

Matter from Frs. 1, 4, 5, and 26 had already been published by Page in his *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962) as numbers 10 and 13 of Aleman and number 193 and 217 of Stesichorus where the texts vary slightly from the form in which they are here presented. The excellent commentary here given on these difficult pieces provides a welcome supplement to *PMG*.

In thinking about authorship and identity of this work it would be well to bear in mind that it is less "Comment on Lyric Poems" than "Biographical Studies of the Lyric Poets."

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RICHARD MANSFIELD HAYWOOD. *Ancient Greece and the Near East*.

New York, David McKay Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii + 626;
6 maps; 34 photographs. \$7.50.

This history, by a scholar well known to a generation of New York University students, is the first volume of a planned two volume work on the Ancient World. Although Professor Haywood has not indicated the audience for which the book is intended, one could predict that it will be considered by some History or Classics departments as a textbook for the first part of the two semester course in Ancient History. Thus, the sequence of the narrative is familiar: the first 150 pages are devoted to Egypt, Babylon and the Near Eastern empires to Darius. An equal amount of space is allotted to pre-Classical Greece, and one is inclined to commend such careful attention to periods that are often given only perfunctory coverage. Haywood then examines the fifth century in detail, and the fourth with less care; the sixteen pages allowed Alexander are obviously a sprint for the finish and merit no serious discussion.

The author will have no truck with theories of history: no cycles of rally and rout, no bloom nor decay appear here and he has successfully resisted the temptation to gush or deplore when dealing with the Classical period. Readers will also appreciate and will benefit from Haywood's obvious close acquaintance with the primary

sources; very seldom has he fallen back upon the scholarship of others at second or third hand. Of special value is his preoccupation with historical and archaeological method. Attention is called in particular to the first chapter, and a later discussion of the evidence for Cretan and Mycenaean civilization. A fine section shows how the Homeric poems may be used as evidence for Mycenaean society; it may be no more than a technical quibble that this is misleadingly located in a chapter entitled, "The Time Between"—i. e., 1100-800 B. C.

There are some fresh ideas here. For example, the burst of brilliance that goes under the name of the Periclean Age is attributed to the restless energy of the Athenians—an energy that produced not only the glories of the age, but also endless, malicious litigation, heavy handed imperialism, and war. The execution of Socrates is found to be regrettable, but perhaps an unavoidable incident under the circumstances, for which the philosopher must bear part of the blame. The fourth century is not a period of decline, but of progress toward greater individualism and the open society. Whether all will agree or not, these are refreshing and thought-provoking points for discussion. I would, however, disagree with the careless generalization that Euripides' *Trojan Women* "... cannot be called an antiwar play or an indictment of war because there was no such line of thought among the Greeks" (p. 449). One hopes that bright students will rise to the bait at this point.

A good short study of fifth century Athens is probably impossible. In my opinion the author has not risen above the difficulties, nor has he helped himself by using the evidence of Thucydides, Plutarch, Diodorus, and Aristotle as if they were all authorities of equal value. Controversial dates are in several cases presented as if definitely established, as are various intricacies of Athenian politics during the Pentecontaëtia. Among minor criticisms: two contradictory statements are made (pp. 264, 310) about the ostracisms of the 480's (it is made to appear as if the Alemaeonids and the Peisistratids were the same people); and on p. 386, Cnidus has mysteriously become an island.

On the other hand, the author has undertaken the difficult but admirable task of including social and economic surveys at appropriate intervals, surveys that rise far above the dreary catch-alls and "vie quotidienne" dustbins that are too commonly chucked into general histories of this sort. On the position of women, and on the relationship between slaves and free labor, Haywood is a partisan, it would seem, of the late A. W. Gomme.

Typographical errors are extremely rare, but a line of type has dropped out on p. 321. It is sad to report that the photographs are perfunctory, in no discernible order, and contribute nothing. And finally, one cannot help wondering over the inclusion of an inexplicably bad photograph of the Acropolis, of all things. Either Haywood, or the editors, or Jotham Johnson (who took the photo) should have seen to it that such a picture was discarded.

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R. E. H. WESTENDORP BOERMA, ed. P. Vergili Maronis Libellus Qui Inscibitur "Catalepton," Pars Altera. Assen, Van Gorcum & Co., N. V., 1963. Pp. vii + 113; 2 pls.

ARMANDO SALVATORE. Appendix Vergiliana, Epigrammata et Priapea. Testo e interpretazione. Naples, Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1963. Pp. 191. (*Collana di Studi Latini*, IV.)

After some fourteen years Westendorp Boerma offers *pars altera* of his edition of the *Catalepton* (minus *Priapea*) containing poems 9-15. The interval has not been entirely in vain for the author has been able to incorporate some of the more recent scholarship on the *Appendix* and even revise some of his earlier views (e.g. he no longer is confident of Vergilian authorship for 12 [I, p. 130; cf. II, p. 70]; Varius and Tucca cannot be assigned the creation of 15 [I, p. xlix; cf. II, p. 106]).

The arrangement of the work is orderly and systematic, making the result a highly useful reference work. The Latin text of each poem is given with *apparatus criticus*. This is followed by an English translation; complete bibliography, chronologically arranged; general commentary and line-by-line commentary in Latin.

The text is an excellent and conservative one. The author makes every effort to preserve and make sense of the best manuscript readings and avoid the pitfalls of emendation (e.g. 10, line 18; 14, lines 7 and 9). He is, moreover, brave enough to leave hopelessly corrupt passages starred (e.g. 9, lines 32 and 43).

The translation is basically that of Fairclough (Loeb), which was out-dated in 1949 and much more so in 1963. A new translation would certainly have been in order. Fairclough's English text is freely emended (mostly these changes are indicated with italics, but not consistently so, cf. *ep. interp.*, line 1), principally where the author's text or interpretation differs. These retranslations are not always happy. 'Block of buildings' for Fairclough's 'lodging-rooms' (*insula*: 10, line 7) is no improvement and loses the essential meaning of 'apartment house' or 'tenement.' *Iugum tulisse* (10, line 18), the note *ad loc.* notwithstanding, means 'bore the yoke'—the humor of the passage is lost with any other interpretation. Fairclough's 'addle-pate' is better than 'conceited cad' for *putidum caput* (12, line 1), but what is the matter with a quite literal 'stink-head' which is still nicer than the Latin expression (for which a good anglo-saxonism exists)? 'Stomach' (American) is politely changed to 'abdomen' (British) in a very impolite poem (*ventrem*: 13, line 39) but neither of them does justice to the interpretation which the author himself gives in the commentary *ad loc.*

The commentary in good Servian-Donatian tradition is largely a compendium of previous scholarship on the *Catalepton*. The most important question discussed is that of authenticity. The author's arguments are forthright and easy to follow. Although he accepted all the poems of his first volume as genuine (see I, p. xlvii) he finds few of the present group to be Vergilian—only poem 10 for certain, perhaps 11, and doubtfully 12. His greatest debt in the line-by-line exegesis is to the editions of Birt (1910) and Galletier (1920). He is closer to the latter, and often his comments are translations of the French into Latin.

Like Galletier, also, he seems rather uncomfortable discussing the obscene humor of which there is much in the Latin poems (with Galletier's "la décence rend la discussion impossible" [*ad* 13, line 29] cf. the author's "pudoris causa breviter de iis agere mihi liceat" [*ad ibid.*]). This is becoming enough, except for the instances where it interferes with judgment (Birt's highly imaginative interpretations—for which the reviewer carries no brief—cannot be rejected solely for the reason that they are obscene); or naively misses a possible point of humor ("quare Nocturnus herniosus fieret filiam Atilii in matrimonium ducendo? Hernia enim vitium corporis est, quo senes quoque, immo infantes puerique laborant, non nimis libidinosi," p. 67); or shows a lack of appreciation for poetry of this type ("id obscenissimum esse et vero poeta indignum," p. 77).

There are numerous misprints, none of which is disastrous (does the author really want 'antiquos' in 13, line 5?), and the font of the italic f is consistently broken.

Finally, one wonders why it was necessary to publish this work in separate parts, making reference back and forth a chore. The two slender volumes might well be joined in a subsequent edition. As the author himself remarks about the original publication of the collection which he ascribes to the early first century A. D.: "Catalepton carmina in unum volumen describenda!"

The same inconvenience attends the use of Salvatore's work. Although one cover embraces an exegesis of the poems of the *Catalepton*, including *Priapea*, one must consult another volume for the text. The text is that prepared by Salvatore and appearing in the second volume of his edition of the *Appendix* for the "Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum" (Turin, 1960), a text which has been for the most part well received (but cf. *C. R.*, XII [1962], pp. 146-8).

The ultra-systematic presentation of Westendorp Boerma is here replaced by a style which is more discursive. Thus, though it can less readily be consulted on specific points as a reference work, it is eminently more readable. It is, moreover, enhanced by having a general thesis to advance. From a detailed examination verse by verse of the texts of these poems and further from an examination of their inspiratory motives and by bringing to bear certain "elementi culturali," Salvatore claims to find revealed in their author a linguistic personality and a human personality that is individual. He thus concludes, against the weight of some impressive scholarly opinion (notably Birt, Galletier, and now Westendorp Boerma), that the author of the entire group (including *Priapea*) is one, and further that there is no reason for not equating this author with Vergil.

Although the problem, as I think Salvatore would be the first to admit, is probably not capable of a resolution in terms of proof positive, his arguments are cogently made and vigorously supported. It is, at any rate, refreshing to have a unitarian view restated, and it strikes the reviewer also that the burden of proof rests rather with those who would reject the authenticity of these poems.

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BENGT ALEXANDERSON. Die hippokratische Schrift Prognostikon: Überlieferung und Text. Göteborg, Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1963. Pp. 250. (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, XVII.)

Prognostic is one of the most important books of the Hippocratic Corpus. In its opening part, the book formulates the social aim of Hippocratic prognosis: to gain the patient's confidence by knowing and revealing his past, present, and future condition. The excellence of its clinical observations is attested by the fact that we still speak of the "Hippocratic face," the face of a dying man as described in this book. The exact age and the authorship of the writing are not known. Common authorship of *Prognostic* and *Epidemics* I and III is refuted by Alexanderson; nevertheless, the book belongs to the stratum of older works in the Corpus. The esteem in which it was held is reflected in its influence on other books of the Corpus and on Celsus and in the commentaries of Galen and of Stephanus; it accounts for the existence of at least two Latin versions made in late antiquity, an Arabic version of which five MSS are still extant, and the presence of about sixty Greek manuscripts containing the text, as well as a fragment in the Papyrus of Antinopolis (see pp. 33 ff. and 68). During the Middle Ages a Latin translation, from the Arabic as Alexanderson believes and probably by Constantinus of Africa, was included in the *Articella*, the early scholastic collection of medical texts; Galen's commentary too was translated into Latin as well as into Hebrew (pp. 170-3). The series of printed Greek editions since the Renaissance begins with the Aldina of 1526 of the *Opera omnia*, makes significant advances with Littré (1840) and Kühlewein (1894), and ends with W. H. S. Jones' edition in the Loeb Classical Library (1923).

Alexanderson subjects the sources for the text of *Prognostic*—indirect, Greek manuscripts, and translations—to a detailed scrutiny. The two ancient Latin translations and the Arabic translation are utilized. Of the first of the Latin versions, he even includes an edition. Consideration of the Arabic translations of Hippocratic works has become especially important since Pfaff showed that for a long time the Greek tradition rested mainly on the editions of Hippocratic works by Artemidoros Kapiton and Dioskurides. Later on, particularly after the rise of the minuscule, the Galenic commentaries exerted an increasing influence. Regarding *Prognostic*, however, Alexanderson registers little success in ascertaining traces of the editions of Artemidoros and Dioskurides. Nevertheless, "nothing contradicts the assumption that V and MI are close to the text of Artemidoros" (p. 32). V (Vat. gr. 276, s. XII) represents a group of manuscripts and so does M (Marcianus gr. 269, s. XI); I is the Paris. gr. 2140, s. XII-XIII. M and I show a close, though not quite clear, relationship (see pp. 102 and 170 on the one hand, but note 141 on the other). The groups V and MI have a common archetype, probably the collection on which the pinax in V was based. Additions to the text crept in very early, and the deterioration progressed during the Byzantine period. Alexanderson arrives at the conclusion that every MS, Greek, Latin, and Arabic, abounds in mistakes; V, Galen, and the Latin and Arabic transla-

tions are particularly valuable; every passage must be judged by itself (p. 178).

Alexanderson's investigation culminates in a new edition of the Greek text, followed by "Testimonia and Similia" (pp. 232-9). Prepared on a broader and more critical basis, this edition is likely to supersede its predecessors, from which it differs in a great many instances. It does not change our understanding of *Prognostic* as a whole, but it does occasionally change the understanding of important passages. For instance, reading ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον πλευρὸν (Litttré, p. 152, 19) instead of ε. τ. ὑγιαῖνον π. removes the major difficulty in the second part of ch. 16, of which Jones (Loeb ed., p. 35, n.) rightly complained. But in spite of great circumspection, a good many passages remain debatable. Alexanderson may be right in his claim that the passages he lists on pp. 43-5 were not originally in Galen's text, but their general removal from the edition seems challengeable. This is especially so where the passages occur in the entire MS tradition and in the Latin and Arabic translations, where they can be traced in other Hippocratic writings and in Celsus, and where they make good sense. For instance, all this is the case with Litttré, p. 138, 3-6 where ἔστιν—μέρος (see Alexanderson, pp. 44 and 207) explains the meaning of ποικίλα.

The early Latin translations offer an interesting example of the difficulty of distinguishing between gloss and intentional rendering. Lat 2 (i. e. the second of the two ancient translations) has *comitiale* for τ. θεῖον. Alexanderson considers this a gloss. This assumption harmonizes well with an old scholium reading θεῖον τινές φασι τὴν ἱερὰν νόσον, etc., which Alexanderson (p. 16) considers as belonging to *Prognostic*. But it seems equally possible that the translator himself interpreted τ. θ. as referring to the *morbus comitialis*. For, peculiarly enough, the first of the Latin translations has *quid ex mundi ratione* (p. 135, 17) instead of *quid divini* (or *quid divinum*) which one might expect, and the Latin translation of the *Articella* has *aliquid celeste* which Alexanderson (p. 171) considers the equivalent of the Arabic *samāwiyun*. In short, all translators seem to have tried to interpret this expression which is still debated by modern scholars.

Alexanderson's book is an important contribution to the mounting number of monographs investigating the tradition of individual Hippocratic writings whose importance is not limited to the obvious task of elucidating the textual history of the respective treatise. Together, they promise to give a clearer picture of the compilation and the vicissitudes of the Hippocratic Corpus as a whole.

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GIUSTO MONACO. Paragoni burleschi degli antichi. Palermo, Palumbo, 1963. Pp. 99. L. 1,600. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna*.)

In this little monograph, Professor Monaco collects and studies a number of direct comparisons, in which one character, speaking directly to another, says (in effect); "You are like so-and so," or,

"You have the face (or the appearance) of so-and-so." As early illustrations, Monaco cites Odysseus' address to Nausicaa in Z, 151-2: "I liken you to Artemis . . . in form and stature and nature," and the playful verses of one of Sappho's wedding songs (127 D):

To what, dear bridegroom, shall I compare thee?
To a slender shoot I can best compare thee.

Both these comparisons are meant to be complimentary, but more frequent and popular were comparisons with a jesting tone and often an offensive intention; these developed easily into caricature and mockery. The type is vaguely recognized and is discussed by various ancient writers on rhetoric: e.g., Aristotle, *Rhet.*, III, 4; Aristides (?), *Techne* (p. 493 W); in Greek, it is called *εἰκόν* and especially *εἰκασμός*. Noteworthy is the definition in Hesychius: *εἰκάζειν· σκώπτειν, κτλ.*

From the examples studied, Monaco is able to show clearly that such jesting comparisons are of popular origin, and appear quite early in Greek society; they are often improvised, and usually refer to physical appearance; as they develop, they tend to move from comparisons of outward appearance and activity to inner qualities associated with certain animals (as in Semonides' famous satire on women). Comparisons to animals and to marine-life are frequent. Furthermore, such jests were common at dinner-parties, and were often delivered in amoebaeon fashion: i. e., a comparison offered by speaker A, followed by a *riposte* by speaker B. In this connection, most instructive is the description of Philocleon's insulting and inappropriate rejoinders hurled at the guests of the dinner-party to which his son had taken him (Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1308 ff.).

The major part of the work is devoted to explaining and discussing at some length about a hundred Greek examples, from Homer to the Palatine Anthology. The earlier examples are, by the way, more witty and pungent. Aristophanes provides the largest number of examples from any single author—as might be expected from an author who constantly represents or parodies scenes from daily life. A final chapter discusses the use (or rather, the lack of use) of such *eikasmoi* in the Roman world. Apparently the Romans made little use of such direct, insulting comparisons: for example, they are hardly found at all in Plautus, despite many scenes where characters exchange abuse or make insulting remarks about another character. The most exact parallel is found in Horace, *S.*, I, 5, 56 f., in the slanging match between the two buffoons at Capua, during the Journey to Brundisium (a passage which perhaps derives from Lucilius). Cicero in *De Oratore* (I, 265-6) discusses jests *ex similitudine*, with an example close to the Greek type; but the orators seem to have avoided such witticisms, perhaps as too vulgar. The book concludes with a classified list of the *paragoni* ("Comparisons with animals," "Comparisons with plants and fruits," etc.), and with indices of passages and of modern authors cited in the text.

I have little criticism to offer of this rather charming little monograph. Perhaps one might say that not all the passages treated are clearly of the type under consideration; and I found some of the explanations a bit foggy. Occasionally the evidence is weak: e.g., there is nothing in the text of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes to

suggest that the "youths exchanging taunts at banquets" were actually using this particular form of insult. On the whole, the work is a pleasant and very readable account of an admittedly minor topic, but one of interest to students of comic elements in the literature of Greece and Rome.

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COSMO ALEXANDER GORDON. A Bibliography of Lucretius. London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962. Pp. 319; frontispiece; 32 pls. (*The Soho Bibliographies*, XII.)

This is a delightful volume. To forestall any misconceptions to which the title might give rise, it should be noted that it does not include scholarly books and articles about the *De Rerum Natura*; it is rather a bibliography of all printed versions. Following the chronological list of editions of all sorts, the material is presented in 7 chapters, each with introduction, list, and descriptive notes under the following categories: editions of text only, annotated and pocket editions, translations, illustrated editions, selections and extracts (in translation), and "ghosts." We are given the location of early and rare copies, the dates of reprints, various incidental descriptive details. There are 32 excellent plates in black and white, in addition to the fine frontispiece in color from the first page of a beautiful illuminated manuscript. Appendix I summarizes with brief descriptions the manuscripts leading to the first printing of the poem around 1473; Appendix II has informative accounts of some of the imitations of the poem between the 16th and 18th centuries. There is also an index.

The author notes in his introduction that "a main object of the present work is to give some sort of *fortuna* of Lucretius in print." This he has indeed achieved, along with a wealth of items of interest. Thus one learns that the first translation of the complete work in English was that of a "Puritan blue-stockings," Lucy Hutchinson, in the mid 17th century, that there have been translations in 22 languages, and 8 in Russian from 1913; we are told something of the opposing views of theologians on the perils to the soul of the first Italian version in 1717. For the hundred years before 1962, 357 publications are cited, including only two years for which no edition of any sort is listed. Attractive in its format, it is a book that should prove rewarding to all students of Lucretius.

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HANS DOHM. Mageiros. Die Rolle des Kochs in der griechisch-römischen Komödie. München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1964. Pp. xv + 294. DM. 38. (*Zetemata*, 32.)

Dohm begins with a sketch of the development of the cook's profession in ancient Greece, stressing its connection with religious

sacrifice. He records references to cooks, cookery, and sacrifice in Epicharmus and Aristophanes, arguing that the sausage-seller in the *Knights* was a cook, and listing references in Old Comedy to preparation of food, catalogues of menus and kitchenware, accounts of the Land of Cockaigne, mentions of cookbooks, speeches by cooks. The cook's role was not fully developed, he finds, until Middle Comedy. Here we find the cook, distinguished by apron and knife (*mageiros* and *machaira* are related words), product of an apprenticeship (involving, according to Dohm, astrology, geometry, architecture, medicine, and military strategy), a free man hired for such special occasions as weddings, sacrifices, wakes, and symposia. Cook-roles are either episodic (monologue, dialogue between cooks, dialogue between cook and master), or integrated with the plot. Dohm believes the episodic roles developed chronologically along with Middle and New Comedy, between 370 and 270 B. C. He analyzes various episodic cook-roles (of which Plautus' *Pseudolus* provides the best-known example), emphasizing the cook as thief, and as mocker of intellectual pursuits: philosophy, medicine, music, architecture, strategy, and tactics. Among integrated roles, the most extended is that of Sikon in the *Dyskolos*, inquisitive, cowardly, bullying, loud-mouthed, self-important over his role as sacrificer. Dohm is no admirer of the integrated cook-roles in Plautus' *Mercator*, *Menaechmi*, *Miles*, *Casina*, and *Curculio*. A final chapter analyzes the cook-roles in Molière and Goldoni, and finds them disappointing, and not classically inspired.

Dohm's method is open to question. (1) He sets up a chronologically developing typology without any really firm evidence for dating the comedies he uses. (2) He sets up rigid categories on fragmentary evidence, nearly all of it from Athenaeus, though he himself admits that if all we had from the *Dyskolos* were the fragments that Athenaeus cites, we should suppose the cook-role there to be episodic, not integrated. (3) Without apology, he does not use the evidence from Terence at all, though *Adelphoe*, 412-31, for instance, is a particularly choice example of a cook-type mocking intellectuals. Finally, the treatment is humorless, with no attempt to make a connection between the subject and Greek literature or life.

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
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LUCAN AND THE DECLAMATION SCHOOLS.¹

Interest in the practice of declamation was very much a part of Lucan's family heritage. His paternal grandfather, the elder Seneca, a man of phenomenal memory and sound critical sense, had, during prolonged residence at Rome, listened to all the important declaimers, and many of the less important, in the times of Augustus and Tiberius.² His three sons, Novatus, Seneca the philosopher, and Annaeus Mela, Lucan's father, inherited this interest; not only did they sometimes take their father along with them to hear contemporary speakers,³ but they also desired him to put on record his reminiscences of earlier declaimers, whom they had not heard. It was to meet this request that Seneca, towards the end of a long life, composed his *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae*.⁴ The eldest son, Novatus, was adopted after the old man's death by Junius Gallio, whose name he took, and this was the Gallio from whose declamations excerpts are often quoted in the elder Seneca's work. Finally,

¹ The present article is a development of the paper which I read at the Fourth International Congress of Classical Studies at Philadelphia in August, 1964.

² Cf. *Contr.*, I, *Praef.* 11. Appreciative studies of the elder Seneca may be found in J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of the Silver Age* (3rd ed. by A. M. Duff [London, 1964]) pp. 37 ff., and W. A. Edward's Introduction to his edition of the *Suasoriae* (Cambridge, 1928). H. J. Müller's text (Vienna, 1887) is now again available (Hildesheim, 1963); H. Bornecque's edition with Fr. trans. and notes, remains useful (Paris,² 1932).

³ *Contr.*, X, *Praef.* 2, *cum illum mecum audieritis*; 9, *cum vos me illo perduxissetis*.

⁴ *Contr.*, I, *Praef. init.*

Lucan's mother's father, Acilius Lucanus, from whom he derived his own name, had been a noted orator of Corduba.⁵ Naturally, therefore, in view of this background, the Senecan family and their friends must have watched young Lucan's oratorical progress with the most lively interest. He did not belie their expectations, for, even before he left school, according to his biographer, Vacca, *declamavit et graece et latine cum magna admiratione audientiae*.

Vacca lists among the minor works of Lucan extant in his day two speeches concerning a certain Octavius Sagitta.⁶ As one of these was written in defence of Sagitta and the other against him, it has generally been assumed, with reason, that they were declamation-pieces. They were, however, based upon a genuine court-case, for a tribune of that name was tried for murder and condemned in 58 A.D. The full and rather sordid details are given by Tacitus in *Annals*, XIII, 44, and these particulars remind us of one of the more sensational adultery and murder cases included in the elder Seneca's *Controversiae* (cf. VII, 5). The case would certainly have made a good declamatory subject. Lucan would be between 18 and 19 at the time of the trial; whether he composed the speeches then or later, we do not know, but they seem to point to his continuing interest in declamation in adult years.⁷ In any case, as Lucan was only 25 when his participation in the Pisonian Conspiracy against Nero cost him his life, and his epic, though still unfinished, had been partially published some time before, the memories of the declamatory exercises must have remained very fresh in his mind.

When Lucan chose for the subject of his *magnum opus* the Civil War, beginning with the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, he found himself dealing with material which had

⁵ *Vita Lucani*, generally attributed to Vacca, a grammarian of uncertain date.

⁶ Cf. H. Genthe, *De M. Annaei Lucani Vita et Scriptis* (Diss., Berlin, 1859), pp. 66-7; Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, II, p. 390.

⁷ For declamations related to closely contemporary events, cf. the *πολιτικά θέματα* declaimed by Cicero in 49 B.C. (*Ad Att.*, IX, 4). O. Schönberger, "Ein Quellenproblem bei Tacitus und Lucan's Deklamation über Octavius Sagitta" (*Historia*, XII [1963], pp. 500-9) argues that Lucan was motivated by hostility to Nero and had the Nero-Poppaea-Otho affair in mind; this I doubt—why, then, should Lucan have declaimed for Sagitta as well as against him?

already proved popular for declamation in prose. Pompey, Caesar, Cato, Brutus, and Cicero had long since provided subjects for numerous exercises, particularly *suasoriae*, some of which remained in fashion long after Lucan's day.⁸ But although we know the titles of some of these exercises, mainly from Quintilian, we do not possess the fully-developed declamations. Two of the *Suasoriae* (6 and 7), and one of the *Controversiae* (VII, 2) of the elder Seneca are concerned with the relations between Cicero and Antony, but even these contain only excerpts from individual speeches; others have a general Civil War setting (*Exc. Contr.*, IV, 8; *Contr.*, X, 3). But if we wish to read at any rate a few sentences of declamatory prose on the subject of the Civil War itself, we cannot do better than turn to the first exercise of the second book of the *Controversiae* (§ 10), where there is an extract from a speech of Fabianus, the distinguished Augustan declaimer, who later turned to philosophy and became the teacher of the younger Seneca.⁹ This is how he begins: "Ecce instructi exercitus saepe civium cognatorumque conserturi manus constiterunt et colles equis virisque utrimque complentur, et subinde omnis regio trucidatorum corporibus consternitur." This high-flown alliterative sentence is soon followed by indignant rhetorical questions: "Quae causa hominem adversus hominem in facinus coegit? . . . Quae tanta vos pestis, cum una stirps idemque sanguis sitis, quaeve furiae in mutuum sanguinem egere?"¹⁰ The general tone, the expostulation at the madness and wickedness of internecine strife, is very like the opening of Lucan's poem, cf. especially line 8: "Quis furor, o cives, quae tanta licentia ferri?"¹¹ One has

⁸ See R. Kohl, *De scholasticarum declamationum argumentis ex historia petitis* (Diss., Paderborn, 1915), pp. 101-7, and the recent work of Paul Jal, *La guerre civile à Rome, Étude littéraire et morale* (Paris, 1963), pp. 299 ff.

⁹ On Fabianus, cf. H. Bornecque, *Les déclamations et les déclamateurs d'après Sénèque le père* (Lille, 1902), pp. 185-6.

¹⁰ Horace's 7th Epode, especially 11-14, may have provided the inspiration here: cf. Fabianus' "nam neque feris inter se bella sunt . . ." with Horace's "neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus | numquam nisi in dispar feris," and Fabianus' "furiae" with Horace's "furor." On the application of this word to civil strife, see now Jal, *op. cit.*, pp. 421 ff.; cf. *Suas.*, VI, 6, "vidimus furentia toto orbe civilia arma."

¹¹ Housman's text; I. Cazzaniga, *Problemi intorno alla Farsaglia* (Milan, 1955) and P. Willeumier—H. Le Bonniec in their edn. of

only to imagine the passage of Fabianus delivered with energy and in dramatic fashion to form some idea of what a declamation on the Civil War sounded like; and this is the tone of Lucan throughout the poem. Lucan was described by Quintilian (X, 1, 90) as *ardens et concitatus*—"passionate and impetuous"—and it is interesting to find that the elder Seneca had already associated these very words with the style of declamation. Speaking of Cassius Severus in *Contr.*, III, *Praef.* 7, he says: *omnia ergo habebat, quae illum, ut bene declamaret, instruerent . . . genus dicendi non remissum aut languidum, sed ardens et concitatum.*

Quintilian, in this celebrated criticism, also declared Lucan to be *sententiis clarissimus*. But what did he mean by *sententiae*? Did he mean only, as W. Peterson assumes in his note on the phrase, those pithy generalisations on human life and conduct which the Greeks called *γνώμαι*? Aristotle (*Rhet.*, II, 21) had said that the *γνώμη* was concerned *ὅ . . . περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστων . . . ἀλλὰ καθόλου*, and the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (IV, 17, 24) similarly defined *sententia* as *oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit*. Applying this interpretation to Lucan, W. E. Heitland, in his Introduction to Haskins' edition of Lucan, was able to find less than forty *sententiae* of this kind in the whole poem, and indeed, there are not very many more than that number.¹² But it is my purpose to show that the widely accepted interpretation of *sententia* as merely a general observation is misleading. Certainly, in declamation, it could be of that nature; but it could also be something quite different, for the practice of declamation had caused a very considerable extension in the use of the term.

The main characteristic of the general reflection, the *γνώμη* proper, was that it could easily be detached from its immediate context and could stand on its own as a useful piece of moral advice or social observation. So it was that Greek primary teachers detached numerous *γνώμαι* from the plays of Menander for children to copy out and learn by heart.¹³ The Romans fol-

Book I (Paris, 1962) revert to the alternative punctuation, joining 8-9; but this does not affect the parallel.

¹² Add to his list on pp. lxvi-lxvii: I, 510-11; IV, 487; V, 29-30 (a good motto for governments in exile); 343; 727-8; VIII, 282.

¹³ Cf. H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris⁶, 1960), p. 218.

lowed suit, and detached hundreds of single-line maxims from the mimes of Publilius Syrus, which they used for a similar purpose.¹⁴ But the *sententiae* of the declaimers are not as a rule of this type; they are usually brief pointed comments which have a specific reference to the exercise in question. If detached, they would generally be meaningless without explanation; although they might sometimes become popular and be imitated in a different context, they were not universal truths. The competitive element in the declamations encouraged originality and improvement on the *sententiae* of previous speakers; to speak merely in generalisations would have made the exercise flat and uninteresting.¹⁵ For instance, in the *suasoria* in which Alexander, at the limits of his Eastern conquests, is supposed to deliberate whether he should embark on the Ocean, only two of the *sententiae* given by Seneca are generalisations: "magni pectoris est inter secunda moderatio" and "quidquid ad summum pervenit incremento non relinquit locum" (§ 3). These are trite enough; but how much more neat are such remarks as "non quaerimus orbem, sed amittimus" (§ 2). In the Senecan declamations as a whole, we may generally find a few gnomic *sententiae* in an exercise, but they are far outnumbered by the specific type.¹⁶

Quintilian was fully aware that a different kind of *sententia* was produced when a general reflection was adapted to apply to a particular individual, or when an apt comment was coined to meet special circumstances. The former he calls *translatio a communi ad proprium* (VIII, 5, 6); the latter belongs to what he calls the more modern class of *sententiae* (VIII, 5, 15, "iam haec *magis nova* sententiarum genera . . .), such as those which depend on surprise, or allusiveness, for their effect. It is noteworthy that quite a number of the examples which he gives here are drawn from declamations;¹⁷ but, whatever their source, they all refer to specific individuals or circumstances. For in-

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. Hieron., *Ep.*, 107, 8, and J. W. and A. M. Duff's *Minor Latin Poets* (Loeb Classical Library), p. 5.

¹⁵ Cf. my *Roman Declamation in the late Republic and early Empire* (Liverpool U. P. and California U. P., 1949), p. 55.

¹⁶ Cf. the interesting distinction drawn between the "aphorism" and the "epigram" by W. H. Auden and Louis Kronenberger in *The Faber Book of Aphorisms* (London, 1964), Foreword.

¹⁷ Viz. VIII, 5, 20, 22, 23, 24, 31.

stance, he quotes (VIII, 5, 18) as an example of a neat, antithetical *sententia* a remark made by Cicero in a letter to Atticus (VIII, 7, 2) concerning Caesar's advance on Rome and Pompey's flight: "habeo quem *fugiam*; quem *sequar* non habeo."¹⁸ When, therefore, we find that Lucan (II, 575) makes Pompey, in a boastful speech to his troops, apostrophise Caesar thus: "heu demens! non te *fugiunt*, me cuncta *sequuntur*," we must recognise that this is to be classed as a *sententia*. In view of Quintilian's treatment of the subject in VIII, 5, it seems at least probable that he had both gnomic and non-gnomic types in mind in his criticism of Lucan.¹⁹

Not infrequently, the expression of the *sententia* gains from the skilful use of antithesis.²⁰ Of gnomic types, the following may serve as examples: "arma tenenti | omnia *dat*, qui iusta *negat*" (I, 348-9); "o *faciles dare* summa deos, eademque *tueri* | *difficiles*!" (I, 510-11); "*servat* multos fortuna *nocentes* | et tantum *miseris irasci* numina possunt" (III, 448-9). Of non-gnomic types we have, for instance, the remark of Brutus to Cato, urging him not to incur guilt by taking sides in the war: "*accipient alios, facient te* bella *nocentem*" (II, 259). Similarly, Caesar, rejecting the suggestion of the besieged Massiliots that he should call off the siege and enter their city in person, says: "iam non *excludere* tantum, | *inclusisse* volunt" (III, 368-9)—a half-jesting *sententia* depending for its point on a contrast of prepositions with the same verb, a favourite device of Cicero adopted by the declaimers.²¹ But the antithetical *sententia* may also fail miserably when there is no basic, underlying contrast, but merely a superficial, or superfluous, contrast of words. What could be weaker than for Caesar to say, reproaching Antony for not crossing from Brundisium: "ignave, *venire* | te Caesar, non

¹⁸ Cf. VI, 3, 109; Macrobius, II, 3, 7 (as a witticism). Cicero's text gives the order "quem *fugiam* habeo."

¹⁹ P. Lejay in the Introduction to his edition of Book I (Paris, 1894), pp. lx-lxi, has an excellent paragraph distinguishing the two types in Lucan; cf. also W. S. Watt's article "sententia" in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. O. A. W. Dilke, in his revision of Postgate's edition of Book VII (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 37-3, follows Heitland, but with reservations (cf. p. 37, n. 3).

²⁰ Cf. the classification of Juvenal's *sententiae* by J. De Decker, *Juvenalis Declamans* (Ghent, 1912), pp. 154 ff.

²¹ For Cicero, see H. Holst, *Die Wortspiele in Ciceros Reden* (Oslo, 1925), pp. 63 ff.; for the declaimers, cf. *Roman Declamation*, p. 67.

ire iubet" (V, 487-8); or for the much-wounded Scaeva to soliloquise: "*non eget ingestis sed vulsis pectore telis*" (VI, 232)? Some of the declaimers also fell into this error, usually to be censured by the elder Seneca with the remark *inepte dixit*. . . . But such lapses are not frequent in Lucan.²²

One of the favourite devices of the declaimers, in their efforts to arrest the attention of their listeners, was the use of paradox. Their *sententiae* often acquired an added piquancy from the fact that they suggested a surprising, or pathetic, or outrageous reversal of normal circumstances. In *Contr.*, I, 8, the father of a thrice-brave hero disinherits his son for insisting on entering a fourth campaign; in defence of his action he is made to say: "*miserrimus pater iam non viderem filium, nisi abdicarem*" (§ 1), and to complain: "*fugit me filius, et quidem ad hostem*." Flight to an enemy is paradoxical, and Lucan, describing the panic-stricken retreat of the senate, says, similarly, that they flee into war: "*sic urbe relictâ, | in bellum fugitur*" (I, 503-4). In *Contr.*, VII, 1, a father of two sons condemns one of them on a charge of attempted parricide, and orders the other son to inflict the traditional punishment; instead, he sets his brother adrift in an open boat. Defending his action, he claims (15): "*dimisi a portu naufragum*" (cf. 4, "*naufragus a litore emititur*" and *Exc.*, VIII, 6, 1, "*naufragus plus de litore queror*"). This is the kind of paradox that Lucan uses when he says of the Nasamones, a tribe dwelling near the treacherous Syrtis, that their only commerce with the outside world is by shipwrecks: "*sic cum toto commercia mundo | naufragiis Nasamones habent*" (IX, 443-4). Then again, speaking of Caesar, he exclaims that he lost a real triumph by extending his conquests: "*perdidit o qualem vincendo plura triumphum!*" (III, 79), which is paradoxical in much the same way as the declamatory *sententia* concerning Alexander: "*orbem, quem non novi, quaero, quem vici relinquo*" (*Suas.*, 1, 3). Exaggeration may also be brought in, as when the appeal is to the feeling of horror aroused by civil war, in such examples as "*civilia bella | gesturi metuunt ne non cum sanguine vincant*" and "*pugnare ducem quam vincere malunt*" (VII, 95-6 and 109).

²² Heitland, pp. lxxix-lxxx gives a list of instances of antithesis "of very varying merit," but it includes some quite effective *sententiae*. Word-repetition may also be employed; cf. II, 276-7, "*nimum placet ipse Catoni, | si bellum civile placet*."

But although both the declaimers and the poet were fond of paradox, we should not invariably attribute *sententiae* of this type to immediate declamatory influence. Sometimes previous writers, especially the younger Seneca, had prepared the way. For instance, Lucan gives us the gnomic *sententia*: "multos in summa pericula misit | venturi timor ipse mali" (VII, 104-5); but Seneca had already expressed the identical sentiment thus: "non aliquoties. . . mortis timor etiam inertissimos excitavit in proelium?" (*De Ira*, I, 13, 4). The origins of a paradox may go still further back. Laberius, in a well-known line, aimed at Caesar, had said: "necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent,"²³ and Seneca (*Oed.*, 705-6) followed suit: "qui sceptrum duro saevus imperio regit | timet timentes." The idea appealed to Lucan, who extended its application in such lines as: "usque adeone times quem tu facis ipse timendum?" (IV, 185), and "quis timor, ignavi, metuentes cernere manes?" (VI, 666). Anyone may coin a paradox, but in the Silver Age declamatory practice, combined perhaps with Stoic interest, made it something of a cult. Some of Juvenal's most successful *sententiae* are of this type, and we could not ask for a better example than: "quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?" (II, 24).²⁴

An important feature of Lucan's use of the *sententia*, which appears to have been quite overlooked, is his skill in placing it at the terminal point of a passage. It is not surprising that this "terminal *sententia*," if I may coin the phrase, is especially common in his speeches, for it was at the end that the declaimer particularly hoped to win applause. This is the practice which Quintilian tells us was increasingly common among the orators of his day, and to which he alludes when he says that *sententiae* are called *lumina, praecipueque in clausulis posita* (VIII, 5, 2). The Loeb translator is extremely misleading in his rendering of *clausula* as "the close of the period" in this chapter; Quintilian is not here speaking of the concluding cadences of an individual sentence (though these did often contain a "point"), but of the placing of *sententiae* at the end of entire passages.²⁵ Thus, in

²³ Macrobius, II, 7, 4-5. Cf. Cicero, *De Off.*, II, 7, 24.

²⁴ De Decker, *op. cit.*, pp. 158 ff., misses this obvious example.

²⁵ Cf. Bernd-Reiner Voss, *Der pointierte Stil des Tacitus* (Münster, 1963), pp. 101 ff. (the point at the sentence-end) and 106 ff. (the point concluding an entire passage). Tac., *Dial.*, 22, 3, *pauci sensus . . . cum*

VIII, 5, 11, he speaks of an *enthymema* as *addita in clausula*, and in VIII, 5, 13, he says that the modern idea of the *clausula* is *ut omnis locus, omnis sensus in fine sermonis feriat aurem*. In the Senecan declamations, which are not complete speeches, we cannot generally discover which of the numerous *sententiae* were terminal in this sense; but the practice must already have been in vogue. There are many of these terminal *sententiae* in Lucan's speeches. They are occasionally of the gnomic type; at VIII, 452-3 Lentulus ends his speech thus: "nil pudet adsueto sceptris; mitissima sors est | regnorum sub rege novo," and at VIII, 534-5, Pothinus concludes: "adversis non desse decet, sed laeta secutos; | nulla fides umquam miseros elegit amicos." So Cotta ends a brief speech at III, 152 with the line: "non sibi, sed domino gravis est, quae servit, egestas." But more usually they are specialised; they make a neat summing-up of the situation, or present a striking comment on what has preceded, and they are often highly rhetorical in form. A good example is found in the powerful short *suasoria* which Curio addresses to Caesar in Book I, urging him to hurry on with the war; he ends thus (290-1): "*partiri non potes orbem, | solus habere potes*," which is very neat and effective.²⁶ Then again, at IV, 362, Afranius, surrendering his defeated troops to Caesar, asks that they may be released from further service, and ends: "hoc petimus, *victos ne tecum vincere cogas*." There is a touch of paradox again in the idea that beaten troops might be used to conquer, but the word play on the active and passive of *vinco* was a common rhetorical device which Lucan rather liked.²⁷

quodam lumine terminantur refers to the former category; I would instance Tac., *Agric.*, 21, "ut qui modo linguam Romanam abnuebant, *eloquentiam concupiscerent*" (paradox!). But I do not agree with Voss (p. 102, n. 74) that Quint., VIII, 5, 2 refers to this; Q. must mean the latter group. Karl Barwick, *Martial und die zeitgenössische Rhetorik* (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1959), p. 18, takes my view. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s.v. *clausula* places some of the references in Quint., VIII, 5 under *sensu non tecnico* (= *extrema pars*), others under *sensu tecnico* (= *maxime in fine periodi*), but this does not appear to me quite satisfactory.

²⁶ Cf. Juv., III, 121-2, "qui gentis vitio numquam *partitur* amicum, | *solus habet*."

²⁷ Already found, of course, in Cicero (e.g. *Ad Att.*, VIII, 7, 2, "malle . . . cum Pompeio vinci quam cum istis vincere") and Sallust

It occurs again in a terminal speech-*sententia* at VIII, 237-8: "Pompeio *vincite*, Parthi, | *vinci* Roma volet," and the antithesis *victus*) (*victor* is similar at VII, 122-3: "omne malum *victi*, quod sors feret ultima rerum, | omne nefas *victoris* erit." At II, 322-3 Cato concludes his speech thus: "ideo me milite *vincat*, | ne sibi se *vicisse* putet." Finally, paradox once more may be responsible for the effect of a terminal speech-*sententia*, as when it is said that nothing is "safer" than war, or "safer" than Pharsalia; cf. III, 370-2, "dabitis poenas pro pace petita, | et nihil esse meo discetis *tutius* aevo | quam duce me *bellum*," and VI, 819-20, "o miseranda domus, toto nil orbe videbis | *tutius Emathia*." The same idea appears, in a milder form, in *Contr.*, VII, 8, 2: "ita apud vos, iudices, *tutius* est *peccare* quam erubescere?"

Lucan is fond of using the terminal *sententia* not only at the end of speeches, but also at the end of sections of his narrative. The famous "*victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni*" (I, 128), a double antithesis, is terminal and brilliantly sums up the rival claims of Caesar and Pompey to have the better cause. Again, at II, 708, after his account of Pompey's escape from Brundisium, to the annoyance of Caesar's troops, he concludes with the comment: "heu pudor! *exigua* est fugiens victoria *Magnus*"—the effect of which is heightened by the rather clever word-play on *exigua* and the proper name *Magnus*. Equally rhetorical is his conclusion of the introductory passage of Book V (13-14): "docuit populos venerabilis ordo | non *Magni partes* sed *Magnum in partibus* esse"—an example of the figure ἀντιμεταβολή, being based on case-changes of the same noun.²⁸ Lucan concludes his account of Caesar's taking of the Roman treasure with the striking reflection: "pauperiorque fuit tum primum Caesare Roma" (III, 168). Antithesis, together with double use of the same verb, produces an effective climax to his moralising on the effects of Pharsalia: "post proelia natis | si *dominum*, Fortuna, *dabas*, et *bella dedisses*" (VII, 645-6). Finally, the famous dictum contrasting Curio with other powerful and unscrupulous leaders: "*emere omnes, hic vendidit*

(e.g. *Jug.*, 42, 3, "sed bono *vinci* satius est quam malo more iniuriam *vincere*").

²⁸ Cf. *Roman Declamation*, p. 154. (The contrasted words may also be verbs; cf. Quint., IX, 3, 85, "non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo.")

Urbem" (IV, 824) is chiasmic in form, effectively brief, terminal to the passage, and concludes the book.

Lastly—and this also is declamatory—there is the use of the terminal *sententia* to close a description. Again and again, in the Senecan declamations, we read such phrases as *cum descripsisset . . . adiecit sententiam*.²⁹ This was evidently felt to be particularly effective, as the style of descriptions was often high-flown and diffuse; the *sententia* formed a smart conclusion. At VI, 262, having described the almost superhuman gallantry of the centurion Scaeva, Lucan remembers that, after all, Scaeva was Caesar's man, and exclaims: "infelix, quanta *dominum* virtute parasti!" Paradox, again, terminates his description of the sufferings of the parched troops near Ilerda: "spectat vicinos *sitiens exercitus amnes*" (IV, 336; cf. VI, 116-17, "*plurimaque . . . | diripiens miles saturum tamen obsidet hostem*"). Typical is his conclusion of a ghastly description of the effects of various snake-bites, especially of the *seps*, which causes complete putrefaction of the body; neatly antithetical, he thus apostrophises the *seps*: "*eripiunt omnes animam, tu sola cadaver!*" (IX, 788).

A recurrent feature of Lucan's terminal *sententiae*, whether in speeches or narrative, is the fact that they derive their impact from stress on the word *civilis*, particularly in connection with the war, for Lucan is obsessed with the horror of civil strife. So he writes: "*alta sedent civilis vulnera dextrae*" (I, 32, narrative); "*. . . quaerunt uter imperet urbi? | vix tanti fuerat civilia bella movere | ut neuter*" (II, 61-3, speech); "*quod socero bellum praeter civile reliqui?*" (II, 595, speech); "*abscidis frustra ferro tua pignora; bellum | te faciet civile meum*" (III, 33-4, speech); "*habenti | tam pavidum tibi, Roma, ducem Fortuna pepercit, | quod bellum civile fuit*" (III, 95-7, speech). Allied to this is his constant preoccupation with death, which provides a natural "terminal point," e. g. "*perdant velle mori*" (IV, 280, speech); "*felix esse mori*" (IV, 520, speech); but this is so permanently present in Lucan's mind that the sentence-termination "*mori*" (or some part of *mors*) is quite ubiquitous.

It is worthy of remark that Lucan's *sententiae*, whether terminal or not, whether gnomic or non-gnomic, are often characterised by a terseness of expression which adds greatly to their

²⁹ See K. Barwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 ff. for several examples.

vigour. Generally speaking, a single line of verse is a standard length for a *sententia*; occasionally, they run to more than this, but more often they are produced in less. Half a dozen words are ample; cf. "exeat aula | qui vult esse pius"; "virtus et summa potestas | non coeunt" (VIII, 493-5). So, at VIII, 673, after describing the clumsy attempts of Septimius to sever Pompey's head; Lucan comments: "nondum artis erat caput ense rotare"—a cynical observation suggesting that practice had now brought decapitation to a fine art; cf. Suet., *Calig.*, 32, *miles decollandi artifex*. (Incidentally, this use of the word *ars* of something atrocious or unnatural appears to have been favoured by declaimers—cf. *Contr.*, X, 4, 2, on deforming exposed children for the purpose of begging: "sua cuique calamitas tamquam *ars* assignatur"; ps. Quint., *Decl. Maiores*, X, 15, "advocatur homo cuius *ars* est ire contra naturam" and Lucan, VI, 437 on the witches, "quarum quidquid non creditur *ars* est.") Good *sententiae* may require only five words, such as "semper metuet quem saeva pudebunt" (VIII, 495), but four are quite sufficient, and this is a rather popular length with Lucan; cf. "in se magna ruunt" (I, 81); "semper nocuit differre paratis" (I, 281); "nescit plebes ieiuna timere" (III, 58); "cupias quodcumque necesse est" (IV, 487); "audendo magnus tegitur timor" (IV, 702); "facinus quos inquinat aequat" (V, 290); "humanum paucis vivit genus" (V, 343); "properante ruina, | summa cadunt" (V, 746-7); "felix se nescit amari" (VII, 727). All these are gnomic, but of non-gnomic examples we may cite "quod defles, illud amasti" (VIII, 85), also "quidquid gerimus fortuna vocatur" (V, 292) and "exiguum dominos commisit asylum" (I, 97). Finally, there are some very effective *sententiae* in only three words, such as Cicero's remark to Pompey, when reluctant to give battle: "pudeat vicisse coactum" (VII, 78). Equally good is Lucan's terminal comment, after discoursing on the imminence of war and hoping that men might be spared knowledge of the future: "liceat sperare timenti" (II, 15); more trite is "gaudet patientia duris" (IX, 403). Summing up his account of the effect of Petreius' speech, calling on his troops to resume warfare, Lucan succinctly concludes: "iuvat esse nocentes" (IV, 253). Finally, at VI, 532, describing how the witch Erichtho draws the dead bodies from the tomb in a sort of funeral procession in reverse, he says: "fugere cadavera letum"—a three-word para-

dox in which, as Housman remarks, only those who do not know Lucan would print "lectum."³⁰

In theory, it had long been recognised that brevity was the soul of a *sententia*. But theory and practice had not always closely corresponded. Even the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (IV, 17, 24), whilst requiring brevity, has only one example which matches up to Lucan's best ("difficile est primum quidque"), and he includes a type of *sententia* in which the statement has a "reason" subjoined to it, and here brevity is conspicuously absent.³¹ Sallust pointed the way to a more compact and vigorous *sententia*; the younger Seneca was a master of it; but it was also a virtue much sought after by some of the declaimers. Indeed, we are told of one of them (*Contr.*, I, 1, 25): *dixit brevissime, rarissimo genere, quo duobus sententia verbis consummatur*, and rather naïvely, Seneca adds: *nec enim paucioribus potest!* Such efforts were symptomatic of the increasing desire for terseness and point. To sum up our investigation so far, it may surely be claimed that not only in quantity are Lucan's *sententiae* greatly in excess of Heitland's estimate, but also in quality they rank higher than Heitland would admit; Quintilian's praise was perhaps a little over-enthusiastic, but by no means unreasonable.³²

But expansion, as well as contraction, was also an important aspect of the declamatory art. The subjects of the exercises often afforded scope for moralising and developing one or more of the so-called "commonplaces" (*implere locum*), or for introducing a description (*ἔκφρασις*, *descriptio*). For example, so many *controversiae* had a rich man as one of their main characters that the declaimer was easily tempted into a disquisition on the evils of wealth and luxury, and the *locus communis de divitiis* became a favourite topic.³³ It might be accompanied by an enumeration of the various manifestations of extravagance,³⁴

³⁰ "lectum funebrem omnes novimus, Lucanum non omnes."

³¹ IV, 17, 24-5 (*sententia cum ratione*); cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.*, II, p. 1430 b (*γνώμη μετ' αἰτίας*); Aristotle, *Rhet.*, II, 21 (*μετ' ἐπιλόγου*).

³² For the popularity of some of Lucan's *sententiae* in the Middle Ages, cf. E. M. Sanford, "Quotations from Lucan in Mediaeval Latin Authors," *A. J. P.*, LV (1934), pp. 1-19.

³³ Cf. *Contr.*, II, 1, 21, "in divitias invectus est"; *ibid.*, 25, 26, 29; I, *Praef.* 23.

³⁴ As in *Contr.*, II, 1 and *Exc.*, V, 5.

such as exquisite villas and their appurtenances, sumptuous banquets, and general looseness of living. In fact, it could easily lead to a denunciation of the evils of society and become a *locus communis de saeculo*, or *insectatio saeculi*; ³⁵ the declaimer would then point the contrast with the frugal living and sound morality of the "good old days," with appropriate historical *exempla*. The theme might be developed at length, as by Arellius Fuscus and, especially, Fabianus in *Contr.*, II, 1, or merely alluded to sententiously *en passant*. ³⁶ Not that the declaimers were first in the field here; far from it, for such diatribes had long been common both in rhetoric and in popular philosophy. ³⁷ Sallust, too, in the *Catiline* (12-13), had spoken of "domos atque villas . . . in urbium modum exaedificatas," "lubido stupri ganeae ceterique cultus," and the habit "vescendi causa terra marique omnia exquirere." But it is important to observe that sometimes the declaimers make a special application of the *locus*. Sallust had been concerned to show that luxury, greed, arrogance, and a general debasement of moral standards had created the kind of society which could produce a Catiline. The declaimers, on the other hand, hinge their moralisings to the Civil War, seeing in *luxuria* both its cause and its effect. "Quietiora tempora pauperes habuimus," says Latro, "bella civilia aurato Capitolio gessimus" (*Contr.*, II, 1, 1). Fabianus, speaking of wealth, said: "haec est quae auget discordiam urbis et terrarum orbem in bellum agit, humanum genus, cognatum natura, in fraudes et scelera et mutuum odium instigat" (*Contr.*, II, 6, 2). In *Contr.*, II, 1, 10 ff. he elaborates the theme, asking if it was worth a civil war to provide lofty villas, gold and silver decoration, finely-wrought ceilings, delicate inlaid work on walls, and tessellated pavements. Other favourite illustrations of the evils of wealth, and of the *saeculum*, were the immorality and immodest dress of women, the effeminate attire of men, and the

³⁵ *Contr.*, II, *Praef.* 2, "quoties inciderat aliqua materia, quae conuicium saeculi reciperet"; X, 4, 18, "insectatus saeculi vitia"; *Suas.*, 6, 9, "hic insectatio temporum fuit." See De Decker, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff. for various aspects of it.

³⁶ As in *Contr.*, I, 7, 5, "repleto sceleribus novis saeculo"; II, 5, 7, "ut saeculi mos est"; I, 2, 20; II, 7, 1, etc. (Already Virgil, *G.*, I, 468 and 500, speaks of "impia saecula" and "everso saeclo.")

³⁷ Cf. now Jacqueline Brisset, *Les idées politiques de Lucain* (Paris, *Les Belles Lettres*, 1964), pp. 41 f.; Jals, pp. 390-1.

neglect of personal responsibility for the upkeep of vast country estates (cf. *Exc. Contr.*, V, 5 for the last). From the declaimers it is but a short and direct step to Lucan, who, describing in his first book the underlying causes of the war, the *semina belli*, is in close accord with declaimers such as Fabianus. Lucan might be annotated from the declamations thus (I, 163 ff.): "*non auro tectisve modus*" (*Contr.*, II, 1, 11, "an ut . . . tecta auro fulgeant, parricidium tanti fuit! . . . quid tandem est, quod non divitiae corruperint? primum . . . aedes ipsas, quas in tantum extruxere . . ."); *ibid.*, 12, "*infusum tectis aurum*"; "*mensasque priores | aspernata fames*" (*ibid.*, 11, "an, ne quid ventri negetur libidinique, orbis servitium expetendum est?"); "*cultus gestare decoros | vix nurbus rapuere mares*" (cf. Seneca himself, *Contr.*, I, *Praef.* 8, "capillum frangere et ad muliebres blanditias extenuare vocem, mollitia corporis certare cum feminis et immundissimis se excolere munditiis nostrorum adolescentium specimen est"; cf. *Exc. Contr.*, V, 6, 1, "muliebre vestem sumpsit, capillos in feminae habitum composuit . . ."); "*fecunda virorum | paupertas fugitur*" (*Contr.*, II, 1, 12, "o paupertas, quam ignotum bonum es!" *ibid.*, 18, "tunc paupertas erat saeculi"; I, 6, 4, "quid tibi videntur illi ab aratro, qui paupertate sua beatam fecere rempublicam?"); "*tunc longos iungere fines | agrorum et quondam duro sulcata Camilli | vomere et antiquos Curiorum passa ligones | longa sub ignotis extendere rura colonis*" (*Contr.*, II, 1, 26, "ignoti servorum domino greges"; *Exc.*, V, 5, 2, "arata quondam populis rura singulorum nunc ergastulorum sunt latiusque vilici quam reges imperant"). If the theme is more fully developed, the result is the sort of diatribe which Petronius (probably parodying Lucan) gives us in the first sixty lines of his *Bellum Civile*. Parallels on individual aspects might easily be adduced from other sources;³⁸ but the important point is that in the declaimers, Lucan, and Petronius the *locus* is closely associated with the theme of the Civil War.

The *locus communis de divitiis* is never very far from Lucan's mind, and he loses no opportunity to launch an attack, whether

³⁸ E.g., for Horace, cf. J. F. D'Alton, *Horace and his Age* (London, 1917), ch. 5; G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (Univ. Wisconsin Studies, 1920); for the younger Seneca, E. Rolland, *De l'influence de Sénèque le père et des rhéteurs sur Sénèque le philosophe* (Ghent, 1906), pp. 36 ff.

in a few lines of indignant expostulation, or in a longer passage elaborated with its concomitant description. Describing how the tribune Metellus barred Caesar's access to the Treasury (III, 118 ff.), he inserts a parenthesis: "usque adeo solus ferrum mortemque timere | auri nescit amor, pereunt discrimine nullo | amissae leges: sed, pars vilissima rerum, certamen movistis, opes"—even though Metellus was not actuated by private gain, but by what he believed to be the public interest. Similarly, when Caesar's troops, starving in the flooded countryside, are willing to pay over all they have for a handful of grain, he exclaims (IV, 96-7): "pro lucri pallida tabes! | non dest prolato ieiunus venditor auro" (cf. IX, 706-7). Towards the end of the same book, his account of the bribing of Curio again touches on the power of money: "perdita tunc Urbi nocuerunt saecula, postquam | ambitus et luxus et opum metuenda facultas | transverso mentem dubiam torrente tulerunt" (IV, 816 ff., cf. X, 110). On the other hand, the humble Amyclas, secure in his make-shift abode, provokes the exclamation: "o vitae tuta facultas | pauperis angustique lares! o munera nondum intellecta deum!" (V, 527 ff.). Similarly, when the Pompeian troops, parched with thirst and at last allowed access to the rivers, sate themselves with copious draughts, Lucan takes the opportunity to exclaim: "o prodiga rerum | luxuries, numquam parvo contenta paratis, | et quaesitorum terra pelagoque ciborum | ambitiosa fames, et laetae gloria mensae, | discite quam parvo liceat producere vitam, | et quantum natura petat" (IV, 373 ff.). It was a common feature of the treatment of the theme of luxury to declare that the Romans went to the ends of the earth to satisfy their craving. Distant forests were felled to provide tables of citrus-wood: so Lucan moralises (IX, 426 ff.): "tantum Maurusia genti | robora divitiae, quarum non noverat usum, | sed citri contenta comis vivebat et umbra. | in nemus ignotum nostri venere secures, | extremoque epulas mensasque petimus ab orbe"—cf. *Contr.*, II, 1, 12, "ad delicias dementis luxuriae lapis omnis eruitur, caeduntur ubique gentium silvae," and Petronius, 119, 27-30. All the elements, earth, sea, and sky, were ransacked to provide exotic foods—as a declaimer absurdly put it (*Contr.*, X, *Praef.* 9) "quidquid avium volitat, quidquid piscium natat, quidquid ferarum discurrit, nostris sepe litur ventribus"! So Lucan, in his description of Cleopatra's feast, writes: "infudere epulas auro, quod terra, quod aer, | quod

pelagus Nilusque dedit, quod luxus inani | ambitione furens
toto quaesivit in orbe | non mandante fame. . ." (X, 155 ff.).³⁹
This passage is immediately preceded by a typically declamatory
outburst: "pro caecus et amens | ambitione furor, civilia bella
gerenti | divitias aperire suas, incendere mentem | hospitis
armati," coupled with a stock allusion to the frugal worthies of
the past, Fabricius, Curius, and Cincinnatus (X, 146-54).

There were historical *exempla*, naturally, to illustrate the
various *loci communes*, but historical personages frequently
themselves provided themes for declamation, whether as the
subjects of *suasoriae* or as the subjects of panegyric or invective,
according as their characters and careers were praised or blamed.
No historical figure was more popular in the declamation schools
than Alexander the Great, to whom two of the elder Seneca's
suasoriae are devoted (1 and 4). The declaimers might seek to
dissuade him from extending his military adventures, in terms
of sententious flattery, such as: "o quantum magnitudo tua
rerum quoque naturam supergressa est! Alexander orbi magnus
est, Alexandro orbis angustus est" (*Suas.*, 1, 3). They might
dilate upon his previous victories and end with a rhetorical
appeal—cf. *Contr.*, VII, 7, 19, "cum, descriptis Alexandri vic-
toriiis, gentibus perdomitis, novissime poneret: 'Quousque, in-
victi?' " This was a deliberative exercise, but Alexander might
also be the subject of a panegyric, and the progymnasmatis-
t Theon suggests that the student, after referring to his successes,
might speculate what he would have achieved, had he lived a
little longer.⁴⁰ But equally well (although we have no actual
rhetorical example of it), Alexander might be the subject of a
denunciation (*ψόγος*), his overweening ambition censured, his
conquests attributed to mere rapacity, his career regarded as
ultimately a failure. The *sententiae* of some such exercise as
this evidently lie behind the conventional adverse comments of
such writers as the younger Seneca, Lucan, and Juvenal. Cestius
Pius had coined the phrase "orbis illum suus non capit" (*Suas.*,
1, 5), which reappears in Juvenal as "unus Pellaeo iuveni *non
sufficit orbis*" (X, 168).⁴¹ Lucan himself had quite possibly

³⁹ Cf. Ovid, *Met.*, VIII, 830 ff., "quod pontus, quod terra, quod educat
aer, | poscit, et appositis queritur ieiunia mensis" (Erysichthon).

⁴⁰ *Rhet. Graec.* (Spengel), II, 110, 28. (Cf. Livy, IX, 17 ff.)

⁴¹ Observed by C. Morawski, *De rhetoribus Latinis observationes*
(Cracow, 1892), p. 10; cf. De Decker, p. 42.

picked up this expression in an Alexander-declamation, for he twice uses it in connection with Caesar; cf. X, 456 "hic, cui Romani spatium non sufficit orbis," and V, 356 (Caesar's troops) "quibus hic non sufficit orbis."⁴² Fairly early in the poem we have an indication of Lucan's critical attitude towards Alexander—"Pellaeus post Tethyos aequora ductor | constitit et magno vinci se fassus ab orte est" (III, 233-4). But it is in the tenth book that Lucan, after mentioning Caesar's visit to Alexander's tomb, launches into a bitter attack on Alexander, in which the conventional rhetorical treatment is sharpened by his own anti-monarchical sentiments (X, 20-52). Alexander is "proles vesana Philippi," "felix praedo" (20-1), "terrarum fatale malum," "sidus iniquum gentibus" (34-6), expressions which find parallels in the younger Seneca.⁴³ Lucan's view is that the conqueror was "non utile mundo | editus exemplum, terras tot posse sub uno | esse viro" (26-8), and, like the declaimers, he runs through the scenes of his conquests (28-38), and includes the point: "Oceano classes inferre parabat | exteriore mari" (36-7, cf. *Suas.*, 1). He, too, notes the campaigns which Alexander might have made had he lived, and adds that he left the world, without a successor, at the mercy of Fate. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this passage, introduced as a digression, is redolent of declamatory exercises,⁴⁴ though presented with the added vehemence of Lucan's personal feelings.

Declamatory audiences were constantly reminded that the power of individuals may wax and wane, and kings may come to miserable ends; so Fabianus warns Alexander: "cum descripsisset nihil esse stabile, omnia fluitare et incertis motibus modo attolli modo deprimi . . . deinde exempla regum ex fastigio suo devolutorum, adiecit" (*Suas.*, 1, 9). Even great empires rise only to fall, through Fortune's jealousy: "numquam solido stetit superba felicitas," says Triarius, thinking of Xerxes, "et ingentium imperiorum magna fastigia oblivione fragilitatis humanae collapsa sunt. scias licet ad finem bonum non pervenisse, quae ad invidiam perducta sunt" (*Suas.*, 2, 3). Here we have entered the province of the *locus communis de varietate for-*

⁴² Note also the similarity of Lucan, VIII, 441-2, "quin respicis orbem | Romanum?" to the *sententiae* of *Suas.*, 1.

⁴³ Cf. *De Ben.*, I, 13, 3; *N. Q.*, III, praef. 5; *Epp.*, 94, 62 ff. et al.

⁴⁴ See also W. Hoffmann, *Das literarische Porträt Alexanders des Grossen* (Diss., Leipzig, 1907), pp. 50-8.

tunae; to us the ideas are trite, but the declaimers loved them, and they are very much in accord with Lucan's thought. Rome, he says, had become too great; greatness topples, but it was Fortune's envy which impelled it to civil war—"invida fatorum series summisque negatum | stare diu . . . | nec se Roma ferens" (I, 70-2, cf. 81 ff. "in se magna ruunt . . . invidiam Fortuna suam"). Of individuals who experienced astonishing vicissitudes of fortune, the declamatory favourite was Marius. "Omnis instabilis et incerta felicitas est," says Latro, "quis crederet iacentem supra crepidinem Marium aut fuisse consulem aut futurum?" (*Contr.*, I, 1, 3). Asprenas echoes his words: "mutabilis est casus; dederunt victis terga victores et quos provexerat fortuna destituit. quid referam Marium sexto consulatu Carthagini mendicantem, septimo Romae imperantem?" (*ibid.*, 5). Again, elsewhere, we read: "Minturnensis palus exulem Marium non hausit; Cimber etiam in capto vidit imperantem . . ." (*Contr.*, VII, 2, 6). Marius in the marshes, Marius and his Cimbrian jailer, Marius at Carthage—these were favourite pictures, and Lucan has them all in a passage of over 60 lines in his second book (68-133)—introduced simply because people remembered the proscriptions of Marius and Sulla when the Civil War began!⁴⁵ Concealed at Minturnae, he was "deposited in trust by Fortune" (72, "depositum, Fortuna, tuum"): and after reviewing his career, Lucan concludes: "ille fuit vitae Mario modus, omnia passo, | quae peior fortuna potest, atque omnibus uso | quae melior, mensoque hominis quid fata paterent" (131-3). Other Roman writers—Manilius, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Juvenal—use the same example to point the same moral;⁴⁶ but Lucan has given us a declamation in full.

If the Romans marvelled at the rise of Marius, they were equally impressed by the fall of Pompey—the disaster of Pharsalia, the flight, the decapitation, the auction of Pompey's goods (cf. for the last, Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 26, 64 ff.). Alluding to him, Latro says: "fragilis et caduca felicitas est et omnis blandientis

⁴⁵ This, the *point de départ* of Lucan's digression, is quite historical; cf. Dio Cassius, XLI, 5, 1, τὸν τε πόλεμον δκνοῦντας μνήμη τῶν τε τοῦ Μαρίου καὶ τῶν τοῦ Σέλλου ἔργων; *ibid.*, 8, 5; cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.*, VIII, 11, 2; IX, 7, 3; 10, 6; 11, 3.

⁴⁶ Manilius, IV, 45-8; Vell. Patere., II, 19; Val. Max., VI, 9, 14; Juv., X, 276 ff.

fortunae speciosus cum periculo nitor; et sine causa saepe fovit et sine ratione destituit. vidi ego magni exercitus ducem sine comite fugientem; vidi ab ambitiosa turba clientium limina deserta sub domino sectore venalia" (*Contr.*, II, 1, 1). So Lucan observes of Pompey in flight: "sed poenas longi Fortuna favoris | exigit a misero, quae tanto pondere famae | res premit adversas fatisque prioribus urget" (VIII, 21-3). After the assassination, he sums up thus: "hac Fortuna fide Magni tam prospera fata | pertulit, hac illum summo de culmine rerum | morte petit cladesque omnes exegit in unc | saeva die, quibus immunes tot praestitit annos, | Pompeiusque fuit qui numquam mixta videret | laeta malis, felix nullo turbante deorum | et nullo parcente miser; semel impulit illum | dilata Fortuna manu" (VIII, 701-8). Lucan's view of Pompey may owe something to declamatory precedents; but he is far more to Lucan than an *exemplum* for a *locus communis*. Pompey does nothing heroic in the *Pharsalia*, and he is not a "hero" in the accepted sense; but Lucan was, I believe, deeply impressed by his humiliation and tragic end, and he was Lucan's hero in the sense that he was dearest to the poet's heart.⁴⁷

Lucan's most eloquent testimony to Pompey is contained in the admirable speech of Cato in Book IX (190-214). It is a *laudatio funebris*, but it is balanced and restrained; it is sententious without too much straining after effect; it makes skilful use of the rhetorical devices of parallelism, antithesis, and anaphora (especially 195-200), without the extreme artificiality of the celebrated prototype of Gorgias.⁴⁸ In its measured dignity it has something in common with the style of Cicero's *De imperio Cn. Pompei*, but in economy of expression it resembles more the encomia upon Cicero of some of the early Silver Age historians recorded in the elder Seneca's 6th *Suasoria*. We are not surprised to find the conventional sentiment that Pompey was "felix opportunitate mortis" (208-10), but the speech (although Macaulay thought it "a pure gem of rhetoric without one flaw") has, I feel, one fault, and that, unfortunately, at the terminal point: "non deprecor hosti | servari, dum me servet

⁴⁷ Cf. VII, 213 "legent, et adhuc tibi, Magne, favebunt," and the sympathetic treatment throughout Book VIII. But I am aware that other views have been held on the hero-question.

⁴⁸ *Apud* Dion. Hal., *De Demosthene, init.*

cervice recisa”—is it not a pity that Lucan, like the declaimers on Cicero, could never forget that severed head?⁴⁹

The moralising commonplace may, as we have seen, easily become associated with a description; the dividing-line is apt to become blurred, and a *locus de divitiis* may easily develop into a *descriptio divitiarum*. Similarly, the subject of *crudelitas* could give rise to general moralising, but it was tempting to treat it as a description, with all the gruesome details. Just as Vibius Gallus prepared his listeners with the words “*divitias describere volo*” (*Contr.*, II, 1, 26), so Fabianus said “*describam nunc ego cruciatus*” (*Contr.*, II, 5, 6). The declamations were frequently concerned with subjects involving inhumanity and physical cruelty: a woman is brutally tortured by a tyrant (*Contr.*, II, 5); a man is decapitated at a feast to gratify the whim of a courtesan (*Contr.*, IX, 2); exposed children are callously mutilated by their master to attract public sympathy and obtain alms (*Contr.*, X, 4); the murder of Cicero is a favourite exercise (*Contr.*, VII, 2; *Suas.*, 6 and 7). Consequently, the declaimers had numerous occasions for dilating on horrible scenes, and sometimes showed utter lack of taste. Audiences long inured to the butchery of the gladiatorial shows in real life readily gloated over still more lurid details provided by over-imaginative declaimers. In the schools, Sulla had long been established as the example *par excellence* of *crudelitas*,⁵⁰ and Lucan’s long account of the Sullan proscriptions (II, 134-232), like that of the Marian massacres, and equally unnecessary, can only be attributed to the *cacoethes declamandi*. Valerius Maximus (IX, 2, 1), also selects Sulla as his first example of *crudelitas*, and includes special mention of the mutilation of Marius Gratidianus “*quem per ora vulgi . . . pertractum non prius vita privavit quam oculos infelices erueret et singulas corporis partes confringeret.*” Lucan (II, 177-87) devotes eleven lines to this episode, specifying the details (181 ff.): “*avolsae cecidere manus, exsectaque lingua | palpitat et muto vacuum ferit aera motu. | hic aures, alius spiramina naris aduncae | amputat; ille cavis evolvit sedibus orbes. . .*” The enumeration recalls

⁴⁹ In the later books Lucan is much too fond of ending his sentences with *caput*; but the end of Sextus Pompey’s speech, “*servata de parte queror*” (IX, 145) is the depth of *cacoethia*.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Contr.*, IX, 2, 19, “*in Sulla crudelitatem*”; *Suas.*, VI, 3; “*civilis sanguinis Sullana sitis.*”

the manner in which declaimers described the sufferings inflicted on the beggar-children: "huic convulsi pedum articuli sunt et extorti tali, huic elisa crura; illius inviolatis pedibus cruribusque femina contudit; aliter in quemque saeviens ossifragus iste alterius brachia amputat, alterius enervat, alium distortet, alium delumbat; alterius diminutas scapulas in deforme tuber extundit et risum in crudelitate captat" (*Contr.*, X, 4, 2). The torture of the woman by the tyrant is equally thorough: "nullum tormenti genus omisit; omnia membra laniata, omnes partes <corporis> convulsae sunt," etc. (*Contr.*, II, 5, 5). Typically declamatory, too, is Lucan's concluding remark; "vix erit ulla fides tam saevi criminis *unum* | *tot* poenas cepisse caput" (cf. *Contr.*, X, 4, 3, "*tot* membra franguntur ut *unum* ventrem impleant").⁵¹ Then again, Lucan loves to depict Caesar in terms of *crudelitas*, and Caesar's image is so distorted as to take on the characteristics of a declamatory tyrant or murderer. So, after Pharsalia (VII, 789 ff.) he gloats over the carnage and prepares for a feast at a spot from which he may study the corpses of his enemies: "epulisque paratur | ille locus vultus ex quo faciesque iacentum | agnoscat"—cf. *Contr.*, IX, 2, 7, on the praetor who ordered an execution: "o qui crudelitate omnes superasti tyrannos, soli tibi inter epulas voluptati est morientium gemitus?"

Although the *descriptio* may be associated with the development of a *locus communis*, it also frequently stands on its own as a highly-coloured piece of literary embellishment. Rhetoric had long played a part in encouraging such ἐκφράσεις. The "description" was one of several exercises practised by schoolboys, and was often prescribed whilst the boy was still with the *grammaticus*, in anticipation of the work of the *rhetor*.⁵² We know something of the subjects and methods of treatment from the Greek progymnasmatists.⁵³ In the advanced and culminating

⁵¹ The same desire for anatomical detail is shown in the description of the effects of the bite of the *seps* at IX, 770 ff., when scarcely any part of the body is omitted.

⁵² Cf. Quint., II, 1, 3.

⁵³ Cf. D. L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (Columbia U. P., 1957), pp. 201 ff.; Eduard Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig, Berlin, 1915), I, pp. 285-6; J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931, rpd., New York, 1962), pp. 507-8. For Lucan, Liselotte Eckardt, *Exkurse und Ekphrasis bei Lucan* (Diss., Bottrop,

study of *suasoriae* and *controversiae*, the description played a much greater part than most of the other *progymnasmata*. So prominent did it become that it almost ranked as a separate part of a speech, along with proem, narrative, proofs, and epilogue, and in the Senecan *Controversiae* we find such expressions as *et in descriptione dixit* (I, 4, 8) and *et illud post descriptionem adiecit* (*ibid.*, 9). But, naturally, some subjects were more likely than others to meet the requirements of the advanced exercises, and not every description used in the initial stages of study would be regularly used in advanced declamation. Consequently, although the loose connection of descriptions with the immediate theme is characteristic of both the declaimers and Lucan, we must not necessarily assume that any and every description in Lucan is directly indebted to declamation. It has also to be borne in mind that many previous poets and rhetorical historians may have similarly tried their hand at subjects which appear in Lucan. A description, therefore, requires to be considered in the light not merely of the Senecan declamations, but also of other literary antecedents.

There is, for example, an excellent example of an *ἐκφρασις* in Lucan's third book (399 ff.). During the siege of Marseilles, Caesar, by his own account (*B. C.*, II, 15) had felled a great number of trees to form his ramparts (*arboribus longe lateque in finibus Massiliensium excisis et convectis*). So Lucan inserts a description of 27 lines on a sacred grove, followed by 27 more on its felling.⁵⁴ We might point to the fact that similar nature-subjects were favoured by Fabianus (*Contr.*, II, *Praef.* 3) and classified by Theon (*Rhet. Graec.*, II, 118, 18); but we have only a limited number of declamatory exercises from which to judge how often there might be scope for the introduction of the individual subjects of descriptions. The *descriptio nemoris* does not appear in the elder Seneca. On the other hand, it had long been a favourite subject with the poets. Horace (*A. P.*, 14 ff.) notes that a "purple patch" is introduced to describe *lucus et ara Dianae*; Persius (I, 70) instances *ponere lucum* as a stock feature of poetic artistry, and nothing was more

1936) views the subject of the poet's digressions in a wider context; cf. also U. Piacentini, *Osservazioni sulla tecnica epica di Lucano* (Berlin Akademie, 1963), p. 34.

⁵⁴ On this topic, cf. Norden on Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI, 179 ff.

familiar to Juvenal (I, 7) than the description of the *lucus Martis*. Lucan begins in traditional fashion, "lucus erat . . .," just as Ovid began "vallis erat . . ." (*Met.*, III, 155) or "collis erat . . ." (*Met.*, X, 86). In fact, it is in Ovid, and not in the declamations, that the closest parallel to Lucan's description is to be found. It has several points in common with the description of the Cave of Sleep in *Met.*, XI, 592 ff. In both passages, the grove is sunless; there are no birds, no beasts, no winds; and it is watered from some dark, mysterious source.

The more sensational and fantastically exaggerated description in Lucan's fifth book (560 ff.) of a storm at sea, encountered by Caesar when he tried to re-cross the Adriatic from Epirus, brings us rather closer to declamation, for several exercises did provide an opportunity for such a *descriptio tempestatis*. Seneca records a few excerpts, but nowhere a full treatment.⁵⁵ Allowance must also be made for the fact that the declaimers themselves drew upon, and sought to rival, the poets and the historians: so the author of pseudo-Dionysius, *Ars Rhetorica* (10, 17) censures the fondness for storm-descriptions in student-exercises, and says that the fault derived from the desire to imitate historians and poets.⁵⁶ Among the more celebrated descriptions before Lucan were those of Virgil (*Aen.*, I, 81 ff. and III, 192 ff.), Ovid (*Met.*, XI, 474 ff.—*in extenso*; *Trist.*, I, 2, 19 ff.—a symmetrical storm), and Seneca (*Agam.*, 465 ff.).⁵⁷ Petronius, 114 is an amusing parody of either declamation or poetry—or both. We see from these passages how the conventional features emerged—such as the preliminary shuddering of the sea (*inhorruit mare*), the conflict of several, or all, winds blowing at once (a Homeric and Virgilian point which displeased the scientifically-minded Seneca),⁵⁸ the Stygian darkness, the sheer precipice of waters, waves hitting the

⁵⁵ *Contr.*, VII, 1, 4 and 10; *Exc.*, VIII, 6, 2; *Suas.*, 3, 2; cf. the Hannibal-suasoria in Juv., VII, 162-4, "an post nimbos et fulmina cautus | circumagat madidas a tempestate cohortes."

⁵⁶ U.-R., II, 372, 4 ff., εἰσεφύη δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἀμάρτημα ἐν ταῖς μελέταις κατὰ ζῆλον τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων.

⁵⁷ Further examples in C. Liedloff, *De tempestatis . . . descriptionibus* . . . (Diss., Leipzig, 1895), pp. 3-16.

⁵⁸ *N.Q.*, V, 16, 1-2, *in unam tempestatem, quod fieri nullo modo potest, congregentur*; yet cf. *Agam.*, 474-6! (Cf. Eckardt, p. 63.) Sen., *Contr.*, *Exc.*, VIII, 6, 2 has "discordes . . . venti."

clouds, and the somewhat naïve comment that the steersman is at a loss. When this sort of thing happens, Juvenal says: "omnia fiunt | tam graviter si quando *poetica* surgit | tempestas" (XII, 22 ff.). Lucan's description has one or two close similarities of expression to that of Seneca, by whom he may have been influenced.⁵⁹ But doubtless the declaimers had contributed a fair share of hyperbole and speechifying to the development of the super-tempest. But let us now enter a particularly declamatory field.

Of all the familiar stock characters of the *controversiae*, none puts in appearance more frequently than the *vir fortis*; he plays a part in innumerable exercises; whether he has displayed heroism on the battlefield or in slaying a tyrant, he usually succeeds in getting himself disinherited by his father for his pains. To heighten the drama of the situation, he is sometimes *ter fortis* (cf. *Contr.*, I, 8) or has lost his hands in battle and becomes the *vir fortis sine manibus* (cf. *Contr.*, I, 4). Naturally, a favourite description of the declaimers was that of the hero in battle (cf. *Contr.*, I, 4, 2; ps. Quint., *Decl. Maior.*, IV, 5); and some of them were capable of saying the most ludicrous things. For instance, a declaimer, taking the part of a paterfamilias who, having lost his hands, is unable to wreak vengeance on his wife's lover, caught *flagrante delicto*, declared: "I left my hands fighting on the battlefield," "reliqui in acie pugnantes manus" (*Contr.*, I, 4, 12). Now of all the handless heroes of antiquity none was more famous than Cynegirus, who, according to Herodotus (VI, 114) grasped a Persian ship and had his hand severed with an axe. Generations of Greeklings declaimed on this subject with patriotic delight,⁶⁰ and the story grew with the telling; by the time it reached Justinus⁶¹ (or Pompeius Trogus), Cynegirus had lost not one hand but two, and hung on to the galley by his teeth. An epigrammatist in the Greek Anthology⁶² commiserates with the hero, who, as a result of academic treatment, has now lost a foot as well. It so happens

⁵⁹ Cf. Lucan, V, 598-9, "primus ab Oceano caput exeris Atlanteo, Core . . ." with Sen., *Agam.*, 484, "quid rabidus ora Corus Oceano exerens?"

⁶⁰ Cf. Val. Max., III, 2, 22; Lucian, *Rhet. Praec.*, 18, and especially *Iupp. Trag.*, 32; brief allusions in Sen., *Contr.*, IX, 1, 2; *Suas.*, 5, 2.

⁶¹ II, 9, 16.

⁶² *Anth. Pal.*, XI, 335.

that we have a couple of declamations from the Greek sophist, Polemo of Laodicea,⁶³ in which the father of Cynegirus and the father of the polemarch Callimachus, who died at Marathon, compete in pressing the prior claim of their son to have his funeral oration pronounced in public. This is how Polemo declaims on behalf of Cynegirus: "For a long time, the ship was held in position by the hand of Cynegirus as by a cable; when this was lopped off, he flung in the other; and a grim battle ensued for each of Cynegirus' limbs . . . Cynegirus let go his own life before his hand let go the ship; then a wonderful thing happened—there was Cynegirus fighting the battle without hands and the hand, without Cynegirus, pursuing the enemy.

. . ."⁶⁴

We are told by Valerius Maximus (III, 2, 22) that in the sea-battle at Marseilles, one of Caesar's men, Acilius, seized an enemy ship with his right hand, and when this was severed, grasped it with his left, and eventually succeeded in sinking it. Lucan, in the course of his long description of this battle in Book III, though he wrongly refers the exploit to a Massiliot, makes much of this episode, and his treatment is in places exactly parallel, in exaggeration and absurdity, to the Greek declamation on Cynegirus. He says (III, 609 ff.) that the hero, having lost his right hand, leaned over the water to rescue it with his left hand! "plus nobilis irae | truncus⁶⁵ habet fortique instaurat proelia laeva | rapturusque suam procumbit in aequora dextram." Then he tells us that the left hand, and arm too, were lopped off. Although perforated with darts, the man, he says, stood firm, defending his twin brother (who is apparently invented by Lucan). Finally, he hurls his body upon the enemy ship and sinks it.

Again, Valerius Maximus (III, 2, 23), immediately after his account of this exploit of Acilius, relates an equally valiant action of Caesar's centurion, Scaeva, who, during the fighting around Dyrrachium, defended one of Caesar's forts almost single-handed against overwhelming odds. Lucan, in VI, 140 ff., takes 123 lines to describe this episode, including the inevitable

⁶³ Edited by H. Hinck (Leipzig, Teubner, 1873); cf. H. Jüttner in *Breslau. Phil. Abhandl.*, VIII, 1, pp. 46 ff.; Kohl, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁴ P. 6 Hinck.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Contr.*, I, 4, 1-3 for this favourite adjective.

speeches, and, if we may judge by certain bold expressions and absurd exaggerations, he was much influenced by the descriptions of the *vir fortis* in the schools of declamation. To impress his readers with the enormity of the odds against Scaeva, Lucan says that Fortune beheld here a novel pair of combatants, an army and a man. His words are: "parque novum Fortuna videt concurrere, *bellum* | atque virum," and he then proceeds to describe the clatter of weapons on Scaeva's shield: "crebris sonat icibus umbo" (191-2). To refer to an army of opponents as a *bellum* is a bold use of language, and, although there are general parallels from Silver Latin poets,⁶⁶ there is nothing quite so close as a citation in Quintilian (VIII, 5, 24) on daring *sententiae*. *Alia nimia*, he says, *ut de viro forti*, *Bella umbone propellit*, where *bella* means "armies." This is clearly taken from a declamation, and it helps to put us on the track of the main influence on Lucan in this description. There is also a close similarity between Lucan and Polemo's declamation on Callimachus. Lucan says that Scaeva was the target of every weapon, and adds later that he stood firm like an unbreakable wall: "illum tota premit moles, illum omnia tela" (189) and "stat non fragilis pro Caesare murus" (201). These now are the words of Polemo: ⁶⁷ ἔνθα πολλὰ μὲν βελῶν καὶ κοντῶν καὶ ξιφῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν βλημάτων ὑπεδέξατο, πᾶσας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑπέμεινε τὰς προσβόλας ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ὦν πύργος ἢ τεῖχος ἀρρηκτον.⁶⁸ Declaimers such as Polemo were in the direct line of descent from those Greek declaimers to whom the elder Seneca often refers disparagingly. It may well be that Lucan's exaggerations are ultimately due to the excesses of what was generally termed "Asianism." In the Scaeva episode, his hyperbole knows no bounds. Caesar had said (*B. C.*, III, 53) that 120 holes were found in Scaeva's shield; Lucan speaks as though there were 120 holes in his chest: "densamque ferens in pectore silvam" (205). But his supreme exaggeration is the comment that Scaeva's vital parts were only protected by the number of spears sticking in

⁶⁶ Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s. v. *bellum*.

⁶⁷ P. 19, § 10 Hinck.

⁶⁸ The idea of thus describing a fighter is ultimately Homeric (e. g. *Il.*, I, 284; III, 229, etc., ἔρκος). Ovid, *Met.*, XIII, 281 has "Graium murus Achilles," and Seneca, *Troades*, 126, "tu murus eras," but the Lucan-Polemo parallel is nevertheless striking. Cf. *Suas.*, 2, 14, ποῖ φεύξεσθε, ἀπλῆται, τείχη;

his bones "nec quidquam nudis vitalibus obstat | iam praeter stantes in summis ossibus hastas" (194-5). Even the declaimer who said to the thrice-brave warrior "no further wound can be inflicted upon you except over a scar" (*Contr.*, I, 8, 3) was tame by comparison.

From such exaggerated descriptions, we may turn to the speeches; and, naturally, there are some very effective ones to be found in a poet whom Quintilian declared *magis oratoribus quam poetis imitandus*. How close some of them are to the declamations of the schools may be judged both from a comparison of their general form with that of the *suasoriae*,⁶⁹ and from the fact that four of them are concerned with subjects which Quintilian himself mentions as current school exercises. The *suasoria*, if fully developed, represented the arguments both for and against a proposed course of action. When, therefore, we find in Lucan speeches grouped in pairs, presenting the arguments for and against a particular decision, we may be sure that this reflects the general treatment of the *suasoria* in the schools. There are several such paired speeches: for instance, Brutus to Cato and Cato to Brutus in II, 242 ff. and 286 ff. on the question of Cato's participation in the Civil War; and Pompey to Cornelia and Cornelia to Pompey in V, 739 ff. and 762 ff., on the question whether she should be sent to Lesbos for safety. In such speeches, a close examination often shows that the arguments of the speakers are neatly balanced. Sometimes, even the phraseology of the one is picked up by the phraseology of the other; a simile used by one is balanced by a corresponding simile of the other; a final point on one side is met by a final countering point on the other. For example, in reply to Brutus' charge: "facient te bella nocentem" (II, 259), Cato retorts: "crimen erit superis et me fecisse nocentem" (288). Brutus compares Cato with the peaceful ethereal calm above this troubled world, and says: "otia solus ages" (267); Cato replies that the fabric of the universe is collapsing around them, and asks: "otia solus agam?" (295). Pompey bases his appeal to Cornelia to go to Lesbos on the grounds of safety, and ends

⁶⁹ I do not find the dissertation of R. Faust, *De Lucani orationibus Pars I* (Königsberg, 1908; all published) of much value; it is mainly concerned with a somewhat mechanical application of the rules of the later Greek rhetoricians (tenuous distinctions).

with the point that, if he is defeated, he will have somewhere to take refuge with her (V, 758-9). Cornelia replies that she will, as Pompey's wife, be anything but safe, and ends with the point that, if he is defeated, Lesbos is the first place his enemies will look for him (787-90). It is possible that these were actually school subjects; we cannot prove it, but there must have been far more *suasoriae* in vogue than have survived, for even the Senecan collection is incomplete.⁷⁰

Several of Lucan's speeches take the form of vigorous military harangues, for which there are numerous parallels in the historians, but not in the Senecan declamations. But it is sometimes possible to observe declamatory characteristics. Noteworthy in this respect is the address of the centurion Laelius to Caesar, urging him to battle (I, 359 ff.). Laelius expresses his impatience in a style marked by rhetorical questions and anaphora (362-8); he then recalls his service in Caesar's expeditions to Britain and the Rhine (369-71), and these, we know, were both declamatory subjects;⁷¹ next comes a *sententia* (372, "iussa sequi tam posse mihi quam velle necesse est"), followed by an excellent example of the declamatory *figura iurisiurandi* (374-5: "per signa decem felicia castris, | perque tuos iuro quocumque ex hoste triumphos").⁷² Finally, the speech works up to a rhetorical climax in which Laelius offers to sack any city at Caesar's orders, be it Rome herself.

Let us now turn to speeches on subjects which are actually mentioned by Quintilian. First, there was no more favourite school topic than that *de contemnenda morte*, which declamations on Cato's death had made so familiar. We meet this theme in IV, 448 ff., where Lucan describes how, during the operations at sea off the coast of Illyria, a raft carrying a number of Caesar's troops, men from Opitergium, ran foul of underwater cables laid by the enemy. Surrounded, they knew, as darkness fell, that the coming of dawn meant certain death, unless they surrendered. Rather than do this, they determined, at the instigation of their leader Vulteius, to put one another to the sword;

⁷⁰ Cf. W. A. Edward, *op. cit.*, p. xxx. On Cato, cf. *Roman Declamation*, p. 9.

⁷¹ Quint., VII, 4, 2, *Caesar deliberat an Britanniam impugnet*; III, 8, 19, *Deliberat Caesar an perseveret in Germaniam ire*.

⁷² Cf. *Roman Declamation*, pp. 153-4.

and Lucan gives Vulteius an appropriate speech (476 ff.). This grim episode is mentioned by Quintilian, III, 8, 23 and 30, as the subject of a *suasoria*.

Usually, the *suasoria* was concerned with only two choices, but both the Auctor ad Herennium (III, 2, 2) and Quintilian were aware that there were sometimes three. So, at III, 8, 33, Quintilian refers to the historical debate which took place between Pompey and his Council of advisers at Syhedra in Cilicia, on the question which country's aid they should invoke. He writes as follows: *nam interim triplices etiam suasoriae incidunt: ut cum Pompeius deliberabat, Parthos an Africam an Aegyptum peteret*. These are precisely the possibilities which Pompey discusses in his speech to the Council in Lucan's eighth book (262 ff.), and in 276 ff. he expresses himself thus: "vos pendite regna | viribus atque fide, Libyam, Parthosque Pharonque, | quemnam Romanis deceat succurrere rebus." He himself declares in favour of an appeal to Parthia, and naturally the objections to such an approach to Rome's hated enemy offered great declamatory possibilities. The speech of Lentulus in reply (331 ff.) is accordingly a highly declamatory *suasoria*, powerful and indignant, in which no less than 15 of the first 17 sentences are rhetorical questions. But the fact that Lentulus advocated placing trust in Egypt dramatically prepared the way for Pothinus' calculating and callous speech later in the book (484 ff.), which directly led to the murder of Pompey, the ultimate tragedy. This speech was also on a subject mentioned by Quintilian as debated in the schools, with the one difference that Lucan attributes the advice to kill Pompey to Pothinus, whereas the rhetoricians followed the more usual tradition in attributing it to the professor of rhetoric, Theodotus. Here again there were three possibilities—as Plutarch (*Pompey*, 77, 4) tells us; the Egyptians might welcome Pompey, or reject him, or assassinate him; Lucan only gives us the speech in favour of assassination; but this is just the subject which appears in Quintilian, VII, 2, 6 in the deliberative form: *quomodo laturus sit Caesar, si Ptolomaeus Pompeium occiderit*. Pothinus, in Lucan's version, considers Caesar's attitude rather from the point of view of his hostility, and the effects upon Egypt, if Pompey should be welcomed.

The question may perhaps arise in our minds whether it may

have been from Lucan himself that the rhetoricians of Quintilian's day had drawn these subjects. If so, it would only prove that they thought him so good at this sort of speech that he was worth taking as a model. Such a view would leave the amount of declamatory influence upon Lucan himself uncertain. I think it more likely that all these subjects mentioned by Quintilian were already in existence in Lucan's day, and that a study of the Pothinus-speech in particular will show that he was very much influenced by rhetorical practice when he wrote. In the first place, this speech is quite extraordinary for the number of *sententiae* which it contains. Pothinus begins with no less than ten *sententiae* in twelve lines—every sentence is an example (484-95). There is a further *sententia* later (527) and two more as a sort of double underlining at the end (534-5). This makes thirteen in all, curiously enough, mostly gnomic, forming about a quarter of all the gnomic *sententiae* in Lucan. Apart from this, the last twenty lines or so consist of two apostrophes, one to Pompey (513 ff.), the other to Ptolemy (528 ff.), and the entire speech is made vigorous with rhetorical questions, and effective use of antithesis and chiasmus. Its argumentation is also rhetorical. In Quintilian's view (III, 8, 22 ff.), the major keynotes of all *suasoriae* are expediency (*utile*) and honour (*honestum*)—either both, or else one to the exclusion of the other. The speech of Pothinus utterly rejects all considerations of honour and loyalty—expediency alone must prevail. As J. P. Postgate well says:⁷³ "Its shameless cynicism, its callous disregard of everything but self-interest and material force must indeed revolt us. Yet we cannot but acknowledge the address with which it handles the essential facts, and the power which it evinces to read a tyrant's heart." But, it may be shown, I think, that there is more in the early part of this speech than the mere rejection of *honestum* as such. Quintilian (III, 8, 26) tells us that there were some theorists who were not content in their theory of the *partes suadendi* merely to accept *honestum* as a major category in itself, but preferred to refine upon it: *tamen apud plerosque earum numerus augetur, a quibus ponuntur ut partes, quae superiorum species sunt partium. nam fas, iustum, pium, aequum, mansuetum quoque . . . subiici possunt honestati.*

⁷³ P. liii of the very thorough *Historical Introduction* to his edn. of Book VIII (Cambridge, 1917).

In other words, their view was that *utile* was balanced by *honestum*, *fas*, *iustum*, *pium*, *aequum*, and *mansuetum*. I now propose to set out several of Pothinus' opening *sententiae*, emphasising the occurrence of key-words of deliberative theory, and observing first that *rectum* is much the same as *honestum*, and that *saevum* is the opposite of *mansuetum*. The lines run thus:—

Ius et fas multos faciunt, Ptolemaee, nocentes.
sidera terra
 ut distant et flamma mari, sic *utile recto*.
sceptrorum vis tota perit, si pendere iusta
incipit, evertitque arces respectus honesti.
exeat aula,
 qui vult esse *pius*. *virtus et summa potestas*
non coeunt. semper metuet quem saeva pudebunt.

All the key-words, except *aequum*, are there. Is this merely coincidence? I do not think so, but rather that, when Lucan composed those lines, he had in his young mind the recollection of the *partes suadendi* as he had learnt them at school.

The speeches in Lucan form approximately a third of the poem, but it has been my object to select those for which parallel evidence from the schools could be found, or which showed marked declamatory characteristics. We do not, of course, know to what extent declamatory rhetoric had already pervaded the historical sources which Lucan may have used, such as the lost books of Livy, or Pollio, on the Civil Wars. Particularly, they may have themselves included speeches which could have served him as models; if this was so to any extent, then we should have to admit that declamatory influence may have been partially indirect. But this possibility should not, I think, be over-estimated, for the following reason. It seems quite as likely that Silius Italicus used mainly the third decade of Livy as that Lucan mainly used the later books on the Civil War.⁷⁴ The proportion of speeches in each poem is much the same. But a careful comparison of the speeches in Silius with Livy's work has shown that Silius used a large measure of independence, often fashioning speeches where there was only an indirect re-

⁷⁴ For Livy, cf. R. Pichon, *Les sources de Lucain* (Paris, 1912); cf. now O. A. W. Dilke, Introduction (to Book VII), pp. 10-11, 30-1. For Silius, Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, II, § 405.

port, or no speech at all, in Livy, according as the situation seemed to offer rhetorical possibilities.⁷⁵ This seems to suggest that Lucan, too, may have relied, in the main, upon his own inventiveness and the oratorical training which he had received. To sum up, he was influenced by that training for both good and ill; for good, in his power of terse and striking expression, and in his virile eloquence; for ill, in his occasional affectation or even puerility, and particularly in the wild hyperbole of some of his descriptions. What Quintilian (X, 1, 98) said of Ovid's *Medea* might well be applied to Lucan's poem: *videtur mihi ostendere quantum ille vir praestare potuerit si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset.*

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⁷⁵ See R. Rebischke, *De Sili Italici Orationibus* (Diss., Königsberg, 1913), pp. 139-40.

ORATORUM AETATES.

In two recent publications¹ Professor E. Badian has castigated an article of mine (*A.J.P.*, LXXVII [1956], pp. 376 ff.; LXXVIII [1957], p. 89), in which, following the lead of E. D'Arms, but, as I hoped, improving on his conclusions, I took seriously Cicero's statement that his object in the dialogue *Brutus* was *oratorum genera distinguere aetatibus* (74), in the hope of establishing the chronological limits within which Sp. Thorius, proposer of an agrarian law (136), must fall.² The problem of the Lex Thoria, as Badian hints (*Studies*, p. 235), can be a bore: it is difficult and tantalizing rather than of great ultimate importance, and, though I cannot forbear to add a few comments on it as an appendix to this article, I no longer have much confidence in my own or any other interpretation of the relevant evidence. These facts, combined with my respect for Badian's learning, enjoyment of his wit, and above all sympathy with his imaginative and refreshing approach to the period of Roman history with which we are concerned, would have tempted me to let the matter rest. However, even ironical hyperbole scarcely justifies Badian's general comment on the chronology of *Brutus*: "That there is a vague chronological pattern in the *Brutus* is obvious: on the whole it moves from the beginnings to Cicero's own day. But there are so many cross-currents . . . that the order in the *Brutus* will not help in fixing the chronology of a man or an event not otherwise chronologically anchored" (*Studies*, p. 241, n. 11). Much depends, of course, on what degree of precision is implied in "fixing" (cf. n. 4 below). None the less I believe that Badian has here gone much too far, and since some suggestive chronological indications in *Brutus* appear to have been overlooked even by Münzer,³ a reply is called for.

¹ "From the Gracchi to Sulla" in *Historia*, XI (1962), pp. 197 ff., especially pp. 211 ff.; *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 235 ff., especially p. 241, n. 11.

² An *aetas* is very narrowly defined, cf. *Brutus*, 307, where each of three orators born between ca. 150 and ca. 130 belongs to a different *aetas*.

³ Sometimes his conjectures about identities and dates are supported by the interpretations of *Brutus* which I shall offer.

When he wrote *Brutus*, Cicero was as excited by Atticus' *Liber Annalis* and the chronological researches of Varro and possibly Nepos as any modern scholar by *Adelsparteien* or *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* or by Badian's own contributions in this field. His interest in chronology is almost obsessive. Few pages, apart from the digressions into literary criticism and polemic, lack chronological indications. Of course, as Badian says, the actual arrangement and sequence of orators is affected by such things as "grouping by subject-matter and by association other than chronological," to which may be added the artistry which made Cicero well aware of the danger of repelling a reader by a "close concatenation of proper names." Yet there is a clear framework, more detailed as the work proceeds. I propose to demonstrate this. It will emerge that Badian's enchanting comparison of my earlier attempts in this vein to "a defence of pre-Copernican astronomy" is even neater than its author may have intended. The trouble with pre-Copernican astronomy was not that it imposed order on what was actually chaos, but that, rightly suspecting that there was order, it found the wrong answer. I still think that *Brutus* can help in fixing chronology, though one must not attempt to prove too much,⁴ but my earlier conclusions certainly must be modified.

Since neither D'Arms nor I, nor, so far as I know, anybody else has treated this question broadly enough, I propose to start with M. Cornelius Cethegus, cos. 204 B. C. (*Brutus*, 57 ff.), the first *quem exstet et de quo sit memoriae proditum eloquentem fuisse et ita esse habitum*. After him comes old Cato (61 ff.) *qui annis ix post eum fuit consul*, and after Cato, his contemporaries arranged in four groups: (i) the *grandiores natu*, some of them named earlier and now rapidly passed over (77), (ii) Cato's near contemporaries, (iii) the *minores natu*, consuls from 177 to 153 B. C. (78-80), and (iv) the much younger contemporaries of the long-lived censor (*vivo Catone minores*), men who were consuls in Cato's old age or just after his death (81 ff.).

⁴In my earlier article I was almost excessively anxious not to overstate my case. I hoped merely to show that the view that Thorius was tribune ca. 119 (a view no longer defended by specialists but seriously discussed and even accepted in older books still widely used) was untenable, while D'Arms' very late dating to ca. 100 was not required by his method. 111 remained a feasible date, and I argued that this interpretation was not inconsistent with the other evidence.

Now, though Cicero makes many references to consular years, arrangement *within* these groups is less by chronology than by association, e. g. the famous cases which brought together L. Cotta, Scipio Aemilianus, Ser. Galba, and C. Laelius. But such deductions as Martha's refusal to identify Q. Fabius Labeo, a member of the last group, with the consul of 183 do not impose a pattern on reluctant text. They merely take note of what Cicero actually says.

After a digression comes a group (94-126) in which the earliest consulship belongs to 148 B. C., the latest to 105 (P. Rutilius Rufus). The Gracchi and their period are covered here. Indeed one may divide the passage into two sections, the first culminating in Ti. Gracchus, the second in Gaius. Now it is pretty clear that Cicero takes the Gracchan troubles as his focus of arrangement, even if one does not follow Fraccaro in supposing that he took names direct from a Gracchan annalist. The most striking case in point—the only really striking chronological upset in *Brutus*⁵—is P. Lentulus, cos. suff. 162 B. C. who is firmly associated by his appearance in § 108 with the Gracchan period, in which he had indeed as a very old man played a notable part (Cic., *Phil.*, VIII, 14; Val. Max., V, 3, 2 f.). Again, consuls of the 140's appear in two well-separated groups, the latter including several best known for their involvement in the career of Ti. Gracchus. Further, M. Livius Drusus, who was *consul* in 112, is linked with his opposition to C. Gracchus as tribune. In sum, nothing so far suggests any qualification to Badian's view that the chronology of *Brutus* cannot fix a man or event not otherwise "anchored," though almost all the dislocations, *given* our other information, can be easily explained.⁶

⁵ Except possibly M. Calpidius (274 ff.): but see below.

⁶ Despite the risk of further strictures from Badian on my "complicated manoeuvres," I mention some. They include the pairing of brothers or father and son (*Brutus*, 94, 95, 99, etc.), the rounding-off of a non-consular group with a statement that T. Flamininus (cos. 123) calls for little comment (109), the similar eight-word "footnote" on the insignificant L. Fufidius (113), and the transition from the Stoic Rutilius to the Stoic Tubero (117), who by Cicero's normal methods ought as a failed candidate for the praetorship to follow the praetor Curio. That Fufidius and Tubero are mentioned parenthetically is clear: they are absent from Cicero's list of orators to be discussed at this point (110).

But the key to understanding Cicero's methods in the remainder of the work is to be found in an apparent dislocation which is at first sight more upsetting for any attempt to modify Badian's statements. That is the occurrence in the "Gracchan" groups of M. Scaurus (cos. 115) and P. Rutilius (cos. 105). Both belong elsewhere if one follows custom and looks simply to consular dates, a tendency encouraged by the fact that before this period very few of the orators mentioned had not held the highest office.⁷ The consuls of 120-110 B. C. mainly appear at §§ 127 ff. and those of the succeeding decade, but *not* C. Fimbria, cos. 104, at §§ 132 ff. But Rutilius is known to have been delayed by a decade on his road to the consulship: like Scaurus, his successful competitor, he was born *ca.* 160. Fimbria, too, a *novus homo*, was a slow mover: hence Cicero's comment on his appearance (129) along with the consuls of the preceding decade, *temporibus isdem fere sed longius aetate proventus*.⁸ The placing is by date of birth. Whatever the precise sources of information available to Cicero on this matter, the *Leges Annales* ensured that Roman politicians were as conscious of such dates as any graduate of his "year" or "class." We must notice too that as more non-consulars make their appearance, Cicero follows generally the plan of grouping by status, consulars preceding non-consulars. So Scaurus appears before his near-contemporaries, the praetor Curio and the tribune C. Gracchus. The reason why he is separated from other consuls of 121-112 will appear later: I was quite wrong about this in my earlier article.

I propose now to pass over the passage in which Thorius appears (127-37), in order to show that after that point we can by simply applying the two principles of birth-dates and grouping by status detect in Cicero's arrangement a taut chronological sequence, indeed a pattern of which the outlines are so clear and firm that we can fill in confidently some blanks as to dates and identities. To establish the pattern, we need only (i) the information provided by Cicero himself, (ii) our own generally much wider knowledge of the period, (iii) the assumption that

⁷ Hitherto only P. Lentulus (a mere mention of the name), presumably the praetor of 203 (77), the textually doubtful Ser. Fabius Pictor (81), and the Q. Fabius Labeo (*ibid.*) mentioned above.

⁸ Hence I withdraw all my hesitations about identifying Cicero's Fimbria with the consul of 104 (*op. cit.*, p. 383).

we tend to have information when a Roman *nobilis* who reached the consulship did not do so *suo anno* or very soon thereafter. It will then be appropriate to consider whether the pattern extends back to the passage in which Thorius appears, or whether after all we must be content to accept that (as one might expect of so elusive a character) we can say no more than that he comes at a point where Cicero is in transition from loose grouping by association to his tauter chronological sequence. In considering what follows, the reader should not be misled by the proportions of my account. I shall generally do no more than mention in their turn and often as whole groups the very large number of orators in whose placing the basic pattern is evident, inevitably devoting the greater part of my space to a small number of particularly interesting figures. Of that small number, it is again to be noted, only three, C. Titius, L. Torquatus, and M. Calidius, have to be discussed because they appear to present problems for my interpretation: the others are of interest because my interpretation throws light on matters already doubtful.

Further, though for one kind of convenience I follow the order of *Brutus*, this procedure creates an inconvenience in that I must soon confront the reader with explanations of some apparently difficult or obscure cases, and this necessity may discredit my arguments especially in the eyes of those who are already suspicious of my "complicated manoeuvres." But the order of exposition was not the order of discovery. I first began to see the truth when, in writing a commentary on *Brutus*, I reached §§ 234 ff. and realized why M. Piso (cos. 61) appears with consuls of the late 70's, Pompey (cos. 70) after consuls of the early 60's. It is well known that Piso was late reaching the consulship, Pompey early. By birth-date, in Pompey's case known, in Piso's conjecturable from his quaestorship (see below), they both fit exactly where Cicero puts them. Proceeding to § 241 I met references to Q. Pompeius who, Cicero here tells us, was born in 108, and his *aequales* P. Autronius consul designate for 65 (but convicted for *ambitus*) and Staienus, quaestor in 77. The tendency to assume that these people were placed by magistracies, their description as *aequales* being merely a casual biographical footnote, led to chaos. Their *aequalitas* was the key. As I looked both forward and backward from this point, the principle of arrangement by date of birth proved (more than

once to my surprise) to be a master-key which opened one lock after another at least as far back as men born *ca.* 160 B. C., and attempts to produce a final draft of this article have been constantly frustrated by the discovery of further points which confirm my beliefs with quite unexpected precision (cf. e.g. n. 10). In almost all cases, as with Scaurus and Rutilius, the lock proved unresisting, though I do not deny that a few others (especially the three mentioned above) needed a small drop of oil.

Here then is the sequence from § 138 onwards. First, we find a long discussion (138-65) of M. Antonius, born 143, cos. 99,⁹ and L. Crassus, born 140, cos. 95, and his *aequalis* and colleague, Q. Scaevola the pontifex: *aequalis* means "born in the same year," as many later instances prove. After other consuls from the years 96,¹⁰ 94, 93, 92, born that is in the early 130's (165-6), comes a group of non-senators, Latins and Italians (167-70). This last is the first such group, and Cicero does not hesitate to include C. Titius (*eiusdem fere temporis* as the consuls of the 90's) whose *floruit* all other evidence, including Cicero's own statement in the present passage that Afranius imitated him, shows to have been not later than *ca.* 130 B. C.—there is clearly much virtue in *fere*, and historians of Roman literature have been unnecessarily troubled by Titius' apparent chronological place in *Brutus*. Cicero even includes here L. Papirius of Fregellae whose activity belongs to 177 B. C.,¹¹ but this time with more adequate warning of the chronological dislocation: *apud maiores nostros*.

We return to pattern with L. Philippus, cos. 91 (173) but already a candidate for 93, so born *ca.* 136, and L. Gellius, cos. 72 (174), but a *novus homo* and slow mover *who was also born ca. 136*, and again Cicero comments: *horum aetati prope coniunctus . . . ita diu vixit ut multarum aetatum oratoribus implicaretur*. The next group (175) consists of D. Brutus (cos. 77), L. Scipio Asiagenus (cos. 83), and Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos.

⁹ On my unnecessary perturbation (in my earlier article) at his separation from his consular colleague A. Albinus see below.

¹⁰ I. e. the consul Domitius of 96 comes *after* those of 95. Even so tiny a "dislocation" is instructive: Crassus and Scaevola were, we know, consuls two years "late," Domitius, we can now be in no doubt, *suo anno*.

¹¹ Cf. Badian, *C. R.*, n. s. V (1955), pp. 22 f.

89), in that order. What we need if my theory is to work is men born about 135-125 B. C.—the next consular figures are Cotta and Curio born *ca.* 124. Strabo presents no difficulty: if consul *suo anno* he was born in 132.¹² D. Brutus' father was consul in 138. Münzer (*R.-E.*, Iunius, no. 46) assumes that our Brutus was consul *suo anno* and so born in 120 when his father was over sixty—which is of course by no means impossible, yet I prefer to think he was consul late—the political history of the 80's may be explanation enough. Münzer (*loc. cit.*) refers to his taking part in the riots of 100 as a young man, citing *Rab. perd.*, 21 but Cicero there says nothing about Brutus' *age*, while being specific about *Q. Catulus admodum tum adolescens* who was born just before 120. Scipio Asiagenus must have been born by 126. In a brief digression about jurists Cicero introduces two non-consulars carefully indicated as of an older generation. In fact one of them, C. Billienus might have become consul *nisi in Marianos consulatus et in eas petitionis angustias incidisset*, i.e. he was praetor by *ca.* 105 and so born *ca.* 145. After him (the digression being over) we have Cn. Octavius, cos. 87, born by 130. Despite the evidence already offered it might be rash to assert that Cicero's arrangement means that Scipio and Brutus were both actually older than Pompeius and Octavius who preceded them in the consulship, i. e. born between 135 and 132, but particularly in view of their political leanings, the possibility seems nearer a probability.

The following group of non-consulars (177-80) is led in by the important figure of C. Iulius Caesar Strabo, born *ca.* 130, along with his *aequalis*, that *éminence grise* P. Cethegus. Of one other figure here the birth-date is approximately known, Q. Sertorius, born *ca.* 123. But we observe also the inclusion of Q. Lucretius Ofella, put to death by Sulla in 81 for claiming to stand for the consulship while still an *eques* (App., *Bell. Civ.*, I, 101). We are not told that he was under age, so he was born by 124. T. Aufidius (praetor *ca.* 66) *vixit ad summam senectutem*, which is almost certainly Cicero's way of hinting that he held office late: for similarly indirect language with a similar implication cf. on C. Fimbria (129) and L. Gellius (174). Next

¹² I follow A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla* (Brussels, 1958), in taking the minimum ages before Sulla to have been the same, except for the quaestorship, as they were later.

come two tribunes of 87. Although there was no fixed age for that office, a tribunate in a man's middle thirties (i.e. about the same as the minimum age for the aedileship, to which it was thought of as an alternative) was common: again our birth-dates come out right. The chronological exception is as usual indicated: the *pupil* of the unknown T. Iuventius, P. Orbius (praetor 64), is marked out as Cicero's *fere aequalis*.

We come now to a transition, plainly indicated by chronological observations, to a group of orators almost contemporary (*aequales prope modum* [182]) with the preceding. It includes Cotta cos. 75, Curio tr. pl. 90, cos. 76, and tribunes of 91, 90, and 88 in Livius Drusus, Q. Varius, and Sulpicius Rufus, all of them born between 125 and 120. Before the last of the orators so listed is dealt with (228) Cicero has digressed on various topics and included several figures not named in the original list, among them a string of *viri boni* for whose strictly oratorical prowess he is not prepared to vouch, and some *improbi* too. But again except where a dislocation of chronology is explicit, as on Quinctius and Palicanus (*ut in his perturbem aetatum ordinem*) or Saturninus, Glaucia, and Sex. Titius (*sed ad paulo superiorem aetatem revecti sumus*) (223-6), all belong closely together in terms of age, though M. Cato *pater* must have been older than those with whom he is associated (222), as, among the *improbi*, was Q. Caepio (praetor 91) (223). Even with these exceptions, it is surely worth investigating the presence here, in a close-knit group of *viri boni*, all except Cato born *ca.* 120, of the mysterious M. Octavius Cn. f. *qui tantum auctoritate dicendoque valuit ut legem Semproniam frumentariam populi frequentis suffragiis abrogaverit*.

This man (*R.-E.*, Octavius, no. 32) is usually supposed to have carried through this repeal before Saturninus put forward his *lex frumentaria* in 100. We are then free, if we wish, to emend the text of our main source for the law of Saturninus (*Rhet. Her.*, I, 21) to make Saturninus' price for corn identical with that of Gracchus (i. e. read *senis et trientibus* for the MSS *semissibus et trientibus*). It is further assumed that the bill of Saturninus was carried despite Q. Caepio's violent disturbance of the voting: *cum viris bonis* (sic) *impetum facit, pontes disturbat, cistas deicit, impedimento est quo setius feratur* (*Rhet. Her.*, loc. cit.). But I suggest that Octavius' placing in the

Brutus makes it unlikely that he was active before 100 B. C., and if he repealed *Gracchus'* law after 100, it follows (i) that Saturninus must have proposed a lower price than that in *Gracchus'* still operative law, (ii) that Saturninus' bill was not carried: the efforts of the *virī boni* were not wasted. I suggest further that since the evidence that Sulla was personally responsible for abolishing *frumentationes* is nebulous to the last degree, we may well have in M. Octavius the front man who carried the abolition. Certainly if we are looking for a Sullan *vir bonus* that is just what Cicero here gives us.

It has taken us, just as it takes Cicero, some time to get clear of the group of men born *ca.* 125-120, first introduced at § 182. We come at last (228) to Sisenna, born *ca.* 120-118, praetor 78, in his right place therefore for a man described as *inferioris aetatis*. After him Hortensius, born 114, cos. 69, makes his first appearance. But the main discussion of Cicero's great rival is for various reasons held back. Just as the long-lived and long important Cato the Censor serves as a focus for the orators of his day, so Hortensius with his long life and important career extending over nearly half a century is used to bind together the narrative¹³—but with this difference that within the framework of Hortensius' career strict chronology is much more closely observed, and Cicero takes even more trouble to make clear what he was doing and why he was doing it (cf. especially 228-9). So after a little by-play we come (231 ff.) to Hortensius' *aequalis* M. Crassus, two Lentuli (coss. 72, 71), M. Pupius Piso *cos.* 61, but another proven case of slow advancement. He was quaestor in 83, and though, before Sulla, he need not have then been fully thirty years old,¹⁴ a birth-date in or soon after 113 suits very nicely.

Of the succeeding group of non-consulars little is known, but the hypothesis of birth-dates between *ca.* 120 and 110 suits what is known or guessed, namely that L. Turius may be a

¹³ This use of Hortensius' career, with perhaps the invitation of Atticus in the dialogue to reconsider the earlier flattering judgement of Cato (292 ff.), provides the only justification that I can see for Badian's remark that Cicero "treats many an important man more than once," and not a very good one. Many orators are *mentioned* more than once, but that is not the point. There is never the slightest doubt where the main discussion of a man's oratory is to be found.

¹⁴ Cf. Astin, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

praetor of 75 (ps.-Ascon., 193 St., MSS *Furius*) and that C. Macer was born before 107. The following group of consuls is as follows: Piso and Glabrio, *aequales*, coss. 67 (born 110?), Torquatus cos. 65 (born 108?: his son, on whom see below, was born by 89: Münzer, *R.-E.*, Manlius, no. 79, advances the hypothesis of a youthful marriage of the elder Torquatus), Pompey cos. 70—but he was a notoriously *rapid* mover: he was born in 106—, Silanus cos. 62 (? born 105).

The following group of non-consulars (240-6) shows points of interest. Chronology is stressed with the first, Q. Pompeius Bithynicus *biennio quam nos fortasse maior*, i. e. born in 108; then after a number of this Pompeius' *aequales*, including two villains, Autronius corruptly elected consul for 65 and Staienus, quaestor in 77—the birth-date principle shows very clearly here—, come the Caepasii *ignoti homines et repentini*, quaestors (according to *M. R. R.*) in the 70's, born therefore *ca.* 105, and finally Q. Arrius. The Arrii are a well-known problem. A Q. Arrius was praetor in 73. Although there is evidence (Schol. Gronov., p. 324 St.) that he died the next year, some scholars identify him with a *praetorius* of 63 (Plut., *Cic.*, 15) who is very probably the Arrius whose hopes of a consulship in 58 were disappointed (and the hero of Catullus' *nobile epigramma*). Others distinguish the praetor of 73 from this latter. It should now be clear that a praetor of the year 73 is too early, for Cicero gives no hint of any straying from the narrow path that we have seen him to be taking, but a man born *ca.* 105, praetor in 65 or 64, will meet the case admirably.

So to the consuls of 61 (*M. Messalla minor natu quam nos*), 60, 57, 56. Cicero delays dealing with those consulars who died in the Civil War, though chronologically they overlap with the present group, and passes to C. Memmius, praetor 58, born *ca.* 100 (247), and then to two living consulars, Julius Caesar and M. Marcellus. These latter are the subject of a lengthy digression. A digression the passage certainly is, as is shown not only by the content: it was Cicero's declared intention to discuss no living orators, for fear of *invidia*, but the inclusion of some was required by tact or admiration, and so the Cicero of the dialogue is here interrupted by Brutus with a request to break his rule of silence.¹⁵ The normal order is restored with

¹⁵ Because the passage interrupts the chronological run, nothing can be deduced from it about Caesar's date of birth. Marcellus seems to

a return (263-4) to further non-consulars, for whom generally rather meagre evidence suggests junior office in the late 70's and so birth in the late 100's. Yet again there is an apparently significant exception to the chronological pattern that I claim to have detected. The group ends with L. Torquatus, son of the cos. 65. He was born certainly *ca.* 89 (he was praetor in 49), and so really belongs, it would seem, with the non-consulars of §§ 271-2. Appearances, however, can be deceptive. The truth is that Torquatus does not belong in *Brutus* at all. As Barwick pointed out in the introduction to his Heidelberger Texte edition (p. 6), Torquatus was killed just after Thapsus: the dramatic date of Cicero's dialogue falls just before news of Thapsus reached Rome, and that is almost certainly also the date of at least the beginning of the composition of the work. Barwick thinks that it was the date of completion also, and that Cicero revised his first draft when he heard of Thapsus and its aftermath, adding allusions to people he now knew to be dead. I think for various reasons that more probably Cicero was in the middle of writing his book when the news came and added a few such allusions as he continued, but the point is not important for the present purpose, which is that once again an "exception" not merely dissolves on inspection but actually sheds light on other matters.

The next group is that of the consulars killed in the Civil War, the oldest of them Bibulus, cos. 59, the youngest Lentulus Crus, cos. 49. They are the last consular group in the book, and are followed by the sequence of non-consulars, discussion of whom extends from § 271 to § 291, after which point come a digression and the final consideration of Hortensius, whose career is treated in parallel with Cicero's own.

The non-consular sequence includes the young Italian equites Cominius of Spoletium and Accius of Pisaurum who failed in their attempts to start a political career with a successful prosecution: Cicero's defences of Cluentius and Cornelius were too much for them. They were probably in their mid-twenties in the mid-60's B. C. when those cases were heard, and so born *ca.* 90. Next comes C. Piso, Cicero's son-in-law, quaestor 58,

have had a normal *cursus*, and there is no reason to doubt that he held his offices *suo anno*. If then he was born in 94, he was born after the dead consuls named later (267-8), and certainly after Caesar, though he is discussed by Cicero before him.

so born by 89, and finally a series of notable figures. They are: Caelius praetor 48, M. Calidius *praetor* 57 (but see below), Curio quaestor 54, therefore born by 85, P. Crassus born *ca.* 85, and the poet and orator Calvus. Calvus is not known to have held any office, but according to Pliny, *N.H.*, VII, 165, was born in 82, on the same day as Caelius. But modern scholars have often doubted the accuracy of Pliny's dating of *Caelius*, recommending a date that would give him a normal *cursus*, i. e. 88 as his year of birth. That view I confidently hold to be supported by the present passage, even if Calidius is an intruder.

But *is* Calidius an intruder? I believe on the contrary that he was born in 87. The crucial text (*Red. Sen.*, 21) must be quoted in full:

Iam vero praetores quo animo in me fuerint vos existimare potuistis, cum L. Caecilius privatim me suis omnibus copiis studuerit sustentare, publice promulgarit de mea salute cum collegis paene omnibus, direptoribus autem bonorum meorum in ius adeundi potestatem non fecerit. M. autem Calidius statim designatus sententia sua quam esset cara sibi mea salus declaravit. Omnia officia C. Septimi, Q. Valeri, P. Crassi, Sex. Quinctili, C. Cornuti summa et in me et in rem publicam constiterunt.

It has always been taken for granted that this passage provides a list of seven of the eight praetors of 57, and reasonably enough. It is true that on a pedantically literal interpretation of the text, Cicero does not *say* that Calidius or the others named after him were praetors. But we know that all the praetors of the year except one, Clodius' brother Appius (cos. 54), supported Cicero's recall (cf. e. g. *Mil.*, 39, Schol. Bob., p. 122). Is it really conceivable that the *seven* names are not those of the *seven* praetors? I should not contemplate so remarkable a coincidence, were it not for an equally remarkable (but hitherto unremarked) coincidence in our evidence for Calidius' career.

(1) On a strict interpretation of our text, not only do the words *statim designatus* not necessarily refer to the praetorship: they might well refer to Calidius' election in the summer of 57 to an office to be held in 56, especially as Cicero's main theme is the year 57 and how different it was from 58 (*Red. Sen.*, 4, 5, etc.). (2) In 51 Calidius was an unsuccessful candidate for a magistracy (*Ad Fam.*, VIII, 4, 1).¹⁹ (3) Finally, he is said

¹⁹ Moll's argument, accepted by Münzer, that the electoral defeat of

to have died as governor of Cisalpine Gaul during the Civil War (Euseb., *Chron.*, II, 137d Schoene): Brutus was appointed to that post at the end of 47. It is true that the interpretation of *Red. Sen.*, *loc. cit.* is doubtful and that we do not know that Brutus was Calidius' immediate successor. But add to the dates suggested by the above a birth-date of 87 based on his position in *Brutus*, and we have the exact sequence of minimum ages for quaestorship, aedileship, and praetorship. Can *this* be a coincidence? The failure to achieve the aedileship is of course of no significance: there being fewer aediles than praetors it could not be a compulsory part of the cursus, and Calidius' failure merely put him in a distinguished company (*Planc.*, 51).¹⁷ I fear that we are less well informed about the praetorian college of 57 than has always been thought.

I return now to the passage (127-37) in which Thorius appears. Though, as we have seen, the preceding passages show no such close chronological sequence as the latter part of the work, there has already been in regard to Scaurus and Rutilius a hint that birth-dates were beginning to play a part. It is worth seeing what happens if we apply the birth-date hypothesis to the present passage. C. Galba presents no problem nor do the consuls of the period 120-110. In my earlier article I thought that they did, but in fact only two, both consuls of 111, born by 154, a few years after Scaurus and Rutilius, the last consulars discussed, are mentioned as *orators*. The others are dragged in as victims of the *quaestio Mamilia*, and the order in which they appear is irrelevant to my purpose.¹⁸

The following group presents difficulties as long as one looks at the little that is known of careers, since only T. Albucius is known to have held office, the praetorship by 105. I now suggest that they were not, as I formerly alleged, "undatable": they are linked by birth-dates in the middle of the 150's B. C.—the last datable non-consular was C. Galba, born *ca.* 160. Their

an unnamed person referred to in *Ad Att.*, V, 19, 3 and VI, 8, 3, was that of Calidius does not affect the issue. Even if the identification is right, the question of what magistracy was at stake is still open.

¹⁷ On my hypothesis Calidius' *in Gallium* of 64 B. C. (we must now accept Asconius, p. 88 Cl. as better evidence for dating this case than the unreliable *Commentariolum Petitionis*) becomes an early speech, possibly his *début*.

¹⁸ For a similar interpolation of a group of *virī boni* of no real oratorical distinction cf. § 222.

careers overlap with those of Memmius and Thorius, but they were older men. The only direct evidence is vague enough, but consistent with my suggestion: *L. Caesulenus quem audiui iam senem* implies that Caesulenus was *senex* when Cicero was himself young.¹⁹

There follows the group that I described in my earlier article as the consuls of 109-99 B. C., thus creating a series of pseudo-problems for myself: (i) the earlier appearance of C. Fimbria (cos. 104), (ii) the later appearance of M. Antonius (cos. 99), (iii) their appearance before a tribune (Thorius) whom I wished to date to 111 and another, C. Memmius, who certainly belongs there. The principles of birth-dates and status-groupings solve all these problems.²⁰ These consuls include those of 109, 108, and 106; and Catulus, who was not consul till 102, was thrice defeated in the elections, having first been a candidate for 106, and so was a near-contemporary of these others,—all, that is, are consulars born *ca.* 150. As for A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 99) so little is known about him that anything is possible. Was he, despite Münzer's scepticism (*R.-E.*, Postumius, no. 33), the disgraced commander of the Jugurthine War rehabilitated in the passage of a decade, or another man who fell in *Marianos consulatus et eas petitionis angustias* but still ultimately attained the highest office? In any event we may conjecture that he was older than his colleague Antonius.

So to our crucial group of non-consulars. How do they fit in? They are preceded by consuls born in the early 140's. The consuls that follow, we have seen, are Antonius, born 143 and those born in 140. (The next non-consular group does not help because it includes the equestrian and Italian groups with their

¹⁹ It seems unlikely that Albucius, if born *ca.* 150, was praetor *suo anno* i.e. in 110 or even earlier. For this hypothesis to stand, his quaestor Cn. Pompeius Strabo who was to have prosecuted him would have been either impossibly young as quaestor or not (as it seems likely that he was: see above) consul *suo anno*, and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo (born *ca.* 130), who took over the prosecution, very young (though not impossibly so), if the prosecution followed closely on Albucius' governorship, as was usual. It is much easier to suppose that the *novus homo* Albucius was praetor late. In fact the accepted date of 105, which makes Pompeius, if consul *suo anno*, quaestor at the age of 27, a normal age in the pre-Sullan period, is a very good one.

²⁰ My worries about Memmius' praetorship also vanish, though the conclusions about the *Liber Annalis* stand (*art. cit.*, pp. 380-1).

deliberately widened chronological range). Of members of the group itself our only relevant information is that C. Memmius sought the consulship of 99 and was therefore born by 142 and that L. Cotta, the last of the group, was tribune in 103. We conclude that Thorius was one of a group of men who were never consuls and were born in the late 140's. This discovery adds nothing to solving the problem of the Lex Thoria. But I have not in this article been concerned with that problem but with calling the attention of modern prosopographical historians to a neglected aspect of the work of a man who, in addition to more important claims on our attention, turns out to have been their earliest extant predecessor, and no incompetent one, namely, M. Tullius Cicero. Some of them, I fancy, will scarcely relish the thought.

APPENDIX.

Sp. Thorius . . . is qui agrum publicum vitiosa et inutili lege vectigali levavit (*Brutus*, 136).

Badian (*Studies*, *loc. cit.*) attempts to show that linguistically there is only one reasonable interpretation of this, the received text of Cicero's cryptic statement about the Lex Thoria, i. e. *vitiosa . . . lege* is privative, *vectigali* instrumental. With the first view, and his reasons for it, I have always agreed. Can *lex vectigalis* be defended? Badian (*op. cit.*, pp. 237; 241, n. 4) dislikes my remark that "adjectives with *lex* often have vague or unusual meanings" (*art. cit.*, p. 388, n. 32) and my failure to give parallels. I should, I now see, have been more explicit. By "vague" I meant that adjectives with *lex* often mean merely "appertaining to," the precise relationship being determined by context. A *lex sumptuaria* restricts *sumptus*, a *lex frumentaria* organizes (or abolishes) corn-distributions. And who would guess, without being told, what a *lex annalis* was about? My "or unusual" is another way of putting the same thing: the use is vague if the adjective merely carried implications, unusual if it was felt actually to have acquired a new meaning, a delicate semantic distinction which it is scarcely necessary to pursue for the present purpose. I still do not regard Mommsen's bald denial that *lex vectigalis* is "Latin" as ending discussion—not that I really believe that one needs to worry either way, as will become clear below.

Badian further argues that the passage must have been immediately intelligible to an audience which (he maintains) knew

little of the history of the period in question, and that Cicero does not write carelessly. Granted that even at his worst Cicero wrote better than many people at their best, yet in these sections, where Cicero is hardly able to restrain his impatience to reach those heroes of his (and of no other ancient critics) Antonius and Crassus, there is much perfunctory writing, in some places almost "telegraphese." For instance, if the MSS are right at the relevant points, and I believe that they are, we twice have sentences without verbs (130, 135) and the description of C. Fimbria (129) is cumbrous, to say the least. Further, I should maintain that Cicero writes here (note the use of *is qui* rather than *qui* or a new sentence with *enim*) as if his audience *did* know about Thorius or at the most needed their memories jogged a little. And if they did know, Cicero may easily have used language that would be perfectly clear to them but to us who do not know, perfectly opaque. Everybody every day makes remarks that depend for their understanding on shared awareness of context.

At all events Badian interprets *vectigali* as "with a rent" suggesting that Cicero's judgement on the law is based on concern for the state of the aerarium. Even if he is right, Cicero's Latin remains inelegant and ambiguous—if it is Cicero's. It is time to take seriously the fact that *vectigali* is a Renaissance emendation for the impossible *vectigale* of the MSS. What change could be easier? In *Brutus* alone the consensus of manuscripts (representing the readings of the manuscript of Lodi, discovered in 1422 and soon lost again, which is the source of all our complete manuscripts of *Brutus*) has this mistake in §§ 215, 277, 282. But it has the equally common error *-e* for *-em* at §§ 11 *praesente(m)*, 162 fin. *oratione(m)*, 253 fin. *facile(m)* and (probably) *-a* for *-am* in 261 fin. If we read *vectigalem*, we make the adjective do a lot of work ("made subject to a rent by a . . . law"), but not more than is done by *vectigali* on any of the modern interpretations of it. The gain is that *ager vectigalis* is in itself indisputably feasible Latin (cf. *Verr.*, II, 3, 103, the *Lex Agraria* of 111, v. 66, *Ad Fam.*, XIII, 17, 1), and that the meaning is absolutely clear—no small advantage. The chief argument against *vectigali*, which is after all only an emendation of our only authority for what Cicero wrote, is that nobody is sure what it means: it is ludicrous to argue at this date that there is only one interpretation which can win the

support of reasonable and open-minded scholars: D'Arms and Badian, of course, both talk in this vein—but their translations are different. Accordingly, while awaiting with interest what Badian may say to develop his hinted doubts about the traditional interpretation of the Lex Agraria I shall for the time being incline to think that Thorius removed a rent (in 111?). In fact I now incline to go all the way with e.g. Strachan-Davidson and believe that in Appian, B. C., I, 27 *Θόριος* (or *Θόριος*) is the right reading—for Badian's arguments that *Bόριος* must go are conclusive—but the wrong man for the second law.²¹ Badian, it appears, thinks Thorius the right man, that he imposed a rent, perhaps in 111, and that the third law belongs "fifteen years" after *Gaius* Gracchus. This view is consistent with all the evidence (particularly if Badian can show that the traditional interpretation of the Lex Agraria is at fault). Yet it seems to me inconceivable that if Appian in the notorious reference to fifteen years is really summing up the whole business he should take *Gaius'* legislation as his initial date. If he is not—and I find surprising the confidence of so many scholars that he is—it is impossible to say exactly what he is doing, though I suspect that the time-reference relates to the immediately following *ἐν δίκαις ἐν ἀγρίᾳ γεγυρότες*. The *δίκαι* were the adjudications of the land-commissioners, and Appian may mean either that the commissioners were reduced to idleness in fifteen years from 133 (so Gabba postulating a lacuna containing a reference to the commissioners) or even that the Romans, the unspecified subject of the sentence, were in idleness *for* fifteen years,²² i.e. failing to work the land, because of the judicial business and consequent upheavals described by Appian in ch. 18, the fifteen years running from 133 to the abolition of the commission.

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²¹ I thus surrender the one point on which Badian approved my earlier arguments, namely that one should not emend an author and then pronounce him to have blundered. But I feel less concern about this now that Badian has convinced me that *Borius*, whose claims I half-heartedly defended in my earlier article, is mere myth: there was no such name. It would be a different matter if to suit our ideas of the history we were emending a perfectly plausible text and then calling our author a blunderer.

²² A common use of the temporal dative in post-classical Greek, and certainly possible in Appian, cf. e.g., *Punica*, 132, 134.

ORPHEUS AND THE FOURTH *GEORGIC*: VERGIL
ON NATURE AND CIVILIZATION.

The fundamental theme of Vergil's *Georgics* is the relation between man and nature. Though the poem is ostensibly concerned with giving practical advice to farmers, probably as part of the renewed Augustan interest in the soil and farming, it is far more than a didactic poem in the narrow sense of the term. As any sensitive reader of the *Georgics* will feel, Dryden's celebrated judgment, "the best Poem of the best Poet," is not to be taken lightly. The agricultural instructions are only the framework for the poet's deep exploration of larger matters: the alternation between creativeness and destructiveness, gentleness and force in the world, the pessimistic sense of human sinfulness and the hope for regeneration, the possibilities, positive and negative, for human civilization against the flawed backdrop of human history and the elemental violence of nature's powers.

These relations are expressed in part in certain contrasts of mood between the four books. Hence Book I ends with a long, gloomy excursus on the Civil Wars, pervaded by a sense of the perversity of human nature and absorbed with sin and expiation (I, 501-2):

satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontaeae luimus periuria Troiae.

And it ends with an image of violence unleashed and out of control (511-14):

saevit toto Mars impius orbe;
ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
addunt in spatio, et frustra retinacula tendens
fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.

The second book strikes a positive note with its description of a Golden Age and praise of a simple life of peace, work, reverence. The third book returns to violence again, with the theme of love, and ends amid desolation: a scene of winter barrenness and brutality (III, 349-83) and finally a long description of a plague which reduces man to a pre-civilized condition, leaving him scratching at the earth with bare hands (*ipsis / unguibus in-*

fodiunt fruges, etc., III, 534 ff.). The fourth book reaffirms order and regeneration with its account of the bee-community as a model of harmony and good government.

In recent years several suggestions have been given for understanding the unity of the four books. Such schemes as Labor (I)—Life (II)—Love (III)—Law (IV) or War-Peace-Death-Resurrection or the balance between nature's resistance to man in I and III and her cooperation in II and IV have much to recommend them,¹ although, as always with such structural analyses, there is a danger of oversimplifying and perhaps over-intellectualizing a rich and complex work of art.

The Fourth *Georgic* has its special problem. Servius, in his commentary on the poem, says that the second half of the book, the Aristaeus-Orpheus story, was added later by Vergil to replace an earlier passage that praised Gallus, a close friend and fellow-poet of Vergil who came to a bad end as prefect of Egypt and committed suicide in 27 or 26 B. C. Servius says that Vergil made the change at the orders of Augustus (*iubente Augusto*). This problem has been one of the most widely discussed questions in Vergil and unfortunately has deflected attention away from the crucial issue of the meaning of Book IV (in its present condition) as a whole. There has been a growing tendency among scholars, since Eduard Norden lent his great authority to the idea in 1934,² to discount Servius' remarks as an exaggeration and to see the Aristaeus-Orpheus episode as part of Vergil's original intention. This position has been carefully and on the whole successfully argued, and there is no need to rehearse the familiar.³ Indeed, even if one were to grant that the Aristaeus-Orpheus portion is a later addition, its thematic connections with the other books are so just and rich that one would be almost compelled to the conclusion that the "addi-

¹ For these schemes see G. E. Duckworth, "Vergil's *Georgics* and the *Laudes Galli*," *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 225-37; Brooks Otis, *Vergil, A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 153-4.

² Eduard Norden, "Orpheus und Eurydice," *Berl. Sitzb.* (1934), pp. 626-83.

³ On the thematic relevance of the Aristaeus-Orpheus episode to the *Georgics* as a whole see Duckworth (above, note 1); S. P. Bovie, "The Imagery of Ascent-Descent in Vergil's *Georgics*," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 337-58; Otis (above, note 1), pp. 143 ff. and especially pp. 187-90, 213-14, and Appendix 7, pp. 408-13.

tion" is a masterstroke which naturally completes the movement of the preceding parts of the poem.

Allowing that Vergil may have made *some* revision after Gallus' disgrace (for Servius' remarks cannot be simply disregarded), possibly the excision of some twenty lines at most, as Otis, in his recent book on Vergil, has convincingly argued,⁴ we must recognize that the poet still let the book be published as it stands. And we should not forget that Vergil was a perfectionist (he worked for seven years on the *Georgics*, a poem of little over two thousand lines), a poet intensely concerned with structural relationships, thoughtful and infinitely suggestive contrasts and balances. There is no question in the *Georgics*, as there is in the *Aeneid*, of editorial bungling and posthumous publication. The poem was given to the public as Vergil wanted it to appear. And finally the structural complexity of the work is too great, Vergil's sense of "architecture" already too well developed, to permit us to think that the work was not meant so to stand and that the contrasts and structural difficulties it contains (or seems to contain) were not intended to be significant.

Why then does Vergil juxtapose the Aristaeus-Orpheus episode with his account of the bees and why has he chosen to end the work in this way? In what sense is Book IV a unity, and how does that unity reflect on the entire poem?⁵ These are the questions to which I shall address myself here. I shall be concerned primarily with Book IV alone, both because the connections of Book IV with the other books have been more or less adequately dealt with by others and because the problem of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 408-13.

⁵ Some of these questions are keenly and pointedly phrased by R. Coleman, "Gallus, the *Bucolics*, and the Ending of the Fourth *Georgic*," *A.J.P.*, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 55 ff., especially ". . . why the *Orpheus and Eurydice*, which forms the central panel of the Epyllion, was permitted by the poet to dominate the ending of the poem and so to cast a melancholy shadow over what is otherwise a joyful and radiant work" (p. 55). But Coleman's answer is inadequate and disappointing, viz. that the episode is Vergil's tribute to Gallus, a poem such as Gallus himself might have written both as regards style and subject-matter. One can never ultimately disprove such an hypothesis (any more than one can definitely prove it); but it clashes so violently with all we know of Vergil's sense of poetic unity and structure as to be improbable or at best only a relatively minor contributing factor that might, possibly, have suggested the Egyptian setting of 287 ff.

unity *within* Book IV has been generally neglected. As I hope will appear, these questions are of some importance—*res est non parva*—for on them turn the larger questions of the tone and meaning of the poem as a whole and hence of Vergil's views on man's place in the frame of nature and the value and difficulty of man's higher achievements, of civilization itself.

II

More than any of the three previous books, the Fourth *Georgic* is only marginally concerned with practical advice *per se*. The significance of the bees lies, as Dahlmann has shown, in their similarity to and difference from man and man's political community.⁶ The metaphor that describes bee-society in terms of human society is the controlling element of the first half of the book. But here emerges the significance of the second half: bees are *not* men; the metaphor does not hold. And where the metaphor gives way, the human narrative, with human values and human suffering, breaks through.

Hence the selfless and sexless love of the bees contrasts with the passionate and all-absorbing love that man can feel. The bees' *amor* is aimed entirely at productivity (*amor . . . habendi*, 177; *tantus amor florum et generandi gloria mellis*, 205). Even procreation is seen in terms of this productivity. There is no passion, only work: *neque concubitu indulgent, nec corpora segnes / in Venerem solvunt*, 198-9. The adjective *segnes* is significant: Venus, sexual desire, would make them "sluggish," prevent them from work. And as they remain free of the involvements of sexual reproduction, so death holds no tragedy for them (206-9):

ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus aevi
excipiat (neque enim plus septima ducitur aestas),
at genus immortale manet, multosque per annos
stat fortuna domus, et avi numerantur avorum.

Bees, then, are totally reconciled to their function. Their lives subserve the ends of nature. Human as they may seem to be, they look not beyond these aims.

⁶ On the force of this basic metaphor in Book IV see H. Dahlmann, "Der Bienenstaat in Vergils *Georgika*," *Abh. Mainz* (1954), no. 10, pp. 547-62.

But the tragedy of Orpheus in the second part of the book is the tragedy of man and the tragedy of civilization. Unlike the bees, man cannot reconcile himself to the conditions of life and nature, does not accept the fundamental facts of existence, challenges death itself, even then loses the fruits of his victory because of *dementia* and *furor* (488, 495), yet is still unreconciled, still finds the laws of nature brutal, unfeeling, unjust: *ignoscenda quidem, scirent si ignoscere manes* (489). And for man the disappearance of sexual desire marks not a whole-hearted accord with nature's purposes, but despair and death: *nulla Venus, non ulli animum flexere hymenaei* (516). This line, of the doomed Orpheus, stands in pointed contrast to the happy activity and chaste energies of the bees: *nec corpora segnes / in Venerem solvunt* (198-9). Instead of the undivided confidence in the *genus immortale*, we meet in Orpheus an individual, deeply human, who loves, suffers, dies. And what survives him is precisely that which arises out of his suffering and his love, the cry after his lost beloved which echoes over the natural world, the world that, as always, outlasts human grief (523-7):

tum quoque marmorea caput a cervice revulsum
gurgite cum medio portans Oeagrius Hebrus
volveret, Eurydicen vox ipsa et frigida lingua
a miseram Eurydicen! anima fugiente vocabat:
Eurydicen toto referebant flumine ripae.

If looked at in these terms, the Orpheus episode takes on a larger significance and raises the difficult question, which interpreters of the poem have not generally asked, namely, to what extent does Vergil's ending qualify the poem's persistent hope for the reconciliation between passion and work, *amor* and *labor*.

In his recent book, Otis makes the excellent observation of the difference between the styles of the Orpheus and the Aristaeus sections of the second half of the book: the style of the *Orpheus* is "empathetic," full of feeling and sympathy; that of the *Aristaeus* is objective, less emotional, less personally involved and involving.⁷ But Otis does not draw from his analysis the logical conclusion, i. e. that Vergil means us to sympathize deeply with Orpheus as we do not with Aristaeus. It is not just

⁷ Otis (above, note 1), pp. 190-208.

that tragedy is more moving than success, but that the sufferings of Orpheus touch upon the greater complexities of the human condition and hence raise deeper questions. Aristaeus is still vaguely akin to the world of nature, to the bees he rears and regards as the glory and pride of human life (*ipsum vitae mortalis honorem*, 326). He completes the purposes of nature and is helped by its elemental powers: the sea- and river-gods to whom he is akin and even Proteus, the possessor of the *miracula rerum* (441), the things that are wondrous in the world.

Orpheus, on the other hand, is distinctly and nakedly human. No mention, in his case, of divine parentage or divine aid. He takes on himself, alone, both action and atonement. Aristaeus does almost nothing unaided, and has to be told, *magna luis commissa*, "Great are the crimes you are to expiate" (454). Not only do we "not quite realize," as Otis observes, "the crime of Aristaeus,"⁸ but we are left to wonder whether *Aristaeus himself* realizes it.

This sharp contrast between the two heroes helps account for the difficult ending of the Orpheus section. Proteus concludes his account of Orpheus in line 527, and Vergil at once resumes the Aristaeus story in his own person (528-31):

Haec Proteus, at se iactu dedit aequor in altum,
quaque dedit, spumantem undam sub vertice torsit.
At non Cyrene; namque ultro adfata timentem:
"Nate, licet tristis animo deponere curas. . . ."

(So much Proteus [spoke], and he leapt into the deep sea, and where he leapt he sent the water foaming up under his eddying plunge. But not Cyrene; for she at once addressed her frightened son: "My child, you may put sad cares out of your mind. . . .")

The abruptness of the transition has puzzled many critics. But may not this abruptness be intentional? The syntactically awkward "But not Cyrene" (530) (which even Otis thinks a mark of unskilful or incomplete revision)⁹ would then be part of this deliberate contrast, this intention to make the difference between

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 413. That Vergil might be making a *deliberately* rapid shift from one character to another in 527 ff. is also suggested by Norden (above, note 2), p. 675, although Norden does not explore the reasons for such a shift.

the two heroes and their two descents—one into life, the other into death—as sharp and harsh as possible. Orpheus, the fully human figure, is left his full measure of suffering. Aristaeus is hastily protected from grief (531), told that the Nymphs are easily amenable to supplication (535-6), and given the necessary instructions (537-47): which he speedily (*haud mora*, 548) and efficiently carries out (548 ff.). That is all we hear of Aristaeus; and at once, with the bursting out of the bees as from a womb (555-7)

liquefacta boum per viscera toto
stridere apes utero et ruptis effervere costis,
immensasque *trahi nubes*,

we are back in the first half of the book, amid the tireless, mysterious, determined cycle of nature's life and processes (58-61):

hinc ubi iam emissum caveis ad sidera caeli
nare per aestatem liquidam suspexeris agmen
obscuramque *trahi vento mirabere nubem*,
contemplator.

This significant verbal echoing between the two halves of Book IV is only one of many links between them.

III

The contrast between Orpheus and Aristaeus, then, is crucial to the broader meanings of the Fourth *Georgic* and of the *Georgics* as a whole. On these two center the recurrent themes of the poem: the interplay between man's control over nature and nature's independence—often destructive independence—from man. In them meets and culminates the poem's opposition between work and wonder; and from this opposition derives a still more pervasive tension, both stylistic and thematic, in the *Georgics*, that between practical advice and poetical description, toil and beauty. Hence of the two heroes, the one is an agricultural figure, a *pastor*, and, according to the literary tradition, an agricultural god; the other is an artist, indeed *the artist par excellence*, often used by Vergil himself in the *Eclogues* as the symbolic prototype of the poet (see *Ecl.*, 3, 46; 4, 55; 6, 27-30 and 82 ff.).

But these oppositions are brought together only in a third

person. It is through the traditionally elusive figure of Proteus that the two heroes confront one another symbolically in the narrative, that their separate and opposed destinies are interwoven. Proteus is an evasive, but essential key to the poem, indeed more important than most commentators have seen. In order to understand Book IV fully, we must here consider his role and character.

Norden showed decisively that, as far as the narrative itself is concerned, Proteus is really superfluous.¹⁰ Aristaeus' mother, Cyrene, does indeed say (398) that Proteus will give *praecepta*, the needed practical instructions. But, as has been seen above, he leaps abruptly away at the crucial moment (527 ff.), and it is Cyrene who in fact gives the *praecepta* (531 ff.), which forthwith prove their efficacy. Thus Cyrene has known what to do all along. She has not needed Proteus at all.

Vergil, then, has another reason for introducing Proteus and making him the narrator of the moving tale of Orpheus. First, obviously, Aristaeus is required thus to prove himself by a difficult ordeal. But, more important, Proteus' role as narrator sets him in different relations to Aristaeus and Orpheus respectively. To Aristaeus, by whom he has been forced to speak, he stands in the relation of an accuser, almost a judge; and his first words are words of accusation, a demand for atonement (453-6):

Non te nullius exercent numinis irae;
magna luis commissa: tibi has miserabilis Orpheus
haudquaquam ad meritum poenas, ni fata resistant,
suscitat, et rapta graviter pro coniuge saevit.

Toward Orpheus, on the other hand—*miserabilis Orpheus* is, significantly, Proteus' way of introducing him—he is warmly sympathetic and full of pity, an admirer, and a vindicator of his rights. Here, then, emerges the significance of the different styles—the “empathetic” and the “objective”—of the two narratives.

Proteus' divided relationship takes on further meaning in the light of his symbolic associations, both those inherent in his figure and those Vergil has particularly exploited. The mysterious, symbolic aura around him goes back to the *Odyssey*; and if any figure in the *Georgics* is symbolic, it is he. He seems to occupy a middle ground between god and animal and to exist in

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 652-4.

a realm between myth and nature. He is connected with the primal forces of nature, and like them he is ambiguously both helpful and recalcitrant. He is a god, held in the highest reverence, endowed with profound and mysterious knowledge, a seer and a prophet (391-3):

hunc et Nymphae veneramur et ipse
grandaevus Nereus: novit namque omnia vates,
quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox ventura trahantur.

As a *vates*, a word meaning poet as well as seer, he has some affinity with Orpheus, the inspired poet. Yet he belongs to the animal world too: he seeks shelter in caves (429), companionably pastures his foul-smelling seals (395), and dwells with "the wet tribe of the vast sea" (*vasti circum gens umida ponti*, 430). His ability to change into the basic substances of fire and water connects him with nature's elemental processes (441-2):

omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,
ignemque horribilemque feram fluviumque liquentem.

These *miracula rerum* (a deliberately ambiguous and suggestive phrase) are perhaps to be associated with the wonder of life which surrounds the bees in the first part of the book (see *admiranda spectacula rerum*, 3; *mirabere*, 60 and 197, etc.).¹¹

Proteus, then, has about him something of the ambiguity, wonder, ungraspable mystery of life itself. One should not try to give too narrow or definite an interpretation to his role, for his dominant characteristic, after all, is changefulness of shape; and only bold and desperate heroes have sought to lay hold of him until he should return to his true and enduring form.

It is this mysterious figure whom Aristaeus is commanded to force. He is explicitly told that he must use violence (398-400):

nam sine *vi* non ulla dabit praecepta, neque illum
orando flectes; *vim* duram et vincula capto
tende; doli circum haec demum frangentur inanes.

The language of the attack itself puts the reader on the side of Proteus rather than of the hero. Vergil seems sympathetic to

¹¹ Vergil's emphasis on the "wonderful" (*admiranda*, etc.) in his account of the bees is well brought out by Dahlmann (above, note 6), p. 555.

Proteus and emphasizes the violence done him: he is old and tired, and the youthful attacker's *clamor* comes abruptly and harshly upon his midday rest (437-40):

cuius Aristaeo quoniam est oblata facultas,
vix *defessa senem* passus componere membra
cum *clamore* ruit *magno*, manicisque *iacentem*
occupat.

And the calm of the preceding simile (433-5), the comparison of the seals to sheep bleating in their mountain steading toward evening, makes Aristaeus even more of the violent and pitiless intruder.

Proteus' first words are in keeping with this tone of outraged peace, for he calls Aristaeus *iuvenum confidentissime* (445), "O most audacious of youths" (*confidens* seems to have a predominantly negative, rather than positive, sense from the time of Cicero). There is a subtle economy of narrative here, for Vergil, in showing us Aristaeus in action against Proteus, perhaps points retrospectively to that same quality of boldness, enterprise, trust in his power to act and compel that led him to pursue Eurydice and indirectly caused her death. Vergil tells us very little of Aristaeus' crime—the crime for which he is consulting Proteus—scarcely more than that Eurydice "fled from him headlong" (*dum te fugeret per flumina praeceps*, 457) and in her flight was bitten fatally by the snake. Yet the sketchy indication of Aristaeus' *confidentia* in the Proteus-episode is enough to provide a delicate hint at a quality of mind that separates him from Orpheus.

Aristaeus' treatment of Proteus, then, has larger ramifications within the framework of the *Georgics*. Aristaeus is the man of work and action; and his attack upon Proteus symbolically reflects man's confidently active effect upon the quiet and mysterious powers of nature, the realm of the *miracula rerum* wherein Proteus exists (441).

Orpheus, on the other hand, stands at the opposite pole from Aristaeus in his gentler relation to the world. He makes no attempt to use nature for his own ends, to work upon it. His task as poet is not work, but beauty; not control, but sympathy. This difference is essential to the meaning of the Fourth *Georgic*. It is strongly and beautifully conveyed in the simile of the

grieving nightingale to which Vergil, toward the end of his narrative, compares the mourning Orpheus (511-15):

qualis populea maerens philomela sub umbra
amissos queritur fetus, quos durus arator
observans nido implumis detraxit; at illa
flet noctem, ramoque sedens miserabile carmen
integrat, et maestis late loca questibus implet.

The second and third lines (512-13) are especially significant, for the bird is seen as a victim of man's vigilant and unfeeling work upon nature, a victim of the *durus arator*.¹² Hence Orpheus, through the bird-simile, reveals a perspective on the world different from that of Aristaeus. He shows us the relation between man and nature from the point of view of *nature*, not man. Through him animate nature, given a voice, renders back the nature-centered, not the man-centered, view of things. So it is that even at his death Orpheus stands in a special intimacy with the natural world: the river carries his head and the banks reecho his lament (523-7).

Yet it is Proteus, the wise and far-seeing narrator, the *vates*, who is the fulcrum for this basic difference between the two mortal heroes and the attitudes they embody. In his symbolic connection with the primal quietudes of life, he is violated by the bold and demanding energies of the man of work and productivity, *pastor Aristaeus*.

From Aristaeus Orpheus is strongly differentiated by his "unproductive" way of life, his gentler relation to the world, and the implications of the nightingale-simile. And not only is he not connected with productivity, but he is soon to relinquish entirely that concern with life and procreation which it is Aristaeus' concern to foster (*nulla Venus, non ulli . . . hymenaei*, 516). He too, like Proteus, like his own Eurydice, like the nightingale, is a victim of Aristaeus and what Aristaeus stands for: he suffers from man's activism.

¹² The role of the birds in this portion of the *Georgics* is noteworthy. A reference to birds occurs at the beginning of the whole episode in connection with the change from winter's barrenness to spring's richness (306-7). Then a bird simile is used at the beginning of the description of Orpheus' descent to Hades (473-4, the famous comparison of the dead to birds gathering in the leaves); and finally the nightingale simile (511 ff.) concludes the account of the descent.

But Orpheus' sufferings are not due entirely to Aristaeus. He too is expiating a wrong of sorts that he has committed. Indeed, that part of his own nature that is active, restless, demanding, is the cause of his deepest unhappiness. In the *dementia* and *furor* that cause him to look back and hence lose Eurydice (488, 495), he shows his kinship (faint though it may be) with Aristaeus: a lack of that quiet trust in the processes of nature which plants and animals have. Aristaeus, with all his rashness—and in part *because of* this rashness—still has perhaps something of this trust, a trust that befits an Arcadian shepherd and is the positive side of his *confidentia*. Hence he succeeds in his attempted "rebirth" (the regeneration of the bees) as Orpheus fails in his (the revival of Eurydice).

There seems at first to be a contradiction here, but it is a contradiction inherent in the nature of things, one which Vergil does not oversimplify. It is the essence of his mythic form that it enables the poet to present life's eternally conjoined polarities in all the truth of their complexity. Mythic poetry of this caliber celebrates life's generous and mysterious wholeness: life embraces and surmounts the opposites it contains.

So it is with the contrasts between Orpheus and Aristaeus. There is, on the one hand, the saving simplicity in Aristaeus' *confidentia* that manifested itself earlier in his boyish complaint about the dead bees (326-32). And what he is asking is, after all, in accordance with nature's laws, the alternation of death and regeneration, barrenness and fruitfulness. Orpheus, the more complex and inward figure (Vergil significantly keeps him silent, save for his final *a miseram Eurydicen*, 526) makes demands which are counter to these laws. Aristaeus' rashness and energy, then, are still ultimately in the service of nature. Orpheus, more fully human and hence more tragic, seeks the fulfillment only of an intensely personal, peculiarly human need—the passionate and individualistic love from which Aristaeus' bees, nature's most efficient creatures, are singularly free (197 ff.).

Through the contrast with Aristaeus, then, Orpheus is linked, also for contrast, with the bees of the first half of the book. Aristaeus and the bees on the one side, Orpheus on the other stand in a complementary relation: Orpheus' *amor* does not further nature's aims of reproduction. He has *amor* without pro-

creation, a peculiarly human, inward and soulful form of *amor*; the bees have procreation without *amor* (in the human sense).

Yet the sad fate of Orpheus and the *furor* and *dementia* associated with him (488, 495) indicate that Vergil's attitude is more complex. Neither Aristaeus nor Orpheus is a faultless model for the right relation to nature's demands. Indeed the Ciconian matrons who tear Orpheus apart are not condemned outright. The narrative suggests shock and horror, to be sure, but not condemnation (520-2):

spretae Ciconum quo munere matres
inter sacra deum nocturnique orgia Bacchi
discerptum latos iuvenem sparsere per agros.

The *matres* (and the fact that they are *matres* is significant in the light of the key theme of reproduction and the continuity of life) do not simply commit murder: they perform a religious act of a sort (*inter sacra deum*, etc., 521) and vindicate nature's laws. The question of condemnation does not arise, for they are instruments of nature's irrepressible surge. Hence they reveal too the brutality and horrifying elemental force with which nature can reclaim its own.

There is perhaps another implicit criticism of Orpheus' behavior in the lines that immediately precede this description of his death (516-19):

nulla Venus, non ulli animum flexere hymenaei:
solus Hyperboreas glacies Tanaimque nivalem
arvaeque Rhiphaeis numquam viduata pruinis
lustrabat. . . .

The juxtaposition of *nulla Venus* and the barren winter waste is suggestive. Orpheus' rejection of Venus, the life-force, associates him with the sterility of winter. It is into the desolate wintry landscape that he goes to escape Venus and to live out his own "widowed" life (note *viduata*, of the snowy fields, 518). The passage recalls the powerful description of winter in the Third Book (349-83), especially lines 381-2:

talis Hyperboreo septem subiecta trioni
gens effrena virum Rhiphaeo tunditur Euro.

The contrast between the life and activity of IV and this lifeless inertia of III is one of the important structural contrasts of

the poem. Hence Vergil, without suggesting anything so strong or specific as that Orpheus' attitude may bring a recurrence of such barrenness, yet points to a subtle connection between an aspect of Orpheus and the harshness and barrenness from which Book IV has moved away.

Neither Aristaeus nor Orpheus, then, represents in himself a fully valid image of man in his relation with his world. The ideal lies, if anywhere, in a balance between them. But Vergil is seeking not to define an ideal, but to state a basic reality. And over against both Orpheus and Aristaeus, the two men who have such different relations to nature, stand the bees of the first half of the Book, full of self-restraint and self-sacrifice, partaking, with unthinking and untroubled instinct, of the given morality of nature. What emerges is the sense of the complexity of man between the two extremes of Aristaeus and Orpheus, external effectiveness in the realm of nature and devotion to man's peculiar inward capacities: emotion, art, love.

If this analysis of the differences between Orpheus and Aristaeus is valid, there appears another explanation for the apparent contradiction in the narrative. Proteus, it will be recalled, tells Aristaeus that he must expiate his crime against Orpheus (453 ff.); but Cyrene, who gives the actual *praecepta* (530 ff.; cf. 398), says nothing of Orpheus and mentions only the anger of the Nymphs (*irasque remittent*, 536; cf. Proteus' *irae* . . . *Orpheus*, 453-4). Is it again possible that this change is intentional? If so, what purpose does it serve?

The answer suggested by the foregoing analysis is that Vergil at the end wishes to separate the two heroes whose fates have become so closely intertwined in Proteus' narrative. Aristaeus, who reaches an accord with nature's aims, is not, ultimately, to be pulled down by the suffering and unreconciled humanity of Orpheus. Life as work and possibility will not be destroyed by life as tragedy. The positive attainments of *labor* will not be cancelled by the negative effects of *amor*. Hence Cyrene, the beneficent goddess-mother, re-enacts her sheltering role and keeps her son from a final confrontation with the tragedy of Orpheus. She performs for her son what her Homeric counterpart and literary ancestor, Thetis, cannot do for hers. Hence she mentions the appeasement of Orpheus only late in her instructions and almost parenthetically (545; cf. 553). Instead, she turns the narrative away from tragic loss and failure, the

underworld descent, mortality and death, to the Nymphs, the happy and fruitful powers of life, and to nature which restores and repairs without brooding over the past. Thus her re-appearance (530 ff.), though technically contradicting the pronouncement of the mysterious and ambiguous Proteus (453 ff.), marks a return to a positive and hopeful future.

Yet there is still the contradiction, still no full resolution of the dissonances implied in Proteus' narrative. We are still reminded at the very end that the bees' rebirth takes place out of violence, putrefaction, death: "The bees buzzed over the whole womb throughout the *putrefying* entrails of the cows and *bursting* the sides swarmed out" (*liquefacta boum per viscera toto / stridere apes utero et ruptis effervere costis*, 555-6). Characteristically Vergil leaves us with the full complexity of the situation. This is part of his deep truthfulness and his greatness. How should the poet, after all, resolve what life does not?

It may be helpful to sum up here the implications of our results for the *Georgics* as a whole. Far from being an irrelevant digression, the Aristaeus-Orpheus episode is intimately connected with the poem's main themes. In a sense it appears as *necessary* to complete the *Georgics*, for it ties together, with the complexity demanded by the subject itself, the delicate and complicated relations between human activism and nature's resistance or acquiescence, between human destructiveness and nature's creativeness (and the reverse), between man's power over nature and nature's power over man. And while both Aristaeus and Orpheus have, as men, some measure of control over and independence from nature, both are united as parts of nature's realm in their participation in the renewal of life, the most mysterious and least humanly controllable (as both learn) of nature's processes.

IV

Despite the apparently limited frame of the *Georgics*, then, their riches and complexities are profound, and Vergil already exhibits that depth and fineness of insight that characterize the *Aeneid*. In the Fourth *Georgic*, in fact, he is already dealing with some of the issues of the *Aeneid*. To equate Aristaeus with the active Augustan ruler, Orpheus with the poet or artist is an oversimplification (though it is with this contrast—the poet in his leisure, Augustus winning battles and giving laws—that

Vergil ends the *Georgics*). But the *Aeneid* too is concerned with the delicate balances between inner life and external effect on the world, there rephrased in part to a contrast between humanity and duty. In the single character of Aeneas Vergil fuses together (though does not always resolve) the opposites which in the *Georgics* are separated into two in the figures of Orpheus and Aristaeus. The Aeneas who suffers loss and through loss feels the inestimable preciousness of his human ties, the precariousness of life, the futility of success without love—the Aeneas who comes to sense the *lacrimae rerum* and who describes (in lines partly taken from the *Orpheus* of the *Fourth Georgic*) the pain of his final parting from his wife, a disappearing ghost now infinitely beyond him, *par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno* (II, 794)—this Aeneas is foreshadowed in Orpheus. But the Aeneas who is aided by his goddess-mother, who confidently lifts the shield of Rome's destiny on his shoulders (VIII, 731), who at the end seems to submerge his *humanitas* in the act of bloodshed that seals the success of his mission—this Aeneas is anticipated in Aristaeus.

And just as Vergil in the *Fourth Georgic* has separated what is later to be fused with greater complexity into a single figure, so his style is divided: the heroic, "objective" style of success, Homeric achievement and impact on the world for Aristaeus; the subjective, "empathetic" style for the private tragedy and aloneness of Orpheus. It is the essence of Vergil's *humanitas* that he gives us both figures, just as he gives both Aeneases. If one may paraphrase a modern parable, the two figures, the successful hero and the tragic lover and poet, the hero who serves destiny and mankind and the individual who suffers within himself, are "two locked caskets, of which each contains the key to the other."¹³

The *Fourth Georgic*, then, poses the question to be put more sharply and more profoundly in the *Aeneid*: the question of happiness for a being whose life moves both in an inner and an outer world, the value of success in the service of nature or destiny as weighed against the continual losses within the personal realm—losses of loved ones, friends, feeling itself—losses that are the price of conquest and achievement.¹⁴ In contrasting

¹³ Isak Dinesen, "A Consolatory Tale," in *Winter's Tales* (repr. New York, 1961), pp. 308, 311.

¹⁴ This contrast between Orpheus and Aristaeus is sensitively de-

the two journeys and the two styles, Vergil suggests the largeness and complexity of man's condition both as a creature of the natural world and as a being endowed with an inner life, both a creature who furthers nature's ends, throws himself into the struggle for life, and a being who negates those ends by his equal capability for unreasoning passion as for love, art, devotion.¹⁵ But, more profoundly, what the Orpheus-Aristaeus episode does is to suggest—and Vergil's way is always to suggest—that human life framed between the two figures may be *essentially* tragic. And here emerges the significance of the first half of the book, the bees: instead of collectivity selflessly devoted to the *genus immortale*, we have in the second part individuals engaged in their personal emotions almost to the exclusion of everything else, individuals who not only do not continue the race, but themselves die when their intensely personal passion is frustrated. Even Aristaeus feels the loss of his bees with an intensity that blindly blots out the rest of life, throws to the winds nature's demand for continuity and self-preservation (329-32):

quin age et ipsa manu felicitis erue silvas,
fer stabulis inimicum ignem atque interfice messis,
ure sata et validam in vitis molire bipennem,
tanta meae si te ceperunt taedia laudis.

If Aristaeus is seen from this point of view, the differences between him and Orpheus become less than the difference between both of them, taken together as men, and the world of the bees.

This thematic contrast of man and bees involves also a stylistic contrast between the two main halves of the book, analogous to

veloped by Bovie (above, note 3), pp. 355 ff. Bovie also suggests (p. 357) some connection between Aeneas and Orpheus, but does not elaborate it.

¹⁵ The myth of Orpheus—his descent to Hades, his fatal yielding to impatience, uncertainty, passion, his ability to move the natural world by his song, and the character of his death—makes him an obvious figure to symbolize this two-sided complexity of man's nature. In this role he has continually appealed to poets and has inspired some of the most sensitive of modern poetry on this theme. See Rilke's "Orpheus, Eurydike. Hermes" and especially his *Sonnets to Orpheus*. Particularly relevant here is the beginning of I, 6:

Ist er ein Hiesiger? Nein, aus beiden
Reichen erwuchs seine weite Natur.
Kundiger böge die Zweige der Weiden,
Wer die Wurzeln der Weiden erfuhr.

that within the second half itself: the language of the first half is highly Lucretian; that of the second, more Homeric and characteristically Vergilian.¹⁶ The difference suits the contrast between the sure, unquestioned, eager fulfilment of nature's processes and the feeling realm of humanity with its passions, hesitations, failures. This difference corresponds also to that between the light and humorous tone of the first half of the book and the tragic coloring of the second half. It is a contrast between the didactic and the mythic styles, but with a curious inversion: the "real" world of bees and practical instruction is lively and happy; the "ideal" world of myth and poetry is filled with death and disaster. Yet this "poetic" world is simultaneously the highest point artistically to which the *Georgics* attain; and, as Otis has suggested, the emotional, "empathetic" coloring of the Orpheus episode is a kind of stylistic culmination of the work. But the price of feeling is separation from nature, challenge of her laws, refusal to heed the universal demand for the preservation and continuity of life.

It is curious, then, that Vergil should end the *Georgics* with the alienation from nature that man's very humanity creates. This alienation is anticipated in the ending of III, where a sub-human brutality brings a fearful coarsening of the relation between man and nature (see III, 373-80).¹⁷ Book IV carries the problem to a profounder level, to the question of whether such a separation may not be inherent in the nature and condition of man. To have arrived at this view and then to look back at the simple and joyful world of the *Eclogues* in the closing lines of the *Georgics* is a touch worthy of the highest poetic genius (563-6):

illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis oti,
carmina qui lusi pascorum audaxque iuventa
Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi.

The poet who could so easily confide in that trustful and easy interchange between man and nature that characterizes the pastoral view looks back on himself from the higher, but more sombre and clouded vantage-point of the *Georgics* as, indeed *audax iuventa*.

¹⁶ See Norden (above, note 2), pp. 631-5; Bovie (above, note 3), p. 354.

¹⁷ On the significance of this passage see Otis (above, note 1), pp. 178 ff.

This more personal and gentle ending mitigates the tragic and negative elements in the Fourth Book, as does, to be sure, the success of Aristaeus' atonement. But the irreconcilables, the unbridgeable gulf between soul and instinct, nevertheless remain. They give the poem a perhaps more pessimistic coloring than many commentators would admit.¹⁸ All is not confidence in Augustan renaissance. Pessimism, however, is too crude and inadequate a word. It is rather that a deep perception of an eternal truth underlies and qualifies whatever hope for the specific, immediate present the poem seems to contain. Recently Otis has suggested that we can regard the four books as contrasting movements of a musical composition: ¹⁹ *allegro maestoso*—*scherzo*—*adagio*—*allegro vivace*. The analogy is suggestive, but perhaps we should more fittingly label the final movement *allegro, ma non troppo*.

ADDENDUM

Friedrich Klingner's attractive book, *Virgils Georgica* (Zürich and Stuttgart, Artemis Verlag, 1963), reached me unfortunately only after this essay had gone to the printer. It is gratifying to see that Professor Klingner, taking a very different critical approach, has strongly argued for the artistic unity of the Fourth *Georgic* and the integral connection of the Aristaeus-Orpheus section with the rest (see his closing chapter, "Das Aristaeus-Finale," pp. 193-239). In discussing the relation between Aristaeus and Orpheus themselves (pp. 292 ff.), he has eloquently called attention to the complementary function of the two narratives in "einer die Gegensätze umspannenden Einheit" (p. 234); and he has put forth an interpretation of their connection which reinforces the approach offered in my study: in the Aristaeus-narrative, Klingner suggests, we have the restorative aspect of life wherein "verlorenes Leben ist nicht verloren," whereas in the Orpheus story "ist Leben dem Tod unwiderruflich verfallen, Trauer um das Verlorene ewig unstillbar" (p. 236).

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¹⁸ Coleman, for instance, in the passage quoted above (note 5), speaks of the *Georgics* as "otherwise a joyful and radiant work."

¹⁹ Otis (above, note 1), p. 151.

PLATO, *PHAEDO*, 62 A.

Since the first part of the nineteenth century this passage has received varied and conflicting interpretations, but I do not believe that it has yet been satisfactorily explained. Instead of giving my own interpretation at once, I shall first review the most important attempts of others to explain the passage, because I believe that such an analysis will point out some of the difficulties involved in its elucidation. Since the text given by our manuscripts seems to me to be correct, as it also does to almost all recent editors and interpreters, I shall not discuss earlier interpretations based on emendation or transposition.¹

It is convenient, first of all, to give a résumé of the context in which the passage occurs, for most interpretations seem to ignore it in that they are irrelevant or contradict what is said before and after the passage under consideration.

After explaining his reason for setting Aesop's fables into verse, Socrates tells Cebes that he should report this explanation to Euenus, should bid him farewell in Socrates' name, and should also tell him that if he is wise he will follow Socrates (who is going to die this very day) in all haste. Simmias expresses surprise at such a strange piece of advice and asserts that surely Euenus is not going to obey Socrates if he can help it. But, says Socrates, if Euenus is a philosopher, he as well as anybody else who is worthy of philosophy will be willing to die, although he will not do violence to himself, since it is said that to do so is not right. Cebes inquires about the precise meaning of Socrates' recommendation: how can he assert that it is not right to do violence to oneself and yet that the philosopher is willing to die? Socrates inquires whether Simmias and Cebes, being

¹ The text was emended by Schanz and by Jackson among others. Wytenbach for his part proposed to read βέλτιον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι in 62 A 4-5. I do not consider Burnet among those who emend the text, because his addition of ὅν in line 4 (the omission of which he explains by haplography) is really not necessary even for his own interpretation of the passage. See Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford, 1911), note *ad loc.*, and Verdenius, *Mnemosyne*, IV ser., XI (1958), pp. 198-9. More recently G. Müller, *Gnomon*, XXXI (1959), p. 341, assumed a lacuna between τάλλα and ἔστιν in 62 A 4, for which he proposed a supplement.

companions of Philolaus, have not heard from him anything about such matters.² Nothing definite, replies Cebes. Socrates then declares that such a discussion is fitting to the occasion and Cebes proceeds to state in unambiguous terms what it is that he wants Socrates to explain, namely, why is it unlawful to kill oneself.³ Indeed he has heard from Philolaus and also from others that one ought not to commit suicide, but from no one has he ever heard anything that would clarify this prohibition.⁴ Here Socrates says:

ἀλλὰ προθυμείσθαι χρή· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θανμαστόν σοι φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θανμαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εἶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.⁵

Cebes expresses surprise at this; and Socrates admits that when the matter is put in this way it may seem unreasonable. Nevertheless there may be a reason for it. We have what is said in the mysteries, namely, that we men are in ward and no one ought to release himself or run away. This is impressive and not easy to understand. But at least it is correct to say that there are benevolent gods and that we are among the possessions of the gods. If this is so, then, as in the case of a man who would be angry and would, if possible, punish a creature of his that without his consent put an end to himself, so a man ought not to kill himself before a god brings constraint upon him as is now the case with Socrates. Cebes accepts this explanation.⁶ But now he finds it hard to reconcile the notion that the philosopher is willing to die with Socrates' own assertion that there are benevolent gods whose possessions we are, since there is no reason why one should run away from good masters. The dis-

² τῶν τοιούτων in 61 D 7 refers only to the wickedness of suicide and not to the philosopher's willingness to die; cf. note 25.

³ Cf. *Phaedo*, 61 E 5-6, κατὰ τί δὴ οὐν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτείνουσι, ὦ Σώκρατες;

⁴ Cf. *Phaedo*, 61 E 6-9, ἥδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διηγάτο, ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὥς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

⁵ *Phaedo*, 62 A 1-7. I have given Burnet's text without accepting his addition of ὅν in line 4; cf. note 1.

⁶ Cf. *Phaedo*, 62 C 9, ἀλλ' εἰκός . . . τοῦτό γε φαίνεται.

cussion goes on with Socrates' demonstration that the two notions are not really inconsistent, but this need not occupy us at present.

It is the first part of the passage, 62 A 2-5, that presents difficulties. Some of the problems are: (a) to what does *τούτο* refer; (b) what is the meaning of the future *φανείται* and what is the relation between *ἴσως θαυμαστόν σοι φανείται* in line 2 and *θαυμαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται* in lines 5-6; (c) and perhaps the most important, how should the words *καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν* be interpreted. It is with reference to this last problem that the two major interpretations have been given, although there are important variations within each group.

The first interpretation to be reviewed here is doubtless the one that has been most widely accepted since antiquity, for it appears to have been the interpretation given by Olympiodorus and by Simplicius. The same interpretation has been maintained by Heindorf, Stallbaum, and others. What is common to this group of interpreters is the belief that what is declared to be surprising is that death is always and for everybody preferable to life.⁷ Against this Geddes⁸ raised serious objections, objections which Bluck,⁹ who recently defended this interpretation, has tried to answer. Geddes argues that the statement would introduce a paradox too abruptly, that *οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι* in line 5 followed by *τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* in line 6 shows that those for whom death is desirable are a class of men, not mankind as a whole, that the doctrine that death is universally pre-

⁷ That this was the interpretation of Olympiodorus is clear from his comment to 62 A; cf. Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem*, p. 10, 21-3 (Norvin): *θαυμαστόν σοι φαίνεται, φησὶν, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἐπαμφοτερίζοντων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν δυναμένων εἶναι, οἷον πλούτου, εἰφους, ὁ θάνατος μόνως ἀγαθός ἐστιν*. See also *Scholía Platonica*, p. 9 (Greene).

The same interpretation was given by Simplicius, *Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion*, p. 28, 33-40 (Dübner): *ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων, καὶ ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτης, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν θάνατον) εἶναι, καὶ κρείττονα τῆς μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ζωῆς, ἀποφαίνεται· οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δὲ οὐ· ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πᾶσι. λέγει οὖν ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· ἴσως μὲν θαυμαστόν σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅτε καὶ βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν*.

⁸ W. D. Geddes, *The Phaedo of Plato* (2nd ed., London, 1885), note D, pp. 213-17.

⁹ R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo* (London, 1955), pp. 151-3.

ferable to life is not Platonic. Of these objections I leave aside the third for the time being; but the first two are not satisfactorily answered by Bluck. He claims that the desirability of death has already been suggested at 61 C and that οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι is a natural way of summing-up the sense of the preceding clause (i. e. "although it is better for men to be dead"). But in 61 C it is not implied at all that death is desirable for everybody; Socrates states only that the philosopher quâ philosopher prefers death to life. So when Simmias says that Euenus will not voluntarily follow Socrates' advice, Socrates asks whether Euenus is a philosopher, and when Simmias agrees, he says, 61 C 8-9: ἐθελήσει τοίνυν Εὐηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. Moreover, when Socrates goes on to explain the desirability of death he explains it for the philosopher, *not* for humanity in general;¹⁰ and the specific reason why the philosopher is willing to die, namely, that to philosophize is to train oneself for dying and being dead,¹¹ shows that he has in mind only a special class of men. Finally, the general preferability of death is never referred to in the *Phaedo*.

So far I have confined my criticism of this interpretation to the difficulties that arise in relation to the context and to what Socrates is trying to prove. But it is questionable whether, with the text as it stands, one can extract from 62 A 3-5 the meaning required. To assert that the clause means that death is always preferable to life one really needs to insert *μόνον* before *ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς* in 62 A 4 and this is unwarranted.¹²

A different interpretation of the passage was maintained by Burnet.¹³ Burnet takes *τοῦτο* as anticipatory and construes 62 A 3-5 in the following way. *οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει* he takes with

¹⁰ Cf. *Phaedo*, 63 E ff., especially 63 E 8-64 C 3.

¹¹ Cf. *Phaedo*, 64 A 4-6, *κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι*.

¹² Cf. Geddes, *The Phaedo of Plato*, p. 214 and Tate, *C. R.*, n. s. VI (1956), p. 222. Cf. Bluck's translation (p. 43), "*only* on some occasions and in some cases." This seems to me to be even a stronger objection than the one raised by Verdenius, *loc. cit.* (note 1 above), p. 198. Verdenius objects to Bluck that "it never happens that only on some occasions" (= it happens that on all occasions) presupposes an inexplicable clumsiness of the Greek, since if this is what he meant Plato should have written *ἀεί* instead of *οὐδέποτε ἔστιν ὅτε*.

¹³ Cf. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, pp. 20-1.

βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν; βέλτιον governs τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ¹⁴ which is modified by ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς. He then translates, "it never turns out, as in other cases, that for man (that is at certain times and for certain men) it is better to die than to live." Consequently εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν in 62 A 2-3 expresses in positive form what is stated negatively in the next clause, so that τοῦτο really means τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι. Burnet considers that both the positive and the negative expressions are to be regarded as false, that is, ἵσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανέται introduces a proposition which is not true, so that what Plato really means is that it would be surprising if death were never preferable to life (or if life were always preferable to death); in fact there is nothing to be surprised at, since for some people and on some occasions death is preferable to life. Hackforth¹⁵ accepts from Burnet the interpretation of τοῦτο and of the clause οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . ἢ ζῆν (62 A 3-5). He also claims that ἵσως θαυμαστόν σοι φανέται introduces a hypothesis which Socrates regards as false. He differs from Burnet, however, in claiming that what Socrates expects Cebes to be surprised at are not two things but one thing, namely, that despite the extreme improbability of death *never* being preferable to life, suicide should *always* be sinful. Hackforth paraphrases the passage in the following way: "But I daresay you find it surprising that, whereas in this matter (sc. of life and death) the same principle holds good as in other human affairs (it would be astonishing if it did not), namely that life is not invariably preferable, but for some people and on some occasions death is so, nevertheless it should be accounted sinful for those for whom death is preferable to be their own benefactors, etc."¹⁶

There are, however, strong objections to this interpretation. While it is true that ἵσως θαυμαστόν σοι φανέται could imply that the proposition that follows is false, it certainly does not need to mean this; it could also be interpreted, as I think it should in the present case, as introducing a surprising fact.¹⁷ It seems

¹⁴ In this way Burnet tries to avoid the objection raised by Geddes, *The Phaedo of Plato*, p. 216, that it is awkward to take τυγχάνει first with a personal dative and then with a verb-clause construction.

¹⁵ Cf. R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 35-6 and especially p. 191.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 191.

¹⁷ Cf. also Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, p. 151.

to me to be unlikely that in line 2 ἵσως θαυμαστόν σοι φανείται would introduce a proposition which is not really true, whereas in 62 A 5-6 θαυμαστὸν ἵσως σοι φαίνεται introduces a proposition which is obviously true. This unlikelihood is heightened when one considers all the different ways in which Plato could have made it clear that he regarded οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν (62 A 3-5) as false. φαίνομαι with the infinitive would come closer to expressing it, and θαυμαστὸν ἂν εἶη with a past tense in the protasis would have made it perfectly obvious that Plato meant what Hackforth and Burnet think he did. If the proposition that follows ἵσως θαυμαστόν σοι φανείται is false, this could only be inferred from the context; but there is nothing in the context that suggests that what is introduced by εἰ is false. To be sure, Burnet's interpretation of the clause οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν requires that it be considered as false. But this interpretation is unnecessary and has difficulties, for it involves the pleonasm of ἔστιν ὅτε after οὐδέποτε and the shift from the singular (τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ) to the plural (ἔστιν οἷς). These difficulties are not so light as Burnet thinks they are.¹⁸ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς is emphatic, but in Burnet's interpretation it would be redundant and clumsy, since it would have been sufficient for Plato to say, "it would be surprising if life were always preferable to death." But, if this is what Plato meant to say with 62 A 2-5, why would he have used such a complicated, ambiguous, and ungrammatical way of saying it, since, as Hackforth himself recognizes, his interpretation makes 62 A 2-5 (ἵσως . . . ζῆν) subordinate in logic to 62 A 5-7 (οἷς δὲ . . . εὐεργέτην), whereas grammatically the two parts are coordinated (cf. also Tate, *C.R.*, n. s. VII [1957], p. 26)?

Equally decisive against this interpretation is the fact that it would be irrelevant in the context. One could see the point of saying something like Burnet's and Hackforth's interpretations of 62 A 2-5 if somebody had previously argued that life is, or seems to be, always preferable to death. Burnet's and Hackforth's interpretations make 62 A 2-5 say that it would be surprising if death were never preferable to life; in fact it is not surprising because sometimes and for some people death is preferable to life.¹⁹ But Socrates has already stated that the

¹⁸ Cf. Burnet, note *ad loc.*

¹⁹ But since so far there has been no statement indicating that any-

philosopher is willing to die and nobody has challenged this. The objection of Cebes in 61 D starts precisely from the fact that he does not understand how Socrates can hold that *despite* the philosopher's willingness to die it is unlawful to commit suicide.²⁰ Cebes is puzzled at the absolute wickedness of suicide, *not* at the philosopher's willingness to die; this is made clear by the reference to Philolaus and by Cebes' statement in 61 E 5-9. He only challenges Socrates' notion that the philosopher is willing to die in 62 C 9 ff., after Socrates, in order to explain the absolute wickedness of suicide, had maintained that we men are possessions of benevolent gods. Consequently, in Burnet's and Hackforth's interpretation, Socrates would be repeating in 62 A 2-7 what has been stated previously. But this cannot be the case, for it is clear that what Socrates expresses in 62 A 2-7 is something paradoxical, something that indeed surprises Cebes, and something that, as Socrates himself recognizes, may appear to be irrational when it is put in the way he has put it in 62 A 2-7.²¹ The purpose of the passage seems to be to state that the unlawfulness of suicide, being an unqualified prohibition, is a paradoxical exception to some rule; instead in Burnet's and Hackforth's interpretation this exceptional character of the prohibition of suicide is lost. Finally, neither Burnet nor Hackforth does justice to the new wording given to the wickedness of suicide in 62 A 6-7.²²

The most recent new interpretation of the passage is the one body is surprised at the philosopher's willingness to die (cf. also the text and note 20), it would have been sufficient for Socrates' purpose to start with *ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν*, rather than saying "you will be surprised if . . . it never turns out for man (I mean sometimes and for some men) that death is preferable to life."

²⁰ Cf. *Phaedo*, 61 D 3-5, *πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι*;

²¹ Cf. *Phaedo*, 62 A 8-9 and 62 B 1-2.

²² Hackforth's interpretation has been accepted by Verdenius, *loc. cit.*, p. 198. Verdenius tries to answer the criticism that Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, p. 151, raised against Burnet's interpretation. Of Bluck's four criticisms I leave aside the last three. His first objection is that *ὥς θαυμαστὸν σοι φαίνεται* seems to introduce a surprising fact rather than a proposition which is really not true. Verdenius attempts to answer this by a reference to the construction of *θαυμαστὸν εἰ*. But this is not the point at issue; for, as I have argued above, it is the context that should determine whether the proposition that follows is true or not.

given by Currie.²³ Currie thinks that *τοῦτο* refers backwards to Socrates' assertion that the philosopher is willing to die (61 C 9-10 and D 4-5); he takes *καί* in 62 A 3 as adversative and construes 62 A 3-5 as Burnet does, but he considers it to be a true statement. He translates 62 A 2-5 as follows. "Perhaps, however, it will seem strange to you that this alone (i. e. that a philosopher should wish to die) is of all things without exception, and yet it never happens, as in other matters, that on some occasions and in some cases, death (i. e. suicide) is better for man than life."

But, in the first place, *τοῦτο* cannot refer to the philosopher's willingness to die; as a matter of fact the discrepancy, or paradox, between this assertion and the wickedness of suicide, which according to Currie is what is expressed in 62 A 2-5, was already referred to by Cebes.²⁴ Socrates inquires whether Cebes and Simmias had not heard about the unlawfulness of suicide from Philolaus.²⁵ Cebes acknowledges that he has heard from Philolaus and from others that it is unlawful to commit suicide, but he has heard no clear explanation of this prohibition. To this Socrates replies with the passage under discussion. After it Socrates gives his explanation of the wickedness of suicide, and only after Cebes admits the likelihood of this explanation does he challenge the compatibility of Socrates' assertion that the philosopher is ready to die with Socrates' notion that we are possessions of benevolent gods. Secondly, if *τοῦτο* refers to the philosopher's willingness to die, then this alone of all things would be without exception; but according to Currie's own interpretation of 62 A 3-5 these lines also express a rule without exception, namely, that it never happens that suicide is better for man than life. Finally, in Currie's interpretation *τεθνάναι* means "to commit suicide," which is in itself unlikely,²⁶ but which is more than unlikely in the context when Plato has used the expressions *βιάσεται αὐτόν* (61 C 9), *ἐαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι* (61 D 4), *αὐτὸν ἐαυτὸν ἀποκτείνουσαι* (61 E 5-6), *αὐτοὺς ἐαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν* (62

²³ H. MacL. Currie, "Plato, *Phaedo* 62 A," *Hermes*, LXXXVI (1958), pp. 124-5.

²⁴ Cf. *Phaedo*, 61 D 3-5 quoted above in note 20 and what was said above in the text against Burnet and Hackforth.

²⁵ Cf. *Phaedo*, 61 D 6-7. In line 7 *τῶν τοιούτων* refers only to *τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἐαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι*, not to *ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπεσθαι*. This is shown by 61 E 5-9.

²⁶ Cf. Verdenius, *loc. cit.*, p. 198.

A. 6-7), αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτείνουσι (62 C 2), αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνουσι (62 C 6-7).

It seems that the main difficulties of the interpretations reviewed above arise from two sources. In the first place, these interpretations do not do justice to the new wording that the wickedness of suicide receives in 62 A 6-7; and these lines, as we shall see, contain the clue to the whole passage. Secondly, the interpretation of 62 A 3-5 as one clause is unsatisfactory. Taking up the last point first, it seems that what has misled interpreters is the fact that ἀπλοῦν is followed by ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς. Since ἀπλοῦν undoubtedly means something which admits of no qualification,²⁷ interpreters have thought, as Burnet specifically puts it, that ἀπλοῦν "is what admits of no distinctions such as ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς."²⁸ But it is unnecessary to think that ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς represents the general case to which τοῦτο in 62 A 2 constitutes an exception since this τοῦτο is ἀπλοῦν. I do not think that we can get a satisfactory meaning as long as we persist in taking οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν as one sentence. There is no need, however, of taking the words in this way, for it is possible to put a stop after τᾶλλα,²⁹ punctuating with a colon. In this case καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα simply explain how the τοῦτο is ἀπλοῦν. τοῦτο refers to the unlawfulness of suicide, but εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν acquires definite meaning only when we reach the second part of the passage, especially lines 6-7. This is the reason for the future φανεῖται.

Burnet and others have objected that if τοῦτο refers to the wickedness of suicide, then this would be the only thing absolutely prohibited which no one has suggested and which is absurd anyway. But the fact that τοῦτο refers backwards to the unlawfulness of suicide does not mean that this is the only thing absolutely prohibited. τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων means that "this alone of all things is without qualification," but καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα begins to tell what this "without qualification" means. All other things prohibited

²⁷ Cf. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien* (dritte Auflage, Berlin, 1886), p. 318, followed by Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, note *ad loc.* and by all recent critics.

²⁸ Cf. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, note *ad loc.*, p. 21.

²⁹ This point was already seen by Forster who was followed by Schanz, but they punctuated with the period which I cannot accept; cf. note 31.

are prohibited because they are bad, whereas the unlawfulness of suicide is a prohibition which is unaffected by the "addition of good or bad." Socrates means "this (prohibition of suicide) is alone of all prohibitions *simple*, i.e. it never applies to man in the way others do."³⁰ But here instead of enunciating the general rule to which the unlawfulness of suicide constitutes the only exception, Socrates proceeds to give the exception; however, from the new wording given to the wickedness of suicide in 62 A 6-7, we are able to infer the general rule. "Sometimes and for some people death is *better* than life; but for those for whom death is *better*, you are surprised if for these very men it is unholy *to do good* to themselves, but they must wait for another *benefactor*." I have italicized *βέλτιον* in lines 4 and 5 and *εὖ ποιεῖν* and *εὐεργέτην* in line 7 in order to show that they constitute the clue to the understanding of the whole passage. That is, in the case of suicide, men cannot do good to themselves; even for those who consider that death is better than life (i.e. that death is good) it is *wrong* to do good to themselves (*μὴ ὁσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν*). The paradox or the exceptional character of suicide consists in its being wrong in any circumstance; and, whereas in all other cases if something is good we can do it, in the case of suicide, despite the fact that death is good, *it is wrong to do good to ourselves*. So, *τοῦτο* in 62 A 2 is not the only thing absolutely prohibited, but it is the only exception to a general rule.

The possible objections to this interpretation seem to be two, but neither of them is a strong one. The first would be the ellipse after *τᾶλλα* in 62 A 4; but in any interpretation there is an ellipse and, moreover, the thought can be easily supplied once we get to lines 4-7.³¹ The second difficulty is that putting

³⁰ Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, p. 20, is therefore correct in asserting that the *ἄλλα* in line 3 and in line 4 are the same.

³¹ This and the fact that *τυγχάνω* with a personal dative is normal Greek usage answers Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, p. 319, who objected to Schanz that *οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα* is unintelligible. Of course I agree with Bonitz's criticism of Forster's and Schanz's proposal to insert *ἀλλὰ* after *τᾶλλα* to avoid the asyndeton. Neither can I agree with Schanz's punctuating with a full stop after *τᾶλλα* (cf. *Platonis Opera Quae Feruntur Omnia*, edidit M. Schanz, I [Lipsiae, 1875], p. 94). The same punctuation, without supplying *ἀλλὰ* had already been suggested by Jan, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, XCVII (1868), p. 340. To punctuate with a full stop, however, is to overlook the fact that 62 A 4-7 contains the explanation of 62 A 2-4;

a stop after *τᾶλλα* produces an asyndeton; but this is not a sufficient reason to reject the interpretation that I have proposed, since this interpretation makes sense in the context. Moreover the asyndeton can be explained, for it is produced by a clause which contains the explanation of the previous one and in which part of the first clause is reproduced almost verbatim (*ἴσως . . . θαυμαστόν σοι φανείται* and *θαυμαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται*).

Hackforth for his part apparently believed that if *εἰ* in line 2 introduces a true proposition, it would mean that Socrates expects Cebes to be surprised at two things whereas Cebes is surprised at one thing only. But in my interpretation Cebes is still surprised at one thing only: the wickedness of suicide; except that now in 62 A 2-7 Socrates shows to Cebes how paradoxical indeed the unlawfulness of suicide is. Up to 62 A Cebes has inquired about the reason for the wickedness of suicide; now, Socrates means, you will indeed be surprised when you realize that the wickedness of suicide, given the fact that for some people sometimes death is good, amounts to the prohibition to do good to ourselves, in fact that it is wrong to do good! And so these people must wait for another *benefactor*. This surprises Cebes³² and Socrates himself admits that when it is put in this way it seems to be irrational, that is without a cause³³ (since it seems irrational that it is wrong to do good). Yet there may be a reason, Socrates asserts, and this is that we are possessions of benevolent gods. Cebes accepts this explanation but now challenges the compatibility of Socrates' explanation with Socrates' previous assertion that the philosopher is willing to die. Next Socrates tries to show that these two assertions are not incompatible and he engages in a discussion which is his and the philosopher's true *ἀπολογία*.

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this was perhaps the reason for Jan's failure to see the meaning of the passage.

³² Cf. *Phaedo*, 62 A 8-9, *καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἡρέμα ἐ-τιγέλασας, ἴττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών*. Olympiodorus saw this, for he comments on this passage: *ἐγέλασε, διότι ἐκάλεσε τὸν φονεύοντα ἐκντὸν εὐεργέτην* (cf. Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem*, p. 11, 3 [Norvin]); but he was prevented from seeing the implications of the new wording given to the wickedness of suicide by his dogmatic belief that the passage asserts the absolute preferability of death to life. Cf. above, note 7.

³³ Cf. *Phaedo*, 62 B 1-2, *καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον*. See Burnet's note to 62 B 1 *οὕτω γ'* (p. 22).

REVIEWS.

A. H. M. JONES. *The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey.* 2 vols. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. Pp. xiv + 1518; 7 maps. \$24.95.

This work is, as the author states in the preface, a social, economic, and administrative survey of the Later Roman Empire historically treated, not a history. On the whole, this is a correct characterization of the book, yet Jones does not adhere to it pedantically. Where the occasion demands it, he reviews, sometimes at considerable length, political, religious, or cultural topics, such as the wars of the Later Roman Empire or its linguistic or religious geography or the school system of Late Antiquity. Similarly, he does not abide slavishly by the chronological limits indicated in the title, but frequently begins his discussion of particular social, economic, or administrative phenomena of the Later Roman Empire with comparative material from the Principate or even the Roman Republic.

The text of the book is divided into two parts: less than one third is taken up by a narrative and the rest by descriptive chapters on aspects of the society, economy, and administration of the Roman Empire. In the preface, Jones calls this division a compromise: on the one hand "in many departments of life conditions were virtually static" and a topical treatment seemed therefore indicated; on the other hand, "to the reader not familiar with the period this treatment would obscure the general course of development." The narrative part, consequently, as Jones himself states, is no more than "an outline of the political, military and ecclesiastical history, stressing the social and economic factors" and does not replace the great histories of Seeck, Bury, and Ernst Stein. It consists of ten chapters, divided chronologically more or less along the lines suggested by Stein's chapter headings and frequently lays the groundwork for, or anticipates, the more thorough discussion of administrative, social, and economic subjects in the second part. Thus the narrative part contains an excellent analysis of the economic effects of the third century inflation (pp. 28-32). In another narrative chapter Jones offers a novel explanation for the subdivision of the existing provinces by Diocletian (pp. 45 f.). According to him this was not done in order to reduce the possibility of military rebellions but to provide for more efficient administration. He also estimates the cost of Diocletian's administrative reforms to have amounted to the equivalent of 4-5 legions, if I understand him correctly (pp. 51 f.). He further suggests that it was the confiscation of temple treasures that enabled Constantine the Great to launch his new gold and silver coinage (p. 108). The chapter on "The House of Constantine" contains a discussion of the origin of the *comites rei militaris* (p. 124) and of the distinction between the mobile field army (*palatini*) and regional field army groups (*comitatenses*). Jones sheds light on the success of the barbarian invasions by a careful study of the military manpower available to

the Western government in the first half of the fifth century, infers staggering military losses during the reign of Honorius from the *Notitia Dignitatum* (pp. 194-9 and 1425 f.) and records his impression that after the death of Valentinian III the Western army dwindled to nothing (p. 244, cf. p. 612). In this narrative portion most of the chronological chapters contain useful sections on the available primary sources. Readers will also welcome the chapter on the successors of Justinian, brief as it is, as this is a period not normally covered. In spite of attractive features such as the above, I should like to record my (subjective) judgment that on the whole the narrative section of Jones' work is not only less original and less detailed than the great histories mentioned before, but that the author's strength lies less in the art of historical narrative than in the analysis of historical data.

Indeed, the second descriptive part clearly is the heart of Jones' work. It consists of fifteen chapters. Seven of them are devoted to the machinery of the state and deal with the Government, the Administration, Finance, Justice, Senators and *Honorati*, Civil Service and Army respectively. Four further chapters are devoted to the social and economic structure of the Empire: Rome and Constantinople, the [other] Cities, Land and Industry, Trade and Transport. There follow three chapters on cultural topics: the Church, Religion and Morals, and Education and Culture. The final chapter entitled *The Decline of the Empire* presents the author's conclusions. While some of these chapters, e.g. those on the Government or the Cities, cover well-trodden ground (the latter were dealt with by Jones himself in an earlier book), others, such as Civil Service or Religion and Morals, bring together information scattered over a variety of monographs or articles. On the whole the division of the material seems satisfactory, but a few questions arise. Why is there no chapter on the handling of Foreign Affairs (officials concerned, treaties, diplomats and diplomatic practices, interpreters, etc.) which certainly belong into an "administrative survey" of the Later Roman Empire? Why no discussion of the organization of late paganism (pp. 938-43 are restricted to the consideration of its survival)? Why above all is there no explicit treatment of demography? The chapters on the cities contain data on the distribution of cities over the various provinces but little (cf. p. 698) on the much debated questions of numbers of inhabitants and size of city territories. The equally difficult question of the total population of the Later Roman Empire does not emerge until the final chapter where it is discussed rather rapidly in connection with depopulation as a possible cause of the decline. Here Jones also states flatly that the East was "probably more populous" than the West, but the book contains no evidence for this assertion (p. 1066).

The collection and orderly presentation of the vast amount of administrative, social, and economic material in the descriptive chapters represents a great achievement. Indeed, the work will be an indispensable work of reference for all scholars interested in the Later Roman Empire, in many cases a superior substitute for the relevant articles in Pauly-Wissowa. Out of the vast mass of information distilled in Jones' work I select arbitrarily a few items which seem to me of particular interest and which may convey an idea of the richness of the offerings because they are not often discussed

or are here discussed more fully or in a more original way than elsewhere. Unlike the institutional historians of earlier generations, Jones is never satisfied with merely describing a governmental structure created to deal with a particular problem but makes a serious attempt to understand its operation. Thus after describing the machinery of the central government he devotes more than twenty brilliant pages (341-65) to the question of how it really worked. He discusses in detail the important role of powers behind the throne (the imperial family, eunuchs, generals), the formation of imperial policy in legislation and administration and (most interesting) the influence of pressure groups on the imperial government (little influence of peasants, of urban craftsmen and shopkeepers, of the rank and file of the army which was surprisingly submissive to the emperors, but powerful and successful pressure by landowners, officials of the *comitatus*, lawyers, and—most important—the senatorial aristocracy). In the chapter on Administration Jones devotes five pages (391-6) to a discussion of *suffragium*, the role played by the influence of great men in the securing of government appointments, and another five pages (396-401) to the revenue of high government officials (cash, rations in kind, extortion, judicial corruption). Similar data are given for the officer corps in the chapter on the Army (pp. 643-6). Valuable is also Jones' description of the process by which, in the later fourth and especially in the fifth centuries, the senatorial aristocracy of birth was transformed into an aristocracy of office through the introduction of ranks (*illustris*, etc.) attached to high office (pp. 527-30). In the chapter on the Civil Service he shows that, contrary to a view widely held, the *agentes in rebus* did not normally function as a secret police, although they and many other officials performed this task under the particularly suspicious Constantius II (pp. 581 f.). Later on he collects the evidence for the institution of *stellatura*, the practice of military officers of pocketing between one week's and one month's rations that should have gone to the men in the units under their command (p. 644). In a very detailed section Jones assembles all the evidence available for the curial order and the city councils, traces the story of their decline, and describes the many heavy duties imposed upon them (pp. 737-63). He collects material (pp. 807 f.) on land rents in Egypt and other provinces and later devotes eleven crowded pages (812-23) to the problem of lands abandoned by their owners. Elsewhere he gathers the evidence for the commutation into cash of the rations of civil servants and soldiers and of taxes in kind, as well as for the abandonment of *corvées* or forced labor in favor of hired labor and hence the return from a partial barter economy to the cash system (pp. 397, 460-2, 629 f., 840, 858). The chapter on Education and Culture opens with a full and suggestive survey of the linguistic geography of the Later Roman Empire (pp. 986-96). Some of the factual information contained in the descriptive chapters is represented on seven diagrammatic maps. Four of them show the secular and ecclesiastic divisions of the Empire at various points in time. Three other maps illustrate the financial districts, the geographic distribution of the Roman military establishment and of cities respectively. Finally Jones offers in Appendix III a tabulation of the information provided by the Verona List, the *Notitia Dignitatum*, and other documents for the division of the Later Roman Empire into prefectures, dioceses, and provinces.

The book, then, offers first of all, a collection of all the material bearing on the administrative, social, and economic history of the Later Roman Empire. This collection is based on an amazing mastery of the primary sources and on an extraordinary skill in extracting information from them. The literary and documentary sources are listed at the end of the work and generous quotations from them are given in more than three hundred pages of footnotes. On occasion, Jones even makes use of sources as yet unpublished, such as the important *P. Beatty Panop.* for the emoluments of soldiers (see pp. 1257 f., n. 31) and other subjects, or an African inscription containing a letter of Marcus Aurelius and shedding light on the qualities expected of imperial officials (p. 1411, n. 37). Indeed, the footnotes provide, as it were, a topical guide to the law codes, papyri, inscriptions, saints' lives, etc. of the Later Roman Empire. The author states in the preface that although he has travelled widely over the areas formerly controlled by Rome, the archaeological material is his "most lamented gap." Indeed, where he does use archaeological evidence, as for example in the concluding chapter as an indication of the geographical distribution of wealth, his remarks are curiously impressionistic and probably incomplete (p. 1065). With this one reservation one cannot but admire the foundation of primary source material on which this work is built.

Jones' treatment of modern bibliography, however, is open to question. At the beginning of most of the topical chapters he usually cites two or three works that proved helpful to him in writing it and in the course of several chapters he sometimes refers to a few further books and articles. The subjective selection of bibliography occasionally produces curious results. At the head of the footnotes to Ch. XXII on the Church, for example, he refers only to Joseph Bingham's *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, published in 1726. He explains his stingy attitude towards modern scholarship in the preface by the remark: "I early realised that if in a field so vast I tried to read the modern literature exhaustively . . . I should not have time to read the sources" and continues with a series of somewhat tortuous apologies. This perfectionism is not worthy of emulation. If Jones' procedure were generally followed, there is a very real danger that men of lesser stature and learning than Professor Jones would feel free to ignore the work done by others and that scholarly progress would thus be arrested. Professor Jones' readers would surely have been grateful for further bibliographical guidance. His attitude amounts to mystification where he establishes his own view on a controversial problem against the background of previous discussions by scholars whom he does not name, particularly in the last chapter on the Decline of the Empire where he identifies only Walbank and Boak but discusses a number of other theories as well.

Jones has lavished loving care on full and detailed descriptions of the political, social, and economic institutions of the Later Roman Empire. I have already attempted to convey an idea of the wealth of descriptive materials assembled by him. This collection would be valuable even if Jones had done no more than collect in one work data for which one would have otherwise to consult dozens of monographs, reference works, and journals.

But Jones' book is much more than a handy reference work de-

scribing the institutions of the Later Roman Empire. The directions in which he surpasses the merely descriptive content may be characterized as causation, quantification, and evaluation. The interest in causation runs through every chapter of the book. Why did generals possess less influence in the Eastern half of the Roman Empire of the fifth century than their counterparts in the West? Because the Western Empire, continually exposed to barbarian invasion, was forced to put a premium on military talent and because, moreover, a number of historical accidents had weakened the military in the East (pp. 342 f.). Why did the *curiales* of the fourth and fifth centuries crave for promotion to one of the privileged groups, the equestrian order, the *comitiva*, and particularly to the Senate? The financial advantages of such a promotion are highly questionable; but the men of the Later Roman Empire coveted titles for the sake of their social prestige and because a title gave its holder personal security especially from flogging by governors (pp. 543 f.). Why were there millionaires in the Roman Senate but hardly any in that of Constantinople? Because in the West senatorial families had an advance of centuries in the accumulation of wealth (p. 555). Why did so many Western craftsmen in the fifth century emigrate from the towns to the countryside? Jones suggests that this process was related to the disappearance of medium sized holdings the owners of which had been the principal customers of the urban craftsmen (pp. 762 f.). Why do we hear so much, in the imperial legislation, of lands abandoned by their owners? Exhaustion of the soil was only rarely the reason for such abandonment, deforestation of the uplands, manpower shortages, and insecurity due to barbarian attacks and internal unrest played some role, but the major cause, according to Jones, was the heavy burden of taxation (pp. 816-23). Why did Christianity fail to bring about a general rise in the level of moral conduct? It set its moral standards too high and most Christians therefore were more concerned with securing forgiveness of their sins by postponing baptism and by doing penance than with the avoidance of sin. Furthermore Christianity had come into being as a religion of humble people, had expected Christ's second coming almost immediately, and had not devoted much attention to the problems of secular authority (pp. 979-85). Finally, the entire last chapter of the book, entitled *The Decline of the Empire*, is concerned with problems of causation but, as it embodies at the same time the author's main conclusions, it will be considered most conveniently in a later part of this review.

Throughout the book, statistical data are one of Jones' major concerns and the results of his attempt, conducted with great skill and circumspection, are remarkable. Again, I can select only a few examples, to convey some idea of the author's methods and results in this area. He assembles the evidence available for the revenue of officials such as governors (pp. 397 f.), military officers (pp. 620 f.), lawyers (p. 511), bishops (metropolitan bishops received as much as vicars of dioceses, pp. 906 and 934), professors (pp. 905 f.). He collects data on the pay scale for civil servants (pp. 643 f.) and soldiers (pp. 670 f.) and on price levels (pp. 445 f.), including the cost of games (pp. 537-9). He offers material on rents paid on agricultural land (pp. 807 f.), as well as on the relation of tax

levels to revenue derived from agricultural land (pp. 820 f.). In the sixth century for example, a highly privileged taxpayer, the Catholic Church at Ravenna, paid a tax of 57% of revenue. He estimates that in the fifth and sixth centuries the Empire employed a total of 30,000 civil servants (pp. 1057 and 1411 f., n. 31) and in A. D. 425 a military establishment comprising less than 250,000 men in the West and somewhat more than 350,000 in the East (pp. 679-85).

The statistical data assembled in this book, as well as the rest of the other factual information collected therein, would be interesting enough in and by themselves, but Jones uses this factual information to evaluate the operation of the institutions. Wherever appropriate he asks two questions with regard to each set of institutions: Were they efficient? How costly were they? In some instances he then raises the further problem whether these institutions were fair to the population. On the whole the highly centralized bureaucracy created by Diocletian operated efficiently, although the selection and promotion of public officials often depended on bribery or influence rather than on merit. The Government collected the necessary revenue, maintained an adequate army, and upheld law and order. On the other hand, the authority of the central government was not infrequently flouted or ignored by provincials of power and wealth and even by officials (pp. 406-10). Repeatedly, tax arrears had to be written off, and tax collectors charged inordinately high "fees" (*sportulae*) in addition to taxes (pp. 466 ff.). The greatest part of the total tax burden fell upon the agricultural population, yet this was hardly unfair as the wealth of the Empire "was derived almost entirely from agriculture, and to a very small extent from industry and trade" (p. 465). The peasant population seems to have been crushed by the burden of taxes and rents, and Jones paints a grim picture indeed of periods of famine when the population of the countryside was starving while food was still available in the cities (pp. 10, 810 f.). Taxation was not progressive and consequently weighed more heavily on the peasant proprietor than on senatorial landowners. The administration of civil law was fair only when the contending parties were of equal rank, but in a contest between a person of wealth and rank and a person of humble status the courts were heavily biased in favor of the former. In Roman criminal justice there was even an official distinction made in the treatment of *honestiores* and *humiliores* (pp. 516-22). Jones further shows that Christianity, though teaching and preaching with great intensity a lofty code of morals, to a large extent failed to impose its standards of conduct on the inhabitants of the Empire. Christians may have spent a greater portion of their property than pagans on almsgiving, but the new religion had only limited success in implanting its teachings on marriage, fornication, baths, games, and gladiatorial shows. Justin II even had to withdraw a law of his predecessor forbidding divorce by consent, and in the administration of justice brutality—torture, flogging, savage penalties—increased (pp. 970-9). A careful study of the spread of the Greek and Latin languages on the one hand and of native languages, such as Punic, Coptic, Syriac, Celtic, Gothic, etc., on the other leads to the conjecture that in many parts of the Empire there existed a cultural cleavage between the upper classes, who spoke, read, and

wrote Latin or Greek, and the common people who spoke only a native language and were moreover illiterate. ". . . in large parts of the Empire it was only a thin upper crust which was Latinised or Hellenised" (pp. 991-7). Among the educated classes, the educational curriculum was entirely linguistic, antiquarian, and literary; the natural sciences, mathematics, geography, history, and philosophy were incidental (pp. 1002-4). The uniformity of this literary education in East and West strengthened the cultural cohesion between East and West and Jones even concludes, somewhat surprisingly in view of what he says elsewhere about the exploitation of the peasant and the cultural cleavage between upper and lower classes, that the lower classes in the provinces showed little hostility to the Roman Empire (pp. 1022-4). Jones' evaluation of the Later Roman Empire, then, leads to the conclusion that the institutional setup was on the whole efficient, though its performance was marred by the costliness of its operation and the differential treatment of the various social classes.

Yet there persists the problem of the Decline of the Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries, both in the East and West, the subject of the concluding chapter of Jones' work. Here he reassembles most or many of the results reached in preceding parts of the book to explain the phenomenon of decline. The "fall" of the West and survival of the East in the fifth century suggest to him that because the West was exposed to a greater degree of barbarian pressure than the East "the barbarians played a considerable part in the decline and fall of the empire" (p. 1027). This "simple but rather unfashionable view" is the first principal thesis of Jones' book. He then discusses a number of internal factors which earlier scholars had considered causes of the decline. He dismisses the charge that the Western Empire might have been saved if the resources of the entire Empire had been mobilized for its defense, instead of being divided among two governments, East and West. In his view the historical record shows that at least two emperors were required to protect the far-flung frontiers on the Rhine, Danube, and Euphrates. Neither does he attach much importance to the charge that the Empire lacked a clear rule for the succession to the imperial throne and that this situation invited usurpations by ambitious individuals. Jones points out that in this respect the situation improved after the reforms of Diocletian and was better in the East than in the West. Jones also finds little evidence for the growth of religious separatism in the Later Roman Empire. He admits that regional attachments played a role among the Donatists of Africa and the Monophysites of Egypt, but even in these cases he points out that neither sect planned secession from the Empire or welcomed the foreign conquerors, as the Jews unquestionably did. Jones also corrects the criticisms of the Late Roman Army. It was much larger and better officered than that of the Principate, the creation of field armies by Constantine and his successors was a wise response to increased pressure on many frontiers, the army was surprisingly loyal to the government and there is little evidence of barbarian generals or soldiers betraying the Empire. It is true, however, that the large new army placed a great strain on the manpower and financial resources of the Empire and that from the fifth century onward the *limitanei* declined in

efficiency. He argues sharply against the view advanced by Oertel and Walbank that the fall of the West was due to the decentralization of industries such as pottery. He points out that export trade had always been on a small scale and that decentralization within the Empire could not have had a deleterious effect on the economy of the Empire as a whole. The economic decline in trade and industry was, so Jones thinks, the result of the decline of agricultural production in certain parts of the Empire and of the emergence of *agri deserti*, which amounted to up to 50% of the total arable land in Africa and up to 10-15% in certain other provinces. Shortages of manpower also had a role in the decline. Compared to modern conditions, the area of the Roman Empire was sparsely populated even under the Principate and mortality rates were as high as those of India at the beginning of the twentieth century. The imperial legislation forcing many categories of workers, especially on the land, and their sons to remain in their original occupations is evidence for chronic manpower shortages. The army, the civil service, and the church siphoned off vastly greater parts of the available manpower than under the Principate. In addition, Jones adduces "proof" for a shrinkage of population; perhaps "indications" would be a better word for the considerations mentioned on pp. 1042 f. The manpower situation was characterized, then, by a low density of population, a high death rate, and the inability on the part of the masses, especially the peasants, to make up for this high death rate by a correspondingly high birth rate. The inability on the part of the peasants to maintain their numbers leads to what Jones considers the basic economic weakness of the Later Roman Empire and to the second central thesis of his book: "too few producers supported too many idle mouths" (p. 1045). The peasants of the Empire were obliged to produce sufficient agricultural products for the free distribution of bread and pork in Rome, Constantinople, and other big cities, for the very high standard of living of senatorial families and their often princely households, for the less wealthy but much more numerous establishments of *curiales*, for the requirements of a vastly increased army and civil service the members of which enjoyed a considerably higher standard of living than the peasants, and finally for members of the Christian clergy who constituted a considerable and altogether new drain on the economy. Jones is less impressed with social factors playing a role in the decline. It is true that the government reacted to the shortages of manpower and capital by tying certain groups and their descendants to their jobs, but he shows that the legislation issued to this end was less extensive than is sometimes assumed and that moreover it was haphazardly enforced. In fact, there existed a good deal of social and economic mobility in the Later Roman Empire and the best energies of individuals were spent on their own social improvement and the rapid accumulation of wealth. The reverse of this phenomenon was a considerable lack of public spirit. High officials usually administered their departments less in the interest of public service than in that of their own influence and wealth. The inhabitants of the Empire, high and low alike, were loyal to the Empire and had no desire to live under barbarian rule, Salvan of Marseilles notwithstanding. But few of them initiated or even participated in resistance movements, and the peasantry

in particular took a passive attitude when faced with danger and crisis. As under the Principate, the Roman Empire evoked no active patriotism and Christianity brought little change on this score. Indeed, Jones suggests plausibly that Christianity, precisely because of its high moral standards, contributed to the decline of morale by withdrawing from public service men of the highest moral caliber who became priests, monks, or hermits and left the secular field free for ambitious careerists. At the end of the book, a comparison of the features of decline in East and West confirms Jones in his view that directly or indirectly barbarian pressure was the principal cause. The greater wealth of the *pars Orientis* and its more even distribution helped the East to survive the crises of the fifth and later centuries, and yet internal factors cannot have been the major cause for the fall of the West and the decline of the East.

On the preceding pages I have emphasized the strong points of what is clearly a monumental achievement but some shortcomings have already been noted and further reservations must now be expressed. It would clearly be wrong to blame the author for emphasizing social, economic, and administrative aspects of the Roman Empire, for this is his chosen topic. It may, however, be proper to warn the reader that the administrative and organizational angle is sometimes more fully and lovingly developed than social and economic factors. This observation becomes especially relevant if one compares the present work with Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* or with Tenney Frank's *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*—comparisons that impose themselves in almost every section of Jones' book. If the strength of Rostovtzeff, for example, lies in the economic survey of agriculture, industry, and trade province by province or region by region in the core chapters of his book, Jones spends much of the available space in the chapters on The Land and on Industry, Trade and Transport on the organization of the economy and especially on state intervention and controls and has less detail on the economy itself, regional agricultural and industrial products, trade routes, etc. Undoubtedly this contrast is conditioned partly by the differences in the economic climate between Principate and Later Roman Empire, yet it seems also to reflect the personal interests and talents of the two authors. A further reservation may be registered with regard to the terminal date chosen by the author for his book, the murder of Maurice in A. D. 602. In his preface the author gives three reasons for this curious choice: the sources abruptly fade out at that point, it marks the beginning of the collapse of the East and Heraclius' work of restoration was "very transient." Whatever the latter phrase may mean, it is true only of Heraclius' reconquest of lands occupied by the Persians, not of his institutional reforms, if indeed they are his, which laid the groundwork for the entire mid-Byzantine period. On the other hand it is undoubtedly true that the collapse of the East begins with the disappearance of the house of Justinian but would it not have been desirable to include the reign of Phocas (602-610) and thus to trace the story of the collapse? Indeed, the year 610 would have been a far more logical terminal date. But it is also surprising that Jones, who so frequently enriches his analyses of Later Roman institutions by tracing them back to their antecedents in Roman Republic and Roman Empire, never looks

ahead to the fate that awaited these institutions during the Heraclian dynasty and beyond. Yet who would be better qualified than so profound a student of the Later Roman Empire as Professor Jones to discuss the military reforms attributed to the Heraclian dynasty, the system of "themes" and military properties, the question of the continuity of cities and the destiny of the regulated economy under Heraclius and his successors? Here the author missed a great opportunity, presumably because he did not wish to get involved in the many controversies surrounding these subjects. Yet a few glances ahead into the late seventh century might not only have shed light on the institutions of the mid-Byzantine period but would also have done much to elucidate important facets of the problem of continuity or discontinuity from Antiquity to Middle Ages which are involved in most of the controversies concerning the "Heraclian Reforms."

It is also puzzling that the final chapter on The Decline of the Empire introduces a great deal of new factual material not previously covered or not adequately covered elsewhere in Jones' work. Here we find a rather elaborate summary of Roman warfare both in the East and the West and of usurpations and civil wars. As has already been noted, here for the first time the author supplies demographic information, except for city populations which are discussed in an earlier chapter. Here for the first time Jones assembles data on the backwardness of ancient technology and the scarcity of mechanical inventions. There is also to be found in the last chapter much new material on the attitudes of the provincials towards the barbarian invaders, and the economic superiority of the *pars Orientis* over the Western Empire seems to be asserted here for the first time. One is inclined to dismiss all this as a mere matter of presentation, but upon further reflection one wonders whether the introduction of so much new factual material in the concluding chapter does not betray an uncertainty on the part of the author whether in the main body of his book he has laid his finger on the true reasons for the Decline of the Empire and whether an enquiry related to the social, economic, and administrative problems of the Later Roman Empire, to the exclusion of military, political, and cultural factors, is an adequate basis for an analysis of its decline. In fact, one of Jones' central theses, first advanced in this last chapter, that referring to barbarian pressure as the major cause for the fall of the Western Empire, looks as if it owed its elaboration to a feeling of doubt on his part. The intensity of military pressure is difficult to measure in quantitative terms and mere statistics on the frequency of attacks certainly do not tell the full story. One would have to enquire in addition into such factors as the size of the military effort both in East and West, the outlay in money, armor, and other equipment, and the damage done by the enemy, before one could confidently assert, as does Jones, that "the Western Empire bore more than its fair share of the burden." In the absence of such quantitative data on barbarian pressure the question may be raised whether the different fate of East and West in the fifth century was not due after all primarily to internal differences. Jones himself, somewhat impressionistically, points to the greater wealth in economic resources and manpower of the Eastern provinces as compared with the West, and it might be possible to strengthen his point by assembling

further evidence province by province in the manner of Rostovtzeff or Frank. Following in the footsteps of Ernst Stein, Jones also calls attention to the more egalitarian character of Eastern society: less wealth among the senatorial order, more medium landowners and peasant proprietors, less influence of the senatorial order in the political sphere, more opportunity for commoners to obtain high political office. One could add that the Eastern government, especially under Justinian, at least attempted to combat and resist the influence of the large landowners. As the result of all the factors mentioned the total economic output of the East was greater than that of the West and a greater share of this total was in the hands of men who were unable to resist the demands of the tax collector. If these differences are correctly identified, are they not sufficient to explain the different destinies of East and West? Is it perhaps no accident that the most severe indictments of Roman government, taxation, and jurisdiction come from two Westerners, the Spaniard Orosius and Salvian of Marseilles? Individual cases of indifference to invading barbarians or of resistance seem to be divided fairly evenly over East and West, but it may be significant that the two men who betrayed Rome to the Visigoths were Westerners (p. 1059) and that mass flights from territories occupied by Germans occurred only in Western provinces (pp. 1059 f.). In various degrees, then, the internal factors so carefully investigated by Jones: usurpations and rebellions, defective distribution of the armed forces, the drop in agricultural productivity, the high death rate and the inadequate birth rate, the disequilibrium between economic producers and idle mouths, the regimented economy, corruption and administrative abuses, the absence of active patriotism—all these internal factors seem sufficient to explain the Decline of the Later Roman Empire. Until further evidence is adduced or discovered, the case for barbarian pressure as the major cause for the decline cannot be considered proved.

A few minor reservations may also be registered here. Sometimes Jones mentions a development but does not explain it. Thus, for example, Jones connects the massive emigration of urban craftsmen from Western cities with the disappearance of the urban gentry from the cities, but he does not say why the gentry left the cities (pp. 762.). Elsewhere he alludes to important phenomena without elaborating upon them. This seems to be true for example of his remarks about the low purchasing power of the masses as a factor limiting commerce (pp. 841, 847), a point already eloquently made by Rostovtzeff. In some rare instances one is inclined to question factual statements. Is it really true, even for the period considered by Jones, that Constantinople possessed no major industries and was unimportant as a commercial center (p. 688; see J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, II [London, 1923], p. 317, and Runciman, in *Cambridge Economic History*, II [Cambridge, 1952], pp. 103 f.)? Should Jones not have mentioned that in the military life of the *pars Orientis* Latin remained not only the language of army administration but also the language of command (Ernst Stein, *Studien zur Geschichte des Byzantinischen Reiches*, etc. [Stuttgart, 1919], p. 132)? Jones speaks of Vegetius as writing under Valentinian (p. 642), but this date is far from certain (cf. V. A. Sirago, *Galla Placidia*, etc. [Louvain, 1961], pp. 324, 465 ff.).

He takes a very dim view of the instruction given to catechumens in episcopal schools (p. 1007, but see H. Marrou, *A History of Education in Classical Antiquity* [London, 1956], p. 315) and in his remarks about Christian poets he omits the greatest of the Eastern religious poets, Romanos (p. 1009).

Where does the principal contribution made by Jones' work to the knowledge of the Later Roman Empire lie? An answer to this question is difficult because of Jones' practice, already mentioned, of quoting previous research sparingly. Obviously, even a long review cannot search the entire book, chapter by chapter and page by page, for major conclusions or minor details hitherto unknown. I shall instead sample from this point of view two chapters, very different in subject matter, methodology, and degree of success, the chapter on the Army and another on Religion and Morals.

The classic work on the Late Roman Army is still Robert Grosse's *Römische Militärsgeschichte*, which appeared in 1920 and is cited by Jones. It goes without saying that Jones, in order to offer a comprehensive account of his subject, was obliged to incorporate much of the material contained in Grosse's work. He did omit some information presumably because he considered it primarily of antiquarian character, such as the data on tactics and on armor. It is puzzling, however, that Jones says so little about the maintenance of military drill and camp construction in the fourth century and their abandonment in the fifth (Grosse, *op. cit.*, pp. 221 f., 261), as these items have indeed the most serious implications for the efficiency of the army and for its morale. Furthermore Jones places little emphasis on the increasing role of cavalry in the military establishment of the Later Roman Empire (Grosse, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.). But in other respects Jones' book marks a great advance over Grosse's work of a generation ago. He stresses more strongly than his predecessor that Diocletian was concerned with frontier defense and that it was only Constantine who created the large mobile field army of the fourth century. A thread that runs throughout his book has to do with the process, not clearly recognized by Grosse, by virtue of which the mobile field army of Constantine's reign was divided and subdivided by his successors into regional field armies and ended up in the sixth century being assigned permanently to garrison duty in various cities of the Empire (pp. 608, 660 f., and *passim*). Jones also goes far beyond Grosse in offering precise data on pay, rations, and equipment of the Roman army, as well as on the discharge of soldiers and on veterans' privileges. A detail that may explain the high degree of loyalty to the dynasty: the standard of living of soldiers was "substantially higher than that of the peasantry from whom most of them were drawn" (p. 647). The recently published Abinnaeus Archive enables him to give a much fuller account of *protectores* and *domestici* than Grosse had done. He also corrects Grosse's (p. 196) lyrics on alleged democratic procedures of promotion to officer rank and emphasizes more realistically the many cases where with the help of powerful patrons men became *domestici* and *protectores* without serving in the ranks or became tribunes without service among the *protectores*. He combats with good reason the prevailing view, adopted also by Grosse, that the frontier armies of the fourth century had no military value (pp. 649 ff.) and offers much new material on the *limitanei* of the sixth century (pp. 661-3).

Above all, however, Jones makes significant headway by subjecting the *Notitia Dignitatum* to close scrutiny and deriving from his re-examination of this famous document data on the geographic distribution of the armed forces, their numbers, the history of individual units, etc. These results, elaborated by Jones in a long appendix on the *Notitia Dignitatum* followed by a set of fifteen tables and presented graphically on map IV, are used by him partly in the narrative chapters, partly in the topical chapter on the Army. They are achieved by a close study of the date of the various parts of the document, by an investigation of the discrepancies between its various parts, and by inferences from the dynastic names frequently borne by military units. It is not too much to say that Jones' book includes a fresh and illuminating monographic study of the *Notitia Dignitatum* and its implications for the military history of the Later Roman Empire. The consequence of these advances in detail over the earlier work of Grosse is a considerably more reliable view of the size, deployment, evolution, and performance of the Roman military establishment.

It is much more difficult to assess the scholarly value of the chapter entitled Religion and Morals. It deals with rather disparate subject matter. Under the heading "religion" the author assembles information on religious groups other than orthodox Christianity: paganism, Jews and Samaritans, Christian heretics of all sorts. He then discusses the religious temper of the Later Roman Empire: types of pagan cults, Christian beliefs in demons, the growth of the cult of Christian martyrs and saints, magic, miracles, and the Eastern passion for dogmatic controversy. With regard to the last he examines at length the difficult problem whether the various heresies were related to national sentiment and social struggles. Finally he compares the moral teachings of paganism and Christianity and enquires into the reason for Christianity's failure to impose its higher moral requirements on the society of the Later Roman Empire. These are important and large topics discussed within the compass of less than fifty pages. Indeed I doubt that any other work offers so much information on such a wide variety of subjects on so few pages and it is therefore natural that for most of these topics mentioned the author offers no more than an introduction and consequently that his treatment is hardly original. Here above all it would have been important to refer to some of the classic works dealing with the same subjects at greater length where the reader can find additional information. For late paganism Jones should have referred, in addition to Boissier's *Fin du Paganisme*, to Geffcken's *Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* and to Noek's *Conversion*. The standard work on the Jews is still Juster's *Les Juifs dans l'empire romain* (this work contains a great deal of material directly relevant to the subject of the social and economic conditions of the Jews, which is not covered by Jones). On the subject of heretics it would have been more difficult to refer to a treatment both comprehensive and detailed, but the classical histories of the Church (Duchesne, Lietzman, Fliche et Martin, etc.) would have been helpful. On the other hand, Jones' well documented discussion of the problem whether doctrinal controversies were motivated by national sentiment or social conviction is valuable. He concludes that for most of the German tribes Arianism had the

character of a national faith, that Monophysitism became the national faith of Armenia, and that there was a strong social aspect to Donatism, but denies with good reason that the Egyptian support of the *homocousion* in the fourth century, Egyptian resistance to Chalcedon in the fifth, and Syrian and Mesopotamian monophysitism had any basic connection with national feeling. Even more original is Jones' discussion of Christian moral teachings and Christianity's failure to raise the moral level of ancient society. Here, too, Jones' readers would have been helped by bibliographical references to works such as Harnack's famous *Mission und Ausbreitung* (Book II) and Nock's *Conversion* (ch. XIII), although these works deal primarily with the Early Church. In summary, then, it may be said that, unlike the chapter on The Army, that on Religion and Morals supplies little new factual information on the topics treated in it, but that it offers valuable analyses of the relation of religious dissidence to national sentiment and social conviction and of the failure of Christianity to inculcate a higher level of morality in its adherents.

The book is adequately indexed and handsomely produced: a solid binding, excellent paper, clear and large print, few typographical errors even in the long Greek and Latin texts cited in the footnotes. The principal difference between the English edition published in 1964 and the American edition is that in the former maps and footnotes each form a separate volume, while in the latter they are bound in at the end of the second volume and are numbered consecutively after the text. Neither arrangement is convenient for the reader. If he uses the English edition, he will always have to balance on his knees at least one volume of text and another of footnotes. The user of the American edition has to use both volumes until he has advanced beyond the end of the first volume. Undoubtedly, economic reasons were responsible for this arrangement, and they may have been compelling. Furthermore, in the U. S. edition the maps have been reduced in format by at least one half, a fact which makes it often difficult to disentangle the maze of thick lines, thin lines, dotted lines, red lines, hollow capitals, and black capitals.

The shortcomings of Jones' work are minor compared to its very great merits. For decades to come it will be a mine of information not only for historians of antiquity but also for general historians wishing to acquaint themselves with the available source material on a given topic. Readers will in addition benefit from the author's valiant, sustained, and on the whole successful attempts to ascertain causes, establish sound statistical data, and evaluate institutions from the point of view of efficiency, cost, and fairness.

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Aristotelis Parva Naturalia Graece et Latine Edidit, Versione Auxit,
Notis Illustravit PAULUS SIWEK, S. J. Romae, Desclée, 1963.
Pp. xxvii + 375. (*Collectio Philosophica Lateranensis*, 5.)

Discontent with the narrow textual basis of Biehl's 1898 Teubner text of the *Parv. Nat.* prompted Father Siwek in 1933 to undertake the ambitious task of systematically studying all pre-1500 MSS con-

taining that collection of psychophysiological treatises. In this way he hoped to lay the broadest possible foundation for subsequent editions of the *Parv. Nat.* and the *De An.* Thirty difficult years and many interruptions later the work at hand fulfills the first of these aims. Others, of course, had shared his discontent. Thus, as early as 1937 Mugnier had identified and tentatively reconstructed the filiation of 50 MSS of our work. For his 1942 edition of *De Sensu* and *De Memoria* Förster additionally consulted W and X. Lulofs in his two special editions broke new ground for three of the treatises. Ross in his 1955 edition collated X for all the treatises other than *De Sensu* (for which Förster had consulted it). All these scholars agreed to the extent of recognizing two major groups of MSS, P being independent of, and intermediary between, both. On the basis of his personal reexamination of these 50 MSS, most of them in the original, Father Siwek, too, agrees. Where he differs from his predecessors is in point of nomenclature and emphasis. What Mugnier and Ross called the a-group (EMYil, etc.) and the b-group (LSUNV, etc.) Siwek now renames class II and class I respectively. For the sake of simplicity we shall here adopt his nomenclature. The first class (= the old b-group) he distinguishes further into 5 families, the second class (= the old a-group) into 2 families. Now Biehl and Mugnier had preferred the second class; Wendland and Lulofs the first, on the ground *i. a.* that although postdating Alexander of Aphrodisias (*fl.* 205) by at least 1000 years, the text of the first class agrees with Alexander more often than that of the second. Upon reviewing the evidence, Ross concluded that though supporting the first class, Alexander supported P even more often (ed. *Parv. Nat.*, p. 63), that P is intermediate between the first and second classes, and hence that Alexander's authority supports a correspondingly "intermediate" text.

Siwek now challenges Ross' major premise, viz. that Alexander agrees more often with P than with the first class of MSS. This challenge is implicit in his insistence that Alexander along with logic, grammar, and Aristotelian usage "maxime favet" the first class (p. XX). Siwek continues to regard P as intermediate, hence cannot mean that the differences between P and the old b-group have been submerged in his new and broader "first" MS class.

At issue, then, between Siwek and Ross is a question of simple fact. Unfortunately, however, neither scholar provides the reader with the statistical evidence on the basis of which he can make up his own mind.

That Siwek does in fact consistently prefer the readings of the first class to those of P is clear from a check of the 11 examples cited by Ross (p. 64) "in which P stands alone or almost alone in having the clearly right reading." Of these, Siwek accepts 5, 3 of them (437 a 9; 443 a 26; 476 b 4) only because MSS of the first class have them, too. Thus in the first of the three passages just cited he inserts *σάσω* with L X. In two further examples (466 b 18; 477 b 31) he cites no source at all. From Ross one gathers it is P. As a rule, the MSS evidence displayed in the apparatus is extraordinarily rich. Its point, in the editor's words, is to enable the reader to see "quid tandem e codicibus mss haurire possit, ut mentem Aristotelis plene attingat" (p. XXII). Occasionally, however, it is not as easy to discover the source of an adopted reading as that of rejected

alternatives. For example, at 477 b 31 we learn that $\phi\pi\epsilon\rho$ is found in MSS families $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\zeta$. Yet the inference that $\phi\omega\pi\epsilon\rho$, the adopted reading, is therefore found in all the other families of the first class is evidently false. For Ross informs us that it is found only in P. Occasionally, an alternate reading is omitted without explanation, even when (as e.g. the variant $\epsilon\iota\sigma\phi\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ at 480 a 29, adopted by Ross) it, too, has "first class" support. And so on.

Siwek's vigorous championship of the first class MSS entails some interesting proposals for the Empedoclean texts cited by Aristotle. Thus at 437 b 30 (= DK 31 B 84, 5) Siwek confirms DK's $\phi\omega\varsigma$ against the $\pi\acute{\upsilon}\rho$ of two MSS of the second class, adopted by Ross. After 438 a 1 Siwek omits the additional line inserted by Blass as restored from P, and in 438 a 2 (= B 84, 10) he prints $\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. Apparently, the MSS evidence suffices here to dismiss without discussion Diels' carefully reasoned preference of $\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$. In the last line, finally, Siwek prefers $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\rho\omega\sigma\kappa\omicron\nu$ of the first and second classes to $\delta\iota\epsilon\sigma\kappa\omicron\nu$ of P and DK. Finally, at 473 b 17 (= DK 31 B 100, 9) the reading of the first class, $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$, adopted by Kranz and Wilamowitz, is rejected in favor of Mullach's and Diels' $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota$ though obviously patterned on the $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota$ of two second class MSS.

But now to the chronological question. In many ways, of course, this is a question whose importance extends far beyond the text at hand. Siwek's decisions here like the very full cross-references to other works of Aristotle in the commentary, reflect an intimate and enviable familiarity with his author. Siwek accepts Ross' consolidation of all the *Parv. Nat.* in the 14 "biological" Wanderjahre. But he goes farther still. He would move the whole of *De Anima* up into the middle period. Nuyens (*L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* [Louvain, 1948]) had argued that the non-localized substance-soul, the cardiocentric substance-soul, and the entelechy-soul mark so many successive stages of Aristotle's intellectual development; and that, since *De An.* exhibited the entelechy-soul, it belonged to the last period. Ross did not challenge Nuyens' use of the soul-concept as a chronological criterion. He only limited the occurrence of the entelechy-soul to books II and III, 1-8 of *De An.* By contrast, Siwek does challenge Nuyens' basic principle. In his view the mere fact that the *Parv. Nat.*, a work of the middle period, contains so many allusions and cross-references to the *De An.* carries more chronological weight than the occurrence of the entelechy-soul in *De An.* In effect, he thus strips the last two of Nuyens' soul-concepts of any but the most marginal relevance to the relative chronology. He is content to plead the relative compatibility of different soul-concepts. In this he in effect associates himself with an emerging consensus of scholarly opinion. One thinks here of the conclusions which Gigon and Theiler had drawn from their book-length studies of the *De Anima* (Zurich, 1950 and Berlin, 1959, respectively); Rees from a study of Aristotle's early dialogues ("Theories of the Soul in the Early Academy," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* = 1957 *Oxford Symposium Aristotelicum* [Stockholm, 1960], pp. 191-200). Yet Siwek could have gone farther still. He himself notes that *De An.*, II, 413 b 7-8, which belongs to what Nuyens and Ross call the entelechy-soul phase, features side by side the definition of soul as entelechy of the body and a discussion of the parts of the soul. He rightly concludes that Aristotle has no

objections to "parts" even of the entelechy-soul, provided these are conceived dynamically, not statically. That the entelechy-soul has not rendered obsolete the soul's need for a material organon (*pace* Nuyens, *op. cit.*, p. 54, n. 152) is clear in any case from the references to connate pneuma within the compass of II, III, 1-8 (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXXIV [1963], pp. 206-7). He is right again when he states "quando Aristoteles loquitur de 'loco' animae in corpore, bene videndum est, utrum agatur de ipsa anima, qua tali, an de quadam eius parte seu facultate" (p. XV). For location in appropriate instruments is a necessary condition not of soul as such but only of its functioning in specific biological contexts.

Siwek has said enough to indicate that he recognizes the Archimedean point from which Nuyens' entire chronology can be unhinged. But he has evidently chosen to defer moving his mighty lever until his promised edition of *De Anima* is out. But why this restraint? Surely, the force of his own argument could carry farther, even on the basis of the *Parv. Nat.* alone. For to question the necessary nexus between the cardiocentric psychology of the *Parv. Nat.* and a Platonizing view of soul and body as two separate substances is, in effect, to allow that cardiocentric psychology and entelechy-soul are compatible. Consistently, Siwek ought therefore to claim the compatibility of the *Parv. Nat.* and *De An.* without specifying the period(s) involved. In fact, however, he couples this point with an, at least provisional, retention of Nuyens' and Ross' early dating of the *Parv. Nat.* on at least partly the very grounds (the alleged incompatibility of entelechy-soul and cardiocentricity) which he himself would disallow.

The criteria from which he expects further clarification of the place of the *Parv. Nat.* are not only the cross-references (so also Ross) but also the use of terms like *μόριον*, *μέρος*, etc. He seems to hold (against Jaeger and with Ross) that Thompson's case for an early date on the basis of place-names referring to the Troad is not outweighed by the corporate character of the research in question. Nuyens (*op. cit.*, pp. 59-60) had confidently appealed to two other independent criteria, which, he felt, would support his reliance on philosophical psychology: Aristotle's development in the conception of godhead and in his attitude toward Plato. Yet these will hardly suffice to clear up the relative dates of the *Parv. Nat.* and *De An.*, particularly if the distinction of cardiocentric and entelechy-souls has become problematic. What other criteria are there? An important article, which Siwek apparently has not seen (Block, "The Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings," *A. J. P.*, LXXXII [1961], pp. 50-77), may help us farther. It advances a view, consistent with Siwek's, that entelechy-soul and cardiocentricity are not incompatible either logically or in fact, that Jaeger's plea for a late date of the biological works is cogent, after all, and that Nuyens' periodization here is dated. Moreover, he advances a striking new criterion, Aristotle's development in the doctrine of the "common sensorium," to argue that *De An.* is actually earlier than the *Parv. Nat.* The author links Aristotle's development in that doctrine with the realization of the importance of the heart as its seat (e.g. *De Somno*, 2, 455 a 4 ff.). He concludes that *De An.*'s failure to mention the heart as seat of the soul coupled with its "primitive" stress on the individual senses shows that it must antedate the *Parv. Nat.*

It will be interesting to see how in his promised edition of *De An.* Father Siwek will handle the relation of that work to the *Parv. Nat.* Will he, as the logic of his position implies, shift the burden for the priority of the latter from Nuyens' psychological to Thompson's geographic evidence, already damaged by Jaeger? If so, how will he meet Block's claim that *De An.* exhibits a stage of the "common sense" more primitive than the *Parv. Nat.*? And if he accepts that claim, would he be prepared to insist, as Block oddly does not, on a date sufficiently early, perhaps as early as the late second period, to accommodate so weighty a "development"? Finally, will that not entail the rehabilitation of Jaeger's view of the "actual(izing) nous" of III, 5 as Platonic, at least in the sense that Rees (*op. cit.*, pp. 194-5) has cited *Sophist*, 248 E ff. as antecedent for the opposition of nous to psyche? After all, this shows that nous can be opposed to the "Platonic" substance-soul quite as effectively as to the "un-Platonic" entelechy-soul.

As for Siwek's commentary, its strength lies in its impressive marshalling of Aristotelian parallels. Much can be learned here. Would it be uncharitable, however, to hope for a fuller discussion of doxographic points in a future second edition? Two examples must suffice. At *De Respir.*, 472 b 20-21 Aristotle criticizes Plato (and, but for mistaking Empedocles' "pores" for "nostrils," would have criticized Empedocles, too) for having the respiration of the newborn commence with exhalation instead of with inhalation. Siwek simply terms this criticism "omnino justa" and passes on. But this verdict, though reflecting what seems to be the *communis opinio*, will be found to crumble under closer examination. The fact is that Aristotle can be shown to have fixed on a part (*Tim.*, 79 A 5—C 7) of Plato's exposition, whose point is to establish not the correct sequence of respiratory stages but the cyclical thrust mechanism governing breathing as such (see "Aristotle on Breathing in the *Timaeus*," *A. J. P.*, LXXXVI [1965], pp. 404-8; LXXXVII [1966], p. 17).

Then there is Aristotle's assertion at 472 b 33 that according to the *Timaeus*, inhalation rather than exhalation is perversely called hot. Siwek passes this over in silence and, we assume, approval. Yet surely Aristotle's criticism is unfair here, too. After all, there is no inconsistency in Plato's maintaining that the air we inhale is much cooler than (inborn) fire, but only a little cooler than the air we exhale.

Finally, a word about misprints. Few of those I caught affect the meaning. At 446 a 9, Siwek prints ἐκχυθείς with most of the first class of MSS, where Ross prints ἐγχυθείς. The apparatus labels the latter "D. Ross" without specifying that it is based on Alexander's paraphrase and seconded by P's ἐκχυθείς (see Ross' edition, p. 64). At 437 a 9 read μέγεθος for μέγεδος, and in the apparatus on 438 a 1 (= DK 31 B 84, 8) correct ληπτῆσιν τ' Diels to λεπτῆσιν τ' and ληπτῆς εἰν Panzerbieter to λεπτῆς εἰν.

No Aristotelian shelf will want to miss this important contribution to our knowledge of the *Parva Naturalia*.

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D. A. RUSSELL. 'Longinus' On the Sublime. Edited with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. lviii + 208. \$5.60.

This new edition of 'Longinus' is intended for students, which in America probably means advanced undergraduates and graduate students. It fills a need since the best known edition, that of W. Rhys Roberts, has been out of print and moreover was not entirely suited to school use since it contained a translation and lacked a real commentary. Yet Longinus, though difficult, should be read: *On the Sublime* is without doubt the second work of Greek criticism, with a remarkably philosophic breadth of vision; and at the same time nothing can make clearer how an intelligent Greek of the Hellenistic or early Imperial period viewed literature, what is meant by saying that ancient criticism is rhetorical, and some of the problems and pleasures of philological research.

Russell has produced an attractive and well-balanced edition. There is first an *introduction* which overshadows neither text nor commentary. About half of it is devoted to a helpful description of the organization and contents of the essay. The account of the date and authorship is relatively brief. Russell rightly dismisses much of what has been written on the subject as shots in the dark and does not himself go beyond an unknown author and a first century A.D. date. Perhaps an early first century date is likely, but this is certainly the kind of topic best left for lecture, seminar discussion, or monographic treatment. What one expects of an editor is concise statement of the facts on which judgment must be based. Russell deals rather thoroughly with the evidence from John of Sicily, perhaps because the matter was brought to the fore by Boyd's recent article, and with the resemblances to Philo. He probably should also have mentioned the alleged similarities to Manilius, even though they are nowhere nearly so significant as has been claimed (cf. Robinson Ellis, "The Literary Relations of 'Longinus' and Manilius," *C. R.*, XIII [1899], p. 294 and G. P. Goold, "A Greek Professional Circle at Rome," *T. A. P. A.*, XCII [1961], pp. 168-92). It would also be useful to have the resemblances or differences in method and terminology between Longinus and the Augustan critics summarized briefly here, though the subject is discussed to some extent in connexion with *hypsos*. Russell stresses what he calls the Jewish connexion of the author. This is of interest in speculation about his identity, but for the interpretation and appreciation of the essay as a whole its Roman connexions are more important. That it is a product of intellectual circles at Rome is shown both by the discussion of the style of Cicero—surely more remarkable in a Greek author than is the reference to Moses—and by the discussion of the decline of eloquence, which is not only a first century A.D. topic, but primarily a Latin one, since it was in Latin literature that the change was most evident. The introduction also contains a discussion of the term *hypsos* which is generally satisfactory, but Russell overstates the situation when he says (p. xxxvii) that this quality reveals itself not in a whole context, but in a single word or phrase. Certainly *hypsos* is not a style, and it may reveal itself in a phrase, as for example in the oath by those who fell at Marathon, but a passage of some lines can maintain it, which is what I would

call a context: the whole fragment of Sappho which is quoted or the whole description of Poseidon's procession are examples.

In establishing a *text* of Longinus an editor is faced principally with the problem of evaluating the readings of *Parisinus* 2036 and deciding what conjectural emendations of it are necessary. Russell himself suggests about twenty changes, mostly matters of particles, pronouns, or spelling which have little effect on the meaning, or suggestions for filling out the text *exempli gratia* where something seems to have been lost. The most important new emendations are 12,5 παρεβάσει for παραβάσει in the interests of a terminology consistent with later rhetoricians; 14,2 πεπλάσθαι for πεπ...χθαι; 27,2 where Ἡρακλείδας is rejected as a gloss, and 39,1 ἦν δέ advanced hesitantly for ἦ διά. All of these seem at least possible.

The *commentary* is the major contribution, sensible, learned without being pedantic, remarkably clear and readable. Significant parallels are cited and usually quoted, including many passages from the Homeric scholia. Textual problems are well explained; a considerable amount of help is given in translation; the haste and disorder of the latter part of the essay are well brought out. It is unnecessary to raise very many objections, but I wonder if Russell is right in saying that συγκλείουσα used of composition in 8,1 means only that it "brings up the rear." It does not mean that composition is all inclusive in the sense of most important, which is what a student might think, but perhaps it could mean that composition "links into place everything mentioned before." Students may be puzzled by the relationship of chapters 10 ff. to what goes before in the light of the outline in chapter 8. Here Russell offers no guidance, nor does he explain clearly enough how chapters 31 and 43 fit together, though he mentions propriety, which is presumably the key concept. The discussion of chapter 44 on the decline of eloquence begins well, but is not totally satisfactory. In discussing the rise and fall of eloquence (p. 185) Russell does not clearly distinguish between rhetoric and oratory. The reference to the younger Seneca (p. 186) might as well have been omitted, since Russell admits that Seneca's subject is a different one, or better yet the reference to *Ep.*, 114 might have been transferred to the commentary on 9, 2. Russell overlooks the fact that sometimes (*De Ben.*, II, 10; *Ep.*, 97) Seneca took the view that no age was more or less wicked than any other. Presumably there is a kind of shifting around of the vices so that sometimes one, sometimes another prevails. It is difficult to discuss the topic of the decline of eloquence in small compass, and a list of the relevant passages with some bibliography for further reference is probably the most satisfactory solution in an edition of this kind. Russell's notes do not seem to contribute very much here.

There is an *appendix* on Longinus' language and style which discusses hiatus, rhythm, and periodicity and a set of three indices of which the third, the English index, is very short and might as well have been omitted if it could not be made into something more useful. The book is well printed and adequately bound. There are very few misprints: p. 74 *name* in the quotation from Quintilian 8. 3. 56 should be *nam et*; p. 185, near the middle, *than* should be *that*.

Russell has produced a fine edition and I hope many Classicists will use it to reintroduce Longinus into the curriculum.

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WINFRIED BÜHLER. Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift vom Erhabenen. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 159. DM. 19. 80.

The central theme of this work is the relationship of *On the Sublime*, or at least of certain chapters of it, to the commonplaces and traditions of Greek rhetorical criticism. The *Vorwort* advances the thesis that the ancient author (no attempt is made to identify him, but an early imperial date is assumed) was thoroughly familiar with the kind of criticism seen most clearly in the Homeric scholia, portions of which also appear in many other Greek and Latin writers, and that his work is fundamentally a part of this tradition. His originality is largely in the style in which he presents his material. Instead of seeking proof for this thesis in systematic examination of the ideas and language of *On the Sublime*, Bühler follows the brief statement of his theme with what can best be described as a fragmentary commentary on the work: often very detailed and learned discussion of parts of fifteen chapters (9, 10, 13-4, 15, 16, 19, 20, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 44) to which a textual note on Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 264 is irrelevantly added. The commentaries usually begin with a general discussion of the thought of the chapter or part of a chapter in which Bühler is interested, followed by notes on particular problems of text, language, or interpretation. The traditional nature of much of the material is frequently brought out by extensive quotation and citation of parallels, of which Bühler has made a most thorough collection. Almost any parallel can be said to be relevant in showing the existence of a traditional line of thought, or the traditional use of some particular quotation.

As far as the general theme goes I think we may grant that Bühler has in many contexts demonstrated the use of traditional material more specifically than it has been shown in the past, but he has not yet proved his negative judgment of the author's originality, and he does not deal with the possibility that originality chiefly lies in the concept of *hypsos* and its sources. Although chapter eight, in which the sources are listed, is not directly discussed, Bühler does suggest (pp. 13-14) that Caecilius may have included the first source, the power of forming great conceptions, in some form. Could an Atticist like Caecilius, once granting the existence of *hypsos* and not basing it on pathos in any way, have found adequate explanation for it in figures, diction, and composition, all parts of style, or must he have discussed some aspect of invention? As far as I can see, other writers of the time in seeking to define literary qualities do not look beyond attributes of style. Bühler cites Hermodenes, *De Id.*, I, 6 as showing that certain thoughts were regarded as naturally *σπουδαί*, for example thoughts about the gods. But this is a much more pedestrian notion than that of great conceptions in *On the Sublime*. One might as well compare the commonplaces of amplification as listed, for example, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, II, 48-9. A further objection to Bühler's work as a treatment of the general problem is that he does not discuss some passages which are highly traditional and yet where originality is evident in the treatment or in the philosophical approach. I am thinking principally of chapter forty-four on the decline of eloquence. The chapters treated are apparently not deliberately selected, but are those on which

Bühler had come to a conclusion in his own mind by a certain date. His study is somewhat more acceptable if viewed not as a book, with all that implies of beginning, middle, and end, but as a commentary to *On the Sublime*. The reader needs to proceed text in hand, and he will find discussion of many points not strictly related to the announced theme. But it is nevertheless a very fragmentary and uneven commentary. Many chapters are not discussed at all and over half of the space is devoted to chapter nine.

It is easy to criticize the form of Bühler's work, which would certainly not have satisfied Longinus, who attempted criticism, as I think Classicists should, in a literary form. It is much more difficult to review adequately the specific points made in the discussion of the text. Among the most interesting are chiefly those relating to Homeric criticism, for example, the discussion of the allegorizing tradition of Homeric scholarship (9, 7-8), the whole discussion of the excursus on the *Odyssey* with Bühler's notes on the theory of an *Alterstil* in antiquity (9, 11), and the interpretation of *προσαποδιδόναι* in 9, 12 as meaning "to pay a debt," in this case the poet's due mourning for the heroes of the *Iliad*.

In a number of places I do not find Bühler entirely persuasive. For example, in the note on the reference to Moses (9, 9) he makes a good point about the use of *θεσμοθέτης* as the correct word, from the traditional Greek viewpoint, for a lawgiver, rather than the more usual Jewish *νομοθέτης*, but goes on to emend the text by deleting *ἐπειδὴ* after a long discussion of possible meanings. Here the interpretation of Russell in his new edition, that *ἐπειδὴ* depends on *τύχων* seems to me far more likely, and it avoids the need for excision. In the note on the use of *ἐπιλέλυσμαι* (9, 14) Bühler seemingly overlooks the tendency of *λανθάνω* and its compounds to become the main verb in their clauses. The discussion of the "dream of Zeus" (9, 14) is interesting, but the conclusion, a very hesitantly advanced emendation of *τοῦ Διὸς* to *γέροντος* is pedestrian and unconvincing. Bühler feels that *ἐνύπνιον* is such a negative term ("mere dream") that it can make no satisfactory sense when connected with Zeus' name. Liddell and Scott, however, observe that the technical distinction between *ἐνύπνιον* and *ὄνειρος*, a dream with some true meaning, is not generally observed, and even if it were, it is hardly a negative judgment of scenes from the *Odyssey* to say that they are not prophetically significant. The simple interpretation is probably correct, that the passage means idle dreams of great imagination and that a rigid insistence on diction here creates problems rather than solves them. In the discussion of *προσπίπτω* (14, 1) Bühler seems to overlook the other uses of that verb in *On the Sublime*, cited for example by Russell in his new commentary. Finally, in 14, 3 Bühler sees pessimism in the author's conflation of writing for posterity and writing what is not pleasing to contemporaries. But this is not necessarily implied. I think that the author has in mind the common attitude of those who said "I could never do that." Perhaps they feared the risk of failure in great undertakings. They were the pessimists. Longinus, or whatever he should be called, is in many ways a remarkably optimistic man: many discussed the decline of eloquence, but in the early empire few shared with him the faith that a greatness comparable to that of Homer or Demosthenes could be achieved.

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R. G. AUSTIN. P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Secundus. Edition and Commentary. London, Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xxviii + 311; 3 pls. \$4.00.

"This is the first detailed English commentary on the Second Book of the *Aeneid*. I have tried to make it useful, without forgetting that Virgil was a poet." Thus writes Professor Austin in the Preface to this admirable edition. The first sentence provokes a certain feeling of wonder. While Books IV and VI have recently been the objects of excellent English commentaries, this splendid tale of "Troy's last agony" has year after year gone begging for a scholar learned enough and brave enough (shall we say?) to confront and resolve, if possible, the many thorny problems involved in its telling. R. Conway, had he lived longer, would surely have given us something worth while. But up to now we have had to content ourselves with Conington, Page, and Mackail, the annotations of Henry in his *Aeneidea*, a notable chapter in Heinze's *Epische Technik*, Jackson Knight's *Vergil's Troy*, and of course Servius. (In 1961 there appeared in Italian a good edition of II by V. Ussani Jr.)

Austin came to his task well equipped. His commentary on *Aeneid* IV and his essays on the Wooden Horse, *J. R. S.*, XLIX (1959), pp. 16 ff., and the Helen-episode, *C. Q.*, XI (1961), pp. 185 ff. showed the reach of his understanding of Virgil. And so one opens this commentary with great expectations; one closes it with the feeling of having been immensely enriched in one's responses to great poetry. For Austin never forgets that he is interpreting a poet whose sensibilities were uniquely delicate and personal, a poet who had a way of his own with words, one who says much in little and often by his silences. Austin has a fine ear for the subtly shifting tones (echoing the sense) of Virgil's hexameters. Thus line 53 "is a splendid noisy line; note the echoing assonances, with the hard consonants and the interplay of vowels, and the fading away of the sound . . ."; on 135 he comments: "the line shows a fine accommodation of sound to sense, with its liquids and assonances. Tennyson must surely have liked it"; 229 is a line "with an oddly breathless pattern; the pause after *et* is barely felt"; in 465 "the words are carefully chosen to show both the sight and the sound of the falling tower"; in 483 (*apparet domus intus . . .*), the effect of no strong caesuras in the usual positions "is a metrical picture of a vista, stretching far into the distance." How many of us, while reading Virgil, have been alert to effects like these? Austin is especially perceptive when he discusses the *colores* of women's words. When Hecuba begs Priam to take refuge at the altar in 521 ff. (*non tali auxilio . . .*), she is "not angry with Priam, nor scornful; the tone of her speech is clearly set in *miserrime coniunx* (519)"; when Venus appears to her son (594 ff.), "she speaks quietly and gently, in dramatic contrast to his angry self-communings"; commenting on the supine *servitum* in 786, he says: Virgil's use of it here shows his sensitiveness to tone: Creusa speaks as any ordinary wife might speak to any ordinary husband."

Austin is well aware that, while Virgil uses many common words and phrases, he heightened their potential and made them glow with a new light. Thus, in 283, Aeneas addresses Hector with the familiar words *expectate venis*: "Here is a very natural phrase in all the

epic grandeur, helping to make Aeneas in his dream talk just as a man would talk to another on meeting him after a long absence." Hecuba's simple words to Priam in 523 (*huc tandem concede*) and Aeneas' colloquial exclamation in 670 (*numquam omnes hodie moriemur inulti*) show that Virgil, like Shakespeare after him, had a way of making ordinary words do what they had never done before. One last example: in 739, Virgil uses the homely word *lassa* ("tired") instead of the normal *fessa*: "Here Virgil has surely chosen the older and more homely word to convey the full pathos of Creusa's state as Aeneas imagines it . . . Did Thomas de Celano think of Virgil's words when he wrote in the *Dies Irae* 'quaerens me sedisti lassus'?" At times, to bring out the full tone of a line, Austin quotes from the Bible (cf. 324-5). In 620, Venus promises her aid to her son (*nusquam abero . . . sistam*) in a "simple, beautiful line of extraordinary comfort and blessing: 'yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me.'" Such parallels often give both light and warmth to a Virgilian passage.

But Virgil has his mannerisms too, his bold experiments in language—often to the discomfiture of Servius and modern scholars. Expressions like *rumpit vocem* (129), *lapsus rotarum* (236), *attolens iras* (381) are strange but vividly imaginative. Others, like *scelus expendisse* (229) and *sceleratas sumere poenas* (576) are baffling in their novelty. There is a good list of such experiments in the *index rerum* (p. 310 e).

In moments of high emotion Virgil sometimes echoes Ennius; in his similes he draws upon Homer, Apollonius, and others. But he does not "copy" his predecessors, as Conington and Page so often say. When, in 241 ff., Aeneas exclaims *o patria, o divum domus Ilium* . . ., Virgil "has refashioned Ennius and made him Virgilian." The flood-simile (496 ff.) reminds us of Lucretius (I, 280 ff.), "a passage which shows Lucretius' immense power and (by contrast) Virgil's tautness." When Pyrrhus is compared to a serpent (471 ff.), we are told that the passage is close to Homer (*Il.*, XXII, 93 ff.), "superficially—but Homer is concerned with externals only, Virgil is depicting Pyrrhus' evil heart." In 626 ff., Troy's collapse is compared to the fall of a great tree. After showing in detail that this is "a careful simile," and recalling some of Homer's tree-similes, he adds the salutary remark: "But no literary ancestry is needed here; Virgil must often have watched the felling of a tree in his country days." This is a point I have tried to make in an article on Virgil's seascapes, *C. J.*, LVII (1962), pp. 302 ff.

When he deals with larger issues, such as the theme of the Wooden Horse, the Laocoon- and Sinon-scenes, and the Helen-episode, Austin is equally perceptive and persuasive. His Introduction is excellent. Why does this book make such a powerful impact on a reader? "It is the poet's own experience. Virgil has lived through the last hours of Troy, knowing how the minds of men . . . work in war-time." He gives a brief account of the many stories about Troy's fall probably known to Virgil, then shows his discretion in choosing what he wanted and his artistry in inventing new details. He sketches the characters in brief, telling colors. In this book "Aeneas is no hero with a mission. He is a brave but bewildered man, suffering often through his own fault." And why did Virgil

so portray him? "Virgil's Aeneas must be set in the context of the world in which Virgil had grown up, a world which needed to be reminded of humility as a preparation for responsibility." Creusa too is "a specially Virgilian figure . . . He has put into his conception of her all his Roman sense of family duty and affection." Austin has some eloquent pages (xix ff.) on the sense of sadness and doubt which pervades this book. He feels "that the whole Venus-scene was an afterthought, and that near the close of his life Virgil experienced some deeply disturbing intensity of poetic vision" in the light of which he saw "that human *pietas* . . . has no protection against the arbitrary ruthlessness of the gods." That may be so. But we must remember that these doubts in the justice of Heaven are Aeneas' doubts; up to Book VI he is often a bewildered human instrument of the *fata*. It was natural enough for him to stress the innocence of the Trojans, but the Trojan leaders were not guiltless and the people—as so often happens—had to pay the penalty: *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*. It is true, as Austin says (*ad* 390), that "the Virgilian problem is still with us, and still unsolved," but Virgil did something to redress the balance in VI (e.g. 660 ff.) and in the rest of the *Aeneid*.

Comparing Austin's notes with my own, I found that his interpretations (when they differed from mine) were generally convincing. For instance, when Hecuba and the Trojan women are compared to doves in 516 (*praecipites atra ceu tempestate columbae*), I always pictured the doves as "swept headlong (and helpless) by the storm." But Austin's picture is more graphic: "The women are like doves, 'dropping sheer down in a black storm.'" He might well have cited *G.*, III, 547 to reinforce this meaning. However there are a few passages where I feel very doubtful about his explications. His interpretation of Aeneas' words in 349-50 (*si vobis audendi extrema cupido / certa sequi . . .*) is labored. He retains the reading of *M* (*audendi*) and translates: "If (or perhaps 'in that') your passion for daring the uttermost is resolute to follow." With many editors I prefer the Servian reading *audentem* (with *me* understood) which gives the words a satisfactory sense. I suspect that *audendi* is the conjecture of a scribe who felt that *cupido* needed a defining genitive. In 336-7 Aeneas says: "At such words of Panthus *et numine divum*, I am swept into the fighting." Austin translates *numine divum* "by the will of Heaven" and takes them as a "protest, not an acknowledgment of kindly guidance from above." Büchner's suggestion (*R.-E.*, col. 330) that the gods in question here are Juno and others who are working against the *fata* is attractive and deserves mention. In 396 ff., Aeneas tells how he and other Trojans, after donning the armor of the Greeks, went on *immixti Danaïs haud numine nostro*. After giving the ideas of others, Austin with some doubt translates: "We march on, in the company of (led by?) a Power that was not ours." He rejects Henry's interpretation ("following the lead and guidance of the Greeks, not the lead and guidance of our own will") with the comment: "absurdly—*numen* cannot refer to human will." Now it is true that *numen* in Virgil generally refers to a divine will. But is that always so? In VII, 584, where the Latins clamor for war *perverso numine*, the words very probably mean "with will perverse" (cf. Page *ad loc.*, who translates "with misdirected impulse").

Lucretius uses *numen* to mean "impulse" in III, 144 (*ad numen mentis*) and in IV, 179 (*inverso numine*), speaking of the "idols." Finally, in 601-2, Venus says to Aeneas: *non tibi Tyndaridis facies invisae Lacaenae / culpatusve Paris* . . . Austin's comment on *culpatus* reads: "probably this means 'adulterous.'" But in Plautus and Horace (*C.*, III, 1, 31; *Sat.*, II, 3, 7; etc.) *culpare* means "to blame" or "to reproach." As I see it, both *invisae* and *culpatus* refer to the odium and the blame heaped on Helen and Paris by the Greeks and many Trojans.

The copious quotations I have made from this book will, I trust, give some idea of its many shining virtues. Austin's notes are never stuffy or pedantic; there is a fresh, personal quality about them which incites one to read on and on and then return to Virgil's text with wider-opened eyes. The traveller in Virgil's realms of gold will always find him an excellent guide.

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ST. ANDREW-ON-HUDSON.

FRITZ SCHACHERMEYER. Die minoische Kultur des alten Kreta. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1964. Pp. 336; 68 pls.; 166 figs. DM. 65.

It is a great boon to have an up-to-date survey of the whole range of Minoan culture—a double blessing to have it from the competent pen of Professor Schachermeyer. The volume is compactly printed, copiously illustrated in black-and-white (color plates would be an unnecessary expense in such a book), and abundantly annotated. A minor annoyance in an otherwise sturdily bound book is a title that promptly flakes off the spine; a major annoyance to the reader is the concentration of the notes at the end of the volume, and, contrarily, the distribution of plates and figures throughout. Even to summarize adequately so packed a volume would exceed the limits of this review, which will therefore concentrate on topics of a more novel character or dealt with in particular fulness.

The first chapter presents the historical setting from Neolithic times on, and makes good use of the new material recently made available from Anatolia and elsewhere. Schachermeyer conceives of the evolving Neolithic and Early Bronze Age culture as subject to an almost entirely one-way "cultural drift" westward from western Asia to Crete (and beyond), accompanied by a considerable actual migration of peoples. The extent of the spread of "Aegean" place-names terminating in -nd- (-nth-) and -ss-, an index of this migratory movement, is presented in some detail, with maps, in chapter 21.1. On the other hand Crete escaped invasion by the Indo-European peoples who migrated into western Asia and Greece during the Early and Middle Bronze.

In chapter 4 Schachermeyer finds it still preferable to retain Evans' chronological system, though with certain modifications and freed from too rigid an adherence to the ceramic framework on which the system was based. However he does suggest (with cogent

reasons) the possibility of altogether eliminating E. M. III, and dating the beginning of M. M. as early as 2150 B. C. On the other hand he comes out definitely against Doro Levi's attempt to minimize the entire E. M. period.

He notes (chapter 5) the suddenness of the development of the Minoan "high culture" at the beginning of M. M., and emphasizes the "epochal" importance of the introduction from the Balkan "Bandkeramiker" culture, via the Cyclades (the mechanics of the transfer are not at all clear), of such dynamic motives as the spiral and torsion.

In chapter 6 he plays down—correctly in my opinion—the exuberant claims of Lloyd and Woolley regarding the supposed formative influences of the palaces excavated by them at Beycesultan and Alalakh, respectively, on nascent Cretan palace architecture.¹

Chapter 9 restates the author's views on the interrelations of Crete, Mainland Greece, and Egypt about 1600 B. C. According to this unprovable yet very persuasive theory the Mycenaean Greeks, profiting by disastrous earthquakes in Crete, raided that island at this time, and likewise assisted the Egyptians in expelling the Hyksos; the results are reflected in the rich furnishings of the Shaft Grave Circles at Mycenae with their numerous distinct signs of both Minoan and Egyptian influence. Schachermeyr entertains the possibility, though not with any favor, that the Greeks were in Knossos from that time until the final destruction of 1400.² He further points out in chapter 10 that the ambiguity of the ceramic evidence of L. M. Ib and L. M. II makes it possible that the catastrophe which befell Thera should be dated to about 1400 instead of to about 1500 as Marinatos would put it. Such an unprecedented catastrophe would certainly help to explain why the Minoan civilization seems to have been suddenly snuffed out at the height of its prosperity, whereas on several previous occasions seismic calamities, however severe, had failed to prevent the palaces and their attendant cultures from rising again in greater vigor and splendor than before. Until a dozen years ago one could suppose that the novel blow that brought final ruin to Minoan culture was struck by Mycenaean Greeks, but now that we know that at the time of the destruction Knossos was under the rule of Mycenaean Greeks this supposition is rendered very unlikely. Therefore the hypothesis that Crete is indeed the prototype of the "Lost Atlantis," and that the irreparable catastrophe was the result of violent tidal waves and earthquake shocks accompanying the explosion of Thera is an attractive one. But a definite decision on this matter must await a thorough investigation of the chronology of the volcanic outburst and of the destruction of the Cretan sites.

In chapter 11 Schachermeyr asserts that the question of the identification of the "Keftiu" of the Egyptian texts and murals has been settled in favor of Crete, thanks to Vercoutter's restudy and full publication of these murals in 1956 (*L'Égypte et le monde Égéen Préhellénique*), and he repeats here (from *Jahresh. oest. arch. Inst.*, XLV [1960], pp. 44-68) his demonstration that the kilts of

¹ Cf. Schachermeyr, *Kadmos*, I (1962), p. 29; Graham *apud* E. L. Bennett, Jr. (ed.), *Mycenaean Studies* (Madison, 1964), pp. 196-209.

² In this he would give some comfort to Joseph Alsop, *From the Silent Earth* (New York, 1962), pp. 234 ff.

the Minoans in the Rekhmare tomb murals were altered to a Mycenaean type about 1450 B. C.—the most likely date for the Mycenaean occupation of Knossos.

Chapters 14 and 15 discuss how the old Mediterranean "mutter-rechtliche" culture was maintained, little affected by Indo-European invasions of surrounding regions, and how it helped (in combination with its island isolation) to give a somewhat feminine cast to Minoan culture. This would serve to explain the preference for the pleasures and comforts of peace over the rigors of warfare or the hunt; the absence of erotic elements in art; the prominence of women in society and religion; the sophistication of costume; the love of nature; and the convenience and comfort aimed at in domestic architecture.

Two of the longest chapters (17 and 19) are devoted to religion and to art. Principles of Minoan art are studied at various stages of development, with particular attention to its dynamic qualities; also to the abrupt change to a naturalistic art after 1700, which is credited to the stimulation of a post-earthquake reconstruction, and perhaps to the guidance of some artistic genius appearing at the crucial moment.

In discussing the aesthetic principles of Minoan palace architecture (chapter 19.4 and cf. chapter 13) he finds unsatisfactory such "Leitidee" as the pillar room, stairways, vistas with light and shade, suggested by previous students; instead he proposes as the leading principle, if I understand him correctly, a desire to create picturesque "frames," or architectural settings, for the palace inhabitants ("massgeblich ist vielmehr die Rahmenfunktion," p. 211). I am afraid that I do not find this explanation any more self-sufficient than those of his predecessors; no doubt all these architectural devices must have been effective, and, in some degree, planned; but no one can be singled out individually as the dominant Leitidee of the architect. To insist on discovering some dominant unifying principle, or even set of consistently adhered to principles, controlling the building of the Minoan palaces is, in my opinion, to expect far too much of these early architects.³

The question whether Minoan art is the "first European" art is fairly faced in the final section of chapter 19. But no simple answer is possible. In love of beauty and freedom of artistic expression it does anticipate Greek art; that is why it appeals so directly to us.

Chapter 20 explores the interesting suggestion that the palaces played an essential part in the economy of the state by acting as a sort of clearing-house for the exchange of goods—a vital function in a highly developed culture not enjoying a monetary system. This would help to explain the enormous amount of space given over to rooms for storage and for the production of goods in the palaces; the

³ A reviewer of my *Palaces of Crete* (Princeton, 1962) is, I feel, guilty of a similar misapprehension. He accuses me of presenting the "Cretan aesthetic" as a series of inconsistent approaches. Possibly some of these apparent inconsistencies are due to chronological disparities (cf. the changes in the principles governing Cretan ceramic decoration), but I think there is no clear evidence yet that this is so. Scranton also expects the Cretan builders to have had a consistent system of making measurements in laying out the palaces, *Soc. Architectural Historians*, XXII (1963), pp. 109 f.

broad areas of the Central Court and the West Court would provide ample space for the conduct of such economic activities. The importance of the palace economically as well as in fields of art, religion, etc., justifies the description of the Minoan civilization as a "palace-culture."

Lengthy chapters are also devoted to Speech and Writing (21) and to Minoan culture as reflected in Greek legend (24); briefer ones to geography (2), the history of excavations in Crete (3), the fiesta (16), and trades (18). Chapters 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 23 examine the successive stages of Minoan culture in an historical framework. The last of these chapters touches on the controversy aroused by L. R. Palmer, but wisely concludes that further clarification is needed; at present the evidence of the tablets cannot safely be used for historical conclusions.

The "eidetic" theory of Cretan art advanced by Snijder is unable to account for the art of so advanced a culture as Minoan, which is *not* primitive (pp. 194 f.). Cretan culture is a "high culture"—developing rapidly, strongly, and independently; it is not a "satellite culture" (chapter 22). The recent theory, espoused by Mellaart and Palmer, of second millennium "Luvian" influence on Crete is to be rejected (pp. 262 ff.). The Cretan language is unlikely to prove Semitic (Gordon), nor old-Greek (Georgiev) (pp. 258 f.). These are a few of the sensible pronouncements scattered throughout the book.

Houses are rather scantied. None at Knossos (except Neolithic) or Mallia is illustrated or discussed; and the statement (p. 214) that their living-rooms were on the upper floors needs considerable qualification. Evans' theory of the early "insulae" at Knossos is retained; but cf. Platon (*Encyc. of World Art*, IV, p. 80), "Evans' idea of original 'insulae' must be abandoned, as the result of recent excavation in the Central Court." The plan of Gournia (fig. 49) is *not* improperly oriented (p. 101). The figures for the capacity of the West Magazines at Knossos (p. 224) should be revised; see *Mallia*, IV, p. 42, and my review of this volume in *Gnomon*, XXXVI (1964), pp. 621-4.

Innumerable other topics are illuminatingly discussed, such as costume, sports (especially the bull-games), tomb architecture, textiles, hydraulics, the flying-gallop, dramatic tension, and factors involved in oral tradition. Undoubtedly the volume will remain for many years an indispensable tool of every student in this field. It is to be hoped that it will appear in an English translation.

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PIERRE MONTEIL. *La phrase relative en Grec ancien. Sa formation, son développement, sa structure des origines à la fin du Ve siècle* A. C. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1963. Pp. 424.

This is a thorough and closely reasoned work, the product of wide study, great industry, and much independent thinking. It presents a detailed history of the Greek relative clause to the end of the fifth century B. C., including inscriptions as well as literary works. The

meanings of the relative words are precisely analyzed. Etymologies are carefully developed. There are occasional references to the language of later periods, especially the Greek of the fourth century B. C. and the *κοινή*. Mycenaean forms have received due attention.

As an example of his method, Professor Monteil's discussion of the derivation of *oĩos* (pp. 178-81) may be summarized.

He mentions as current a derivation from **yo-* by means of the suffix **-yo*, important in nominal and verbal derivation. In opposition he points out that **yo-yo-s* would become **doš* by the disappearance of intervocalic *y*. He points out, further, that in Homer the word is regularly a trochee, only rarely a pyrrhic. One must then assume a form **hoyyos*.

After criticizing derivations of Schwyzler, Buck, and W. Schulze—the last with reference to a Mycenaean form—, and after referring for other derivations to Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, the author constructs his own etymology. While *oĩos* and Latin *qualis* are not cognates, they have the same meaning. The structure of the latter is known. Monteil posits tentatively that the structure of the former is similar. The two words would then be composed of morphemes which are distinct but have like properties and are joined in like ways.

Quā-li-s and *tā-li-s* are nominatives of adjectives whose stems are formed by the addition of a suffix **-li* to the pronominal stems *quā-* and *tā-*. Sporadically in Indo-Iranian and more regularly in Hittite, *-lis* functions as a pronominal genitive singular ending. Certain Latin adjectives in *-lis* owe their origin to the fact that substantives in the genitive singular were understood to be nominatives of adjectives expressing the same idea as the genitive case, namely, possession, connection, or the like. Examples are *erilis*, *civilis*, *naturalis*, *talis*, *qualis*. *Talis . . . qualis* means, "participating in that in which . . . participates."

oĩos, then, on the author's tentative assumption, would be derived from **yo-syo-s*, which includes the pronominal genitive singular ending. By a similar analysis *poĩos* would come from **kʷo-syo-s* and would be the exact counterpart of Latin *cuius*. (Buck, according to Monteil, reached the same derivation for *poĩos* through a different and more complicated analysis.) Monteil's derivation of *oĩos* gives, as he says, an economical explanation of the *-yy-* while taking into account the meaning of the word. However, it is, he adds, unverifiable, for already in Mycenaean *s* before *y* had disappeared.

Of Monteil's many significant observations only a few may be stated here. 1. Greek has a proclivity for dissyllabic subordinating words and word groups (pp. 125, 397, and *passim*). So *δοτις* eneroaches upon *ος*; *δτου*, *δτω* almost entirely supplant *οϋ τινος*, *δ τινι*; *δπη*, *δπου* prevail over *η*, *οι*, but *δθεν*, *δθι* over *δπόθεν*, *δπόθι* (p. 94). 2. *ως* is probably instrumental in origin (p. 329). 3. The use of *ινα* to introduce a clause of purpose probably developed directly from the instrumental, not from the (derived) locative use of the word (pp. 380-1). 4. *oĩos* and *δοσος*, and likewise *poĩos* and *πόσος* are probably closely related: *δοσ(σ)ος* < **yo-tyo-s* (p. 205). 5. In Hdt., IX, 51 *δοσον περ* is not, as L.-S.-J. would have it, equivalent to *δοσον τε*. Rather, as Legrand interprets, it indicates an *exact* measure (p. 209, n. 3).

Especially noteworthy is Monteil's bridging of the gap that sepa-

rates the two principal branches of the uses of *τε* (pp. 108-12). This particle, he says, has totalizing force. I.-E. **k^we* expressed indefiniteness, from which it is but a short step to generalization and totalization. In its copulative use *τε* directs attention to a group, to the neglect of individuals, as in *πατήρ τε μήτηρ τε*. In the so-called free use, it totalizes not individuals but circumstances. An example is I, 632:

καὶ μὲν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποιήν ἢ οὐ παίδος ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος.

"Assuredly (in indeterminate circumstances = under all circumstances) we customarily accept compensation from the man who has killed our brother, or for our dead child." In P 176 *τε* reinforces *αἰεί*.

Monteil's general conclusion (pp. 392-405) is, in summary, as follows.

1. The Greek relative clause developed from the anaphorical statement. 2. Greek relatives are formed from a variety of stems; and their large number has stylistic and metrical advantages. 3. Of the ancient languages of the Indo-European family, the Indo-Iranian tongues alone rival Greek in the abundance of relative words. The Indo-European inflectional system for nouns and pronouns, discovered by the study of comparative grammar, is a mutilated system. Many of the elements which at the level of late Indo-European we call "suffixes" or "particles" may be fossilized rejects of the inflectional system. On this assumption certain marginal forms may be explained. Some adverbs in *-*te* (*ὅτε*), *-*ta* (Lesb. *ὄτα*, Lat. *ita*), *-*ka* (*ἡνίκα*), *-*na* (*ἵνα*) may once have been parts of the inflectional system. Greek augmented the rich inheritance that came to it from the inflectional morphemes of the parent speech and in a number of instances did so in the historical period.

4. **yo-* is the principal relative stem. The use as relatives of words formed from **to-* began comparatively late: relative clauses introduced by such words in Homer have only a restricted use. Conjunctions are derived from **yo-*, not **to-*. (Nicander's *τότε* for *ὅτε* is a false Homerism. *τὼς* in Arist., *Acharn.*, 762—cf. Soph., *Ich.*, 296 and Aesch., *Sept.*, 637 [p. 328]—is an example of equivalence of demonstrative and relative.)

5. While in the parent speech pronouns probably lacked morphological coherence, Greek developed a number of systems. Among these are *οἷος*, *τοῖος*, *ποῖος*, *ὁποῖος*; *ὅτε*, *τότε*, etc. Apparently some of these quadripartite series were completed at a rather late date. Isolated forms like *ὄφρα*, *ἵνα*, and *ἕως* are rare.

6. The indirect question developed from the relative clause introduced by *ὅστις*. This word in its interrogative use could be analyzed into *τί(ς)*, symbol of interrogation, and *ὅ-*, symbol of dependence. Additional indirect interrogatives were mechanically formed by prefixing *ὅ-* to the direct interrogatives *ποῖος*, *πότε*, etc.

The relative pronoun *ὅστις*, misnamed indefinite, is really a defining pronoun. In contrast to *ὅς τε*, it refers to an actor as performing an act ("comme réalisant effectivement l'acte"). It has "actualizing" force. With the passing of time it becomes more and more an intensive word. By virtue of the close connection of *ὅστις* and the *ὅπο-* series as indirect interrogatives, the former in its relative func-

tion communicates its forcefulness to that series in its relative use. (This use had grown out of the indirect-interrogative function of the series [pp. 176, 203].) By the end of the fifth century the relatives *ὁποῖος*, *ὁπόσος*, etc., have to a great extent become intensive variants of *οἷος*, *ὅσος*, etc.

7. *οἷος*, *ὁποῖος*, *ὅσος*, etc. are "categoric" relatives. They indicate that a word in the dependent clause, subject or object, belongs to the same category as the "antecedent." Thus *ἄνδρες οἷοι σὺ* does not mean "men who you are" (absurd), but "men of the category to which you belong."

8. Conjunctions with relative stems originated from case forms of relative pronouns, in nearly all instances in prehistoric times. The fact that with a few doubtful exceptions there are no correspondences between Greek conjunctions and those of related languages suggests that the Greek conjunctions were formed after the end of Indo-European unity. They do not constitute an orderly group: several may express the same idea, and one may express several ideas. Nevertheless, from Homeric times to the end of the fifth century and beyond, the language manifests a tendency toward coherence in the use of conjunctions. *ὥς*, however, always the most general conjunction, retains all of its uses,—substantival, causal, final, consequential, temporal.

By means of tables Monteil shows the number of occurrences of the various substantival and causal conjunctions in Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Herodotus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Lysias. A third table, of the final conjunctions, includes also Thucydides, Attic inscriptions of the fifth century, and Plato. There follows a discussion of the changes revealed by the tables and also of the changes in the frequency of the various temporal conjunctions.

9. By the end of the fifth century the Greek relative clause had become a tractable and exact instrument for the expression of both specific and general ideas.

A partial bibliography, logically divided into four sections but not alphabetized, an index of the passages which head the lists of examples, and a minute table of contents complete the volume.

In this large and comprehensive work there are a few details to which the present reviewer would take exception.

Monteil has confirmed the rule that indirect questions, in the strict sense of the term,—namely, those which solicit information, are introduced by *ὅστις*, *ὁποῖος*, etc. (cf. K.-G., *Satzlehre*, ed. 4, II, p. 516, 1), not by *ὅς*, *οἷος*, etc. This rule is not absolute. As Monteil says, exceptions are inevitable in a language in which the indirect question is essentially a relative clause (pp. 153-4, n. 2 *fin.*). However, he is very reluctant to admit exceptions; and this reluctance has at times led him astray. Two examples follow:

Φ 609 (pp. 48-9):

οὐδ' ἄρα τοί γ' ἔτλαν πόλιος καὶ τείχεος ἐκτὸς
μεῖναι ἔτ' ἀλλήλους καὶ γνώμεναι ὅς τε πεφεύγοι
ὅς τ' ἔθαν' ἐν πολέμῳ.

Monteil would read *πεφεύγει*, which, he says, is found in some MSS. Since it is only in the indirect question that Homer uses the optative

after a past tense in place of the indicative, retention of the optative would necessitate interpreting the dependent clause as an indirect question, which, however, is regularly introduced by *ὅστις*. Rather than admit an exception to the usual practice, Monteil rejects the reading which is overwhelmingly favored by the MSS. In support of his position he points to the parallel use of the indicative, *ἔθανε*. However, in II 650-1 differing moods, subjunctive and optative, are used together in an indirect deliberative question in "secondary sequence." Cf. also Euripides' use of present subjunctive and future indicative as parallels in direct deliberative questions, where the readings are protected by the meter: *El.*, 967, *Ion*, 758, *I. T.*, 96-8.

Soph., *Trach.*, 1077 (p. 201):

καὶ νῦν προσελθὼν στήθι πλησίον πατρός,
σκέψαι δ' ὅποίᾳς ταῦτα συμφορᾶς ὕπο
πέπονθα.

Having differentiated between indirect question (with *ὅποιος*) and relative clause (with *οἷος*) on the basis that the former solicits information while the latter indicates the possession of information, Monteil comments: "Heracles no doubt knows, but by a psychological substitution he adopts his son's point of view. If this *nuance* is neglected, the scene loses much of its emotional power." Through this subtle explanation the author avoids counting this passage an exception to the usual distinction between indirect question and relative clause.

A similar explanation is given for Soph., *Phil.*, 249 (p. 152), and a different but equally subtle one for Thuc., I, 137 *ὅστις ἐστὶ* and Lysias, XIII, 4 *ὅφ' ὅσον* (p. 153, n. 2).

There are a few other examples of what seems to me extreme subtlety, such as the distinguishing between "objective" and "subjunctive" identity (pp. 168-70) and the suggestion that an *ὄφρα* clause of purpose with *κε* or *ἄν* is less dynamic than one without a particle (p. 315).

While Monteil has to some extent succeeded in clarifying the grammatical term *indefinite* (pp. 130-5), he is not consistent in his treatment of the term. He questions its validity (p. 130) and says that he has rejected it (p. 396). Yet he uses it (pp. 109, 111, 201, 225, 226, 284, 286 and, in quotation marks, p. 222).

The author thinks that the development of the relative clause from the anaphorical statement was very gradual (p. 28). He mentions the frequent impossibility, especially in Homer, of distinguishing between the two and says that only the existence of more complicated structures, developed from anaphorical statements, can make one suspect that expressions which are anaphorical in form are relative clauses (p. 392). From the last remark it seems reasonable to conclude that originally no clause would be felt as a relative clause if it could be taken as an independent sentence. A relative clause was first uttered, it seems to me, when a person had something to say that could not readily be said in simple sentences. A saltus would be involved. An example of the earliest type of relative clause would be that in E 192: *ἵπποι δ' οὐ παρέασι καὶ ἄρματα τῶν κ' ἐπιβαλὶν*. Cf. "A Theory of the Origin of Hypotaxis," *Indogermanische Forschungen*, XXXV (1915), pp. 237-44.

The change of subjunctive to optative in a clause of purpose depending on a verb in a past tense is not so mechanical as Monteil's remarks would lead one to think.

π 234 (cited, p. 315):

νῦν αὖ δεῦρ' ἰκόμην ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθήνησιν
ὄφρα κε δυσμενέεσσι φόνου πέρι βουλεύσωμεν.

The author would account for the subjunctive on the ground that this is a formulaic verse displaced from its proper grammatical context (p. 315, n. 3). However, when Odysseus speaks these words his purpose abides, so that the use of the subjunctive is natural. (For examples of the subjunctive employed under like circumstances see "Notes on the Text of Euripides," *A. J. P.*, LXXXIII [1962], p. 399.) In purpose clauses introduced by ὄφρα without a particle Monteil accepts the subjunctive after past tenses (p. 314). He says that there are in Homer eleven examples following the aorist; two following the imperfect: X 282; δ 163; one following the pluperfect: M 356. In the three examples which he cites the purpose abides when the words are spoken. In μ 52 (cited, p. 315) the subjunctive occurs in a clause introduced by ὄφρα κε and depending on a verb in the aorist imperative. The entire sentence refers to future time, so that here too the use of the subjunctive is natural.

The author reasons (p. 344, n. 1) that the absence from Homer of ὥς with the superlative, a construction which first appears in Pindar, "tends to prove" that ὥς ἄριστος and Skt. yācchrestāḥ do not have a common archetype. Surely the Homeric poems do not contain all the grammatical constructions that were available.

It is stated (p. 371) that ὅπως is used, very rarely, with independent clauses expressing wish. Neither of the examples cited is convincing. Of Aesch., *Eum.*, 298 Monteil himself says that it may be a clause of purpose. In A 136 the verb, in the future indicative, has volitive, rather than optative force. Cf. Aristoph., *Pl.*, 326 and the other examples, all post-Homeric, in K.-G., *op. cit.*, II, p. 376, A. 6.

σ 270 (cf. β 54, 128; υ 342; π 52):

γῆμασθ' ὃ κ' ἐθέλωσθα τεὸν κατὰ δῶμα λιποῦσα.

ὃ is not attracted into the case of its antecedent but depends on γῆμασθαι understood. ἐθέλω is regularly completed by an infinitive.

The relative clause in O 209 (p. 285) should be listed under the heading "iterative" instead of "defining."

While in the body of the book typographical errors are rare, the bibliography has four misprints in the titles of German books and articles.

The author has shed light on the Greek language at many points. His most important contribution, however, is, as one would wish, the book in its entirety. The world of classical scholarship is indebted to Professor Monteil for an accurate and well organized presentation, comprehensive and detailed, of the history of the relative clause in ancient Greek.

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A. N. BRYAN-BROWN, J. T. CHRISTIE, F. C. GEARY, T. F. HIGHAM, M. PLATNAUER, A. F. WELLS. *More Oxford Compositions*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xxi + 234. \$5.60.

Here is a second volume of compositions in Latin and Greek prose and verse, similar to *Some Oxford Compositions* (1949). Of the seven original authors three remain (Bryan-Brown, Higham, and Platnauer); three others joined the Club after 1949. As before, one or two compositions were discussed at fortnightly meetings during term and the members of the Club benefited by the friendly criticism of their colleagues.

In the preface Higham explains that this time he contributed only eight versions, but he also submitted many of the orations in "Contemporary Latin" required of him as Public Orator. One of these is included by way of illustration (no. 14, H. M. King George VI at Winchester College). Others have been published in *Orationes Oxonienses Selectae* (1960). Higham adds that the book "contains fewer pieces of great difficulty, fewer *tours de force*" than its predecessor.

In the introduction he describes the changes affecting the teaching of the classics during the last fifteen years. He discusses the adaptation of composition to modern requirements and points out that its main object "is precisely what the malcontents would wish—to make possible the reading of classical texts with ease and correct understanding." In the course of a defence of verse-composition he refers to Menander's *Dyscolus* and states that "out of some 330 readings either adopted or thought worth mention in the Oxford text at least 200 were suggested by British scholars who had practised verse-composition." He then gives a summary of the introduction to the previous volume, which was soon out of print.

There are 28 contributions in Latin prose, 45 in Latin verse, 29 in Greek prose, and 26 in Greek verse. This makes a total of 128, since no. 55 and no. 73 are translated by two authors. In Latin verse 10 versions are in hexameters, 23 in elegiacs, 4 in hendecasyllables, 3 in iambics, 2 in alcaics, 2 in sapphics, and 1 in asclepiads. In Greek verse 19 are in iambics (though no. 124 and no. 126 include other metres), 4 are in elegiacs, and 3 in hexameters.

In Latin prose Higham (no. 24) shows his usual skill in translating Churchill's description of the time when he became Prime Minister: (Therefore, though impatient for the morning, I slept soundly and had no need for cheering dreams) *lucem igitur avide exspectabam, sed ita, ut graviter arteque dormire neque ulla requirerem somniorum visa quibus incitarer. quid enim? potiora somniis praesentia*. He also translates an interesting estimate of Chamberlain (no. 13): (His vanity was great. He surrounded himself with men he could get on with, that is to say with yes-men) *ut erat immoderatus sui aestimator, homines ascivit sibi ipsi commodos, hoc est assentatorum coetum*; and his translation of a lecture by Gilbert Murray (no. 6) ends with these striking words: (But who would not be proud to have been an unknown camp-attendant at the battle of Marathon or to have thrown his garment under the ass's feet when Christ entered Jerusalem?) *ecquis tamen est qui in laude sua haec non poneret, quod in pugna Marathonica calo, isque ignotissimus, rem pro sua parte gessisset, aut quod unus e multis de domo*

deduxisset M. Atilium Regulum ad Poenos provisosque cruciatus sua voluntate redeuntem?

The Principal of Jesus College (J. T. Christie) has an admirable version about the value of the classics, taken from the *London Times* (no. 20): quae Graeci tradiderunt cuncta si sustuleris, quantum adiumentum aetas nostra desideret, ne is quidem ignorat cui Graecis literis studere non contigerit; etenim huius humanitatis nostrae non solum fundamenta sed ornatum etiam speciemque externam sentiamus esse dilapsam. The former Principal of Brasenose College (M. Platnauer), who has made the largest contribution and is equally good at prose and verse, has an excellent version of Macaulay on Dr. Johnson (no. 11) and two good descriptions of Barrère, who appears as Hyperbolus (no. 9 and no. 17). Geary gives us Stanley Baldwin speaking of the hint that Homer provides of the beauty of Helen (no. 12). Bryan-Brown, who has succeeded Higham as Public Orator, has a fine translation of Macaulay (no. 21), and Wells is good on Gibbon and Swift (no. 1 and no. 23).

In Latin verse Christie, who is a very gifted composer, contributes fifteen versions, which are all interesting. Tessimond's *Horoscope for a girl* (no. 34) has great charm:

flamma tibi ante alias vitae dum elarior ardet,
ut tibi sic aliis causa doloris eris;

and A. D. Godley's humorous poem about the Oxford undergraduate (no. 68, When Oxford is wakened by bells) ought to give special pleasure:

Iam campana sonat, rumpitque Oxonia somnos;
iam rubet Aurora versicolore polus.
me, nisi mane peto quotiens lex postulat aedem,
poena, Decane, reum, sic minitare, manet.

Finally a beautiful poem by Robert Bridges (no. 72, Will love again awake) is rendered with great success in asclepiads:

Iam sopitus Amor diu
longae vincla velit solvere inertiae?

Higham with a delightful sense of humor translates a notice posted in Civil Service departments (no. 32, A secret is only a secret when nobody else knows it):

Parce tegenda loqui; nam sic modo tecta manebunt
si nemo omnino conscius alter erit.

This should belong to a lost work of Ovid, which might be called *De arte tacendi*. Platnauer gives us Rowe's *Colin's Complaint*:

Rusticus es, Corydon; sperabas, stulte, puellam
posse tua talem rusticitate capi!

And both he and Geary translate Lehmann's poem about a dog called Rufus (no. 55), which will appeal to all dog-lovers.

In Greek prose Bryan-Brown and Platnauer contribute all the versions except two. The former gives an eloquent translation of Churchill's broadcast to U. S. A. (no. 78), which includes these words:

"But there was no unity. There was no vision. The nations were pulled down one by one while the others gaped and chattered" (ἀλλὰ νὰρ οὐκ ἦν κοινωνία τῶν πράξεων οὐδεμί' οὐδὲ πρόνοια, καθηροῦντο δ' αἱ πόλεις καθ' ἐκάστην χασμωμένων δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ληρούντων). He is equally good at translating President Roosevelt's speech (no. 98) with its humorous reference to his little dog, Fala. Platnauer excels in prose in Platonic style; good examples are a version taken from Max Beerbohm's *Zuleika Dobson*: "'Tell me, do you seriously think of drowning yourself this afternoon?' 'Rather,' said the undergraduate" ("εἰπέ μοι σὺν· ἔτεδν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις περὶ δέιλῃν σαντὸν καταποντίσαι;," "ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;," ἡ δ' ὅς, where his translation of "rather" should be noted (no. 81), and another taken from Bertrand Russell's *The Conquest of Happiness* (no. 74).

In Greek verse Christie has a good version of Oscar Wilde (no. 108) with a clever translation of "quite dead" (πάντῃ λέγω τέθνηκεν, οὐ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὐ), and his epigram (no. 120, "There's been an accident," they said) is amusing; his versions of Flecker and Belloc (no. 124 and no. 126) are difficult compositions written with great skill. Bryan-Brown translates Malory into Homeric hexameters (no. 103), Platnauer gives us a humorous passage from A. P. Herbert's *Helen* (no. 111), and Geary translates an interesting poem by Bradby into elegiacs (no. 116).

This book should appeal to all who are interested in the classics and especially to those who teach composition in colleges and universities.

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GIORGIO BERNARDI PERINI. L'accento latino. Cenni teorici e norme pratiche. Bologna, Casa editrice Prof. Riccardo Patron, 1964. Pp. 144. Lire 1900.

As the title says, the purpose of this book is twofold: it aims to give brief theoretical sketches concerning Latin accentuation, and proposes some practical rules on implementation, addressed especially to native speakers of Italian. But since in Classical Latin (the form of Latin here dealt with) the *place* of the accent is entirely dependent upon another prosodic feature, namely, the quantity of the penultimate syllable, one should think that what needs elucidation is the question as to what *type* of accent it may have been. Or else, if the problem of the place is to be treated at all, one expects it to be done in terms of the prosodies of quantity and syllabation.

In this book, however, the problem of type is dismissed in the traditional manner, with reference to ancient testimony together with a perfunctory critique of it, and the author reaches the conclusion, in Chapter One, "Pitch and stress accent" (all translations are mine), that "it seems reasonable to maintain that the Latin accent was, from the beginning of the literary period to the first centuries of the Empire, one of pitch" (p. 15). It would follow, then, that the author is really interested principally in the place of the accent, and in fact the title of Chapter Two, "Phonemes and syl-

lables, duration and quantity," promises the treatment I just remarked upon. But this chapter, instead of being the crucial portion of Bernardi Perini's theory, indeed of the entire book, pursues a faltering course among half-truths and trite truths. There is an entirely circular definition of the syllable: so-called 'explosive' and 'implosive' phonemes (not the author's invention or terminology), which owe their very names to their position at the beginning and at the end of the syllable, respectively, and which therefore *presuppose* a definition of the syllable in terms of its boundaries, are by Bernardi Perini employed blithely, and circularly, to *define* the syllable as a unit that is bounded by them. And the discussion of duration and quantity is disappointingly inconclusive and inconsequential.

The title alone of Chapter Two conjures up a most formidable array of baffling and exasperating problems of both general and Latin linguistics, questions which cry out for solutions by means of modern theoretical and experimental linguistics to take the place of some worn and question-begging answers transmitted to us by ancient and medieval grammarians, and accepted by us with a misplaced reliance upon the dicta of those who, many think, know best because it was their own language they were describing. If we have learned anything in the past decades it is that knowing a language natively is no guarantee for the ability to analyze it scientifically (no more than it is a guarantee—and agreement on this may be easier, though the argument is essentially the same—for the ability to teach it properly): speakers see in their language properties as obvious and patent and common-sense as was the orbiting of the sun around the earth to Aristotle. Since in Bernardi Perini's book at least the titles, some references, and the terminology led me to look for a modern revision of prosodic theory, I approached it, especially its theoretical portion, and in particular Chapter Two, eagerly and expectantly—all the more so since my own present research deals with the prosodies. I was, I fear, thoroughly disappointed.

I must say in all fairness that the author makes an earnest and valiant effort to grapple with the problems he encounters, in a manner more objective and systematic than do many of his predecessors: witness his effort and desire, which I applaud wholeheartedly, to bear in mind that prosodies of a language must be viewed phonetically and phonemically as a whole system, and the various prosodic features, be they functional ('phonemic') or not, as interdependent parts; but he makes no attempt to construct such a system, which really would have been his task. I must also say, however, to my sorrow and discomfort, that the author is not fully equipped to do the job.

Bernardi Perini's information on linguistics consists, I am afraid, of bits and pieces, with not enough breadth or depth. And if his text did not betray this shortcoming, his bibliography would: to stop with de Saussure and Vendryes (of the early 'twenties) as regards comprehensive manuals on linguistics; to refer to, and rely upon, the works of Rousselot and Grammont (of the 'twenties and 'thirties), both deservedly esteemed in their days, as "modern experimental phonetics" (p. 9), as if the spectrograph had never been invented and as if the field of acoustic phonetics, together with psychoacoustic investigations, so important in prosodic phonology (only Miss Dur-

and's book of 1946 on vowel length is mentioned), did not exist; to ignore completely the vast and important contributions on phonetics and phonemics, especially on prosodies, published in the English language (dare I contemplate the reason for this which comes to mind?) and the concomitant disregard for the reports emanating from British, Scandinavian, and American (to say nothing of German and Russian) laboratories: all this could not but result in the defeat of Bernardi Perini's well-intentioned attempts to improve upon earlier purely theoretical, impressionistic, and introspective treatments of his subject. It is true that he is better acquainted with recent contributions to the field of Latin studies, and that his philological expertness is amply attested by voluminous references to ancient authorities; but it is also true that many modern writers on these subjects have not availed themselves sufficiently of new methods and new findings, and that ancient grammarians are consequently in a still worse position even though they were speaking of their own idiom (see above). All this Bernardi Perini indeed senses, and seems to want to remedy in his own work, but cannot get a grip on.

This being the state of the theory, it is not surprising that the practical sections of the book also leave something to be desired. Chapter Three, "The rules of Latin accent," is but a restatement of what every grammar contains—which is all right as far as it goes, but does not go far enough in view of the manifest intentions of the author. The final Chapter Four, "Errors of accentuation," is addressed to students of Latin, especially of Italian tongue, who may be tempted to accentuate Latin words on the same syllable as their Italian derivatives, hence often wrongly. Bernardi Perini gives a list of 240 lemmata (pp. 62-116), ordered in several subgroupings and amply interspersed with theoretical comment. In this section there is also a treatise on "Grecisms in Latin" (pp. 95-117), where, in my view, the author sets out on the right path by associating the varied and apparently inconsistent treatment of Greek loans in Latin with the "diverse linguistic environment—popular or learned—into which they were received" (p. 97), and refers to a "triple front: popular language, learned conservative language, and learned innovating language" (p. 98). But he is unwilling or unable to pursue this line of inquiry, possibly because he is trapped by a theory stated earlier, which makes it "absurd to postulate two different languages within one and the same community of speakers" (p. 9); so he must come to the lame concession that the question "still awaits . . . a systematic conclusion" (p. 105)—which leads me to wonder just where such an investigation belongs if not in a book on Latin accent. It does so especially because the way in which borrowings from one language behave in another often provides illuminating insights on either or both tongues. (In the field of phonology, for example, the Greek transliteration *Kaĩsap* for *Caesar* is one of the valuable clues for our knowledge that *ae* was pronounced [ai] in Classical Latin, and that *c* sounded like [k].)

Most curious, and injurious, is the following clash of theory and practice. Bernardi Perini declares himself, as I noted, an adherent of the view that Latin had a pitch rather than stress accent. I shall not defend here my own (and different) opinion, or ask the question whether his theory refers to phonetics or phonemics (it would make

a difference), or object to his preposterous account of how pitch eventually changed to stress (p. 15). In any event, in his counsels on how to avoid errors of accentuation, Bernardi Perini is concerned with the place of the accent and not with its character. But it emerges clearly from his own words, and from the nature of the advice he gives, that he uses in *his* Latin, and teaches students to use in *their* Latin, a stress accent: that is what the juxtaposition and comparison of Latin and Italian words (pp. 69-80) is all about. For surely, if Latin is really taught with a pitch accent whose position is predetermined by the quantity of the penultimate syllable, Italian (or any other language) which has a stress accent whose position is unpredictable on the basis of any other prosodic feature, that is, has a functional stress, cannot cause interference with the proper accentuation of Latin in the first place. So if Bernardi Perini actually transferred his own theory of Latin accent into practice and made recommendations to teachers and students accordingly, his chapter on errors of pronunciation would look quite different—if it were needed at all, once the prosodies other than accent were consistently described and taught. I myself think the chapter useful enough—but only because I *disagree* with the author's views on Latin accentuation: and that is a strange state of affairs indeed.

I have no doubt that Bernardi Perini perceives, though dimly, the linguistic problems that beset the description of Latin prosodies, and is dissatisfied with some of the theories we have held; hence it displeases me to render so unfavorable a judgment on his earnest, though wanting, efforts. Had I viewed this book as but another amiable, unimaginative rehash of old stuff, I should not have bothered to record my objections; but as Bernardi Perini's intentions and aspirations seem higher, I could not but take them seriously. (Readers desirous of being competently instructed in the history and present status of the Latin accent problem will find linguistically pertinent information, masterfully presented, in G. C. Lepseky, "Il problema dell'accento latino: rassegna critica di studi sull'accento latino e sullo studio dell'accento," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Lettere, storia e filosofia*, Serie 2, XXXI [1962], pp. 199-246.)

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ANTONIO MADDALENA. *Sofocle*, Seconda Edizione. Torino, G. Giapichelli, 1963. Pp. viii + 391.

This is a revision of the book that appeared in 1959 as volume nine in the Edizioni di Filosofia nella Letteratura, a series in which Maddalena's 1951 book on Aeschylus had appeared. In its new appearance, outside the format of that series, it has undergone many small changes, primarily to tighten the rather ambulatory, narrative approach to the plays. The notes are thinned in number and length, and appended to the relevant page instead of being bunched after each chapter; the heavy reporting of other Italians' opinions (especially those of Bignone) is reduced, and all citations are reworked. This makes it particularly sad that Maddalena does

not take the opportunity to incorporate the results of scholarly work done in recent years. Hans Diller and Bernard M. W. Knox, for instance, make no appearance here, though they have been working along lines that focus the very problems that Maddalena is interested in. (Diller's early paper on the fixed, predicted course of the Sophoclean hero was referred to in the first edition, but the reference has now been excised.) The only new work brought to bear on the plays is that done by Kirkwood in his book (1958), which Maddalena did not have time to use in the first edition. And, for one polishing his phrases in a second edition, Maddalena shows surprisingly little interest in later revisions of the books he quotes from. He may, understandably, not have had time to deal with the new edition of Kitto's book (1961); but it is harder to grasp his reason for ignoring the important new edition of Pohlenz (1954) or for giving us the pagination, not of Reinhardt's second or third editions (1941, 1947), but of the first (1933).

The new edition puts a few short quotations in Greek characters (which are apparently not within the compass of the Edizioni di Filosofia), though not always accurately. Maddalena himself rarely condescends to textual matters (he seems, from his treatment of *O. T.*, 894, to be using Pearson's text; no mention is made of Dain)—even when the difficulties involved in establishing (or at least choosing) a text are vital to his point (as the attribution of *Ant.*, 572 is to his discussion on p. 77); he adverts to such difficulties only three times—when he insists on $\Delta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ at *El.*, 162-3, and says that if any correcting has to be done it should be done on $\beta\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ (Dain prints Meineke's $\lambda\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota$); at *O. T.*, 894 where, with Musgrave and most modern editors, he departs from L's (and Pearson's) $\epsilon\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$; and at *Ant.*, 927-8, where he gives us our choice of three emendations to prevent Antigone from what he considers the illogical curse "Let Creon suffer no *more* than I do" (but she is simply protecting herself from repercussions, as Creon does at vv. 773-6, 887-9—a legalism endemic to those who believe in curses and their consequences).

Maddalena has in no way changed his interpretation of Sophocles as re-delivering the message of Aeschylus (and, one is tempted to say, as anticipating the message of Christ): Sophocles the pious wrote to prove that the gods are just. Although the author agrees or disagrees with isolated observations of Weinstock, Reinhardt, Opstelten, or Whitman, he rather ignores than answers the central points in their "existentialist" approach to Sophocles, and continues to use anachronistically Christian concepts and language to cope with Sophocles. He can, for instance, take Antigone's remark that her life is so full of suffering that to trade it for death would be a bargain ($\kappa\epsilon\rho\delta\omicron\varsigma$, *Ant.*, 461-4), and, through his ethico-critical alembic, alchemize it into this: "Di contro alla inevitabile morte che uccide i corpi stanno i maggiori ma evitabile mali che uccidono l'anima." He makes Antigone a type of the religious mystic confronting, in Creon, the worldly rationalist. He thinks that Oedipus, arriving at Colonus, has discovered that ritual purification is superseded once man knows that the spirit is pure—which misses the point that in his death, which he approaches precisely as a ritual purification (*O. C.*, 1544-52), Oedipus is not only wonderful, $\epsilon\iota\ \tau\iota\varsigma$ $\beta\omicron\rho\omicron\tau\omega\eta\nu$ $\theta\alpha\upsilon\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, but wonder-working. He magically blesses Athens.

When Oedipus warns Theseus not to take the risk of touching him (vv. 1132-6), Maddalena, to avoid facing the fact that Oedipus still believes in an objective and effective pollution, attributes these words (on p. 352) to Oedipus' humility! The majestic human Fury who dooms his own sons hardly seems a natural candidate for this unique distinction of being the Greek tragic hero who is humble; and this explanation of vv. 1132-6 will not account for the *μή ψαύετε* of v. 1544.

But it is not possible to place Maddalena entirely in the category of the traditional defenders of Sophoclean piety. As opposed, say, to Pohlenz and Kitto and Bowra, he retains nothing of the hamartistic view of these plays. For him, the heroes have no flaws—or at worst (as in the case of Ajax) no flaws that have not been purged away by the time the hero appears to the audience. This puts him, in one sense, on the side of Jaeger and the "existentialist" critics: the hero's suffering arises, not out of any *hamartia* but from his very *arete*. (Like these critics, Maddalena takes a rather dim view of the unheroic Chorus.) Indeed, Maddalena is just as adept at exculpating an Ajax as slavish Aristotelians have been at hunting out flaws in Oedipus. He casuistically defends Ajax and Heracles and Electra from any charges of inhumanity; he even uses the argument that heroes have their own standards, not to be questioned by us lesser beings (though one wonders, then, why the hero's humanity has been exposed to our scrutiny and judgment). This latter argument is consonant with the Nietzschean approach of Whitman to Sophoclean heroism, but not with the otherwise Christian assumptions of Maddalena. Thus, though he travels some distance with the "pessimistic" critics, he soon parts company with them. Where they see darkness and mystery, he sees none at all. Suffering is a mark of divine favor, for which posthumous fame is an adequate compensation. (There is the unsuppressible suspicion, here, that the hero is able to contemplate the growth of his resplendent reputation among men from some convenient niche on the lower reaches of the Christian Olympus, a kind of Cloud-eagle-land.)

The book is not without its merits. Maddalena has read widely, and goes outside the routine circle of critics for some telling comments on Sophocles by, e. g., Voltaire, Jaspers, and Francis Ferguson (spelled Ferguson in both editions; but Cedric Whitman fares better here than in the early volume, where he lurked under the pseudonym "il Withmann"). Maddalena can see through clichés (for example, that of Creon as a typical tyrant) and make fresh observations. He will have nothing of the "diptych" approach to the *Ajax*, *Trachiniae*, or *Antigone*; he is commendably immune to the ingenuities that make Odysseus the hero of the *Ajax*, Creon of the *Antigone*, Neoptolemus of the *Philoctetes* and Deianeira of the *Trachiniae*. He has an especially fine feel for the effects intended when a character moves from troubled lyric measures to calmer trimeters, and he has excellent things to say on the use of oracles in the plays. Even on points which must remain doubtful, he presents a well-argued case—as when he says that the merchant's entry in the *Philoctetes* is meant to show that Oedipus is a meddler who will always botch his own plots by being "too clever by half"; or when he takes Ajax's "Trugrede" as motivated by the desire to ban others from what is an essentially religious rite of self-immolation. His

admiration for Sophocles is contagious; but he has not enough pondered the fact that—as Gildersleeve put it—the Attic μέλιττα is as notable for his sting as for his honey.

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PETER SALWAY. *The Frontier People of Roman Britain*. Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. 304; 8 pls. (*Cambridge Classical Studies*.)

In 200 pages of text, in another 50 to assemble and comment on the relevant inscriptions, and in several maps and plans, Salway gives the history of the civilian population of northern England and southern Scotland in the period of Roman rule. The subject has not been studied before with any care, and Salway's work seems likely to stand for a long time, partly because of its own merits, partly because the evidence (as the author is aware) is sparse, problematic, and, it must really be said, unrewarding. Few readers will want to read the book throughout, however useful for consultation it will certainly be to specialists.

"This is intended to be a study of the processes and products of Romanization, of the impact of Rome on the British frontier region and the place of the civilian in the Roman system of that area." A ponderable subject; yet of the first topic, Romanization, there is no extended discussion, nor is any comparison drawn between the end results and the prior, native condition. Inscriptions are handled expertly, but their very limited total is obscured by the weighing of them in terms of percentages. Many of the men and women recording their origins on stone were not risen from the tribal population at all, but were rather immigrants from other areas, even in surprising numbers from the eastern provinces; and on the other hand, what is said of the natives, though interesting points are brought out, must be collected from comments scattered over several chapters. The possibility of testing for degrees of Romanization in styles and proportions of local and imported pottery is not explored.

From one of the maps, not giving all the places mentioned in the text but admirably clear, it can be seen that civilians are known almost solely through their connection with army centers. Though this fact is not emphasized, it must follow that we are in ignorance of how the native majority of the population lived. Of the minority, our knowledge is laid out military site by military site, in a chapter of 130 pages, of which perhaps 20 pages are extracts from antiquaries' reports of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, filled with enigmatic references to stoke-holes, drains, and "ruynes," and attended by synopses of more recent excavations. This section of the book represents a vast amount of work, valuable because it exhumes information long buried and otherwise unobtainable. There is no denying, however, that the non-specialist will find it painful reading. The chief conclusions that emerge reveal the close connection between the life history of civilian settlements and that of troop concentrations. Governmental and military policies had im-

portant effects on the movements, pursuits, and prosperity of dependent civilians (see, for example, pp. 66-8 and 114).

An excellent short chapter on civil architecture is followed by somewhat disconnected summaries of other topics: *vicani*, the *territorium legionis*, and the general history of the region treated. Roman commanders seem to have exercised final authority over the people living near the camps, but as the civilian population grew larger it came to elect its own officials and to run its own affairs. Experiments in self-government are mostly hidden from us. Their variety from one time or place to another is a consequence of their unimportance and of the unwillingness of the military to take on the full, formal duties of administration. Further light might have been shed on the scanty material through a study of evidence from other provinces. This is attempted, not very successfully. We are, for example, ill served when relevant aspects of guild organization, of the "Jupiter Column" at Mainz, and of the *saltus Sumelocensis* are adduced through reference only to the *C. I. L.* and Desau's *I. L. S.* A book by the reviewer would have been helpful, but though it appeared two years before the most recently published works that Salway quotes, it was not used. His researches thus pass over those enlightening parallels and wider contexts that could have been brought forward, in order to focus instead on the archeology of north Britain; yet it must be said with praise that what that narrow focus reveals is as clear and complete as the material permits.

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MICHEL LEJEUNE. Index inverse du grec mycénien. Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1964. Pp. 116.

The lexical material in the Linear B inscriptions had become sufficiently abundant by the beginning of the present decade to call for an etymological dictionary and a reverse index. The former of these needs has been met through the publication in 1963 of Anna Morpurgo-Davies' excellent *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon (M.G.L.)*. Lejeune, whose extensive earlier publications have made him one of the world's leading Mycenologists, has now provided the numerous students of this new branch of classical studies with an indispensable work of reference.

The reverse index is based upon *M. G. L.* and is in a sense almost a kind of supplement to it; Lejeune demonstrates the close relation of his work to that of Mrs. Morpurgo-Davies by many references to it in his introduction and appendices. At the same time he has included a few corrections (p. 11) and additions (pp. 95-6 = Appendix I) to *M. G. L.*, these last being partly forms not reported in *M. G. L.*, partly forms for which the references were not given there. Although the main part of the work, the index itself, is a mechanical listing of words in reverse alphabetical order, with square brackets to show signs missing at the beginning or end of the word, the book contains rather detailed discussion of problems and explanation of methods adopted. On pp. 12-13, for example, Lejeune discusses certain forms containing one character

which is nearly illegible. In such cases he must make an arbitrary choice from among several admissible conjectures, or indicate the doubtful character by [.], or list in proper alphabetical position all the possible forms (there are three variants for the forms which he here discusses), placing a question mark in front of all, or in front of all except the most probable. Following the practice of *M. G. L.* he has adopted the last of these choices. A welcome addition is Appendix II, which includes a list of words containing any of the twenty signs which because of their uncertain value are still represented by numbers, and a list of words containing the "secondary" signs, that is, both those which, like *a₂*, *a₃*, *pu₂*, *ra₂*, *ra₃*, etc. appear to be alternants of signs more frequent and more surely known, and those like *nwa*, *pte*, etc., which have two consonants, in contrast to the usual type with not more than one consonant before the vowel. Lejeune admits the possibility that some of the as yet unidentified signs may turn out to be **ju*, **zi*, or **zu*, values which we should expect to find represented in the syllabary, but he considers it preferable to continue using numbers or conventionally vague symbols rather than to assign new values through undue haste and on the basis of insufficiently rigorous method.

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GIULIO GIANNELLI. *Culti e miti della magna Graecia. Contributo alla storia più antica delle colonie greche in occidente.* Florence, Sansoni, 1963. Pp. 302. L. 3000. (*Università di Napoli, Centro di Studi per la Magna Grecia*, II.)

Culti e miti originally appeared in 1924, though completed in 1922; this reissue is in token of Giannelli's retirement from the chair of Greek and Roman history at Florence.

The work has been reset, and to some extent it has been refurbished. Giannelli has changed his mind on some minor points of fact (e. g., p. 87, n. 2, from Pisticeï to S. Mauro Forte; p. 108, the alliance coinage of Pyxus); has made brief additions to cover new evidence, as at Posidonia; and occasionally has cited Bérard, Dunbabin, Wuilleumier, *et al.* in the notes. But the references and the text in the main remain precisely the same as in 1924, including the continued misspelling of Nilsson and Schoemann. In sum, we have a detailed study of the evidence for the deities worshipped city by city in the Italian colonies as far as Posidonia (but not Cumae), with brief concluding chapters on the foundations of these states.

Since the publication of this volume is an exhibition of piety, criticism has perhaps little place; and Giannelli's interpretations have been adequately assessed in subsequent literature. Nonetheless, one may observe that the world does move in 40 years; we now know more—or think we do—about south Italian pottery, chthonian deities (from the Sicilian finds), and various other matters which bear on the argument of this work.

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FULVIO GROSSO. *La lotta politica al tempo di Commodo*. Turin, Accademia delle Scienze, 1964. Pp. xxiv + 792. (*Memorie dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche, Serie 4^o, n. 7.*)

The reign of Commodus will not be understood from the *Cambridge Ancient History*, where Wilhelm Weber's chapter constitutes one of the weakest sections in the whole series. Many of the misconceptions in the *C. A. H.* were soon corrected by H. Mattingly, *B. M. C.*, IV, and others like Mason Hammond have thrown new light on this or that aspect, but a thorough reexamination of all the evidence, not just the numismatic, awaited the present decade.

The merit of Fulvio Grosso's work, *La lotta politica al tempo di Commodo*, lies first in a critical reexamination of the literary tradition and a clear discernment of the value not only of Dio but of Herodian and the *Vita*, and in a more subtle examination of the channels through which information reached Xiphilinus, the *Chronicon Paschale*, and the *Suda*. This is no mere summary of accepted opinions.

The merit lies secondly in the collection of evidence from the inscriptions of every province and of Italy. The mere collection would have assured the value of the book to other scholars, but in addition Grosso has elucidated problems and found something interesting to add in so many cases, that the book becomes a veritable starting-point for any further work on the reign of Commodus.

The book is divided into six main parts: I, "The Sources"; II, "The First Five Years (180-185)," with an interesting discussion of the friends of Marcus and the *consilium principis*, the pains Marcus took to marry his daughters to men of personal merit rather than aristocratic blood to be the immediate advisers of Commodus, the pernicious freedmen who sought to exercise their personal influence over the weak and inexperienced emperor, the abortive conspiracy of the ambitious Lucilla which led not only to her death but to the overthrow of the friends of Marcus and to the antisenatorial attitude of the emperor, and finally an appreciation of the rule exercised for the emperor by the able, harsh, but, in his way, conscientious praetorian prefect Perennis; III, "The Second Five Years (185-190)" after the overthrow of Perennis by a coalition of senators and imperial freedmen, with the rise of Cleander.

One of the most important arguments of this book is that the crafty and unscrupulous Cleander was blocked by his servile extraction and by the watchfulness of the praetorian prefect Perennis from a full exploitation of his intimacy with Commodus until the death of Perennis. Then he became all-powerful but was still not eligible for the prefecture of the praetorian guard. His posts were those of a *cubiculo* and a *pugione*, the latter indicating command of the armed household, not of the praetorians. Yet he chose the praetorian prefects, among whom Atilius Aebutianus, the most important since Perennis, seems like Perennis to have commanded without a colleague. On the basis of *C. I. L.*, VI, 4, 2, 31154, in which Grosso restores a reference to the consuls of 188 in line 5 and to Aelius Aebutianus in line 2, *Atili* [*Aebutiani p(raefecti) p(raetorio)*, et

name *tribuni n]umeri equitum si<ng>(ularium)* NEI¹ (unexplained), he arrives at the conclusion that on Jan. 7 in A. D. 188 Cleander was not yet prefect of the praetorian guard. The new dating of Cleander's prefecture solves a number of problems and is attractive, but the evidence has been forced a little.

The nature and roots of Cleander's graft, moreover, are exposed clearly, and the maladministration of Commodus finds no apology.

Part IV, "The Final Two Years (190-192)," attempts to explain the program of 191 as the establishment of a theocracy under the Roman Hercules. The importance of Rome, refounded by Commodus Hercules, was supposed to be augmented because a city drew its importance partly from its founder. The finances of the government were by now in a ruinous condition, and the follies of the emperor could not be allowed to continue; but when Commodus was assassinated, neither Pertinax nor any other senator at Rome could manage the praetorian guard, whose discipline had been undermined. Grosso studies the legacy which fell to Pertinax, whose brief reign first opened the door to Septimius Severus.

Part V, "The Provinces (180-192)," takes the reader impressively around the whole empire, where the evidence for the local *fasti* and for the condition of each province is clearly stated and seriously studied. The prosperity and loyalty of Africa to Commodus stand against the economic plight of Egypt.

The importance of the purge following the conspiracy of Lucilla stands out in this book for the vacuum it created and for the way in which it led first to a weakening of traditional institutions and then to the establishment of autocracy. Various stages and influences emerge with a sharpness that not all will accept but which the reviewer admires.

Among the inscriptions cited the reader finds everything of real importance, even *I.G.*, II/III², 13012 on p. 484, though the author uncharacteristically forgot to give a reference to the *Corpus*.

The reviewer gratefully acknowledges that his own name is correctly spelled on every occasion, but other American scholars have been less fortunate. In the note on p. 425 and in the index Robert E. A. Palmer becomes E. A. Robert, on p. 534 Paul MacKendrick emerges as P. Mc. Kendrick, and in the index G. McLean Harper appears unexpectedly under M as Mac Lean Harper, G. The index, however, performs a great service, and the author deserves thanks not only for his conscientious book but for his detailed self-sacrifice in making several indices and lists.

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¹ The stone has *SI<NEI*. The fact that the *O* is raised and smaller indicates that it is the end of one abbreviation. It should not be combined with what follows. Since the letters *NEI* stand where one expects the abbreviation *AVG*, could they not be interpreted as *n(ostri) e(xsuperatori) i(mperatoris)*? Dio-Xiphilinus, LXXII, 15, 4 attests the assumption of the title *δρεπαλμω* by Commodus, and the *Vita Commodi*, 11-12 attests *εσsuperatorius* as the Latin form of this title. The abbreviation *PP* for *praefecti praetorio* seems surprisingly drastic, if *tribuni* is not abbreviated at all. Grosso's interpretation would be strengthened by assuming *praef. pr.* and *tr.*, but it is epigraphically not impossible that as Henzen restored the inscription, the nomen *Atili* was that of the tribune. In line 4, where Henzen read *ag(entis) vice*, Grosso reads *Ael(i) Vict(oris)*, but his photograph supports Henzen at least on *vice* and gives no support to his own reading.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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
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THE DOLABELLAE AND SULLA.

Pitfalls in prosopographical research are many. Homonyms cause confusion and overlapping careers often make distinguishing of personalities and identification of individuals difficult. Political alignment sometimes has to be postulated on the basis of similarity of name alone. That can be a risky business. Relationship by birth, marriage, or adoption is normally a good index of political cooperation; but it is not an infallible guide. An interesting and revealing example is the object of investigation here. The purpose is not just to counsel caution in prosopographical work, but to shed light upon the political atmosphere of the years surrounding the death of Sulla.

Two men named Cn. Cornelius Dolabella reached high office in 81 B. C., with the Sullan regime firmly entrenched in power, one as consul, the other as praetor.¹ It may be assumed that both received the Sullan *imprimatur*. After the dictator's death, the Sullan oligarchy became more shaky. In the early 70's both Dolabellae, among others, were attacked in the courts. Here, if ever, there is a *prima facie* case for inferring alliance in the political sphere: the family and the name are the same, the careers overlapped and appear almost parallel. Ancient writers themselves, not unnaturally, tended to confuse the two men. Asconius, a stickler for precision, felt obliged to assure his readers that these were two separate individuals.² Yet a striking

¹ T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (New York, 1951-1952), II, pp. 74, 76.

² 26, Clark: *Ne forte erretis et eundem hunc Cn. Dolabellam putetis esse in quem C. Caesaris orationes legitis, scire vos oportet duos eodem*

fact should cause hesitation. The outcomes of the two trials were quite different. The consular Dolabella, despite a vigorous and persuasive prosecution, secured acquittal; the praetorian Dolabella found himself deserted by friends and allies and was convicted and disgraced.³ How is this to be accounted for? Guilt in one case, innocence in the other? Perhaps; but in the highly charged political atmosphere of the early 70's, other factors may well have been relevant. An examination of the careers of the two Dolabellae will suggest that their political sympathies may not have been identical at all, and that the results of their trials should not be surprising.

The Cornelii Dolabellae were an old patrician family. A consulship is attested as early as 283 B. C. (Broughton, *M.R.R.*, I, p. 188). But recent generations had not been quite so happy, and no Dolabella had reached consular rank since 159. Another old patrician family had fallen on evil days in the second century: the Cornelii Sullae. Sulla the dictator succeeded single-handedly in bringing his family out of political obscurity. It might be expected that other members of the declining patriciate would benefit as well, and the older Cn. Cornelius Dolabella was not forgotten. Little is known of that individual, but it appears that he had joined Sulla early, not as a last-minute deserter. He held command of a fleet under Sulla.⁴ In 82 he played a prominent role in the civil war, serving at the two key battles of Sacriportus and the Colline Gate.⁵ The reward came immediately. Dolabella received the consulship for 81, obviously with Sulla's blessing (Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 74). It was a singularly uneventful consulship for Dolabella; the dictator and his reform program held the center of the stage. But there is nothing to suggest any disloyalty or interference with the promulgation of the Sullan program. A province followed in due

eo tempore fuisse et praenomine et nomine et cognomine Dolabellas.
Cf. 74, Clark.

³ For the results of these trials see Asconius, 26 Clark; Cic., *Verr.*, II, 2, 44, 109; 3, 76, 177; Suet., *Jul.*, 4, 1; Plut., *Caes.*, 4, 1.

⁴ Plut., *Comp. Lys. and Sulla*, 2. That Sulla at one point reduced the number of ships under Dolabella's command was probably not due to envy as Plutarch suggests. Strategical considerations may have been involved.

⁵ Plut., *Sulla*, 28, 4; 29, 4.

course: Macedonia, probably from 80 to 78 when he was succeeded by the Sullan consul of 79, Ap. Claudius Pulcher.⁶ A successful career was capped by the awarding of triumphal honors in 78 or 77.⁷

The news of Sulla's death in 78 brought young C. Julius Caesar scurrying back from the east to promote his career in a more congenial atmosphere (Suet., *Jul.*, 3). For budding and ambitious politicians the courts frequently provided a vehicle for advancement. Caesar now brought Dolabella to trial in 77 on the charge of *res repetundae* for his actions in Macedonia.⁸ Caesar's political stance vis-à-vis the Sullan *factio* is clear. He was proud of his Marian associations through his aunt Julia.⁹ When Sulla had requested of him that he demonstrate his loyalty by divorcing his wife, the daughter of Cinna, Caesar had pointedly refused.¹⁰ That independent young man was spared by Sulla but only through the intervention of the Vestal Virgins and the pleas of men like C. Aurelius Cotta, Caesar's kinsman and the member of a family closely connected with the Sullan circle.¹¹ L. R. Taylor has argued that Caesar was more a favorite of the Sullani than is generally recognized.¹² But the only evidence is Caesar's admission to the college of pontiffs (Vell. Pat., II, 43, 1), and this did not come until 74 or 73. It cannot be used to illuminate Caesar's political attitude in 77.¹³ At that time he was still considered suspicious and hostile by the friends of Sulla. M. Lepidus clearly expected Caesar to

⁶ Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, pp. 86; 89; 92, n. 4.

⁷ Cic., *In Pis.*, 19, 44; Suet., *Jul.*, 4, 1; cf. Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 92, n. 4.

⁸ Asconius, 26; 74 Clark; Suet., *Jul.*, 4, 1; 55, 1; Vell. Pat., II, 43, 3; Val. Max., VIII, 9, 3; Plut., *Caes.*, 4, 1; Quint., *Inst. Orat.*, XII, 6, 1; 7, 4; *Vir. Ill.*, 78, 2.

⁹ Plut., *Caes.*, 5; cf. Suet., *Jul.*, 6, 1.

¹⁰ Suet., *Jul.*, 1, 2: *neque ut repudiaret compelli a dictatore Sulla ullo modo potuit*. Also cf. Plut., *Caes.*, 1, 1, and Schol. Gronov., p. 293 Stangl.

¹¹ Suet., *Jul.*, 1, 2-3. For the connections of the Aurelii Cottae with the Metellan *factio* into which Sulla married, see my article "The Lex Varia" in *J. R. S.*, LV (1965).

¹² "Caesar's Early Career," *C. P.*, XXXVI (1941), pp. 113-20.

¹³ Cf. E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (New York, 1964), p. 99, n. 69.

join him in his abortive revolt against the Sullan regime in 78. That the latter declined was due to considerations of expediency, not political principle.¹⁴

The attack on Dolabella then was not just a step in furthering Caesar's personal career, but also an enunciation of his sympathies for the enemies of the Sullan inner circle. It fits perfectly with Caesar's legal assault on C. Antonius, another Sullan officer, in the following year.¹⁵ It is apparent also that the Sullani recognized the political implications of a conviction for Dolabella. The insurrection of Lepidus had been crushed, but the political heirs of Sulla were still under fire in the courts. Dolabella perhaps was a man of no great consequence but he had been an officer and protégé of Sulla, and was now *consularis* and *triumphalis*. A conviction would damage the reputation of the regime. The celebrated orator Q. Hortensius came to Dolabella's defense (Cic., *Brutus*, 317). Hortensius' Sullan credentials were strong. Although he had remained in Rome in the 80's while Sulla was abroad,¹⁶ Hortensius was married to the daughter of Q. Catulus, cos. 102, and was thus a kinsman of the leading defender of the Sullan regime, Catulus' son, the consul of 78.¹⁷ He was also an intimate of L. Lucullus, Sulla's closest confidante and the executor of his will.¹⁸ Hortensius obviously was acting as champion of the status quo in his defense of Dolabella. Even more revealing is the other recorded defense counsel: C. Aurelius Cotta.¹⁹ Related to Caesar and a spokesman for the youth with Sulla in the 80's, Cotta nonetheless opposed him in this case. The explanation lies ready at hand. The stability of the Sullan oligarchy outweighed any personal considerations for his young relative. It was perfectly in character for Cotta who two years later as consul in 75 sponsored a

¹⁴ Suet., *Jul.*, 3: *abstinuit, cum ingenio eius diffusus tum occasione, quam minorem opinione offenderat.*

¹⁵ Plut., *Caes.*, 4, 1; Asconius, 84 Clark; cf. (Q. Cic.), *Petit. Cons.*, 8. See also Badian, *Studies*, p. 82.

¹⁶ A relative, L. Hortensius, it should be noted, was with Sulla in the east; Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 56.

¹⁷ Cic., *Verr.*, II, 2, 8, 24; *De Orat.*, III, 228.

¹⁸ Plut., *Luc.*, 1, 5; Cic., *Arch.*, 3, 6.

¹⁹ Cic., *Brut.*, 317. Val. Max., VIII, 9, 3 wrongly gives him as L. Cotta.

measure allowing tribunes to reach higher magistracies, in order to remove some of the pressure against the Sullan system (Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 96).

Caesar had the facts on his side and spoke with eloquence and persuasion.²⁰ But the weight of influence was with Dolabella. The Sullan regime was still solid,²¹ and Dolabella secured acquittal.²² In the following year, Caesar received another setback in his abortive prosecution of C. Antonius (see above). He could read the signs and withdrew to Rhodes.²³

The known career of Cn. Dolabella, cos. 81, thus appears consistent and intelligible: a loyal Sullan officer, rewarded with magistracy, province, and triumph while the Sullan *factio* was in control; attacked later by enemies of the *factio*, he was successfully protected by its staunchest champions. But what of Cn. Dolabella, the praetor of 81?

Since the *praenomina* are the same and the ages apparently not very different, the two Dolabellae are probably cousins, perhaps second cousins. Neither father can be determined with certainty, but a Cn. Dolabella is recorded in the previous generation and under the most surprising circumstances. He is described as a *frater* of the demagogic tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus and was slain with him in the riots of 100 B.C. (Orosius, V, 17, 10). No other item is preserved. This branch of the Dolabellae therefore may have sought political revival by attaching themselves to the followers of Saturninus and Marius.²⁴

²⁰ Val. Max., VIII, 9, 3; Suet., *Jul.*, 55; cf. Gellius, IV, 16, 8. The bitterness of Dolabella is expressed in his spreading of stories regarding Caesar's alleged indiscretions at the court of Nicomedes; Suet., *Jul.*, 49, 1.

²¹ Cf. Vell. Pat., II, 43, 3: *nobilissima Cn. Dolabellae accusatio et maior civitatis in ea favor, quam reis praestari solet.*

²² Asconius, 26 Clark; Suet., *Jul.*, 4, 1; Plut., *Caes.*, 4, 1. *Vir. Ill.*, 78, 2 wrongly indicates that Caesar was successful here.

²³ So Suetonius, *Jul.*, 4, 1, correctly discerning the motives for Caesar's departure, but misdating it immediately after the trial of Dolabella.

²⁴ Cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 200-1. The name of only one other Dolabella of this generation has been preserved, a L. Dolabella who served as proconsul in Spain and celebrated a triumph in 98 (Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 5). This may suggest a praetorship in 100 (*M.R.R.*, I, pp. 574; 577, n. 2), but since nothing more is known, conjecture on political affiliation would be fruitless.

Frater here most likely refers to a uterine brother. The mother may have married a Dolabella and a Saturninus in turn. The relationship in any case is close. The filiation of the consul of 81 is given as Cn. f. Cn. n. (Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 74).^{24a} Hence, it has been conjectured that he is the son of the man killed in 100.²⁵ Yet it does not seem likely that a nephew of Saturninus was promoted to officer rank in the Sullan army of 83 and then awarded the consulship in the first full year of Sulla's dictatorship. The question must be left open, but one cannot exclude the possibility that the son of Saturninus' *frater* and compatriot was the praetor of 81.

A praetorship in that year implies Sullan favor or, at least, indifference. But not all the men who reaped the benefits of Sulla's victory can be reckoned as loyal and consistent Sullani. Many had remained in Rome in the 80's, had cooperated with the Cinna regime, and had deserted to Sulla only when his victory appeared imminent.²⁶ Two items in the earlier career of Cn. Dolabella suggest that he was no dedicated Sullan.

One piece of evidence has been overlooked altogether.²⁷ In a fragment of his speech for the younger Scaurus in 54, Cicero records a family feud with Cn. Dolabella. It dated back at least to 91 B. C. when Dolabella appeared in court at the side of his *propinquus* Q. Servilius Caepio in a prosecution of M. Scaurus the elder, cos. 115, the *princeps senatus*.²⁸ Scaurus,

^{24a} A brief article by E. Badian, "The Dolabellae of the Republic," *P. B. S. R.*, XXXIII (1965), pp. 48-51, bearing on this problem, appeared after the submission of this paper. Badian points out that the filiation of the consul of 81 was conjecture by earlier scholars, not certainty, and that an inscription from Thasos shows him as P. f. (C. Dunand and J. Pouilloux, *Rech. sur l'hist. et les cultes de Thasos*, II [1958], pp. 45-55, no. 175; *contra*, Broughton, *M. R. R.*, *Supplement* [1960], p. 19). Badian's stemma (*op. cit.*, p. 51), if correct, would strongly support the argument made here.

²⁵ Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms* (Berlin, 1899), I, p. 482.

²⁶ Cf. the excellent article on this subject by Badian, *Studies*, pp. 206-34.

²⁷ Both Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms*, I, p. 484, and F. Münzer, *R.-E.*, IV (5), cols. 1297-8, "Cornelius," no. 135, imply that available information on Dolabella begins only with his praetorship of 81.

²⁸ Asconius, 26 Clark: *Nam cum ex multis unus ei restaret Dolabella paternus inimicus qui cum Q. Caepione propinquo suo contra Scaurum*

a man of immense prestige and influence, was the leading figure in the powerful aristocratic circle around the Metelli. He was himself married to a Caecilia Metella. The unsuccessful attack on Scaurus by his *inimicus* Caepio was one of the opening shots in a judicial campaign against the Metelli which was carried on through the Social War under cover of the *lex Varia*.²⁹ A younger protégé of this group was now emerging into prominence. L. Cornelius Sulla in 89 became the successor of Scaurus as husband of Caecilia Metella (Plut., *Sulla*, 6, 10), and soon succeeded him as the most prominent figure in the Metellan *factio* as well. It is therefore a noteworthy fact that Dolabella was a *propinquus* of Q. Caepio, the embittered enemy of Scaurus, Livius Drusus, and the Metellan clan, and appeared openly as a young man in an attack on the *princeps senatus*.³⁰ He was not a man likely to become a trusted follower or confidante of Sulla.

A second item lends support. Among the members of Cn. Pompeius Strabo's staff at Asculum in 89 was a certain Cn. Cornelius Cn. f. Pal. (*I. L. S.*, 8888), apparently a *tribunus militum* at the time. His name occurs in the inscription immediately following a compatriot who is almost certainly M. Aemilius Lepidus, the future praetor of 81 and consul of 78.³¹ Hence the conclusion seems not unreasonable that this Cn. Cornelius is in fact Dolabella the praetor of 81 whose career would then parallel that of Lepidus.³² Service under Pompeius Strabo is suggestive. That imposing personality was *dis ac nobilitati perinvisus* (Asconius, 79 Clark). Moreover, Sulla regarded him as his most dangerous rival and sought overtly to

patrem suum subsignaverat. Badian (see above, note 24a) has now noted this item as well.

²⁹ On the political background for the trial of Scaurus, see my "Political Prosecutions in the 90's BC," *Historia*, XV (1966), pp. 32-64; on the *lex Varia*, see *J. R. S.*, LV (1965), pp. 59-73.

³⁰ On the continuity of policy between Drusus, the Metelli, and Sulla, see now E. Gabba, "M. Livio Druso e le riforme di Silla," *Ann. Scuola Norm. di Pisa*, XXXIII (1964), pp. 1-15.

³¹ This identification has been convincingly argued by C. Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (Berlin, 1922), p. 147; cf. L. R. Taylor, *Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (Rome, 1960), p. 187.

³² Such is also the verdict of Cichorius, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8. More skeptical is Miss Taylor, *Voting Districts*, pp. 206, 208.

relieve him of his command in 88. The troops of Strabo, with the consent of their commander, did not shrink even from the murder of Sulla's appointee and relative Q. Pompeius Rufus.³³ Once again therefore the associations of Dolabella would lead him on a path sharply diverging from that of Sulla.

If this identification be accepted, it gives a filiation for the praetor of 81: Cn. f. The conjecture that he is the son of Saturninus' *frater* becomes a little more probable. A nephew of Saturninus might well be expected to appear in court against M. Scaurus who had taken the initiative in crushing that demagogue and in causing the death of Dolabella's father.³⁴ Such a man would also be likely to find congenial refuge and prospect for advancement on the staff of Pompeius Strabo, enemy of the aristocracy and rival of Sulla.

Of Dolabella's actions between 89 and 81, nothing has been preserved. In view of the foregoing arguments it seems most unlikely that he served with Sulla in the east. Probably he remained in Rome, securing promotion and perhaps reaching the quaestorship during the *Cinnae dominatio*. In 81 with Sulla firmly in the saddle he reappears in the pages of history as praetor, apparently as *praetor urbanus*. That should not elicit surprise. Other men with Marian associations and no prior commitment to Sulla had read the signs correctly and joined the returning proconsul in time to be reckoned among his friends rather than his adversaries. Sulla was not averse to advertising the legitimacy of his regime by parading scions of illustrious families, particularly patrician families. Two examples will suffice; they are the most notorious and they present striking parallels with the position of Dolabella.

M. Aemilius Lepidus, as noted earlier, served with Dolabella on the staff of Pompeius Strabo. His patrician ancestry promised a distinguished career, but Lepidus was a man of independence and flair. His marriage to an Appuleia reveals his political inclinations.³⁵ Her name suggests a link with

³³ Livy, *Per.*, 77; Val. Max., IX, 7, ex. 2; Vell. Pat., II, 30, 1; Appian, *B. C.*, I, 63.

³⁴ Cic., *Rab. Perd.*, 7, 21; *Vir. Ill.*, 72, 9.

³⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, VII, 122; cf. Orosius, V, 22, 16: *Lepidus, Marianae partis adsertor*.

Saturninus; she may indeed have been his daughter.³⁶ Here again we have an unexpected tie between Lepidus and Dolabella through the demagogic tribune of 100.³⁷ Lepidus is clearly not to be reckoned among the Sullani. Yet when the crisis came, that mercurial individual switched sides with despatch and success. Sulla bore no grudge; a Lepidus would make a handsome addition to the new government. Like Dolabella, Lepidus was awarded a praetorship for 81 and Sulla indulged even his excesses in the proscriptions (Sallust, *Hist.*, I, 55, 18 Maurenbrecher). The province of Sicily followed in 80 (Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 80). Offices and rewards, however, did not make Lepidus a consistent supporter of the establishment. As is well known, he raised a major insurrection against the government after the death of Sulla, culminating in his own destruction.³⁸

Another notorious patrician appears on Pompeius Strabo's staff in 89: L. Sergius Catilina.³⁹ He was a younger man, as yet of no prominence. The Sergii, though patrician, had left no mark on Roman history in previous generations. Cn. Dolabella's immediate ancestors knew the same frustration. For such men associations with the Mariani and with the enterprising *novus homo* Pompeius Strabo offered promise and hope. It is no coincidence that Catilina was married to the sister of Marius Gratidianus,⁴⁰ and served with Strabo in the Social War. But here again the successes of Sulla proved irresistibly attractive. Catilina, like so many others, could sacrifice principle and relations to expediency. He next emerges as a dedicated agent of the Sullan proscriptions, counting among his victims his own brother-in-law Gratidianus and other reminders of a Marian past he preferred to forget.⁴¹

³⁶ Cf. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart, 1920), p. 308.

³⁷ Lepidus, perhaps to save his own skin, wisely abandoned Saturninus when the tribune alienated the majority, and stood with the senate in the riots of 100; Cic., *Rab. Perd.*, 7, 21.

³⁸ For the sources, see Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, pp. 85, 89.

³⁹ The inscription gives "L. Sergi L. f. Tro." The identification has been forcefully argued by Cichorius, *Röm. Stud.*, pp. 172-4, and accepted by Miss Taylor, *Voting Districts*, p. 253.

⁴⁰ Sallust, *Hist.*, I, 45 Maur.; Schol. Bern. on Lucan, II, 173; cf. R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 85-6.

⁴¹ On Catilina's activities in the proscriptions, see the references collected in Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 72. Many other ex-Marians can, of

Into this pattern Cn. Dolabella fits neatly: a patrician, connected with Saturninus and the Mariani; his early career promoted by enemies of the Metelli and by Pompeius Strabo; when the military situation dictated prudent reversal he joined the Sullani, and reaped the benefits of high magistracy and provincial assignment.

As praetor in 81 Dolabella sat on the civil case of P. Quinctius *vs.* Sex. Naevius. It was one of the first appearances of the young advocate M. Tullius Cicero who spoke for Quinctius with the earliest of his preserved orations. In the course of the speech Cicero denounced Dolabella as showing excessive partiality for the opposing litigant Naevius (*Quinct.*, 2, 9; 8, 31). Some have seen political motivation involved in this case.⁴² Q. Hortensius appeared for Naevius, as did the eminent *ensorius* L. Marcius Philippus (*Quinct.*, 1, 1; 2, 8; 22, 72). In 83 when the case was first brought up, the tribune M. Junius Brutus intervened on Quinctius' behalf and secured a delay (*Quinct.*, 20, 63; 20, 65; 21, 69). This Brutus, father of the tyrannicide, later joined Lepidus in his uprising against the Sullani in 77 (Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 91). Thus, the hearing of 81 has been described as a test of strength between the Sullan oligarchy and its enemies, and Dolabella has been seen as the "optimiate" Sullan praetor.⁴³ That is nonsense. Modern scholars who defend this reconstruction have not troubled to investigate Dolabella's earlier career and associations; they extrapolate only from his actions in 81. Civil cases, in any event, do not present a stage for political conflict. The issue at stake was a purely private matter of no interest to the state. Brutus who simply answered a citizen's appeal for tribunician *intercessio* in 83 was not even involved when the case came to court in 81. The youthful M. Cicero was hardly a spokesman for the enemies of Sulla. In the civil war he had advocated reconciliation and then supported the

course, be discerned among Sulla's last-minute "friends." Cf. e.g. the treacherous Lucretius Ofella; Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 72. See further Badian, *Studies*, pp. 228-30.

⁴² R. Heinze, "Ciceros politische Anfänge," *Abh. Sächs. Gesell. Wiss. Leipzig*, XXVII (1909), pp. 954-60; E. Ciaceri, *Cicerone e i suoi tempi* (Milan, 1939), I, pp. 22-3.

⁴³ So Heinze, *loc. cit.* and Ciaceri, *loc. cit.*

cause of Sulla himself.⁴⁴ If Dolabella showed a certain favoritism towards Naevius it was not because he was defending the interests of the Sullan oligarchy. The reason may be that Naevius, like Dolabella himself, had once been on the other side and was a recent convert to the new regime.⁴⁵

For the years 80 and 79 Dolabella served as proconsul of the province of Cilicia (Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 80). It was not a pleasant tenure for the subject population. That Dolabella was a man of greed and cruelty cannot be determined with certainty. But it is clear that he did not select his subordinates on the basis of merit and that he took few steps to check their rapine and extortion. His quaestor was C. Malleolus and serving as legate was the unscrupulous C. Verres (Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, pp. 80, 81). Malleolus, who had left no property at home, fleeced the provincials unmercifully and became a man of great wealth within a very short time (Cic., *Verr.*, II, 1, 36, 90 f.). His background is unknown and his family obscure. But it might be noted that the staff of Pompeius Strabo included a M. Maloleius (*I. L. S.*, 8888), possibly a variant on the name and a relative. Dolabella would not forget old *contubernales*.

Malleolus perished while serving under Dolabella in Cilicia (Cic., *Verr.*, II, 1, 36, 90). Verres was immediately assigned his post, apparently as *legatus pro quaestore*. His crimes in this capacity were recounted in detail and with fervor by Cicero a decade later and need not be reiterated here (*Verr.*, II, 1, 16-39; 41-102). The responsibility of Dolabella for this conduct is difficult to assess. Cicero naturally pushes Verres into the foreground and Dolabella's role is minimized in order to place all acts of wickedness and immorality in the lap of the proquaestor. On one occasion at least Dolabella interfered; he restored statues of Apollo snatched from the island of Delos by Verres. Even here, however, Cicero ascribes the act to religious superstition rather than moral scruples (*Verr.*, II, 1, 18, 46). The blackest of Verres' deeds is given a full description by the orator: the

⁴⁴ Cic., *Rosc. Amer.*, 47, 136: *Sciunt ei qui me norunt me pro mea tenui infirmaque parte, postea quam id quod maxime volui fieri non potuit, ut componeretur, id maxime defendisse ut ei vincerent qui vicerunt.* Cf. 49, 142.

⁴⁵ Cf. Cic., *Quinct.*, 21, 69; 22, 70: *tu, postquam qui tibi erant amici non poterant vincere, ut amici tibi essent qui vincebant effecisti.*

seduction of a maiden of Lampsacus and the execution of her father and brother who blocked the consummation of his lust. In this affair Dolabella connived; he exerted pressure on the proconsul of Asia to effect the executions (*Verr.*, II, 1, 29, 72 ff.). This prompted an outburst on Cicero's part: *Verresne tibi (Dolabella) tanti fuit ut eius libidinem hominum innocentium sanguine lui velles?* (*Verr.*, II, 1, 30, 77).

Why was a man like Verres to be found on the staff and in the confidence of Cn. Dolabella? Again the answer suggests itself readily in the light of our earlier investigation. Dolabella "recognized in Verres a kindred spirit" a scholar has remarked.⁴⁶ That is doubtless true, but not just in the way meant, as a partner in crime and devastation. Verres, like Dolabella, was a late-comer to the ranks of the Sullan. Earlier sympathies or connections had tied him to the opposite camp. Verres, it is reported, belonged to the Marian faction.⁴⁷ The facts seem to bear out that judgment. Verres' first recorded office is the quaestorship of 84, followed by a prorogation for 83, both years in the service of the anti-Sullan leader Cn. Carbo in Picenum and then in Gaul (Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, pp. 61, 64). Cicero cannot resist the allegation that Carbo was indignant at having as quaestor a man of notorious luxury and indolence (*Verr.*, II, 1, 13, 34). But his own account refutes this statement: Carbo treated the quaestor with every kindness and placed in him implicit trust.⁴⁸ However, when the fortunes of Sulla's enemies ebbed, Verres was swift to desert to the proconsul of Asia.⁴⁹ In the civil war of 82 he was firmly on the Sullan side. For him too came the rewards of desertion through the bountiful Sullan proscriptions. Cicero's judgment is sharp: Sulla honored him as a traitor, but put no confidence in him as a friend.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ F. H. Cowles, *Gaius Verres: An Historical Study* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1917), p. 7.

⁴⁷ Schol. Gronov., p. 329 Stangl: *O. Verres, qui Marianus fuit.*

⁴⁸ *Verr.*, II, 1, 13, 34: *ornabat eum beneficiis officiisque omnibus*; II, 1, 14, 37: *tibi pecuniam, rem frumentariam, rationes omnis suas exercitumque commisit.*

⁴⁹ Cic., *Verr.*, II, 1, 13-15, 34-40; II, 3, 76, 177; Ps. Asconius, 208 Stangl.

⁵⁰ *Verr.*, II, 1, 15, 38: *habuit honorem ut proditori, non ut amico fidem.*

That, of course, is a prejudiced verdict, but it may not be far from the truth. The deserter can rarely be regarded as trustworthy by friend or enemy. But Dolabella found a "kindred spirit." They may both have had desertion in common.

It was probably in 78 that Dolabella returned to Rome from that nefarious provincial tenure. As can be readily expected, wheels were immediately set in motion for a prosecution *de repetundis*. The prosecutor was young M. Aemilius Scaurus the future praetor of 56.⁵¹ No defense counsel is recorded.⁵² It seems likely that Dolabella had difficulty in attracting distinguished advocates for his cause. But matters became worse still. Verres, the legate, the quaestor, the trusted subordinate, had a penchant for abandoning sinking ships. The prosecution wanted an air-tight case and promised the slippery Verres immunity if he would provide information and testify against his own commander. There was no hesitation; the testimony of Verres destroyed any case that Dolabella might have had. Doubtless the proquaestor shifted the responsibility for all extortionate actions onto the shoulders of the proconsul.⁵³ Dolabella was convicted, probably with little difficulty.⁵⁴ It was the end of his career; he departed into exile, leaving behind beggary and misery for his family (Cic., *Verr.*, II, 1, 30, 77).

The outcome of the trial is not difficult to explain. Guilt was surely clear-cut and the evidence of Verres will have put the verdict beyond question. But there is more to it than that. Unlike his homonymous relative, this Cn. Dolabella is not to be regarded as the victim of an anti-Sullan prosecution. That much

⁵¹ Asconius, 26; 74 Clark; Cic., *Verr.*, II, 1, 38, 97.

⁵² Ps. Asconius (194 Stangl) affirms that Q. Hortensius defended Dolabella against Scaurus. That is obviously a confusion. The commentator describes Dolabella as *consularis* and *triumphalis*. That, of course, refers to the other Dolabella, prosecuted in 77, who was in fact defended by Hortensius; see above. Scaurus had nothing to do with that case. A similar confusion occurs somewhat later (234 Stangl). There it is stated that Scaurus failed to win his case against Dolabella. Once more the two Dolabellæ are conflated. The praetor of 81 was convicted; it was the *consularis* and *triumphalis* who secured acquittal through the good offices of Hortensius and others.

⁵³ Cic., *Verr.*, I, 4, 11; II, 1, 15, 41 ff.; 1, 38, 97; 3, 76, 177; cf. Ps. Asconius, 234 Stangl.

⁵⁴ Cic., *Verr.*, II, 2, 109; 3, 76, 177; Asconius, 26 Clark.

is demonstrated by the identity of the prosecutor. M. Scaurus had personal reasons for an attack on Dolabella; he had not forgotten that Dolabella had appeared as a youth in a criminal case against his father, Scaurus the *princeps senatus*. Dolabella was a *paternus inimicus* (Asconius, 26, Clark). If there were political implications in this case, they point in exactly the opposite direction from that of Cn. Dolabella, the consul of 81. Scaurus was, in fact, the step-son of Sulla himself who had married his mother Caecilia Metella.⁵⁵ Cn. Dolabella was dispensable. Exactions in the provinces made him an embarrassment to the regime and his earlier career showed that he was not to be trusted anyway as a loyal Sullan. Whether the case was tried while Sulla was still alive is not capable of determination. But the consul of 78, M. Lepidus, will already have been making anti-Sullan noises. It was in the interests of the establishment to make an example of another ex-Marian of doubtful loyalty, and it also enabled the step-son of Sulla to settle an old family score. That Dolabella found no prominent supporters and was abandoned by his own subordinate should no longer occasion surprise. Nor should the sparing of Verres provide any difficulty. He was valuable in the disposing of Dolabella and could be useful in the future. Of an undistinguished family without high office to its credit, Verres would not appear potentially dangerous like the patricians Dolabella and Lepidus. Moreover, he may well have been protected by an important and neglected connection: relationship with the powerful Metelli.⁵⁶ The cards were well stacked against Dolabella.

A résumé is now in order. The trials of the two Dolabellae in 78 and 77 produced two strikingly different results. The *consularis* Dolabella, defended by the leading lights of the Sullan faction, was triumphantly acquitted. The praetorian Dolabella, abandoned on all sides, was convicted and disgraced on a charge by Sulla's step-son. The conclusion seems inescapable that these homonymous contemporaries did not cooperate politically. The one was attacked unsuccessfully by Julius Caesar as a recognized

⁵⁵ Cf. Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms*, I, p. 20.

⁵⁶ L. Metellus, Verres' successor as *propraetor* of Sicily in 70, acknowledged the family tie; Cic., *Verr.*, II, 2, 26, 64: *sibi cum eo amicitiam cognationemque esse*; also II, 2, 56, 138.

adherent of the Sullan establishment. The other, an ex-Marian, a late converter, an associate of men unhappy and untrustworthy, was disposed of. A clearer picture now emerges of the strength of the Sullani in the early 70's. The dictator was dead; the constitution was under fire by Lepidus in the field, and Sullan officers were under fire by younger *populares* like Caesar in the courts. But the oligarchy remained firmly in the saddle. Lepidus was crushed in the field and a potential sympathizer, the praetorian Dolabella, was crushed at the bar. An effective demonstration of solidarity came in the triumphant acquittals of Dolabella the *consularis* and of C. Antonius. Julius Caesar slipped away to the island of Rhodes; the atmosphere was no longer congenial, but he survived to fight these battles another day.

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SI CERTUS INTRARIT DOLOR
A RECONSIDERATION OF HORACE'S FIFTEENTH
EPODE.¹

Parios ego primus iambos
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.

Horace did his Epodes a considerable disservice by this passage (*Epist.*, I, 19, 23-5). He thought he was fairly and clearly pointing out his debt to his sources and the limitations with which he had used them. But in effect he provided his readers with a text by which they have turned from the appreciation of the Epodes themselves to a search for the *numeri*, the *animi*, and even the *res* and the *verba* of the iambists. Thus it is that even in a passage of general approval such an admirer of Horace as L. P. Wilkinson must condescend a bit to characterize Epode 15 as the best of a group (8, 11, 12, 15), noting that it "has an almost Catullan intensity and a touch of imagination."² A harsh judgment, for it implies that intensity and imagination must belong to a precursor when they seem to be present in such early Horace. But the Epodes have a value of their own, even if we admit (as Horace does) his great debt to his literary antecedents. I hope to show that 15 is a poem of some complexity and quality, that it is appropriately linked with 8, 11, and 12 by Wilkinson, and that it deserves the occasional compliment granted it in passing by those whose interpretations differ considerably from that which follows.³

The Structure of the Epode

Just as the poem concerns a triangle of a girl, her discarded lover, and her new lover, so it take a tripartite shape. Lines

¹ For several helpful suggestions I owe thanks to Professors Robert E. A. Palmer and Michael C. J. Putnam.

² *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (ed. 2, Cambridge, 1951), p. 46.

³ E. g., that of Wilkinson and of Steele Commager, *The Odes of Horace. A Critical Study* (New Haven, 1962), p. 150, n. 7, "the beautiful fifteenth epode." Perhaps the extreme statement of dependence on the part of Horace is to be found in F. Lasserre, *Les épodes d'Archiloque* (Paris, 1950).

1-10 are the girl's as she undertakes a false oath to the poet, the rejected lover; in 11-16 the poet is primary with his threat to her; in 17-24 the new lover is in the foreground while the poet unburdens himself of dire prophecy.⁴ The apparent sim-

1		physical setting	
2			
3		anticipated result of oath	two elements
4		mechanics of oath	of setting
5		erotic setting with	
6		comparison from nature	
7			1-animal
8		oath	2-human
9		protestations: ἀδύνατα	3-divine
10		the actual promise	
11		the abstract threat	
12			
13		the	supposition
14		detailed	specific
15		threat	threats
16			supposition
17		present appearance	1-negative
18		of happiness for new lover	2-positive
19			3-negative
20		impossible criteria	
21			1-wealth
22			2-wisdom
23		confounding of apparent happiness	3-beauty
24		the poet's conclusion	

plicity of this familiar relationship is useful to the dramatic structure, and Horace has therefore marked the transitions clearly (11 *o dolitura*, 17 *et tu*). Each of the sections, however, is carefully constructed to achieve its own internal cohesion,

⁴ The division into two parts suggested by C. Giarratano, *Q. Orazio Flacco. Il libro degli epodi* (Torino, 1930), p. 99, seems much less satisfactory. He would have 1-16 deal with Neaera, 17-24 with the rival. True enough, but this division completely overlooks the shift in tone at the very strong break in 11.

while elements within each section serve as connective devices for the whole.

The most obvious of the structural connective devices is numerical: in each of the three sections there is a statement subdivided into three elements. In the oath (7-9) the *ádúvara*, protestations of a lasting character, draw from animal (*pecori lupus . . . infestus*), human (*nautis infestis Orion*), and divine (*agitaret Apollinis aura capillos*) situations, with Orion a bridge between human and divine. The detailed threat (13-15) is triple, negative-positive-negative. And the impossible criteria of 19-22 are three, unbelievable wealth, improbable wisdom, and unsurpassable beauty,⁵ Parallelism in bracketing of ideas further ties the sections together. The physical and erotic settings bracket the preparation for the oath (1-6), suppositions in the form of conditions bracket the detailed threat (12-16), and the apparent happiness of the new lover and its confounding bracket the impossible criteria in 17-23.

Somewhat more subtle is the structural effect of the use of verbs and their temporal significance. The first two sections clearly represent the past and the future. 1-10 are dominated by imperfects *erat*, *fulgebat*, and *iurabas* (with its participle *adhaerens*); the oath, though necessarily it has future import, by sequence is subordinate to the idea of the past. The final *fore*, however, retains enough of its future strength to lead effectively into the *dolitura* of 11 and the future cast of 11-16, all the verbs of which supplement the tense of the opening participle. *Est* in 12 is a condition both general, adapting itself to the time of its conclusion, and parallel by implication to the

⁵ I have not classed this set of impossibilities as *ádúvara* since they do not conform specifically with the categories of this figure discussed by, e. g., E. Dutoit, *Le thème de l'adynaton dans la poésie antique* (Paris, 1936) or H. V. Canter, "The Figure *ádúvarov* in Greek and Latin Poetry," *A. J. P.*, LI (1930), pp. 32-41. But the general spirit of these hyperbolic statements is enough in accord with Canter's definitions (pp. 32-3) to justify relating them to *ádúvara*, particularly in the light of their position of balance with lines 7-9. Although each group of three items in the three sections is clear, it is worth adding here that there is a potential extension in each: Orion has a double role in 7-8, the threats are qualified by the conditions in 12 and 16, and wealth is subdivided into literal (*pecus* and *tellus*) and figurative (Pactolus) expressions in 19 and 20.

future perfect of *intrarit* in 16. Horace seems to turn logically to the present for the final section (17-24) as he rounds on the new lover with taunts of the poor fellow's apparent happiness at the poet's expense: *es, incedis*, and the sense of immediacy derived from them by *licebit* and its subjunctives.

In the last two lines of the poem, in a remarkable feat of compression, Horace reviews the affair in time: *translatos . . . maerebis . . . risero*, following the order of time in the three sections instead of the chronologically more accurate *translatos . . . risero . . . maerebis* or *risero . . . translatos . . . maerebis*. The future perfect *risero*, although quite clearly denoting the laughter Horace *will have* forced out when he has observed the discomfiture of the now-happy rival as still another lover attracts Neaera, is so placed in the poem and in the temporal sequence as to announce that by the very poem in which he warns the rival Horace is enjoying the first phase of that laughter. This is the bitter pleasure that the discarded lover must express as he anticipates (and demonstrates) the inevitability of the same fate to his successor. Similarly in the Pyrrha ode (I, 5) the future discomfort of the *puer* (*flebit* 6 and *emirabitur* 8) is brought forward to the present by the very existence of the poem, in which the same inevitable chain of circumstances is outlined. There, too, the literalness of the tenses is belied by the dramatic plight of the poet's *persona*: *me . . . sacer . . . paries indicat . . . suspendisse*, boldly as it attempts to say that the old lover *has* put an end to his involvement with Pyrrha, just as unequivocally states by the need he feels to write these lines (or the whole poem) that the old feeling is still there, albeit cloaked in the bitterness that doesn't quite conceal it. So in Epode 15 the literal separateness of time in the three sections is made false by the continuing though ineffectual love of the poet for Neaera, which defies past promises, present infidelity, and threats for the future. There is, therefore, a rather pathetic quality in the *risero*, placed as it is in a strong summary position, that emphasizes the poet's *present* plight: the past's future (*laesura*) has become the present, yet to the present's future (*dolitura, non feret, quaeret, nec cedit*) the present is painfully past; the present lover will see his love as past (*translatos*) and will grieve (*maerebis*); the poet, for whom only the future allows any recourse (his threats)

but to whom only the past has meaning (his love), must be content to *have had his laugh* at that point in the future when the present becomes the future's past and the new lover, himself caught in the toils of the future's past, recalls this laugh that preceded (*risero*) the loss of his love.

Finally one should observe how importunate the future is throughout the poem, regardless of the current time of each section. So *laesura* interrupts *erat . . . fulgebat; esset* (implied in 5), *turbaret*, and *agitaret* show future duration, and *fore* expresses the inevitable futurity of an oath. *Dolitura* is the fate of Neaera, and the discarded lover is all future bluster. The present of 17-22 scarcely awaits (*licebit*) the future of *maerebis* (23), and 24 reveals that the whole poem is intended to justify or mollify the bitterness of Horace's present laughter.⁶

Horace has built another kind of unity around the persons of the triangle and their appearance in the poem. Neaera enters first in 3 *tu*, with Horace providing a bracket for the couplet by his appearance in 4 *verba mea*. They remain together until 10 *hunc amorem mutuum*, which is slashed in 11 as the poet's *virtus* asserts itself. The rival separates them in 13 *feret . . .*

⁶ Expressions of future time tend to be remarkably exact in Latin, as is generally known. But often emotional stress makes demands on this exactness which, while not blurring the technical correctness of the tenses, emphasizes the close relationship between the present and future in many dramatic situations. So Catullus, when he wishes to show the inconsistency of a lover who is exhorting himself to cast off his clearly faithless girl (8), plays in the lover's hell between the present and the future with a vivid mingling of independent subjunctives, imperatives, and present and future indicatives; when finally he has been overwhelmed by the erotic suggestiveness of his threats to her (lines 15-18, where *manet* yields immediately to the future) in 19 he pulls himself back to a trembling firmness with the temporal reminder that he *has* summoned up the strength (*destinatus*, cf. 11-12) and must *now* maintain it (*obdura*). One may also note the dramatic immediacy of such a use of the future perfect as that in Caesar, *B. G.*, IV, 25, where the *officium* of the *aquilifer* is performed almost as he says *officium praestitero* (I refer to the sense of dramatic action here, not to the literal idea that he anticipates a later investigation of the army's performance).

D. Bo, *Q. Horati Flacci Opera III. De Horati Poetico Eloquio* (Torino, 1960), p. 262, seems to me to miss the correctness of Horace's *risero* when he groups it in his index of future perfects as one "ubi fut. II idem fere valet ac fut. I," i. e., as the simple future.

potiori te, as Horace's anger does in 14 *quaeret iratus parem*. The relationship of the rivals in 17-18 *tu . . . meo* seems to overwhelm Horace as the impossible criteria sweep by (19-22), when suddenly in 23 a fourth party, the next lover in line (*alio*), struggles with the seemingly happy present lover for (or almost within) Neaera's embrace (*translatos alio maerebis amores*). The poem closes as Horace reasserts his narrative first person with his imagined self-respect (*ego*) and sums up the whole with a single adverb *vicissim*, presumably referring to the laughter first of Neaera and the previous lovers, then of the new lover, and finally of Horace as Neaera moves on to *alius* and continues the chain. This thread of personal relationships from the opening *tu* to the final *ego* transcends the tripartite sectioning of the poem.⁷

It would do Horace less than justice to comment on the structure of one of his poems without some mention of the word and sound patterns. I do not propose to dwell on what becomes fairly clear with careful oral reading. But there are some effects achieved that will bear mention, if only to demonstrate in yet another way the care in composition to be found in Epode 15. Line 3's amazing row of sounds *u-plus-nasal* is sliced neatly by the *laesura*, which in position as well as meaning does violence to the relationship between *numina* and *deorum*. In 5 the ivy moves along with a series of broad *a*-sounds, until the strangling of the ilex is represented by the *i*'s of *adstringitur ilex*, an action aided by the elision *proceradstringitur* to suggest the attempted encroachment of the ivy. Horace has placed his combatants at the caesura and at the final position of the line; so in 1 and 3 earlier he has arranged an internal rhyme and a noun-adjective

⁷ Note in comparison the use of the persons in Epode 8, perhaps closest in general structure to 15. The questioning woman *te* appears in 1, the poet concludes the couplet with *meas*. His qualification of her question and comment on the effect of her "beauty" in 3-10 begin with her (*tibi* 3) for the first part and him (*me* 7) for the second. His wishes for her show her twice, *esto* at the beginning (11) and *tuum* completing that couplet. And she ends the poem in his obscene final injunction, the real answer to her question in 1 (*rogare . . . te*): *provoces* 19 and *tibi* 20, the final word of the poem. Epode 12 shows a similar concern for the persons as structural elements. So in 1-4 *tibi vis, mihi, mittis . . . iuveni*, and *unus odoror*. The usage is most striking in 14-26, the lady's complaint, where the first and second persons tumble one over the other.

relationship between the word before the caesura and the last word of the line. Others have noted the effect of the feminine caesura in 9 to show the movement of the breeze in Apollo's hair; the dactylic rhythm also enhances this.⁸ Indeed the pen-themimeral caesura is used with constant strong result in every other dactylic line of the poem except 7, where Horace has in a brilliant stroke employed a double caesura in a seeming fragmentation that actually enhances the associations of the words and ideas in this compressed line

dum pecori || lupus et nautis || infestus Orion.

Line 12 snaps out its meaning with a string of *t*'s aided by the clipped *qu-* and *-co-*. The *runc* of 17 pounces at the end of its line—indeed the ordering of this couplet is quite remarkable. 21 intones the philosophical impossibility with its numerous *a*-sounds resting between the *ts* and *-ti*. Finally the sounds of 24 laugh themselves, but it is a nervous and unsustained laughter of *s-* and *i*-sounds.

These are perhaps the most striking of the effects, but by no means all. I select them because, although they are of themselves not unusual in Latin poetry, each seems to me to be used here as a direct aid to the meaning or tone Horace is seeking. They demonstrate that even in as early an effort as Epode 15 Horace has begun his mastery of sound and arrangement that is to become a principal characteristic of his later lyrics.

The Meaning of the Epode

The opening statement of the setting (1-2) looks innocent enough as an almost elegiac picture unfolds.⁹ Night is the time for lovers, a moon-and-starlit night perhaps providing a seemingly more idyllic and less physically erotic scene than the lamp-

⁸ On this feminine caesura cf. Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.* and Wilkinson (*op. cit.* above, n. 2), pp. 115; 141, n. 6.

⁹ It is indeed the elegiac tone here established that has attracted most notice to the poem. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), p. 67, in discussing a group of non-Archilochean epodes comments on 15's "unmistakable affinity to several elegies of the Augustan period and to the kind of Hellenistic epigram by which those elegies were influenced." Convenient literary comparative references can be found in the editions of Kiessling-Heinze and Shorey-Laing.

lit night so often found in epigram and elegy.¹⁰ The calm established by *sereno* remains dominant until *laesura* cuts it without warning in 3 and the oath machinery in 4 explains the circumstances; in short, the oath will be false. The startling irony of 3 makes suspect lines 5-6, wherein the girl completes the dictates of her role by appropriate gestures of reinforcement. *Minora* in 2 has a double use: it contrasts *sidera* with *luna* mechanically and *luna* + *sidera* with *magnorum . . . deorum* in more contrived fashion, since *magnorum* does double duty itself with *numen* and *deorum*. But *minora* has also introduced the first element of the negative and has provided at least a hint to prepare the way for *laesura*.¹¹ Line 4, heralded by the citing of the gods whose *numina* guarantee oaths, points out through its use of the formula *iurare in verba* that the lover is spelling out an oath for her to take, not confident of the girl's spontaneous protestations.¹² This negative cast is heightened in 5-6

¹⁰ B. Kirn, *Zur literarischen Stellung von Horazens Jambenbuch* (diss. Tübingen, 1935), p. 50, notes the distinction. Horace uses the moon, epigram the lamp. Kirn then cites from the Palatine Anthology a group of poems (V, 8, 164, 165, 166) in which the lover calls on the night (and in 8 on both night and lamp), no one of which offers a real parallel to Horace's beginning. *A. P.*, V, 191 has the lover asking the stars, the moon, and the night if his girl is alone with her lamp or if someone is with her. *Nox erat*, with all its potential in the establishment of an amorous setting, was not picked up by the Augustans for that purpose. There is no parallel in Propertius' one use (III, 15, 26), and Vergil uses it to introduce two of Aeneas' dreams (*Aen.*, III, 147 and VIII, 66) and the sleeplessness of Dido in her torment (IV, 522), where Dido complains of her *dolor* in a passage bearing no other resemblance to Epode 15. I find no related use among the seven appearances in Ovid, the closest (*Am.*, III, 5, 1) owing more to Vergil than Horace.

¹¹ When Horace returns to the figure of the moon and the lesser stars in *Carm.*, I, 12, 46-8 it is to show the magnitude of *Iulium sidus* and the figure has lost its romantic note.

¹² Lovers' oaths are not uncommon, but the dark coloring of this one and the circumstances surrounding it are noteworthy. Epode 16, 25 provides the parallel *iuremus in haec*, but perhaps more to the point are the examples in Caesar, *B. C.*, I, 76, where Caesar spells out the oath and then says *princeps in haec verba iurat ipse (Petreius)*, and Livy, XXIII, 53, 12 *in haec verba, L. Caecili, iures postulo, ceterique qui adestis*. Some additional effect may be gained by the proximity of *adstringitur*, a word often associated with oath-taking; cf. Cicero, *Off.*, III, 111 (where *artius* by chance occurs), and Ovid, *Her.*, 16, 321-2

by the choice of comparison drawn from nature to describe her histrionics. She clings to him as the ivy clings to the ilex, a relationship often injurious to the host.¹³ The noxious quality of the ivy is introduced almost openly by *artius*, and again in this special context by *lentis*. *Lentis* extends its meaning here: it is appropriate to the choking tendrils of the ivy and to the similar quality in the girl's embrace, but it also transfers its meaning to her character, where it displays a kinship to *tardus* and *serus* and reflects a lack of real concern on her part.¹⁴ In the latter meaning it introduces the oath proper (7-10), wherein three *ādūvara* are cited to attest the eternal nature of her love. And what *ādūvara* they are, chosen by a lover for his girl to repeat! The first two are minor in key, ominous in effect and negative in result; the threat of Orion to the sailors and the winter sea is here made more appropriate by the notable bad luck Orion had as a lover, which ultimately brought his own death.¹⁵

meque/adstringam verbis in sacra iura meis (a vexed passage where Ehwald emends to *tua iura*). That the oath would cite the *numina magnorum deorum* is implicit in *laesura*. Horace may extend the hyperbole by including *nox*, *luna*, and *sidera minora* as rather conventional additional witnesses.

¹³ Ivy is three times cited by Pliny, *H. N.*, as destructive to its host tree: XVI, 151 *arbores autem necat candida (hedera)*; XVI, 243 *hedera necari arbores certum est*; XVII, 239 *necat et hedera vinciens (arbores)*. Cf. also Laberius, *Mim.*, 122-3 (Ribbeck) *ut hedera serpens vires arbores necat, ita me vetustas amplexu annorum enecat*. Ivy in Catullus, 61, 34 is *tenax*; cf. the notes in their respective commentaries by Ellis and Fordyce, who point out that Catullus' ivy by exception in a common simile is used to represent love rather than the lover.

¹⁴ *Lentus* is a word fairly easily adapted to double usage. In several instances Horace uses it to express the lingering, even tenacious quality of his love, and at the same time the indifference of the lover for whom he is suffering. So *Carm.*, III, 19, 28 *me lentus Glyceræ torret amor meæ*, I, 13, 8 *quam lentis penitus macerer ignibus*; see also Tibullus, I, 4, 81 *eheu quam Marathus lento me torquet amore*, where the primary and secondary meanings are reversed. In Tib., II, 6, 36; Prop., I, 6, 12; 15, 4; II, 14, 4, it seems to have as its principal meaning "indifferent." Propertius shows *lentus* in a physical erotic sense in II, 15, 7-8.

¹⁵ In *Carm.*, III, 27 Horace, in a strange propempticon, wishes that Galatea, who is leaving him, may be *felix* (13, while characteristically pointing out *sed vides quanto trepidet tumultu / pronus Orion* in 17-18). Horace then tells the story of Europa, who left her home (on the bull's back) and regretted her voyage. So the rival is *felicior* now (as is Neaera by extension), and so he will regret *his* trip.

Apollo, again not a particularly successful lover, is cited apparently only to have his locks ruffled by a breeze. The verbs of the oath *turbaret*, *agitare*, and (*esset*) *infestus* add to its perverse strength, both in their literal sense and in their potential in erotic language.¹⁶ The capping line *fore hunc amorem mutuum* is by now anticlimactic: the poet has declared the oath to be a false one, and has made it evident by the restless and even vicious terms by which he has described the relationship that no amount of oath-taking can make this an *amor mutuus* in the usual sense. No more than the relationship ascribed to the flock and the wolf or to the sailors and Orion can this love be described as reciprocal. It is at best a temporary union, too one-sided to last. But since it involves two, each can have a part in breaking it up, and the root of change in *mutuum* foreshadows line 11 and the laugh at the end of the poem.¹⁷

To this point, except in the possible dictation of the oath in 4, the poet has been essentially passive as he recounts Neaera's performance. Now the direct accusation of *laesura* and the implications of the whole passage are confirmed in an active fury of threats by the betrayed lover. Even here, however, there is no narrative statement of her dereliction. The actual betrayal is revealed in Horace's threats (13-16) and in the happiness of the new lover (17-18), as it was anticipated in 1-10. His first and general threat in 11 closes the past episode and summons his manhood to face action and Neaera's future punishment. To such an extent has the epode been constructed as a poem of situation that one is a bit surprised to learn that the

¹⁶ Kiessling-Heinze note that Horace, perhaps following Vergil, *Ecl.*, 5, 76, has made the whole protestation a positive one (*fore*) rather than what they call the more common approach (e.g., sooner nature will change than our love will die), thereby completely missing the point of the examples chosen by the poet and the tone they set.

¹⁷ In two other uses of *mutuus* in the Odes Horace may have this double edge to the word in mind. In III, 9, 13 *face mutua* expresses the reciprocal feeling between the girl and her new lover, which will be eternal—but has evaporated by her final speech (21-4). And in IV, 1, 30 *animi . . . mutui* reflects the temporary nature of the love at hand when considered in its context: a rejection of all kinds of love and love devices, only to be followed by an avowal of affection for Ligurinus. Cf. the tone of temporariness in Epode 11, especially lines 25-8. And for the idea of love as a loan (therefore temporary) on the part of one lover, cf. Plautus, *Curc.*, I, 1, 46-8.

girl has a name.¹⁸ The emotional release in shouting out "Neaera!" brings an almost inevitable response as Horace tries to assert his own *persona* with *Flacco* in 12. In this attempt to bolster his courage (11) the poet applies *multum* in a kind of free ἀπὸ κοινοῦ to *dolitura* and *virtute*.¹⁹ Such is the strength of the resulting line that it becomes the embodiment of the whole theme, sharing alone with the last bitter *ast ego vicissim risero* of 24 the distinction of completeness within its line. The general threat is followed by a three-part specific threat, and with it a masterful construct of hesitation and doubt, quite unlike the purposefulness in the action ascribed to Neaera. The five clauses of the threat (each occupying a line) show the poet's resolve grow to a peak in 14 and retreat to the point from which it was forced: *if* Horace is a man, he will *not* put up with her profligacy, and he *will* in his anger look for someone else, and his constancy will *not* yield to her beauty, *if* real pain reaches him. By this pyramidal arrangement and by its unique positive nature *quaeret* is thrown into strong perspective and becomes Horace's answer to Neaera, the would-be threat of *dolitura*.

Laesura was something of a shock in 3; the answering *dolitura* comes in harshly after *amorem mutuum*. But the way has been prepared for its abrasiveness and it seizes upon the erotic vocabulary that has begun in 1-10. Indeed the erotic nature of these lines provides a key to the poem and its relationship to Epodes 8, 11, and 12. The tendency to romanticize Epode 15 has not been to its advantage, since thereby most readers have failed to see the double prongs to Horace's vocabulary and to enjoy the care with which the poet has worked. Those who see in it a charming profession of love with an Archilochean touch, or a light and youthful complaint in a real situation, mistake the poet's intention and misread his words.²⁰ 15 belongs with

¹⁸ In a rather superficial glance at Epode 15 F. Durand, *La poesia di Orazio* (Torino, 1955), p. 35, remarks that among the less interesting epodes 15 has some happy touches, starts well (the first couplet), "ma il tono è subito interrotto, e la figura della donna rimana generica, senza intima vita."

¹⁹ Although *multum* and *virtute* cannot be associated grammatically, Horace has used bracketing here to extend the force of the adverb to the noun. *Multa* in 19 is a conventional instance of ἀπὸ κοινοῦ.

²⁰ F. Olivier, *Les épodes d'Horace* (Lausanne, 1917; pages are cited from repr. in F. Olivier, *Essais [Université de Lausanne Publications de*

the iambic content of 8 and 12 and with the satirical qualities of 11.²¹ It takes its tone and its strength from the sense of the negative and from the erotic imagery that characterize its companions.

The erotic structure of 15 does not become obvious until the shout of line 11. Then, as so often, Horace introduces a series of ideas and words the interpretation of which requires the concurrent reevaluation of the foregoing lines. The process is twofold: direct recall of words and phrases, and an adjustment of tone to elicit the underlying rancor of 1-10, a mood that threatens to emerge in the first reading of the lines and inescapably breaks through the crust of control as 1-10 receive the commentary of the second section.

Dolitura provides the fulcrum on which Horace shifts direction. There is a direct recall of line 4 *in verba iurabas mea* and a faint continuation of the legal figure as *dolitura mea . . . virtute* suggests the penalty for false oaths. But with *dolitura . . . virtute* a series of erotic images assumes control of the current scene as it also requires a reappraisal of the opening. All of these images are evoked in language of double meaning, but Horace manages in this section of the poem to let the secondary erotic meaning struggle successfully for primacy with the more literal value of the word. So *dolitura* begins the line as a statement of the mental anguish Neaera must suffer for her

la Faculté des Lettres, XV, 1963]) reflects the former view on pp. 109-10; the latter appears, e. g., in R. Latsch, *Die Chronologie der Satiren und Epoden des Horaz auf entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Grundlage* (diss. Würzburg, 1936), p. 109.

²¹ Epode 14 seems rightly to be dated later on stylistic considerations by Latsch (*op. cit.*), p. 116 in his chronological summary of the thoughts of five scholars on the dating of the epodes (cf. the discussion on p. 109). The comparative table shows that all five sources date 14 from 33-32. 15, while it receives two votes for 33, has three placing it 41-38, in the latter case providing some association with the consensus on 8 (41-39), 11 (37-34), and 12 (40-39). These dates are, of course, fairly tentative; they are produced as a result of stylistic comparison within the 17 poems and the assumption of composition between the late 40's and 30, as well as in consideration of the few apparently datable references in the poems. A glance at the tables is an instructive experience, a warning to all of the dangers of categorical dating for even apparently obvious poems.

betrayal. But as *mea multum virtute* unfolds, and particularly as the erotic image in the next line appears, *si quid in Flacco viri est*, it becomes clear that *dolitura mea . . . virtute* has a physical and erotic sense as well, and the physical pain of love is suggested by what proves to be a rather pathetic threat by the poet in the light of what follows.²² The injury Neaera was to do to the *numina* of the gods, and by extension to Horace's love, is transferred to Horace's person also as the *laesura . . . dolitura* echo promises a like revenge. *Verba . . . mea* has already suggested in a waspish way the language of love; *mea . . . virtute* now turns to the act. The appearance of Apollo in 9 has prepared the way for this idea. In both senses of the words Apollo has made his loves suffer and has provided the betrayed lover with frequent and drastic examples of punishment.²³ So the *agitaret . . . capillos* of 9 receives its ominous meaning: it is Apollo in anger, in physical motion as well as in vengeful mood, about to punish his current unfaithful lover.²⁴ *Mea* in 11, which seemed at first to reflect only the *mea* of 4 and the *hunc amorem mutuum* of 10, now adds to its list of antecedents the *Apollinis* of 9, and by extension through *mutuum*

²² The variant *virium* is equally applicable, though not to be preferred because of the *virtute*. Cf. Epode 8, 2 for a similar use in *viris*. For *dolor* as the physical pain of love see Lucretius, IV, 1079.

²³ Unfaithful Coronis was punished with death while pregnant by Apollo, Hesiod, fr. 123 (Rzach); Pindar, *Pyth.*, 3, *init.*; Ovid, *Met.*, II, 542 ff. Cassandra's punishment for denying the god after he had granted her prophetic powers is well-known (cf., e.g., Aeschylus, *Ag.*, 1202 ff.). And the Cumaean Sibyl's denial of the god's love brought a withering-away as she suffered the fate of eternal life without eternal youth, Ovid, *Met.*, XIV, 130 ff.; Petronius, 48, 8.

²⁴ Propertius, IV, 6, 31-2, where Apollo has his hair bound up for battle, is enough different in setting that it seems not to limit my interpretation here. Ennius, 231d (Diehl) has the long-haired god (*crinitus*) draw his bow. Commager (*op. cit.* above, n. 3), pp. 143-4, in a discussion of *Carm.*, III, 20, notes on lines 13-15 of that poem,

. . . et leni recreare vento
sparsum odoratis umerum capillis
qualis aut Nireus fuit . . .

"Nearchus' almost divine indifference, emphasized by the ironic echo of *Epod.* 15, 9-10, does more than provide a twist to the tale of hot pursuit." This is true, and the irony is in part in the fact that Apollo is in motion, Nearchus at rest, Apollo (and therefore Horace) much involved, Nearchus indifferent.

the turmoil of Orion and of the wolf in the first two *ἀδύvara*. 11, then, finally caps the *ἀδύvara* and provides the explanation for their dark nature.²⁵

The pun on the poet's cognomen in 12, difficult as it has been for many to accept, is double.²⁶ First it associates the poet *Flacco* with Apollo of the uncut and therefore *pendant* hair, and then by a kind of erotic oxymoron *Flacco viri* confirms the erotic

²⁵ Dutoit (*op. cit.* above, n. 5), p. 88, has noted the peculiar character of these *ἀδύvara* and wondered if by the first two Horace could be offering a foretaste of "le ton irrité et les menaces de la deuxième partie de l'épode." Dutoit cautiously but correctly concludes "dans ce cas il ne faudrait plus trop insister sur le ton élégiaque des dix premiers vers. Le mordant de l'iambe s'y trouverait déjà." He less successfully explains the Apollo *ἀδύvarov* as a combination of the motifs of eternal youth and of Apollo as god of poets, for as poet Horace takes his revenge. Fraenkel (*op. cit.* above, n. 8), p. 67, remarks on the "peculiar juxtaposition" of the *ἀδύvara*, which he refers rather more directly than that text allows to Callimachus, "Ἰαμβοί, fr. 202, 69 (Pfeiffer).

²⁶ Kiessling-Heinze, interpreting the passage as a burst of self-confidence, find any play on the meaning of Flaccus out of place, whether it be general (*schlaff*) or localized (*schlapporig*). L. Mueller, *Quintus Horatius Flaccus. Oden und Epoden* (Leipzig, 1900), *ad loc.*, and Giarratano (*op. cit.* above, n. 4), *ad loc.*, doubt the play on words, the latter because of the contrast with the pathos of the scene. In a footnote Olivier (*op. cit.* above, n. 20), p. 110, n. 3, observes that it is not translatable in Greek and therefore shows Horace's independence just at that part of the poem when he becomes Archilochean with invective (Olivier then begs forgiveness for not translating the pun into French). In its one other appearance in his works I suspect that Flaccus tempted Horace by its meaning. In *Serm.*, II, 1, 17-20,

haud mihi deero
cum res ipsa feret: nisi dextro tempore Flacci
verba per attentam non ibunt Caesaris aurem,
cui male si palpere recalcitrat undique tutus,

the sequence *deero . . . Flacci . . . attentam . . . recalcitrat* certainly plays on *Flacci* as parallel to *deero* and contrasting with the other two, although in this instance no erotic intention seems appropriate despite the potential of the last line. Cf. Martial, XI, 27, 1, for a similar play on the meaning of Flaccus.

In Epode 12, 16-17, *mollis* and *inertem* may well pun on the cognomen of the hapless poet, while *mollis inertia* in 14, 1 certainly has a physical as well as a psychological force as it shows the lover exhausted by Phryne's demands and spiritually worn out by the affair's course. The potential of a similar pun on *non mollis viros* in 1, 10 is made likely by *imbellis ac firmus parum* in line 16.

sense of *virtute* and at the same time reveals that the threat of 11 is a hollow one. For the picture that is introduced by 12 suggests that Horace is very unlikely to cause the physical *dolor* of love in Neaera's case. Indeed the reverse seems to be the case, as line 13 makes clear with *potiori* and *adsiduas . . . noctes*. Someone more capable of satisfying Neaera's constant demands is evidently replacing the more moderate or perhaps exhausted Horace.²⁷ The lament of the lady in Epode 12, 14-16 is recalled and provides a rather concise erotic commentary for this section, as do certain portions of the scabrous attack in 8.

The very beginning of line 13 with its pathic undertone (*non feret*) prepares the way.²⁸ *Quid . . . viri* sounds rather feeble as *adsiduas potiori . . . noctes* reveals an insatiable Neaera and a prodigious new lover. The *noctes* are particularly in sad contrast with the *nox* of 1, since that *nox*, qualified by *caelo . . . sereno*, seems rather sedate when compared with the erotically active *adsiduas . . . noctes*.²⁹ Lines 15-16 of Epode 12 with their *ter nocte potes* echo line 13 here, just as the *langues* (14), *mollis* (16), and *inertem* (17) of that poem underline the effect of *quid . . . viri*, *non feret*, and *potiori* here. All right, if only a *potior* will satisfy her, Horace will get mad and look for a *par*. That the language is technical here is evident from 12, 17 *quaerenti*, used there of application to a procuress by the lady. *Parem* allows a triple interpretation: someone as good as she, someone more his own equal, or his own *potior*.³⁰ All are erotic qualifications. The capsule military metaphor introduced in 15

²⁷ Comparable erotic uses of *potior* and related words can be found in Epode 12, 15 *potest*; *Carm.*, IV, 1, 17 *potentior*; IV, 10, 1 *potens*; III, 9, 2 *potior*; and very possibly the *potest* of Epode 9, 14. For *adsiduas* see particularly Propertius, II, 16, 13-14; 33, 43-4; and Catullus, 61, 230-1. Note also Epode 11, 18, where *imparibus* may refer to the *potiores* in love.

²⁸ Cf. Catullus, 29, 5 and 9, and note 36 below.

²⁹ *Priap.*, 3, 1-2, provides a parallel for *dare* and *adsiduas*. The poem abounds with *dare* as an erotic word.

³⁰ The long hair of the youthful Apollo parallels Epode 11, 27-8, where the *alius ardor* of the poet may be *puellae candidae / aut teretis pueri longam renodantis comam*. A fourth *par* should perhaps be added, then, a boy like the young Apollo. This idea may not be too far-fetched when one considers *Carm.*, III, 20, 13-16, with the picture of the breeze ruffling the long hair of the youth compared to both Nireus and Ganymede.

by *offensae* (a perfectly acceptable manuscript reading) again recalls the attack on the faded charms of the ladies in 8 and 12.³¹ But more directly *offensae* echoes with *semel* the *ad unum / opus* of 12. 15-16. Indeed line 15 demonstrates most directly the affinity of the epode to 12 as *cedet constantia* almost takes its meaning from 12, 19-20,

cuius in indomito constantior inguine nervus
quam nova collibus arbor inhaeret.³²

With this remarkable parallel the comparison in 15, 5-6 must be reconsidered, and the ivy-ilex relationship restudied. I have mentioned earlier the passivity of Horace as he allows Neaera to control nearly all the action in the early lines. This passivity is made quite literal as the ilex is the subject of the passive verb *adstringitur* in 5.³³ Since 12, 20 makes an erotic meaning in this line almost certain, the aggressiveness of Neaera is made painfully explicit by *procera* as a descriptive word for the ivy. This aggressiveness and Horace's passive nature are emphasized from this point at almost every turn. *Adhaerens* shows Neaera in action. Clearly she is the spirit behind *turbaret* (as she is the wolf and Orion) and, despite Horace's wishful thinking, *agitaret* as well. *Dolitura*, the very word by which Horace is to punish her, is active. In the threats Horace is represented by the verbal ideas *est, non feret, quaeret* (to which he must be driven *iratus*), *nec cedet*, while Neaera, after *dolitura*, has *dare, offensae*, and *intrarit* to show her active role.³⁴ *Dolor*

³¹ Olivier (*op. cit.* above, n. 20), pp. 109-10, effectively defends the manuscript *offensae* as a participle with active meaning "hateful" by citation of Ciceronian examples. Bentley's *offensi* is attractive, but I prefer the bitterness of *offensae formae*. The military figure of *offensae cedit constantia formae* continues in the next line's *intrarit* and is recalled by *superbus incedis* 18 and *vincas* 22.

³² With the military-erotic figure in *cedet constantia* the similar metaphor in *indomito constantior* can be compared. *Offensae* adds force to the picture by its position next to *cedet*; indeed *offensae cedit constantia* offer a remarkable progression of movement forward, movement backward, and no movement, indicative of the irresolution that besets Horace even when he is proclaiming fortitude.

³³ Lucretius, IV, 1187, shows *astrectos* in a similar sense: *quos retinere volunt astrectosque esse in amore*.

³⁴ The possibility that *iratus* may here mean "aroused to violent desire" is suggested by its use in *Serm.* I, 2, 71. Cf. Ernout-Meillet,

in 16 provides a structural close to the section by its echo of *dolitura* and at the same time echoes the erotic element in that word, this time as applied to Horace and his *malum*. *Dolor* is the theme of the middle section and, as it ultimately appears from *maerebis . . . risero* in 23-4, of the whole poem.

There is a notable dramatic contrast between 15 and its companion poem 12 in the source of the expressed dissatisfaction. In the latter the woman, complaining of Horace's inability to meet her demands, ends her plaint with *o ego non felix*; in 15 Horace pouts because his girl has found him unsatisfactory and has moved on to a *potior* and *felicior*, emphasizing his sad situation with *si certus intrarit dolor* and *meo nunc / superbus incedis malo*. The reversal of situations is given greater point by the contrasting cries *o ego non felix* and *o dolitura . . . Neaera*. As the incompatibility of flock and wolf is an ἀδύνατον in 15, 7, it becomes the expression of Horace's rejection of the lady in her final cry of 12, 25-6. The lover previous to Horace in 12 is cited for his prodigious potency; in 15 the lover who succeeds the poet has similar qualities. *Dolor*, mentioned above as the theme of 15, associates the poem with 12 and 8, where both women bemoan Horace's impotency, and with 11, wherein Horace's *dolor* as he complains of being perpetually lovesick is made a bit pathetic by the obviously temporary nature of the love he feels and is given in return. Although *dolor* does not appear directly in any of the other poems in question, that it is their theme is amply demonstrated by the situations and by the language of all three.

When Horace turns to the new lover and his seeming happiness in line 17, he continues the language and figures with which he has been discussing Neaera and himself. *Felicior* certainly recalls the *potiori* of line 13 and its erotic potential.³⁵ *Meo nunc / superbus incedis malo* is a probable echo of Catullus 29, 6-7,

Dict. étym., on *ira*. In referring *Carm.*, I, 16 to this Neaera L. Hermann, *Horace Épodes (Collection Latomus, XIV [1953])* p. 26, has suggested that *irae* in I, 16, 9 and 17 be connected with Epode 15's *iratus*. In line 17 the *irae* of Thyestes certainly favor the extended meaning I propose for *iratus*; the *tristes irae* of line 9 do not.

³⁵ Cf. Catullus, 100, 8 *sis felix, Caeli, sis in amore potens*, and particularly Propertius, II, 33, 43-4, with its very broad puns.

et ille nunc superbus et superfluens
perambulabit omnium cubilia,

and recalls *superbo . . . ab inguine* of Epode 8, 19, where *superbo* instead of the usual interpretation "fastidious" may rather offer a proleptic description of physical condition when the lover is aroused.³⁶ The probability of this somewhat graphic secondary meaning for *superbus* is enhanced by the use of *malo*, which refers both to Horace's general misfortune at the loss of his girl and to the physical incapacity that caused it.³⁷

The erotic double meaning recedes at this point, at least as far as direct punning or wordplay goes, as the poet turns in 18-22 to the set of impossible criteria, the unattainable degrees of wealth, wisdom, and beauty. There is in these impossibilities obvious reminiscence of their earlier counterparts, *pecore* 19 and *pecori* 7, the water of the river in 20 and of the sea in 8, and the youthful Apollo of 9 with a double match in the *arcana* of 21 and the youthful Nireus of 22. Once more in this set the triple division is used, and once more the minor key helps Horace to maintain his mood. The three examples—the riches of the Pactolus, the wisdom of Pythagoras, the beauty of Nireus—all evoke tales of misfortune wherein the quality cited was of little avail to the individual concerned. Croesus of Lydia, where the Pactolus became proverbial of wealth as he of wealthy men, is an outstanding example of the futility of wealth against fate and of the fall of a proud man.³⁸ Pythagoras most likely died an exile, and his school was suppressed first in Croton and then

³⁶ Catullus announces his intention to pun in the first lines with *pati* 1 and *feres* 5. Then 6-7 show Mamurra in his pride and wealth and well-primed for the progress from bed to bed. The repeated line (5 and 9) that brackets this passage and ends with *feres* establishes the erotic double meaning of *superbus* and *superfluens*.

³⁷ *Priap.*, 82, 19 at *o sceleste penis, a meum malum* (Mueller emends the manuscript reading to *sceleste penis, o cave meum malum*) provides an exact parallel for *malum* in the double sense of general discomfiture and sexual impotency. So in Epode 11, 7 *mali* is the general misfortune of being a laughing stock and the particular one of unrequited love.

³⁸ That the reference to the Pactolus would evoke Croesus is clear from Propertius, III, 18, 27-8, where the two are linked in a set of *adivara* and where coincidentally Nireus' beauty is also cited.

in Tarentum.³⁹ Nireus' beauty brought him neither strength nor happiness.⁴⁰

The new lover is ever-present in the ominous lines that belie his happiness and announce his fall. Indeed, he suppresses the poet entirely after one feeble entrance in 17: *tu . . . es . . . (meo)*, 18 *incedis*, 19 *sis*, 20 *tibi*, 21 *te*, 22 *vincas*. Within these lines Horace has also woven an alternating pattern of verbs of physical action and those of rest: *es . . . incedis . . . sis-licebit . . . fluat . . . fallant . . . vincas*.⁴¹ This pattern emphasizes the almost breathless heaping-up of attributes, a cumulus of good fortune that is dissipated swiftly by *heu heu* (23), recalling the *o dolitura* of 11 and introducing the curse of *maerebis*. *Forma* (15 and 22) has thus proved infallible to neither Neaera nor her new lover. *Hunc amorem mutuum* bitterly reechoes in *translatos alio . . . amores*. The lover who began as *felicior* and *superbus* is reduced to bemoaning his fate as he had seen Horace do before him.⁴² *Et tu* of 17 is now given its real meaning "you, too" as the foreboding significance of the juxtaposition in 16-17 *dolor/et tu* is confirmed. Horace (*ast ego*) now sees the *mutuum* of 10 come full circle: in *visissim* he recalls that earlier misshapen sentiment. His share in the love has brought him only *dolor*, and the scarcely comforting chance to make some contribution to the mutuality of the affair by taking his turn in the line of bitter laughers. And so he warns the new lover—as unavailing as he himself was undoubtedly warned—of his inevitable fate.

³⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. Pyth.*, 39-40, gives several versions of his death, either by violence or by starvation.

⁴⁰ The fecklessness of Nireus was apparently concomitant with his beauty. He has only three ships in *Il.*, II, 671-5 (*ἀλαπαδὸς ἔην*, Homer therefore says in 675). Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1414a, notes that Homer uses the device of mentioning Nireus' name three times in this passage (though nowhere else) to make him seem important. In the later tradition Quintus Smyrnaeus, VI, 385-6, has Eurypylus sum up Nireus' fate after killing him: *ἐνὲ νότοι εἶδος ἀγῆτον | οὔτι λιλαιμένω περ ἐπήκεσεν*.

⁴¹ A more remarkable alternation of similar effect is achieved in Epode 8, 1-18 *rogare, enervet, sit, exaret, hiet, incitat, esto, ducant, sit, ambulet, iacere amant, rigent, languet*. The final couplet breaks the alternation with two verbs of action, suitable to the insulting suggestion that caps the poem.

⁴² *Felicior* further announces the first two qualities of wealth and wisdom and *superbus* gives a foretaste of beauty, as *vincas* suggests.

Here, then, are the Parian iambs to which Horace had turned for inspiration and for metrical guidance. Perhaps one can grant in part Horace's claim that he did not pursue the *res et agentia verba Lycamben*, but to such an extent does Epode 15 imbibe of the spirit of Archilochus that the limitations on invective set down by Horace seem to have been transgressed somewhat in this early poem. The Archilochean spirit, however, must not detract from the very considerable skill displayed by Horace himself in this remarkable performance. Epode 15, far from being a charming if bittersweet elegiac interlude, should take its place among the epodes (8, 11, 12) of doubtful subject and doubtful taste to the modern ear, but of evident skill and promise. The techniques of the odes are here, the control of words and patterns, the structural cleverness and strength, the amazing ability to say many things in limited numbers of words. The compression of language is certainly not completely developed; it is more evident in Epode 14. But Epode 15's achievement is notable and its merits qualify it for far greater appreciation than even its admirers have been wont to give.

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ON THE COMEDY OF PLATO'S ARISTOPHANES.*

Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium* has often been viewed as an ingenious, amusing example of the old comedy, unworthy of much serious philosophic attention.¹ Many interpreters, however, have discerned a serious or even a tragic note in it. For eros, according to Aristophanes, is the passion to return to a primeval unity with one's beloved. Thus, scholars have found in Aristophanes' tale traces of Kierkegaard (separation from God), Freud (separation from the womb), and Socrates (separation from the ideas).² Indeed any attempt to bridge the gap between ideal and reality is imaged in the passion of Aristophanes' lovers. One could characterize Aristophanes' passion as tragic only if one regards the attempt to bridge this gap as a serious pursuit. Thus, only a dedicated idealist, a man prepared to sacrifice his life for some person or cause, would find tragedy in Aristophanes' story.

The present paper attempts to show that Diotima would regard this somewhat Socratic element of Aristophanes' speech as essentially comic. For her, comic coarseness and promiscuity are in no way incompatible with the notion that eros is a desire for a unity transcending the limits of particular selfhood. In order

* AUTHOR'S NOTE: This interpretation of Plato's Aristophanes is meant to be a companion piece to my articles "Diotima's Concept of Love," *A. J. P.*, LXXXVI (1965), pp. 33-59, and "On the Sophistry of Plato's Pausanias," *T. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), pp. 261-7. It is part of a series of articles on Plato's *Symposium*.

¹ B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, III³ (New York, 1914), p. 287; A. E. Taylor, *Plato*⁶ (Meridian Paperback, 1960), pp. 219 f.

² T. Gould, *Platonic Love* (New York, 1963), pp. 33-4; R. G. Bury, *The Symposium of Plato*² (Cambridge, 1932), p. LIX, n. 2. Bury rightly observes that the unity taught by Socrates is spiritual and not physical as it is with Aristophanes. In both cases, however, a transcending of one's corporeal self is required in order to be what one really is. Cf. Jowett (above, note 1); G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (Beacon Paperback, 1958), p. 99; G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*² (Frankfurt am Main, 1948), pp. 129 f. P. Friedländer, *Platon*, 2^a (Berlin, 1960), pp. 16 f.; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II (New York, 1943), p. 184; K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, I⁴ (Harper Paperback, 1963), pp. 218 ff., n. 3, section 4; Taylor (above, note 1).

to substantiate this interpretation, we turn first to an examination of the Aristophanic myth (189 D 5-193 B 6).

Originally human nature was not as it is now, for there were three "sexes": double-male, double-female, and the combination of male and female.³ Each of them was round all over with one head, but two faces, four arms, four legs, and two sets of reproductive organs. They moved in a circular fashion, executing cartwheels by means of their eight limbs. Both their shape and motion were due to their parents. The double-men were offspring of the sun; the double-women, of the earth, and the combination, of the moon. At first, then, they did not have a human form, since their parents were not human (189 D 5-190 B 5). Although born of these natural bodies, the original humans were subject to the Olympian Gods. Entertaining very lofty ambitions which led to an attempt to overthrow the Olympians, they incurred divine retribution (190 B 5-C 6).

³ I have followed Taylor (above, note 1) in using the terms "double-male" and "double-female," although this usage is somewhat misleading. The original wholes are not regarded by Aristophanes as "double" or two, but one; they become two as a consequence of divine retribution. Even then, they are two artificial halves, fractions, so to speak, and not two genuine unities. Aristophanes' eros is the drive to overcome this unnatural bifurcation through a return to primitive integrity.

By maintaining that something which is by nature one can be split, Aristophanes rejects the *Republic's* notion of unity (525D-E4), although Aristotle (below, note 9), seems to imply that Aristophanes accepted this notion. On the *Republic's* contention that natural units cannot be turned into fractions, see J. Klein, "Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie, und Physik*, III (1934), pp. 47 ff. and especially p. 105 on the Aristotelian basis of the acceptance of such fractions. Popper (above, note 2 and below, note 9) regards the desire of the Aristophanic "fractions" to become whole again as a yearning to lose oneself in a primitive tribal unity. According to J. E. Harrison, *Themis*² (Meridian Paperback, 1962), p. 473, the primitive consciousness does indeed lack "... the sense of separatedness or consciousness of the severance of one self from other selves and of that self as subject and distinct from objects." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 470: "... the individual man has but slight consciousness of himself as distinguished from his group." See also F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (Harper Paperback, 1957), pp. 46 ff.; B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*² (Harper Paperback, 1960), p. 31: "Primitive man feels that he is bound to the gods; he has not yet roused himself to an awareness of his own freedom."

Thus Aristophanes' men are originally friendly to their parents, the heavenly bodies, but hostile to the Olympians. Although the civilized Greeks never denied the divinity of these cosmic phenomena, they never worshipped them with temples and sacrifices. Such worship was condemned as typical of primitive Greeks and barbarians.⁴ In the *Peace* (403 ff.) of Aristophanes these deities are engaged in a plot to betray Greece to the barbarians, for the latter worship them, while the Greeks sacrifice to the despised Olympians (cf. above, note 4). According to the *Cratylus* (397 C 8-D 2), the earliest Greeks believed in the nature-divinities which, in Socrates' time, were worshipped by the barbarians: "Whatever may have been the view of the unthinking public, the educated man as well as the barbarous Persian knew that in past days, the Greeks had worshipped nature-powers."⁵ Worship of these deities was, then, equated with a primitive, barbarous state. Thus, when Plato's Aristophanes makes men the descendants of nature-Gods, he implicitly sides with barbarism against civilization. Man, for him, is by nature uncivilized; the civilizing Gods, the Olympians, force him to be unnatural in order to curb his overweening insolence.

By his bifurcation of men, Zeus deprived them of their natural form and made them in the image of the Olympians, although he failed to teach them piety as he had intended. His lack of foresight resulted instead, in eros, the uncontrollable longing of the two halves to be whole again. To appease this passion, the halves clung to each other, oblivious of everything including the demands of self-preservation, not to speak of piety. The birth of eros frustrated Zeus' expectations, for he had hoped to reap a twofold benefit by halving the power of men and, at the

⁴ W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods* (Beacon Paperback, 1956), pp. 212 f. See also Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*² (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 269; Harrison (above, note 3), pp. 445 ff.; B. B. Rodgers, *The Comedies of Aristophanes*, III² (London, 1913), pp. 51-2.

⁵ See references above, note 4, especially Harrison (p. 446) who also cites a scholiast to the *Peace* (413) and Herodotus (I, 31) on the Persian custom in this regard. See also E. Frank, "The Religious Origin of Greek Philosophy," *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben* (Zurich and Stuttgart, 1955), pp. 76 ff. Cf. Milton, *Paradise Lost*, IX, 718-22: "The Gods are first and that advantage use / On our belief, that all from them proceeds: / I question it, for this fair Earth I see, / Warmed by the Sun, producing every kind, / Them nothing. . . ."

same time, doubling the number available to sacrifice. If they had persisted in their rebellion, he had intended to quarter them. In this way each successive impiety would diminish man's power, while increasing the benefits accruing to the Gods (190 C 6-191 B 5).

The eros, unintentionally generated by Zeus' punitive measures, has no connection with the activities usually associated with sexual love. On the contrary, sexual intercourse and reproduction are devised by Zeus expressly to take man's mind off the serious concern of eros, since that concern precludes piety.⁹ Inaugurated by the Gods of civilization, intercourse and reproduction are not the primary erotic phenomena. This is perhaps the most comic aspect of Aristophanes' eros, not only to most men, but also, as we shall see, to Diotima. And yet, it is the aspect which is most Socratic (above p. 420).

For Diotima, reproduction, whether physical or psychical, is prompted by the erotic drive to make oneself immortal within the limits of the possible (206 B 1-209 E 4, cf. 212 A 2-7). Those creatures able to obtain immortality solely through reproduction are contrasted with beings who are divine or immortal and therefore have no need for reproduction to make them so (208 A 7-B 4). Thus, according to Diotima, the heavenly bodies would not have become the parents of the first humans, if they were truly Gods. Being self-sufficient, Diotima's Gods do not experience eros, the desire to reproduce (cf. 202 B 10-D 6). On the other hand, Aristophanes' first humans, like their parents, feel the need to beget (191 B 7-C 2). Thus, from Diotima's point of view these original men, as well as their parents, were not self-sufficient. If their attack on Olympus was based on their false sense of self-sufficiency, it was doomed to failure from the start.

Always a desire to reproduce, Diotima's eros, in its highest and most spiritual form, is engendering in others an allegiance to the moral values which tie men together in a culture or

⁹ 191 B 5-C 8; cf. Krüger (above, note 2), p. 128: ". . . sowohl die Fortpflanzung wie die Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebes ist eine Nebenwirkung. Das Sexuelle ist in der erotischen Leidenschaft gerade nicht die Hauptsache, und nicht das unstillbare Verlangen zum Einssein ist ihm zu verdanken, sondern gerade dies, dass man die Liebe zuweilen satt bekommt."

civilization (208 E 1-209 E 4). In the *Republic* (598 D 7-608 B 8), Socrates ascribes a similar function to the tragedians and especially Homer, although he censures what he regards as their failures. Similarly the Athenian Stranger bans the tragedians, for he himself is attempting to bring about a truer and more genuine tragedy.⁷ He condemns them as dangerous competitors who are more concerned with gaining applause or fame than with the truth and the moral improvement of their audience. Although also ascribing a pedagogic role to the serious poets, particularly Homer and Hesiod, Diotima views the desire for immortal glory as the true goal of such tragedians. Her poet is not subject to the tragic spell which he casts upon his audience, for he does not subordinate himself to the ideals of human community taught by his work. For him, the dissemination of tragic values is a means to acquire fame, and not a basically altruistic act. In Diotima's eyes, wisdom itself is a form of beauty (204 B 2-3) and all beauty is merely a means to the glory made possible by her spiritual reproduction. Her concept of tragedy would therefore be condemned as sophistic by Socrates and the Athenian Stranger.⁸ Aristophanes too would be con-

⁷ Laws, 817A2-D8. Cf. 658 D 3-659 C 5; *Gorgias*, 502 B 1-C 4. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III (New York, 1944), p. 256; Krüger (above, note 2), pp. 295 f.; P. Friedländer, *Plato*, I³ (Harper Paperback, 1964), pp. 122 f.; Grube (above, note 2), p. 193, n. 2. E. R. Dodds, *Plato's Gorgias* (Oxford, 1959), p. 321. According to Snell (above, note 3), pp. 115 ff., the historical Aristophanes was the first to regard the tragedians as moral teachers: "This moralization of poetry we owe to Aristophanes; its first exposition as a doctrine, as a deliberate programme, occurs in the *Frogs*."

⁸ Although not generally recognized, the sophistical character of her eros has been observed by Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II³ (Berlin, 1962), pp. 171-3. He maintains, however, that this sophistry is limited to her "lesser mysteries," while her "greater mysteries," culminating in a union with absolute beauty, far transcend the desire for glory. Cf. Bury (above, note 2), pp. XLVI ff. Against this view, R. Hackforth, "Immortality in Plato's *Symposium*," *Classical Review*, LXIV (1950), pp. 43-5, has rightly noted that the end of her eros is never contemplation of, or union with, absolute beauty; its goal is always given by the desire to immortalize oneself through physical or psychical reproduction. Hackforth does not, however, perceive the sophistical character of such a goal, as Wilamowitz does. Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (University of California Paperback, 1963), p. 218, who suggests

temptuous of those incapable of perceiving anything deeper in eros than a craving for fame. In his turn, Diotima's tragedian feels no desire for the comic poet's lost paradise. Indeed, she knows no passion for an ultimate union even with the absolute beauty which she acknowledges to be perfect in every way. All beauty, including absolute beauty, is merely a means to her (206 E 2 f.). Aristophanes' rejection of this sophistical eros makes it impossible for him to write her kind of tragedy.

While Diotima's sophistic eros strives to civilize men, Aristophanes' master passion leads to a rejection of "civilization and its discontents" in favor of a barbaric, primeval integrity.⁹

that her concept of eros would subordinate reason to instinct. See also I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, I (New York, 1962), pp. 362 f. and II (New York, 1963), pp. 23, 323. In "Diotima's Concept of Love" (see above, Author's Note), I have attempted to substantiate the view that Diotima's eros is basically sophistical and un-Socratic.

⁹ According to Popper (above, notes 2 and 3), Aristophanes' eros is connected with "The idealization of one's childhood—one's home, one's parents, and with the nostalgic wish to return . . . to one's origin." For Popper (p. 200) this desire leads ultimately to bestiality and nihilism: "Beginning with the suppression of reason and truth, we must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is human. There is no return to a harmonious state of nature. If we turn back, then we must go the whole way—we must return to the beasts" (cf. p. 71). Cf. Nietzsche, *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* (Kröners Taschenausgabe, 1955), p. 265: "Der Weg zu den Anfängen führt überall zu der Barbarei. . . ." Popper's view seems in harmony with Aristotle's *Politics* (1262 a 25-b 35) which condemns the Aristophanic eros implicit in Socrates' desire for political unity, Aristophanes' love would, according to Aristotle, destroy one or both of the lovers, while Socrates' passion for unity would lead to immoral, bestial behavior. However, Popper (p. 314, n. 59, section 2) finds the eros giving rise to these excesses also in Aristotle's psychology and epistemology which assert a "mystical union" of subject and object. This theory of sensation and knowledge is said to be connected with the Socratic doctrines of "recollection" and assimilation to God (above, note 2 and 3). Cf. Friedländer (above, note 7), pp. 56-8, 80-4, on Plotinus in this regard. Whether Plato subscribed to such doctrines, as Popper believes he did, is not so easily determined, since Plato nowhere in the dialogues endorses anything in his own name. On the problem of Plato's silence, cf. P. Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy," *J.H.I.*, VIII (1947), pp. 406-30; L. Edelstein, "Platonic Anonymity," *A.J.P.*, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 1-22. My views on this question are presented in

From her standpoint, he is unaware that even the original men and their parents were essentially mortal and could, therefore, enjoy happiness or self-sufficiency only through reproduction. Understood in this way, his yearning to return to the origins arises from his ignorance of human nature. Somehow he has come to believe that men were originally perfect wholes. For Diotima, this means that he has confused the Ideal with the Real. Now it is, as we noted, the job of her tragedian to instill into others an allegiance to the ideals which bind men together in a union transcending their individual selves. From her point of view, then, Aristophanes' rebellion against civilized values in the name of primordial unity is an outgrowth of his passionate adherence to these very values. His noble attachment to an ideal union or community has blinded him to what she regards as his actual self and its true needs; he has succumbed to the spell of tragedy. Thus, in her eyes, the comic poet does what he most wants to avoid; he makes himself ridiculous (189 B 4-7). Any desire for immortality is, in her terms, ridiculous, if it does not comprehend itself as a passion to "reproduce." Aristophanes' longing for his lost Eden is, for her, basically comic; it does not, as has often been suggested, provide a tragic backdrop for the comic externals of his speech. Although not tragic by her standards, his eros is, indeed, capable of responding to the nobler tragedy advocated by Socrates and the Athenian Stranger.¹⁰

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"Diotima's Concept of Love" (pp. 34-7). On Aristotle's criticism of the Socratic concept of political unity, see Klein (above, note 3), p. 101, n. 1, and C. J. Friedrich, *Man and his Government* (New York, 1963), pp. 139 f.; E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (University Paperback, 1960), p. 201.

¹⁰ Cf. Jaeger (above, note 2), pp. 189 f. Heckforth (above, note 8) has rightly suggested that Diotima's view of eros precludes the Socratic doctrine of recollection and that it is, in fact, opposed to the notion of immortality championed by Socrates in such dialogues as the *Phaedo*.

NATURE AND ART IN VERGIL'S SECOND *ECLOGUE*.

Servius' suggestion, "Corydonis in persona Vergilius intellegitur,"¹ is not entirely misleading if we refrain from seeking personal allegory in the love situation and consider instead how Corydon speaks for his creator as a young poet experimenting in pastoral verse. Corydon is not only a rejected and despairing lover, but also a highly self-conscious pastoral singer.² His invitation to Alexis is an invitation to join in an ideal life that only the shepherd singer can enjoy. A description of this life holds the central place in the poem, and Corydon's greatest despair follows from his realization that this description will be meaningless to Alexis. As he unfolds the sorrows of his courtship, Corydon alternately celebrates and questions the value of pastoral song.³ By emphasizing the speaker's awareness of his artistic activity, Vergil directs attention to a theoretical consideration of pastoral poetry.

¹ *Servii Grammatici, qui feruntur in Vergilii Bucolica et Georgica Commentarii*, ed. G. Thilo (Lipsiae, 1887), p. 18.

² Georg Rohde, *De Eclogarum Vergilii Forma et Indole* (Berlin, 1925), p. 34, remarks to this effect: "immo poeta magis quam pastor videtur esse, cum de carminibus loquatur."

³ Critics have observed that Corydon's song comprises several structural units, each defined by the mood of the speaker. The several inconsistencies in his attitude both toward himself and toward his song have led critics to give their attention chiefly to the psychological development of his character rather than to the literary significance of the song. For discussions of structure see: A. Cartault, *Étude sur les Bucoliques de Virgile* (Paris, 1897), pp. 78-84; Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12; Friedrich Klingner, review of Rohde, *op. cit.*, above, *Gnomon*, III (1927), pp. 577-8; Alfred Kappelmacher, "Vergil und Theocrit," *Wien. Stud.*, XLVII (1929), pp. 92-3; H. Helek, "Mitteilungen Vergils 2. Ekloge Gedankgliederung und Charakteristik," *Phil. Wochenschr.*, LII (1932), pp. 1507-10; Edwin Pfeiffer, *Virgil's Bukolika, Untersuchungen zum Formproblem* (Stuttgart, 1933), pp. 6-7 and ff.; Karl Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1959), pp. 159 and 167-8; Guillaume Stégen, *Étude sur cinq Bucoliques de Virgile: 1, 2, 4, 5, 7* (Namur, 1955), pp. 28-39; Herbert Holtorf, *P. Vergilius Maro, Die grösseren Gedichte*, Band I: *Einleitung, Bucolica* (Freiburg/Munich, 1959), pp. 139-47; Brooks Otis, *Vergil, A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 120-1; Viktor Pöschl, *Die Hirtendichtung Virgils* (Heidelberg, 1964), pp. 64-5.

It is chiefly the presence of this theoretical dimension that distinguishes the poem from its two major Theocritean sources: *Idylls*, 3 and 11. Although much has been said of the differences between these two poems and the *Eclogue*, the literary implications of these differences have not been clearly defined.⁴ The poem is obviously imitative, but the imitations reveal a questioning rather than an acceptance of their models. It is not, as it has sometimes been called, a conventional set-piece, but rather a speculative composition whose ambiguities and uncer-

⁴ The points most often discussed are as follows: 1) Character: Polyphemus and the goatherd are comic figures, parodies of the bucolic lover, whereas Corydon is a "serious" character whose emotions demand sympathy. (Cartault, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-91; Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11; Klingner, *op. cit.*, pp. 579-80; Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; Büchner, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-70; Stégen, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Holtorf, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Otis, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-4.) 2) Structure: The design of Corydon's song is more complicated than those of the Theocritean lovers. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 7, notes the symmetry ("rahmentechische-pyramidal") of *Liebesklage* I (vss. 6-18), *Liebeswerbung* (vss. 19-55), *Liebesklage* II (vss. 56-68). See also L. Richardson Jr., *Poetic Theory in Republican Rome* (Yale, 1942), p. 124, and references under n. 3, above. 3) Ending: It is obvious that vs. 73: "invenies alium, si te hic fastidit, Alexim," is an imitation of Theocritus, 11, 76: εὐρησείς Γαλάτειαν ἴσως καὶ καλλίον' ἄλλαν. But, whereas the Cyclops is still hoping to win Galatea at the end of his song, Corydon has undergone a change of heart. Cartault, p. 87, finds him nearly indifferent. Rohde, p. 11, says he has yielded to despair. Kappelmacher, p. 92, and Holtorf, p. 141, think that Vergil has followed the Epicurean principles of Philodemus: only reason can demolish passion and Corydon turns to reason in the final lines of his song. Otis, p. 124, says that Corydon, unlike the Cyclops, realizes his folly and the betrayal of his dignity and that "thoughts of the pastoral life call him back to reason." Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 65, gives the final lines to the poet. See discussions note 10, below, and notes 15-17, below. 4) Style: There is general agreement that Vergil's pastoral style here differs from the Theocritean models, but the nature of the difference is variously explained. Cartault, p. 190, says that Vergil has altered Theocritean simplicity to learned and elegant artifice. Rohde, pp. 31-40, observes that Vergil has omitted all vulgar and rustic details to be found in Theocritean description. Jean Hubaux, *Le réalisme dans les Bucoliques de Virgile* (Paris, 1927), pp. 72-39, says that Vergil's originality lies in his creation of a more precise and detailed rustic setting. The theory that Vergil's sources are not entirely Theocritean (Hubaux, pp. 36-71, Pfeiffer, pp. 14-29) will be discussed below. 5) The Role of Nature: There is general agreement that nature plays a more important part in the *Eclogue*. For discussions see notes 5-9 and 11, below.

tainties declare a poet's concern for investigating and testing the assumptions of the convention within which he chooses to write. Thus the importance of Corydon's questions must not be underestimated. The shepherd's misgivings lead directly to questions that the reader must ask for himself.

Several persons have found, although only in passing, that the poem presents some generalizations about the rural or pastoral life.⁵ Cartault defends Vergil's handling of the love situation by observing that Corydon, unlike Theocritean wooers, seeks to convert the beloved to an appreciation of the countryside:⁶

Enfin toute cette *Églogue* est animée d'un sentiment particulier, l'amour communicatif de la vie rustique. Corydon ne cherche pas seulement à gagner dans un but égoïste les bonnes grâces d'Alexis; il veut le convertir à l'existence pastorale, et c'est bien Virgile qui parle par sa bouche: car la conviction que c'est aux champs seulement dans la simplicité des plaisirs et des mœurs, que se trouve le bonheur vrai, paraît être un des traits intimes de la nature du poète.

In discussing Corydon's celebration of the pastoral life, Cartault makes a distinction between real and ideal images of nature. Commenting on verses 45-55 in the love song, he says:⁷

⁵ In addition to Cartault, notes 6-8, below, see Rohde, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Although most critics are agreed that the pastoral life is thematically important here, opinions vary concerning its significance. Stégen, *op. cit.*, p. 32, returns to an older allegorical interpretation, proposing that the praise of the bucolic life is Vergil's attempt to overcome a general Roman dislike of pastoral. In interpretations centered about Corydon's psychological process, nature, "external quiet," is usually seen in contrast to the inner turmoil of love. Thus Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 21, speaks of it as "Mitspieler im Seelendrama." Otis, *op. cit.*, p. 122, see nature in vss. 66-8 as a reflection of changes in Corydon himself. At evening he sees the folly of his *studium inane*: "... his feelings are changed: the 'external-quiet-internal-passion' motif is itself changed and reflects the change in Corydon."

⁶ Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 85. Rather than considering the love of the country as a literary motif, Cartault regards it as an expression of Vergil's intellectual convictions. He finds similar statements in *Eclogue* 10.

⁷ Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 82. The fantasy begins at vs. 45 and ends abruptly at vs. 55. I would broaden the definition to include other passages that Cartault explains simply as imitations of Theocritean pastoral. See p. 435, below. Other critics notice the heightened tone of

Le couplet précédent contenait le tableau de la vie rustique réelle, telle que devait la mener Alexis. Mais l'imagination de Corydon travaille et à la vie rustique réelle succède une sorte de vie idéale. Nous voici en plein rêve.

The same phenomenon has recently been observed by Pöschl in his description of the structure of the poem:⁸

Dort er hebt sich die Klage des Corydon zu Liebeswerbung und Liebeshuldigung, zu lichten Träumen der Phantasie, erreicht in der Schilderung des locus amoenus und der Huldigung an den Geliebten durch Blumen und Früchte, Myrte und Lorbeer ihren Höhepunkt, um dann wieder zur Klage zurückzusinken.

Corydon's appreciation of nature presents one of the major problems of the poem. The love-song is clearly an invitation to enter into the pastoral life. Yet, the images that characterize this invitation present a picture of nature entirely different from that to be seen at the beginning of the poem, or again at the end. As the singer pursues his evangelical discourse, he transforms the pastoral life into something more fantastic than real. He invites Alexis to share in a world that exists only and entirely in his imagination.

Neither Cartault nor Pöschl seems to me to have solved the problems raised by Corydon's retreat into fantasy. Both accept his picture of pastoral felicity as a positive element in the poem.⁹ But Corydon himself loses confidence in his dreamworld; and, at the end of the poem, the eclogue poet reprimands the shep-

vss. 28-55 and especially vss. 53-5. Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11, sees Corydon's speech gaining in confidence (*fiducia*) until it reaches a structural and emotional climax ("quasi culmen totius carminis"). He also notes, p. 11, that, in contrast with Vergil's bucolic descriptions elsewhere, vss. 45-55 are hyperbolic in their enthusiasm and praise.

⁸ Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁹ Cartault, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-7, observes that Corydon, at vs. 56, "retombe du rêve dans la Réalité," and that his disillusionment gives way to resignation until, at vs. 73, he is almost indifferent to Alexis. He does not, in my opinion, really explore the implications of the retreat into dreaming. Pöschl gives the dream-world a more active role, for he thinks that the exercise of imagination modifies the severity of the lover's pain (p. 64): "So denkt der Hirt zu Beginn der Corydoneklage daran zu sterben, während er am Ende nur noch von der nicht endenden Glut seiner Liebe spricht."

herd for his folly, suggesting that he occupy himself with some useful work.¹⁰ The criticism, I believe, refers not only to the folly of loving, but also to Corydon's idea of the pastoral life. The questions raised by the poem concern the relative values of real and idealized nature in the pastoral. My interpretation of the poem will center about Corydon's tendency to substitute an imaginative world for the actual and the relationship of this tendency to his self-conscious concern for pastoral song.

The praise of an ideal pastoral life is not in itself the new element in Vergil's poem. It is also conspicuous in Theocritus where it furnishes the major argument for the courtship songs. In the third *Idyll*, the snub-nosed goatherd complains to Amaryllis outside her cave. In the eleventh Polyphemus calls to Galatea by the shore of the sea. Both lovers offer rustic gifts to their desired mistresses. Each sees himself as an integral part of a carefree and opulent world of nature that the lady in her reluctance foregoes. Ironically, of course, each lover desires the lady to help him enter more fully into the ideal spirit of pastoral recreation that he, by himself, has not fully realized. In both poems we find the suggestion that the ideal pastoral life is an endless holiday in a world of escape and pleasure where nature and fantasy are one.¹¹

¹⁰ Vss. 70-2. Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 65, seems to me absolutely right in giving the final verses, 69-73 to the eclogue poet. In *Idyll* 11 also, the last word is the poet's (vss. 80-1). Pöschl does not, however, see the poet's remarks as a criticism of Corydon, but rather as a sympathetic-ironic commentary on the way in which bucolic song can set tragic feelings at a distance. This point seems to me more true of Theocritus (see pp. 432-4 and notes 14-16, below).

¹¹ Since the time of the grammarians, Theocritus has been celebrated for his "simplicity," but the idea that his poems are "realistic" often carries the assumption that he created verisimilitude for its own sake alone. For a typical discussion of this point of view see J. H. Hanford, "Pastoral Convention and *Lycidas*," *P. M. L. A.*, XXV (1910), pp. 403-16. In order for a critic to disagree with this idea it has in the past seemed necessary to argue that Theocritus was not actually "realistic" or not *merus rusticus*. Thus Hubaux, *op. cit.*, p. 82, speaks of the atmosphere of the *Idylls* as "pastoral" or "bucolic" rather than "rustic." Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (T. G. Rosenmeyer, trans., New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 282-8, moves in the right direction in observing that the realism of Theocritus is not absolute verisimilitude. Although he does not deny realistic and rustic qualities in the poems, he points out that their "simplicity is still more

Theocritus' frustrated pastoral lovers are characters who offer a hint of man's actual inability to satisfy his natural desires, even within a simplified natural world,¹² but the suggestion is not a very strong one because both lovers are grotesque. An ugly rustic only deludes himself in believing he is part of nature's design. We assume that a handsome goatherd or a two-eyed Polyphemus would overcome the maidenly resistance of a nymph. Theocritus does not really caricature pastoral assumptions, but strengthens them by showing that ineptitude cannot join with fantasy to create an ideal world.

Even if fantasy cannot advance a hopeless courtship, it does, in the Polyphemus *Idyll*, have some value for the shepherd in love. Here the lament is framed by a commensality presenting a perspective different from the Cyclops' own.¹³ In the first verse the poet speaks of Polyphemus as a man torn by love sorrows, the particular example of a general human woe. According to the poet, there is one remedy for such love and this lies in cultivating the Muses. Polyphemus has found this relief. With his rustic gifts, his simple lament and his love of the country, the Cyclops fares better than the city man who spends gold.¹⁴

ideal than fact." The answer to the problem is in understanding that "simplicity" is a literary device, an idea and not a matter of factual reporting. A very satisfactory discussion of this point appears in Adam Parry, "Landscape in Greek Poetry," *Y.C.S.*, XV (1957), pp. 10-14. Observing that nature in poetry always suggests man's longing for a return to simplicity, he says (p. 10): "[pastoral poetry] . . . is always artificial. Some awareness of the artifice is necessary for its enjoyment. We must feel this world close enough for us to enter into it (therefore it is not really description of rustic life), and far enough from us to be a metaphor of our lost innocence. Within these limits, considerable variation is allowed. The swain may wear a goatskin still smelling of rennet, and the goats may copulate while the rustics talk; or the shepherd's sorrow may be entertained by all the saints above. The fiction is always there, whether the setting be more or less realistic."

¹² Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 10: "... [pastoral poetry] is always the product of a sophisticated age, one whose civilization has made it conscious of a separation from a simpler and more innocent way of being. But the device of pastoral poetry is not to recognize overtly this separation; it is to pretend it does not exist."

¹³ Theocritus, *Idyll* 11, 1-18. The text used is that of A. S. F. Gow, edited with a translation and commentary (Cambridge, 1952). Passages quoted in translation are from this edition.

¹⁴ Theocritus, *Idyll* 11, 80-2.

Although the comedy and irony of the poem give its theme an indirect presentation, the song of Polyphemus confirms the Theocritean doctrine of pastoral innocence and simplicity. The making of poems is an activity that places painful reality at a distance. Through the medium of song, the dream of complete participation in nature can be expressed in such a way as to give escape from the limitations of real life. The Cyclops sings in a timeless, self-contained world where processes are more important than ends. Although he may never win a Galatea, he will always be able to sing. Despite his amorous frustrations, the naive Polyphemus is in harmony with his environment and with nature, providing an example of the gratifications of the simple life.

Recognition of the thematic inter-dependence of nature, song, and emotional healing in *Idyll* 11 is particularly important because this is the point on which Vergil differs most greatly from Theocritus.¹⁵ In the *Idyll* the Cyclops concludes his lament boasting that he can find a fairer Galatea, a remark that Brooks Otis calls "a naive strategy for making her either jealous or interested."¹⁶ But in the *Eclogue* advice to abandon the courtship is given by the poet and suggests that the song itself has been of little avail. Neither poet nor singer mentions his love-song in a healing capacity.¹⁷ Vergil has in fact turned his

¹⁵ The significance of the healing theme in *Idyll* 11 seems quite clear. The ironic tone of the poem makes literal interpretation unnecessary in so far as Polyphemus himself is concerned. Kappelmacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-9, proposes that the theme is derived from the Epicurean doctrines of Philoxenus: music is a cure for the passions. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8, says that the poem is intended to heal the passion of the physician Nikias by presenting Polyphemus as a mythological example. But Brooks Otis, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-4, has recently attempted to read Vergil's poem in this way. He omits all consideration of the healing theme in Theocritus, calling the Cyclops a shallow character, incapable of change. Corydon, in contrast, is serious and introspective. He analyzes (vss. 56-68) the nature of his feeling and the character of Alexis and decides that both are worthless, for Alexis cannot understand the pastoral life. Thus the utterance of passion shows the way to its cure.

¹⁶ Otis, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁷ The poem is less subtle, but more clearly organized than most interpretations show. The idea that Corydon turned to reason at the end of his lament, as first expounded by Kappelmacher and Helck, did not satisfy Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11. If the poem shows the working

back on this simple justification for pastoral song. Even though he is a singer, Corydon cannot rest comfortably in the pastoral world.

Unlike the song of Polyphemus, Corydon's love-song is not simply an exposition of nature, but also a glorification of the singer's own art. As the song develops, we see that its image of nature is entirely the invention of art. If we compare the two poems, we may see that from the beginning Vergil's shepherd places an increased emphasis on song. The Cyclops boasts of musical skill, but does not give it first place in his wooing.¹⁸ In the opening verse of his lament, Corydon suggests that his chief virtue as a lover lies in his singing (6):¹⁹ "o, crudelis Alexi, nihil mea carmina curas?" He presents his despair as the cause of imperfect music. He cannot rest at mid-day with the flocks or harvesters (8-11), but wanders alone at hot high noon, singing in company with the harsh cicadas (12-13):

at mecum raucis, tua dum vestigia lustro,
sole sub ardenti resonant arbusta cicadis.

Obviously the cicadas would be singing regardless of the lover, but Corydon's use of the term "mecum . . . resonant" indicates a belief that he has moved nature to sympathize with and to answer his grief.²⁰ It would seem to be a point of particular reproach to Alexis that he is the reason for such unmelodious song.

Even if his music is, at the moment, ineffectual, Corydon makes large claims for his poetic powers. He compares his songs with those of the mythical Amphion (23-4):

out of Corydon's cure, then the theme should have been announced as it is both in the opening and closing verses of Theocritus. The problem is, of course, obviated when the closing verses are assigned to the poet.

¹⁸ The Cyclops boasts of his singing also: *Idyll* 11, 38-40, but only as one of many attractions and as proof of a constant obsession with love.

¹⁹ The text of Vergil is that edited by F. A. Hirtzel (Oxford, O. C. T., 1959).

²⁰ For the opposite interpretation of these lines see Marie Desports, *L'incantation Virgilienne* (Bordeaux, 1952), pp. 28-31. Mlle. Desports finds in the phrase *mecum resonant* the expression of an intangible rapport between the singer and nature. Such a rapport seems to me what Corydon *wants* to find and he interprets the noise of the insects as the instrumental accompaniment to his own song.

canto quae solitus, si quando armenta vocabat,
Amphion Dircaeus in Actaeo Aracyntho.

Thus he places himself above the rank of a simple rustic, among the legendary musicians whose songs had magical power over their environment, whose art could influence the natural world.

The magical power of a pastoral singer is the subject of the central part of the courtship song. Corydon will admit Alexis to the select number of imitators of Pan (31-5):

mecum una in silvis imitabere Pana canendo
(Pan primum calamos cera coniungere pluris
instituit, Pan curat ovis oviumque magistros),
nec te paeniteat calamo trivisse labellum:
haec eadem ut sciret, quid non faciebat Amyntas?

He outlines the mythology of the pastoral tradition. Pan is the poet's divine predecessor, his protector and his model. His human forbear is an older poet who has bequeathed Corydon his pipe and thereby his musical honors. Not all pastoral characters have such skill in singing; foolish Amyntas desires the pipe in vain (36-9):

est mihi disparibus septem compacta cicutis
fistula, Damoetas dono mihi quam dedit olim,
et dixit moriens: 'te nunc habet ista secundum':
dixit Damoetas, invidit stultus Amyntas.

These suggestions are conventional enough,²¹ but Corydon uses them to assert his own importance and his place in the tradition. In his mouth they become praises both of himself and of the special and enviable character of the pastoral singer.

The pastoral world bestows special favors upon the singer. If Alexis will join Corydon, he will have not only the pleasures of music, but also the attendance of Nymphs and Naiads bringing garlands and flowers (45-50). But the supreme gift is tendered by Corydon himself (54-5):

et vos, o lauri, carpam, et te, proxima myrte,
sic positae quoniam suavis miscetis odores.

²¹ For sources and analogues see Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

These are the symbols of love and poetry, brought together to form a poet's garland.²²

Once he has offered the consummate gift, however, Corydon questions its value (56-7):

rusticus es, Corydon, nec munera curat Alexis
nec, si muneribus certes, concedat Iollas.

If the symbols and honors of pastoral song are rejected, if the shepherd singer is not the artificer of his world, but merely an ineffectual boor, then the landscape of imagination is blighted; illusion is overthrown. Corydon fears this and blames the folly of his own words (58-9):

heu, heu, quid volui misero mihi? floribus Austrum
perditus et liquidis immisi fontibus apros.

The lines carry out Vergil's thematic emphasis on pastoral song.²³ Corydon's liquid fountains are the traditional springs of the poetic imagination. They are both the landmarks of the pastoral world and the sources from which it derives. The *flores* are not only the honors accorded a poet, but also the ornaments, or the artistry, of his speech.²⁴ The image of the passage is that of chaotic nature breaking in on the mild order of the garden; yet here the garden is imaginary and the boars and south winds are inhabitants of an ordinary natural world. The danger is that Corydon has allowed his poetic fancy to wander too far from reality, creating an image that attempts to exceed nature itself.

Verses 45-55 constitute that part of the poem which Cartault and Pöschl describe as the retreat into a dream world. The reason for the dreamlike quality is clearly that the lines present an image of nature standing in sharp contrast to the rest of the poem. There are no flower-bearing Nymphs in the landscape Corydon has earlier described, only hot noon-day, tired laborers, and harsh cicadas. Yet these Nymphs and flowers would not be out of place in other, earlier pastoral poems: the "Lament for

²² This point is made by Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 17, who refers to Vergil's explicit mention of the symbolism of myrtle and laurel in *Eclogue* 7, 62.

²³ For a comparable use of *fontes* and *flores* as metaphors for poetic creation see Lucretius, I, 926-30 and IV, 2-5.

²⁴ Cicero, *De Oratore*, III, 96; *Brutus*, 66, *et al.*

Bion," the *Bucolic Epigrams*,²⁵ or even Theocritus' first *Idyll*. The ideal world that Corydon has constructed is one built on literary tradition; his imagery is that of the more rarified Alexandrian pastoral. No simple rustic life is offered, but rather admission to a realm of pure recreative fantasy where the artist celebrates nothing save his own imaginative powers. Here the singer is no longer an awkward swain, but a semi-mythological being free to revel in his own visions of timeless and endless delight. But Corydon is neither Moschus nor Bion; he is a rustic with no real claim to their world. His fear of destroying illusion is valid; his fancies lie open to correction from the natural world.²⁶

At this point many readers have seen Corydon undergo a change of heart, recognizing, as Otis says, that "he is wasting his time on one who can neither appreciate his way of life nor reciprocate his passion" . . . "love has led him to betray both his personal dignity and his way of life."²⁷ This idea seems to me subject to debate. Although verses 60-5 involve a change of subject—Corydon is no longer offering gifts—they do not constitute a real reversal or recognition. Instead of displaying his imaginative world to Alexis, Corydon now defends it against the charge of *rusticitas* that he himself has brought forward.

²⁵ For discussions of Vergil's use of bucolic epigrams by Meleager and others see Hubaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-71 and Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-29. Among the passages that Hubaux traces to the Anthology are the comparison of Corydon's beauty with that of Daphnis (vss. 26-7 and *A. P.*, XI, 28) and the gathering of flowers (vss. 45-50 and *A. P.*, 146). I do not argue for specific borrowings from the "Lament for Bion," but the Nymphs, the flowers, and the description of the shepherd poet's life are all reminiscent of that work. Ultimately what is important is not the exact details that Vergil took from his sources, but the fact that these sources are so clearly suggested as to place Corydon's song in the sophisticated and artificial post-Theocritean tradition.

²⁶ Servius, *op. cit.*, p. 27, *ad vs.* 58, discusses the failure of imagination in these lines: "Epicurei enim dicunt, quod etiam Cicero tractat, geminam esse voluptatem, unam quae percipitur, et alteram imaginariam, scilicet eam quae nascitur ex cogitatione. unde ita debemus accipere, hunc usum per cogitationem illa imaginaria voluptate, qua et cernere et adloqui videbatur absentem. sed postquam obiurgatione sua in naturalem prudentiam est reversus, caruit utique illa imaginaria voluptate, ubi nunc sibi se offuisse dicit per hanc ratiocinationem 'rusticus es . . .'"

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

The passage is more of a consolation than a lament.²⁸ Corydon's disillusionment is not very long-lasting and fails to make him abandon his faith in his own point of view. Now Alexis is *demens* for scorning a landscape the gods themselves have enjoyed (60-2):

quem fugis, a, demens? habitarunt di quoque silvas
Dardaniusque Paris. Pallas quas condidit arces
ipsa colat; nobis placeant ante omnia silvae.

He insists that the pleasures of the pastoral world are not merely subjective; they will survive the threat of Alexis' disdain. His own activity may appear as one of the reciprocal arrangements of a playful nature that assigns to each particular creature its own personal delight (63-5):

torva leaena lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam,
florentem cytisum sequitur lasciva capella,
te Corydon, o Alexi: trahit sua quemque voluptas.

By means of analogy, lover, beloved, and the art of pursuit are all adjusted into an apparently coherent scheme.²⁹ Nature, as Corydon sees it, is full of similar activities, and all these activities form a justifiable order.

The entire consolation shows a definite design, an almost

²⁸ Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 89, speaks of Corydon's consolation, but Klingner and all who follow him have called the passage a *Klage*. There seems to me some analogy between this passage, early in Vergil's work, and the more formal song of consolation in *Eclogue* 5.

²⁹ On "trahit sua quemque voluptas," Servius, *op. cit.*, p. 28, writes: "notatur a criticis, quod hanc sententiam dederit rustico supra bucolici carminis legem aut possibilitatem." This point seems to me correct. The source for the passage is Theocritus, 10, 30: "Goat follows after moon-clover; wolf after goat; crane after plough and I for thee am mad." Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 100, interprets Vergil's rearrangement accurately: "Virgile a fait de ce passage une imitation très ornée. Theocrite commence une gradation ascendante, puis il l'interrompt; la grue n'a aucun rapport avec la chèvre. Virgile supprime ce détail, qui lui a paru peut-être trop vulgaire, et établit en revanche une gradation descendante, parfaitement régulière: la lionne, le loup, la chèvre, le cytise. Il fait oeuvre de styliste." In attempting to make the *voluptas* of lioness and wolf that of perverted *amor*, Hubaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-5, misses the point. The stylistic regularity of Corydon's *sententia* conceals a false analogy.

hierarchic arrangement. Corydon builds his image of pastoral pleasure by looking on the one hand to the gods who may give dignity to the forest, and on the other, to the animal creatures whose activities can give him an excuse for his own desires. This formulaic description of an orderly nature may seem to recall other passages in the *Eclogues*³⁰ but for one major weakness. Corydon's analogy is witty and well contrived, but false. He equates two unequal elements: the natural pleasure animals take in seeking their necessary food is compared with his own irrational, unnecessary passion. Strictly considered, the equation tends toward a lowering of human dignity. Furthermore, Corydon the shepherd is not really like the gods who were only temporary sojourners in nature. The allusion to Trojan Paris suggests a desire to be a kind of hero in disguise. By comparing himself to gods and to animals, Corydon actually avoids a direct contemplation of his own place in nature. His order is playful and figurative, and again an escape from reality.

Even as the shepherd is formulating these principles, he is confronted with another aspect of nature, with an order that surpasses any he can make for himself. He sees the approach of night; he watches the cattle come home from the fields, and recognizes the need for ending his song. The fires of passion, figuratively appropriate at noon-day, now clearly indicate his distance from the natural world. But his response to nature is only another burst of self-pity, a general complaint of the injustice of his lot (68): "me tamen urit amor: quis enim modus adsit amori?"

If Corydon himself has failed to read a lesson in nature, the poet's own words make it clear (69-73):

a, Corydon, Corydon, quae te dementia cepit!
semiputata tibi frondosa vitis in ulmo est:
quin tu aliquid saltem potius, quorum indiget usus,
viminibus mollique paras detexere iunco?
invenies alium, si te hic fastidit, Alexim.

The life of love and song is a life of irresponsible idleness. Nature allows the rustic no excuse for imaginative games.

The poet's words reflect ironically upon Corydon's preceding

³⁰ Cf. *Eclogue* 3, 80-1 and 82-3; 5, 45-7, 82-4, *et al.*

speech. The term *dementia* echoes his own reproach to Alexis. If Alexis was *demens* to scorn the country, so also is Corydon in forgetting his duty. The image of the bullocks returning home from the day's labors may be compared with Corydon's image of the joyous animals pursuing their *voluptates*. The laborer is the man who is truly fulfilling his role in nature, and Vergil confirms this suggestion by his recommendation of useful work. The man who does not control himself cannot give order to nature.

What choice will Corydon make? Vergil gives no answer. The conclusion of the poem is ambiguous, for the idea of another Alexis appears as the promise of a new day. Although there is a suggestion that the singer has been impressed by nature's example of order and change,³¹ the mention of another Alexis is no assurance of reform. A new love may well produce a repetition of the pattern, leading Corydon once more to madness and illusion.

As a drama the poem remains amusing, but inconclusive. Its meaning does not lie in the discovery of a solution for Corydon's love-sickness, but rather in the contrast between fantasy and reality that emerges from his song and from his changes of mood. Corydon is certainly a pathetic figure and one whose portrait contains a good deal of psychological subtlety, but so clearly does the reader see his delusion that he is less inclined to sympathize than to judge. Vergil himself provides the standards by which the judgment is to be made.

In verse 4 Vergil describes Corydon's lament as "*haec incondita*." The meaning of *incondita* is essential to the thematic statement of the poem. Otis' interpretation, "unpremeditated," supports his reading of the poem as psychological drama,³² but is inadequate to comprehend the literary implications of the term.

³¹ Among the critics who give these lines to Corydon, Rohde, *op. cit.*, p. 11, finds the ending abrupt and Helck, *op. cit.*, 1508-10, and Otis, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-4, find it dramatically prepared by vss. 60-9. It is worth noting that Vergil does not, as the Cyclops, suggest that another Alexis will be *ἴσως καὶ καλλίον' ἄλλαν*. The *voluptas* analogy above has made Alexis not simply an object of passion, but actually the symbol of a way of life. The future history of Corydon is, of course, quite outside the scope of the poem.

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

Inconditus has both a common meaning of disorderly and a more technical literary meaning of poorly or roughly composed. Both are operative here. In the first place, Corydon's entire mode of conduct is disorderly. He strives for a love that is not only hopeless, but also outside the boundaries of the pastoral world. His noon-day wanderings put him at odds with nature; his singing is at the expense of duty.³³ It has often been observed that Corydon, as a simple rustic, a servant, could not logically possess the wealth of which he boasts in verses 20-3. The inconsistency is generally attributed to Vergil's imitation of Theocritus in the song.³⁴ The point, it would seem, is not that Vergil, but Corydon is inconsistent or imitative.³⁵ He

³³ One of the more amusing points that arises in the criticism of this poem is a suggestion that Vergil actually makes Corydon speak in the disordered manner of one who has lost his mind. Servius suggests "*insanientis dicta verba*" as a possible meaning for *incondita*. Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11, considers the sudden change from rapture to despair in vss. 54-9 as similar to the effects of fever or delirium.

³⁴ Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 86, attributes the catalogue of possessions to Vergil's literary borrowings, but finds it strange that a rustic so well furnished should be leading goats or clipping vines. Rohde, *op. cit.*, p. 38, explains that Vergil has placed dramatic necessity above consistency. In order for the love to be hopeless, he argues, Alexis must be *deliciae domini*, but Corydon must be rich in order to make his case attractive to the reader. At any rate he is not, like the Theocritean shepherds, a man of inferior condition. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 19, takes the wealth literally—Corydon is a small landholder—and finds the mention of farm duties inconsistent with the rest of the characterization.

³⁵ H. J. Rose, *The Eclogues of Vergil* (Berkeley, 1942), pp. 33-8, speaks of the illusions of grandeur that Corydon derives from imitating, or indeed identifying himself with, the Polyphemus of Theocritus: "He is for a moment no longer poor Corydon, the slave herdsman, but the amorous giant scorned, not by a brat from the city, but by Galatea the mermaid." If we see Corydon as the deliberate imitator of Polyphemus, however, we encounter an awkward double irony. Since the Cyclops himself is comic and grotesque, Corydon would have to be more blind, tasteless, and stupid than he is to take this character upon himself. His song does not follow that of Polyphemus, but rather the Alexandrian pastoral in general. When Corydon says, "*rusticus es*," he does not intend this term in quite the derogatory sense that Cicero and Catullus give it. There is some pride in being an inhabitant of the simple pastoral world, and in living for song. If Corydon cannot compete in a contest of *munera*, he can still consider himself above the mercenary approach to love. Corydon is by no means a boor, and the *rusticus* in

claims the wealth of Polyphemus, the songs of Amphion, and the beauty of Daphnis; yet in fact he is neither a mythological nor a literary shepherd, but a mere rustic who escapes reality by wandering into an imaginative world.

Vergil has given Corydon a song which is not appropriate to his character, but derivative of the pastoral tradition. By the use of *inconditus*, a term Cicero uses in speaking of orators whose style is lacking in art,³⁶ he implies that our literary judgment on Corydon's song should be a critical one. In allowing the song to become subject to vacillation and uncertainty, Vergil is mocking his protagonist as thoroughly as Theocritus mocked the Cyclops, showing the discrepancy between the ideal world of his fantasies and the natural world that he actually inhabits. In a broader sense, however, the mockery is not aimed at Corydon but rather at the artifice underlying the pastoral tradition itself.

Both the beginning and the ending of the *Eclogue* show a discrepancy between Corydon's perspectives and those of the poet. Corydon's ideal world is timeless, but the poet's world of nature is not. Obviously the love-song could not last from noon-day to sun-set. The poet contrives the ending of the song by intro-

this context is somewhat ironic, as any Roman familiar with Cicero and Catullus would realize. For other discussions agreeing with Rose, see E. A. Hahn, "The Characters in the *Eclogues*," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXV (1944), p. 220, and J. P. Elder, "*Non iniussa cano*," *H.S.C.P.*, XLV (1961), pp. 119-20.

³⁶ *Brutus*, 69, 242 and *De Oratore*, III, 44; 173. Cicero also uses *inanis* in connection with ineffective and artless speech, *De Oratore*, I, 17; 20; 51. Several discussions of *incondita* have touched on its literary meaning. H. Helck, "*Incondita iactare*," *Festschrift zu Franz Polands 75 Geburtstag*, *Phil. Wochenschr.*, LII (1932), pp. 970 ff., interprets Cicero's use of *inconditus* as "ohne Anwendung der Regeln des Rhythmus oder des Wohlklangs, regellos." He argues that Vergil adopted this meaning to suggest a kind of bucolic freedom from the stricter demands of epic and elegy. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13, n. 8, strongly disagrees and cites Plessis to the effect that Corydon was too passionate a lover to make use of literary art and formal principles of composition. Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 201, refers the epithet to the "uncouthness of the naïf speaker depicted with real power by the already skillful poet," but considers also "a delicate depreciation of his own first attempt by one [Vergil] who was always prone to underrate himself."

ducing the end of day.³⁷ In so doing he forces Corydon—and the reader—to recognize the existence of an objective nature, larger and more stable than fancy. Looking back, we see that the orderly rustic life is not embodied in Corydon but in the anonymous laborers who live in conformity with nature, resting at noon, ending their work with the setting of the sun.³⁸ Corydon's last words look toward this order, but with dubious commitment. Consequently the poem creates a double vision of the pastoral world, for Corydon's extravagance suggests not merely the vagaries of a single character, but something larger: an essential doubleness within the form itself. A desire to have the world both ways: to combine rustic simplicity and the orderliness of life conforming to nature with the hypothetical pleasures of unrestricted imagination is, by Vergil's time, already a characteristic of the pastoral tradition. Nevertheless, Vergil's own emphasis falls on the natural rather than the imaginative world.

Vergil has done more than present the double vision of pastoral poetry; he has separated its components to develop two distinct modes of pastoral discourse: an artificial and a moral. The failure of Corydon's fancies is tantamount to a criticism

³⁷ The obvious foreshortening of time in vss. 66 ff. has provoked varied interpretations. Cartault, *op. cit.*, p. 87, invokes poetic license, contending that any poet has a right to hasten the passage of time. Klingner, *op. cit.*, p. 578, observes that Vergil is rounding off the poem by a return to the mood of its beginning. Hubaux, pp. 79-81, attributes the handling of the time-span to Vergil's use of an epigram from Meleager (*A.P.*, XII, 127). Otis, *op. cit.*, makes it more of a symbolic than a structural device. There is, he argues, "a definite indication that the time span is important in its own right. Something happens to Corydon as he goes over the song with himself." This interpretation seems strained. The interruption of Corydon's train of thought is surprising, and should be. Corydon has been creating a timeless, artificial world. Vergil intervenes, showing his ultimate control over the poem, and reminding us of the limitations and the reality of time.

³⁸ Hubaux, *op. cit.*, p. 82, finds the distinctive character of Vergil's nature in the fact that it is always under cultivation, but because he has attributed Vergil's use of time here to his imitation of Meleager (see pp. 46-9), he does not consider the passage of time in itself an aspect of Vergil's rustic world. But in the *Eclogues* it is time, both the progress of the day and that of the seasons, that determines the pattern of man's activity in nature.

of pure bucolic artifice, and to a declaration that the Roman poet will not follow directly in the way of his Greek predecessors. In Alexandrian pastoral the natural world is completely absorbed into art. Vergil insists that art be tempered and modified by nature. As the second poem in the book of *Eclogues*, this work announces Vergil's unwillingness to create poems that offer only self-indulgent escape from the limitations of the real and natural world. The final verses with their emphasis on work and order look toward the moral position of the *Georgics*,³⁹ but backwards also towards the discourse of the more responsible shepherds in *Eclogue* 1.⁴⁰ In this poem we are given to understand that the pastoral world is neither a lost Golden Age nor a simple substitute for it. Instead, it is a part of a coherent natural order that extends from the rustic farm and country village to the city of Rome, harmonizing all in a comprehensive world view.⁴¹ Indirectly the poem appeals to Octavian to recognize a natural order in the Roman domain and to preserve it with his power.⁴²

³⁹ Cf. Hubaux, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴⁰ For discussion of these characters and their attitudes see Pöschl, *op. cit.*, ch. 1, "Die erste Ekloge," and especially on Meliboeus, pp. 32-3 and on Tityrus, pp. 55-7.

⁴¹ In *Eclogue* 1, Meliboeus first sees the leisure of Tityrus as the miraculous survival of a world he himself has lost (vss. 1-5). But Tityrus soon makes it clear that his happiness is the result of a journey to Rome (vss. 6-10; 19-25), an activity quite out of keeping with the idea of the Golden Age. Moreover, Tityrus has just gained his freedom, both from his legal master and from his demanding and mercenary mistress, Galatea (vss. 27-35). He is an experienced, rather than an innocent shepherd. For discussion of the way in which the structure of the poem widens to incorporate an awareness of Rome within the pastoral framework see Pöschl, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-8; 56-9 and especially 63-4.

⁴² *Eclogue* 1, 59-63. This passage contains a development of the *adynaton*, a type of formula that appears in Theocritus, but much more frequently in Vergil. Here Tityrus' grateful memory of Octavian depends upon the stability of nature in its proper order, and the responsibility for that order, by implication, lies with the ruler. Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 58, finds this passage effective because of its vision of empire: "Eckpfeiler des Imperiums erscheinen im Gedicht und damit das Imperium selbst in seiner grandiosen Ausdehnung. Der Dank an Octavian wird höchst sinnvoll mit der Erwähnung des Imperiums verknüpft, dem seine Sorge gilt und auf das auch der einfache Hirt stolz ist." As important as the idea of empire is that of stability: the existence of each creature in its proper home. Considering the state of Roman affairs

Unlike Corydon, Vergil is committed to a recognition of the limitations nature places on the poetic imagination. In a larger perspective, the *Second Eclogue* is a paradigm of the book as a whole. Corydon withdraws into fantasy and returns, not by his own volition, to nature. The pattern of withdrawal and return governs the arrangement of the ten poems. Vergil is aware that civilized man—and the Roman in particular—is not truly a displaced creature of nature, despite the psychological and aesthetic satisfaction he may find in this idea. His participation in any kind of pastoral world is hypothetical. At the same time, pastoral poetry is a way of thinking that is able to direct our attention toward the regular operations of nature in the world, and hence toward the natural in ourselves. In order to achieve this end, it must remain subject to an understanding of man's tentative place in the natural scheme. In the first *Eclogue* Tityrus invites the wandering Meliboeus to spend the night in his farmhouse, but the invitation is cautious and perhaps already too late. In the tenth *Eclogue* Vergil abruptly turns Gallus out of the pastoral world. Nature gives place to the city; withdrawal yields to return. It is one of Vergil's major contributions to the genre that the need for such a pattern should exist. For him all pastoral is a deliberate experiment, and the pastoral world is a temporary place of discovery and organization for the poet and for man.

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in the years 42-41, I believe that Tityrus' remark is as much of an appeal for the future as a celebration of present well-being.

A NOTE ON THE MEANING OF ΠΙΣΤΙΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*.

Two recent articles have treated the meaning of *pistis* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; the first, William M. A. Grimaldi's "A Note on the *Πίστις* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1354-1356,"¹ was countered by G. H. Wikramanayake's "A Note on the *Πίστις* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*."² Grimaldi, who confines his study to the crucial opening chapters of the *Rhetoric*, proposes three meanings for the word *pistis*. The first (a)—to follow his designation—is, "source material, or the subject-matter capable of inducing in an audience a state of mind called *πίστις*, or belief, if employed correctly."³ He assigns this meaning to *pistis* in the expressions *πίστις ἀρετῶν* and *πίστις ἐν τεχνῶν*, and identifies the latter as *ἦθος*, *πάθος*, and *πᾶγμα*.⁴ The second meaning (b) is, "the method or technique whereby one utilizes the material, gives the matter form, so to speak, and produces the state of mind, *pistis*, in the audience."⁵ Here he locates *ἐνθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα*, the instruments of probable argumentation directed toward *κρίσις*. The last meaning (c) is, "the state of mind produced in the audience."⁶ The key concept of (a) is *matter*, the "source material" or "subject-matter" for bringing the audience to *pistis*. In (b), *form* is the operative word, taken not as distinct from matter but as having already informed the matter; *pistis* here is the argument as ordered for presentation. The idea of effect is essential to (c). In short, he distinguishes *pistis* as matter, as form, and as effect.

Grimaldi's theory of the meaning of *pistis* is rooted in a specific interpretation of Aristotle's rhetorical theory; his interpretation may be summarized thus: *pistis* as matter (*ethos*, *pathos*, *pragma*) is ordered by *pistis* as form (*enthymeme* and *example*) to produce *pistis* as effect. Grimaldi refuses to separate *ethos* and *pathos*, as non-logical or quasi-logical proofs, from some third, logical proof. Instead, he calls the third member

¹ Grimaldi: *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 138-92.

² Wikramanayake: *A. J. P.*, LXXXII (1961), pp. 193-6.

³ Grimaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

pragma, and makes it only an aspect of the proof, "the logical, rational, intellectual aspect of the subject under discussion."⁷ The three pisteis, then (ethos, pathos, pragma), are sources which "are integrated and made into effective rhetorical demonstration"⁸ by enthymeme and example. This theory is grounded in a philosophy of language which denies that discourse can be purely logical, rational, and intellectual (to use Grimaldi's terms), in no way revealing the speaker or touching the auditor affectively. Grimaldi implies such a philosophy of language in a footnote: "It appears that attention should also be called to the fact that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle recognized as Plato did in the *Phaedrus* that we accept propositions and make judgments as human beings with the whole complex of intellect, will, emotions, feelings coming into play."⁹

When he says that pistis as form is a technique for utilizing the material, he brings ethos and pathos under the control of enthymeme and example. He sees this universal application of enthymeme and example as the rhetorical counterpart of Aristotle's tenet that deductive and inductive reasoning are essential to all demonstration.

Two questions must eventually be asked about this theory: first, whether the texts proposed by Grimaldi (or any texts) show a distinction between pistis as matter and pistis as form; secondly, whether the linguistic thesis that discourse is not only denotative but also reveals the speaker and affects the auditor (an acceptable modern view) is really Aristotle's.

Wikramanayake wrote in refutation of Grimaldi. He treats the use of the word pistis throughout the *Rhetoric*. The word, he says, has two uses relevant to Aristotle's theory: it may mean (a), "the state of mind produced in the audience,"¹⁰ or (b), "the means whereby the state of mind called *πίστις* is produced in the audience."¹¹ It should be noted immediately that Wikramanayake's definition (a) corresponds word for word with Grimaldi's (c). Wikramanayake also seems to believe that his definition (b) corresponds with Grimaldi's (b). The idea, however, of some means whereby the state of mind called pistis is produced in the audience, Wikramanayake's (b), is really a

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189, n. 4.

¹⁰ Wikramanayake, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

note common to two of Grimaldi's definitions, namely, (a) and (b). Grimaldi's words are almost the same in each case: of (a) he says, "source material . . . capable of inducing in an audience a state of mind called *πίστις* or belief . . .";¹² of (b), "the method or technique whereby one . . . produces the state of mind, *pistis*, in the audience."¹³ So Wikramanayake has failed to see, or has chosen to ignore, Grimaldi's distinction between (a) as matter and (b) as form.

Wikramanayake's interpretation is rooted in a different synthesis of the Aristotelian rhetorical theory. Because he has not recognized this, some of his criticisms of Grimaldi are invalid as presented. He writes, for instance, that "nowhere in the *Rhetoric* is *πίστις* used unambiguously in this sense [i. e., Grimaldi's (b), *pistis* as form]. As examples of this usage Grimaldi refers to 1355 b 35, 37 ff.; 1356 a 1, 13; and 1356 a 21. But the word can bear the meaning (b) [of Wikramanayake] in all these passages."¹⁴ Grimaldi would readily admit that it does, but would point out that this note is common to both his definitions (a) and (b), and that Wikramanayake has not hit the salient point. The second criticism,¹⁵ that Aristotle uses other words when he wants to refer to "source material" or "sources," leads nowhere without a demonstration that the words are Aristotle's only terms for "source."

The synthesis of Aristotle's theory offered by Wikramanayake is rooted in the word *pistis* in his sense (b), which he translates "proof."¹⁶ There are, he says, two classes of proofs: in-artificial (*atechnoi*) and artificial (*entechnoi*). Moreover, there are three kinds of artificial proofs: ethical, which depend on the character of the speaker; emotional, which produce a certain disposition in the hearer; and logical. This last he studies at length. Wikramanayake, following the traditional interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, places enthymeme and example here under logical proofs.¹⁷ In Grimaldi's view, *ethos*, *pathos*, and *pragma* are three constituent parts which are organized into one proof

¹² Grimaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

¹⁴ Wikramanayake, *op. cit.*, pp. 193 f.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 194 f.

by enthymeme or example. For Wikramanayake, ethos and pathos stand on their own as proofs; parallel to them there is another kind of proof, logical, which has two species: enthymeme and example. Ethos and pathos require no further organization, and enthymeme and example do not involve the speaker's character or effect an emotional reaction in the audience, but are pure demonstrations by reason. This theory is based on a philosophy of language which admits the possibility of merely denotative discourse.

One criticism of this theory must be made immediately, although a little out of order: if ethos and pathos are on the same level with enthymeme and example, and yet separate from them, it is possible for the speaker to inspire confidence in his own character or produce a disposition in the auditors apart from the deductive and inductive processes of rhetorical reasoning; such a use of ethos and pathos seems to be precisely that condemned by Aristotle in the first chapter of the *Rhetoric* as *ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος* (1354 a 15).

An attempt to examine the text of the *Rhetoric* in the light of the controversy can be begun by narrowing the problem. There are several senses of the word *pistis* which are clearly recognizable and not directly involved in the dispute. These may be listed here.

At 1375 a 10, *pistis* means "a pledge of good faith," as Wikramanayake notes.¹⁸ This use is not relevant to Aristotle's theory.

In the part of Book III in which Aristotle treats *τάξις*, the arrangement of the speech, *pistis* is a technical term for that part of the speech in which the proofs are set forth, as distinguished from the *πρόθεσις*, the exposition (cf. 1414 a 35 ff.). *Pistis*, always in the singular, is used with this meaning at 1414 a 36; 1414 b 8, 9; and 1418 a 18.

In the same section, *pistis*, in the plural, means one argument within the *probatio*. It is so used at 1414 b 10, 11; 1416 b 34; 1417 b 21; 1418 b 6, 8, 23. The sense of the word in Book III is quite distinct from its sense in Book I, and the later use does not elucidate its meaning in Book I.

As Grimaldi and Wikramanayake both recognize, *pistis* may

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

refer to the state of mind produced in the audience. The meaning appears in the verb πιστεύω (1356 a 9) and the compound ἀξιόπιστος (1356 a 5). The same sense is found in the noun form occurring at 1367 b 30, 1377 b 25, and 1394 a 10. In each instance, the noun is singular.

But the most important and controversial occurrences of the word remain to be discussed, those which are the cause of the disagreement in the two articles summarized earlier. A study must first decide whether pistis in these texts can be univocal. If it is apparent that it cannot, the next step will be to determine how many meanings it does have, and illustrate them from the text.

The question whether the word is univocal can be decided from a juxtaposition of two texts. One is 1355 b 35 (Wikramanayake's basic text): τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἀτεχνοὶ εἰσιν αἱ δ' ἐντεχνοί.¹⁹ The other is 1356 b 6 ff.: πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ τὰρ ταῦτα οὐδέν. . . . But before a comparison of the texts can be made, one problem concerning the second must be settled. Wikramanayake says that the meaning of pistis in this text is doubtful, and it can mean either (a) or (b)—that is, the state of mind or the means.²⁰ But a reading of the rest of the sentence proves that it cannot mean (a). After οὐδέν the passage continues: ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἢ συλλογισόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὅτι οὖν, . . . ἀναγκαῖον ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐκατέρῳ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι.²¹ In the clause beginning ὥστ' εἴπερ, which compares rhetoric and the methods of dialectic and science, the counterpart of the phrase τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι is δεικνύναι ὅτι οὖν, "to demonstrate something," not "to convince somebody." Therefore pistis in 1356 b 6 refers to some means for producing belief.

This established, the argument may be resumed. In the first text cited, there are many pisteis: some, the atechnic ones, are named; Aristotle does not name the entechnic pisteis, but

¹⁹ All citations are from the text *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1959).

²⁰ Wikramanayake, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

²¹ Ross correctly brackets ἢ ὀντινοῦν after ὅτι οὖν. Both cannot remain, and no MS omits ὅτι οὖν. Ὀντινοῦν yields no sense in context, despite Cope's defense of it. See E. M. Cope (ed.), *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary* (Cambridge, 1877), I, p. 36. n.

describes the means by which (διὰ οὗ) they are produced.²² In the second text, he states that the speaker may use enthymeme or example to prove something, but that these two exhaust the possibilities. Now there cannot be both many pisteis and only two, if pistis is univocal. Therefore it must have more than one meaning.

If pistis cannot be univocal, it remains to determine how many meanings it does have, and what those meanings are. Grimaldi's view of the matter appears defensible; a further demonstration of it from the text will be attempted.

In the first of the quotations given above (1355 b 35), the pisteis which are many in number are divided into atechnic and entechnic. Aristotle goes on to describe the entechnic pisteis in detail. The paragraph following the quotation resumes the general treatment of the entechnic pisteis in the phrase ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ (1356 a 20 f.), and continues in a tone which makes it evident that pisteis here means "the matter of a proof," before it is put into form. The sentence begins: ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ὅτι ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένον . . . ; that is, since the (entechnic) proofs are (provided) through these (namely, through the ethos of the speaker [1356 a 2, 5], through some disposition of the auditor [a 3, 14], and through the λόγος²³ [a 3 f., 19]), clearly it is the task of one who can form syllogisms to take those (pisteis) in hand. . . . Therefore the pisteis as presented in the paragraph 1356 a 1-20 still require organization into syllogistic (in the context, enthymematic) form. It should be noted that this is said of all three εἴδη of the pisteis, and not only of the "logical" ones (1356 a 1). The conclusion is that pistis in this context refers to the matter of a proof, which as yet lacks organization.

The same text suggests that the pisteis from each of the three entechnic classes are factors contributing to the formed proof, rather than independent proofs, for when Aristotle speaks of ethos he writes that pistis is provided through ethos ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα (1356 a 5 ff.). The implication is that ethos (taken technically) is conveyed to

²² In the first two clauses beginning διὰ (1356 a 4 f.: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθους; a 14: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν), words such as αἱ πίστεις πορίζονται (cf. 1356 a 1) should be understood.

²³ Probably to be taken as meaning "logical or rational elements."

the audience in logos as in a vehicle, rather than as some separate proof.

The other sense of *pistis* is demonstrated in the second of the texts cited earlier, in which Aristotle states that all men prove (*tὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται*) their points through enthymeme and example, and that besides these, there is no other way (1356 b 6). This establishes that these two *pisteis*, of which one is inductive and the other deductive, exhaust the forms of proof. The text 1356 a 20 f., also cited above, makes it clear that syllogism (i. e., enthymeme) organizes the entechnic *pisteis*. That Aristotle here pairs enthymeme and example very closely should not be forgotten, since he sometimes stresses enthymeme to the neglect of example, as in the following text, which also illustrates *pistis* in the meaning, "the form of the proof": *ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις, . . . ἔστι δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα . . .* (1355 a 3 ff.). *Pistis* and enthymeme are often associated; for example: [*ἐνθύμημα*] *ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως* (1354 a 14 f.); or: *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων [οἱ τεχνολογούντες] οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός* (1354 b 21 f.).

In this way, the distinction between *pistis* as the matter for proof and *pistis* as the form of a proof imposed upon its matter is demonstrated.

Six senses of *pistis* have been proposed, five of them relevant to Aristotle's rhetorical theory; the question of their mutual relations must now be raised. When one studies the text in its natural order, it becomes apparent that Aristotle varied the meaning of the word with the context, and was careful to give clear indications every time the context changed. For example, the word occurs seven times before Aristotle begins (at 1355 b 35) to define the atechnic and entechnic *pisteis*, namely 1354 a 13, 15; 1354 b 21; 1355 a 4, 5, 7, 28. All these instances are in the introductory first chapter. Although the meanings of *pistis* here can be read back from the later uses, one must admit that these instances alone would not suffice for the construction of a clear distinction between *pistis* as matter and *pistis* as form. It is interesting that Grimaldi draws on only one of these seven occurrences for an example, and that after his point is made.²⁴ The conclusion to be drawn is that *pistis* here is used

²⁴ Grimaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 192, where he cites 1354 a 15.

in a rather general sense, because Aristotle is not yet speaking of the technical pisteis of rhetoric.

The discussion of the atechnic and entechnic pisteis (1355 b 35-1356 a 33), examined above at length, yields the clearest instances of pisteis as matter. The word is used four times, at 1355 b 35; 1356 a 1, 13, and 21. This meaning is resumed in the long discussion of ethos and pathos which occupies parts of Books I and II. Pistis in this sense recurs at 1363 b 4; 1365 b 19; 1366 a 9, 18, 27; 1375 a 22; 1377 b 12, 18; 1388 b 30; 1391 b 24; 1393 a 23; 1403 b 7, 9.

The last two instances occur in a résumé; otherwise, the discussion of ethos and pathos ends at 1393 a 23 ff., with a text quite relevant to the present purposes: λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ περ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰς δ' αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῶν γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα. . . . The second occurrence of pisteis in this text obviously has the same meaning as the word has in 1356 b 6, and in 1358 a 1—that is, pisteis as form, or enthymeme and example. These two references are within the section devoted to enthymeme and example. Again Aristotle carefully separates the usages.

When pistis means the state of mind produced, it occurs in the singular, or in a verbal or adjectival form. The instances in which it refers to the *probatio* and its parts are restricted to a well-defined section in Book III, that is, 1414 a 29 to the end.²⁵

Therefore, in its five significant meanings, the word pistis refers in one way or another to the proof, which is simply the means of inducing belief in the audience. So Wikramanayake is

²⁵ It might be helpful to list in order all the places at which the word pistis and certain of its significant derivatives occur. All have been mentioned above.

Book I:

1354 a 13, 15, b 21
1355 a 4, 5, 7, 28, b 35
1356 a 1, 13, 19, 21, b 6
1358 a 1
1363 b 4
1365 b 19
1366 a 9, 18, 27
1367 b 30
1375 a 10, 22
1377 b 12

Book II:

1377 b 18, 25
1388 b 30
1391 b 24
1393 a 23, 24
1394 a 10

Book III:

1403 b 7, 9
1414 a 36, b 8, 9, 10, 11
1416 b 34
1417 b 21
1418 a 18, b 6, 8, 23.

not wrong in his definition. Only, it is maintained here that it is possible to render the meaning of the word more precise; and if the evidence presented is accepted, then Wikramanayake must be held wrong in some of the conclusions he draws. Under Aristotle's hand, the word shifts its meaning as the topic under discussion changes; the meaning varies enough to allow separate definitions, but not enough to lose the note of "proof" in any of the occurrences.

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BENEVENTAN WRITING IN CODICES VAT. LAT.
3032, 5951, AND 7277.

In the course of the present century considerable effort has been devoted to the task of assembling a complete list of the manuscripts written in full or in part in Beneventan script. In 1914 E. A. Lowe published an extensive catalogue of such manuscripts as a part of his larger work, *The Beneventan Script*.¹ In 1962 a supplementary list of Beneventan manuscripts was published by the same scholar as a part of a two-volume festschrift produced in honor of Anselm Cardinal Albareda.² In 1964 a brief list of Beneventan manuscripts which had been overlooked by Lowe was published in *Scriptorium* by Michel Huglo.³

It is the purpose of this note to call attention to three examples of Beneventan writing which have not been noted in any of the above-mentioned lists. The first of these is a fragment of a single folio attached to the end of Vaticanus Latinus 3032—a fifteenth century manuscript containing the *Logica* of Paulus Venetus and miscellaneous other works dealing mainly with logic.⁴ The folio containing Beneventan writing has no number of its own, but follows immediately after fol. 112 of the codex proper. Both the recto and verso of the Beneventan folio have single columns of text with the initial letters of lines on the recto and concluding letters of lines on the verso missing. The material making up the text is obviously liturgical, but, because of the incompleteness of the lines, it has been impossible to identify this. The writing is of the Bari type and dates from the eleventh or twelfth century.

¹ E. A. Lowe, *The Beneventan Script* (Oxford, 1914), pp. 334-70.

² E. A. Lowe, "A New List of Beneventan Manuscripts," *Collectanea Vaticana in Honorem Anselmi M. Card. Albareda a Bibliotheca Apostolica Editae, Pars Secunda (Studi e Testi, 220)* (Vatican City, 1962), pp. 211-44.

³ Michel Huglo, "Liste complémentaire de manuscrits Bénéventains," *Scriptorium*, XVIII (1964), pp. 89-91.

⁴ The information about Vatican manuscripts discussed in this paper is based on microfilm copies of these documents made available to the writer by the Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University.

The second example consists of twelve lines of ninth century Beneventan writing inserted between the Carolingian portions of Codex Vaticanus Latinus 5951—a manuscript containing the *De Medicina* of Celsus.⁵ The main body of the text was copied by several Carolingian scribes who worked around the middle of the ninth century. The Beneventan portions include the last eight lines of fol. 134^r and the first four lines of fol. 134^v and contain the portions of the *De Medicina* of Celsus extending from *ori interdum* (VII, 29, 4) through *indice digito* (VII, 29, 6). There is no reason for doubting that the Beneventan section of the text was executed at the same time as the other parts. Hence this segment, though brief, is of considerable importance since examples of Beneventan writing dating from the ninth century or earlier are quite rare. In fact, only some forty are included in the lists mentioned above. The writing in this example shows many of the traits listed by Lowe⁶ as characteristic of the early period of Beneventan writing. The indecision and flux mentioned by him are certainly present in this segment of the manuscript. The appearance of the script is uncalledigraphic and word separation is poor. Short *r* is used throughout.

The third example is Vaticanus Latinus 7277—a manuscript of 127 folios containing portions of *Codex Theodosianus*. A detailed description of this document is contained in the edition of *Codex Theodosianus* by Mommsen and Meyer,⁷ in which it is stated “. . . scriptus est saec. IX litteris minusculis” (p. xxv). This to most readers would probably suggest Carolingian writing. Actually, however, the text throughout is in Beneventan characters except the chapter headings which are in uncials. As correctly noted by Mommsen and Meyer (p. xxvii), three contemporary scribes participated in the preparation of the codex: scribe A copied folios 1-97 and from approximately the middle of 103^r through 117; B copied from 98^r through the first half

⁵ A detailed account of this manuscript is provided by Fridericus Marx, *A. Cornelii Celsi quae supersunt (Corpus Medicorum Latinorum, Vol. I)* (Berlin, 1915), pp. xxxi xxxii. Marx does not, however, mention the appearance of Beneventan writing in the document.

⁶ Lowe (note 1, above), p. 123.

⁷ Th. Mommsen and Paulus M. Meyer, *Theodosiani Libri XVI*, Vol. II² (Berlin, 1954), pp. xxv-xxviii.

of 103^r; and C, folios 118-127. The writing is much more even and regular than the Beneventan writing in Vaticanus Latinus 5951. In the opinion of this writer it should be dated saec. X rather than IX.

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A NEW LATIN WORD?

Professor James H. Oliver, in *A.J.P.*, LXXXVII (1966), pp. 75-80, has supplied an interesting and informative commentary on an inscription found in the Stoa excavation at Samothrace and published by James R. McCredie in *Hesperia*, XXXIV (1965), pp. 114f. On one important point, however, it is necessary to differ from his reading and interpretation: in lines 28-9 he reads *Felix autuitor verna* for McCredie's *Felix Aucustor Verna* on the grounds (p. 79) that *Aucustor* as a name is non-existent, that the third letter C—the bottom of which is very clear—is not intentional, and that McCredie's fifth letter S seems merely a weatherbeaten I. Oliver's *autuitor* is a word hitherto unknown which he takes to mean (p. 75) "a specialist in the interpretation of omens," resembling *auspex*. Although the stone is difficult to read, and without discussing the merits of Oliver's suggestion, it seems to me clear that the reading is *Augustor(um) verna*.

If the third letter is C, there is no difficulty in taking it as a fairly common form of G.¹ However, the letter could well be G with unusual stroke. The word *Augustor* is far from being a non-existent name: it is a commonly used abbreviation of *Augustorum* in the status-indication of Imperial slaves and freedmen, especially in the period A.D. 161-169 which is precisely the date of this inscription (May 1, A.D. 165). Examples are: *Augustor. verna*, *C.I.L.*, VIII, 12899; *Augustor. ser(vus)*, VI, 552 (A.D. 164), VIII, 24701; *Augustor. (servus/verna)*, VI, 18414, 22975, 25049, XIII, 1818; *Augustor. lib(ertus)*, VI,

¹ See J. S. and A. E. Gordon, *Contributions to the Palaeography of Latin Inscriptions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957), pp. 102 ff., with examples, p. 104; and for a short sample, *C.I.L.*, VI, 38114, 38570, 38629, 38680, etc.

9047, XIV, 2807, *A. E.*, 1901, 171; 1954, 86. Further, in the same period *verna* is the regular form in place of *servus* in the status-indication of the Imperial slaves.²

Whether or not the status-indication of Felix indicates that he attended on the governor of Macedonia in some official capacity, it is obvious that his presence during the visit to the temple is perfectly natural, as is the position of his name at the head of the list of those slaves not belonging to the proconsul (lines 28 ff.). Cf. the vacant space following the name of Zoticus (line 27) and separating the two lists of slaves, those belonging to the proconsul and those of other masters. If Felix were a functionary in the household of the proconsul, he would surely have found a position at the head of the first list of slaves.

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² See my article on the status nomenclature of the Imperial slaves, *C. Q.*, N. S., XIV (1964), pp. 136 f.

Also J. F. Gilliam in a letter to J. H. Oliver pointed out that *Augustor(um) verna* was the correct reading.

EDITOR.

REVIEWS.

BERNARD M. W. KNOX. *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964. Pp. 210. \$6.00. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXXV.)

In this worthy addition to a distinguished series, Professor Knox seeks to explore Sophocles' vision of the hero both in its general characteristics and in its specific manifestation in three plays. The first two chapters, "The Sophoclean Hero," survey certain outstanding unifying traits through a cross section of all the plays except the *Trachiniae*. The succeeding four chapters present detailed analyses of separate plays: two chapters on the *Antigone*, one on the *Philoctetes*, one on the *Oedipus at Colonus*.

Sophocles, Knox argues, "invented tragedy as we know it" by placing before us an heroic individual confronting his destiny, alone, free to act, but bearing the full and terrible responsibility for his actions. To attain and present this vision, Sophocles gave up the trilogy for the single play and introduced the third actor. The Sophoclean, unlike the Aeschylean, hero can look to no redeeming future or larger scheme of meaning for his suffering; and unlike Euripidean figures, he is an active agent rather than a victim.

Knox seeks not so much a rigid definition as a general recurrent type on which the dramatist will have rung numerous variations. By ample citation of typical language used by and about the hero, Knox presents his dominant characteristics: intransigence, strength and unity of will, refusal to "yield," harshness and proneness to offense and anger. Stubborn, immoderate, extraordinary in every sense, the hero comes up against the unchanging conditions of existence, all-powerful Time, "his real adversary" (p. 27). Isolated, refusing to compromise, setting "his own conditions for existence" (p. 42), such a figure often finds death the only way out, purchases integrity at the price of self-destruction. Yet through this very aspiration toward the impossible and the suffering it entails, "through the hero's loyalty to his nature in trial," "humanity achieves its true greatness" (p. 27).

This formulation is the central theme of the book; and, though it owes much to predecessors like Reinhardt and Whitman, it is certainly a valid and valuable approach to Sophocles and one which Knox makes very much his own. He steers a middle course between seeing Sophocles' heroes as individuals and as ideal types; and he fully recognizes that Sophocles is a complex and difficult playwright, a poet whose creations, like all deep and valid artistic creations, are both unique and normative, both individual and universal.

The second part of Chapter II seeks to put Sophocles' conception of the tragic hero in historical perspective. Deeply akin to Homer's Achilles (pp. 50 ff.), he has little in common with Aeschylean figures. Prometheus, Knox argues, is the closest, with the significant

difference that he is a god, immortal, hence removed from time and change that are so crucial in Sophocles. Knox even suggests that the *Prometheus*, which, with most recent scholarship, he would date to the very end of Aeschylus' life, was written under the influence of Sophocles.¹ Knox also effectively brings out the differences of attitude between the two dramatists: Aeschylus' confidence in an emerging order; Sophocles' sense of disaster, the "enigmatic, masked" quality of his gods (p. 54). Perhaps one could formulate the difference by saying that Aeschylus is still the contemporary of Pindar in his belief in an ultimate harmony in the universe,² whereas Sophocles has, with Thucydides, learned from war, the *βίαιος διδάσκαλος* (Thuc., III, 82, 2), that man's proudest creations may collapse into "nothingness" (cf. *Antig.*, 1325). Knox moves into a more speculative, but most interesting, realm in his suggestions of a connection between the conception of the hero in the plays and Sophocles' personal associations with the cult of heroes (pp. 55 ff.).

Knox' approach to the specific plays in the four following chapters takes essentially the form of a running commentary focusing on the heroic character described in Chapters I and II and on the subtleties and expressiveness of Sophocles' language, with careful attention to exactly what Sophocles has in his text.

Antigone. When the terms of the Heroic Temper are applied to this play, it becomes apparent that Creon, unlike Antigone, lacks the full measure of Sophoclean "heroism." His resolve collapses where Antigone's is carried through. As in the succeeding chapters, Knox does not attempt a radical reinterpretation. So his emphasis here is upon the conflict between a religious and a political attitude. But he attempts a more subtle elaboration of this antinomy: Antigone's defiance of the *polis* is also "a political action," just as Creon's treatment of the corpse "stems from religious . . . convictions" (p. 75). The conflict represents the still-continuing tension between clan and *deme*, family and *polis*. Knox seeks to reconcile elements that have divided interpretations of Creon. On the one hand, Creon's claims are, to some extent, justified: the *polis* as the embodiment and preserver of civilization must be respected. On the other hand Creon becomes increasingly violent as the play proceeds. Yet Knox seems to go too far when he asserts that "the sequence of events has forced Creon" to this position (p. 89), for Creon's extremism is surely inherent in his character from the very beginning.³ It only requires an Antigone to bring it out fully. Granted too that Creon is in some sense a champion of the *polis*, his notion of a *polis* is (as Knox himself brings out) severely limited (see vss. 736-9).

In his second *Antigone* chapter Knox stresses Antigone's loyalty

¹ On the dating of the *P. V.* add now G. Méautis, *L'authenticité et la date du Prométhée Enchaîné d'Eschyle* (Neuchâtel and Geneva, 1960).

² For the agreement of Pindar and Aeschylus in "their final goal of peace," see J. H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), p. 287 and *passim*.

³ Note e.g. Creon's treatment of the Guard in 223-331 and his violent, insulting language in 244, 280-1, 322, etc.

to the cult of the dead. Her *nomima* should not be confused, he maintains, with universal "unwritten laws"; they are the "usages" that apply to the dead. Against her Creon defends the Olympian gods, the gods of the *polis* whom he invokes in his first line in the play. He is entirely insensitive to "the religious aspects of death" (p. 101).⁴ The tragedy of the play, as Knox sees it, lies in the fact that both come to deny their loyalties. Though Knox' defense of the genuineness of Antigone's much-contested speech of 905 ff. is sensitive and convincing, he seems to overstress her "denial" of kin ties. The speech is perhaps not so much of a denial as Knox makes it out to be. It is only to affirm the bond between brother and sister that she rejects (illogically, to be sure) the ties which come through marriage. Even her rejection of children and husband are expressed, he it noted, in a contrary-to-fact condition (905 ff.). This is her way—passionate, intense, illogical—of making the fullest and most positive affirmation she can of the particular bond, the aspect of blood ties most immediately before her, to which she sacrifices her life. Knox is excellent, however, on the end of the play. The gods, while punishing Creon, do not redeem Antigone. They seem to recognize her greatness, but permit her to die.

Philoctetes. This play, Knox argues, is unique in that we *want* the hero to surrender and we know that this surrender must ultimately take place. Knox is good on the contrasts and reversals in the play. Neoptolemus finds in Philoctetes the older friend and mentor whom he should have had from the beginning; and Philoctetes is reminded by Heraacles at the end what the possession of the Bow means—the heroic *ponoi* which he is to undertake at Troy. Knox is both illuminating and convincing on the Bow and the *deus ex machina*; and his solution, though it is not new,⁵ is cogently and eloquently stated. At the same time he does not oversimplify the resolution of the tragedy, and he well observes the regretful note in Philoctetes' closing farewell to the island that has been not only a place of pain, but also "a tempting haven from the real world of men" (p. 141).

One difficulty in Knox' approach is his handling of the prophecy. Granted that this is a complicated and delicate question, Knox is perhaps overly subtle in claiming that Odysseus wants the Bow for himself, that he disregards what the prophecy says about Philoctetes coming to Troy, and that what he means by accusing Neoptolemus of "spoiling our fortunate success" in 1069 is the risk of persuading Philoctetes to come to Troy now that Odysseus has control of the Bow. Knox himself admits that the textual support for this interpretation of Odysseus' motivation is weak and that he comes dangerously close to the "documentary fallacy" castigated by Wal-

⁴ For this aspect of Creon's attitude toward death see also my essay, "Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the *Antigone*," *Arion*, III, no. 2 (1964), p. 62. Though Knox' chapters on the play and my essay deal with many of the same issues, both were entirely independent of one another.

⁵ See e.g. P. W. Harsh, "The Role of the Bow in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles," *A.J.P.*, LXXXI (1960), pp. 408-14, which Knox himself cites.

dock. It is also hard to reconcile his interpretation of 1053 ff. (when Odysseus says that he is now willing to leave Philoctetes behind, he is serious, not bluffing) with Odysseus' return in 1293 ff., for, when he reappears on stage, it is to renew his threat that he will ship Philoctetes off to Troy by force (σ' ἐς τὰ Τροίης πεδί' ἀποστελῶ βίᾳ, 1297). This passage is significantly his last appearance in the play and hence his last attempt to fulfil his plan: therefore, even granted an element of bluster, he still regards the fulfilment of that plan as requiring Philoctetes at Troy, even though he totally violates the "free will" clause of the prophecy.

Though Knox takes adequate cognizance of *physis* in the play, he might have made more of the initial contrast between the Chorus and Neoptolemus. The Chorus, though not of noble birth, show themselves to be more *gennaioi* than their master. They act in response to a "nature" higher than their "birth" (the double sense of *physis*), whereas Neoptolemus, initially, acts in obedience to a *physis* unworthy of his heritage. One wonders, in the light of Knox' interpretation of the *O. T.* in his earlier book and of the *O. C.* in the following chapter here, whether the *Philoctetes* too might be read in terms of the poet's hope for a "rebirth" of Athens' nobility after the years of demagoguery and "Odyssean" principles of "advantage" and "interest." Suggestive in this connection is the exchange between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes in 436 ff. and 446 ff.: only the good are lost in war; the base survive and prosper. And Heracles' last words on piety (the quality praised in Athens and its idealized ruler in *O. C.*, 260 and 1125) seem to breathe already the transcendent atmosphere of Sophocles' last play (*Phil.*, 1443-4)⁶:

... οὐ γὰρ ἡνέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς·
κἀν ζῶσι κἀν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλεται.

Given Knox' concern with the "heroic," he might also have pointed out a possible parallel between *Philoctetes* and *Antigone*. Both plays have a double tragic focus; but in the *Antigone* only one, in the *Philoctetes* both figures, when tested, are found to possess a measure of the heroic temper. If *Antigone* and *Creon* are a study in contrast, *Philoctetes* and *Neoptolemus* are a study in complementation. Knox notes the connection between the latter pair in *Neoptolemus*' echoing the other's *παπαῖ*, p. 132. One might add that the situation of heroic choice and tragic *amechania*, as expressed in the question of crisis, τί δράσω, is also confronted and resolved by both men, first by *Neoptolemus* (908, 969) and then by *Philoctetes* (1063, 1350).

Oedipus at Colonus. This chapter forms a fitting conclusion to the book, and Knox does justice to this moving and sublime play. *Oedipus* appears here almost as the logical development of the hero

⁶ The theme of "rebirth" is important in the play, as Knox notes (pp. 135, 141). See *Phil.*, 946 f., 1018, 1030, 1312, etc. The passage in 436 ff. also reminds one of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, where the same themes—and the same emphasis on *χρηστοί*, *γενναῖοι*, etc.—are prominent (see my essay on the *Frogs*, *H. S. C. P.*, LXV [1961], pp. 214 ff., 226 ff.); and the *Frogs* too, as I have argued, is concerned with a "rebirth" of Athens' spiritual vitality.

Knox has been describing, here purified, removed from the flux of time, made almost the equal of the gods. In this play the hero possesses from the beginning the knowledge of human limitation and suffering that he elsewhere acquires only late—too late. His first speech reveals “a man who seems to be at the end rather than the beginning” (p. 148; one might cite here *O. C.*, 583-4). In him, Knox argues, is imaged the transfiguration of Athens—“physically destroyed,” but possessing an immortal strength “conferring power on those who love it” (p. 144). Hence the great ode on Athens (see pp. 154-5) and the idealization of Theseus who embodies “the humane greatness of Athens at its best” (p. 152). But Knox is far from reading the play as a political allegory. It is rather that in this play all the aspects of the “heroism” he has been describing—the individual and the communal, the human and the more than human—come together fused and resolved. This chapter is perhaps the least analytical of Knox’ “studies”; but it effectively recreates the dramatic force of the work. One does miss a discussion of Antigone: the child of Oedipus’ accursed marriage and the companion of his wanderings, she belongs to his human past; she is the gentler, more reasonable part of himself which he still needs as long as he is among men. She is Oedipus’ link with the world, guides his practical movements, intervenes between him and his son, only to be led herself when Oedipus, at the end, has passed beyond the human world.

Knox is especially good at tracing the growth of Oedipus’ prophetic power and almost divine authority; but, rather surprisingly, he seems to excuse the harshness of the old man as a “daemonic, superhuman wrath” or “a superhuman anger” (pp. 159, 160). Is it not rather that the Sophoclean hero is not a figure to mellow with age? He is no gentler or more lovable in extreme age than in youth. His anger, then, is only *too human* a part of the Sophoclean “heroism” which Knox develops so well in his first two chapters. One might have expected Knox to draw here on his material on the cult of heroes in Chapter II: Oedipus is a saving power, to be sure; but he shares the ambiguity of the heroes and the chthonic deities. His is a power which can bless but also curse. Hence his connection with the equally ambiguous Eumenides at the beginning of the play and with the gods of the Underworld at the end (e.g. 1556 ff., 1606). Hence too the awesome, terrifying circumstances surrounding his death (especially 1623-5).

Knox’ notes provide a rich discussion of philological and textual problems, and some are interesting little studies in themselves.⁷ Unfortunately the notes contain a number of minor misprints in the Greek.⁸

The book will appeal to specialist and non-specialist alike. Its limitations are self-imposed: the treatment in detail of only three

⁷ E.g. n. 29, pp. 170-1 (a refutation of Waldo’s “theatrical fallacy”); n. 47, pp. 185-6 (the meaning of *ὑψιπῶλις*); n. 21, pp. 187-90 (Neoptolemus and the prophecy of the *Philoctetes*).

⁸ Other than minor misprints: on p. 180, n. 40, for *Διὸς* read *Ζηνὸς*. In the text, on p. 150, line 2, the words *δὲ κλέειν* seem to have been omitted after the second *δαινός*. On p. 160, line 22, read *οὐχί*.

plays, the exclusion of the *Trachiniae* almost entirely from the formulation of the heroic temper, the primary (though by no means exclusive) emphasis on character. One might have hoped for a fuller unity and a fuller development of the general themes of the beginning. Knox is at his best on the single plays. His effective movement from points of syntax and diction to larger issues is characteristic of his method and is brilliantly executed. His forceful, concentrated style, compactness of argument, and tense progression of thought from paragraph to paragraph match the dramatic tension of the plays. It is a rare pleasure to encounter a work of scholarship written with such power. Professor Knox has again displayed in full measure the qualities familiar from his previous works: first-rate scholarship combined with acute judgment and deep sensitivity to language, character, and dramatic situation.

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Aristotele. Della Filosofia. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento esegetico di MARIO UNTERSTEINER. Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1963. Pp. xl + 312; L. 6000. (*Temi e Testi*, 10.)

After an Introduction in which he deals with the significance of the *De Philosophia*, its chronology and title, the interlocutors of the dialogue, the problem of the proems to each book, the Aristotelian dialogue, and the bibliography, Professor Untersteiner gives the text of the fragments, a translation, and a commentary on each of them. He follows the editions of V. Rose, R. Walzer, and W. D. Ross, but adds other texts claimed by Bignone, Mariotti, etc., for our work. Untersteiner adds *Physics*, I, 8-9 as a fragment.¹ Untersteiner has kept the numeration of the fragments given by Ross, but proposes a new arrangement of them the arguments for which he advanced in an article published earlier.² The commentary has an original part and another that is informative. The author has decided to quote other scholar's own words rather than paraphrase their thought lest he misrepresent what they actually mean.

That the fragments of Aristotle's *De Philosophia*, as well as the texts that without good reasons are attributed to it and even those that can be shown not to belong to it, are in need of a fresh critical examination cannot be denied; but the reader should be warned against expecting such a study from Untersteiner's book. In so far as the ascription of fragments to the work is concerned, the basic task for any critical reconstruction of a lost work, Untersteiner feels

¹ Cf. M. Untersteiner, "Aristotele *Phys.* I 8-9. Frammenti del ΗΕΠΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ," *Riv. Fil.*, N. S. XXXVII (1959), pp. 1-23. This is included in pp. 91 ff. of the book.

² Cf. M. Untersteiner, "Π ΗΕΠΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ di Aristotele," *Riv. Fil.*, N. S. XXXVIII (1960), pp. 337-62 and *ibid.*, XXXIX (1961), pp. 121-59.

(p. X) that there is no need to reject the new fragments discovered by Jaeger and Bignone. He appears to believe that only "per amor di novità o per spirito di contradizione o ancora, e peggio, per amor di tesi" can one reject or challenge the attribution of fragments to a lost work. Apparently it does not occur to Untersteiner that there may be good reasons to show that a text does not belong to a lost work of Aristotle, that there are texts which may or may not have been included in the *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, but that the burden of proof that they were included rests upon those who claim them as fragments and that the fact that a majority of critics today accept as genuine most of the fragments "discovered" by Bernays, Bywater, Jaeger, Bignone, and others does not constitute proof that they are.

In his interpretations Untersteiner has, for the most part, followed Jaeger and Bignone; indeed he has proceeded to accept most of their interpretations as though their opinions were as good as facts and has constructed new theories upon very disputable and in many cases erroneous interpretations. The book is not even free of misquotations and of serious cases of misinterpretation. It is impossible in the space allowed to this review to discuss all the points at issue, but I hope to give some examples of them. In discussing Untersteiner's views I shall have to refer often to Jaeger's *Aristotle* (which I quote from the 2nd ed. of the English translation), for upon Jaeger's interpretations Untersteiner relies most heavily.

Chronology. Untersteiner thinks that Aristotle wrote the *De Philosophia* when he was 37-39 years old (p. XI). The point of departure is Jaeger's assertion that in *Metaphysics* A, 9 Aristotle includes himself among the Platonists as is shown by his use of the first person plural. Since in the *De Philosophia* the doctrine of Ideas is attacked, Jaeger thought that *Metaphysics* A must have preceded it, for it is unthinkable that Aristotle should have published the attack on the Ideas contained in the *De Philosophia* before an esoteric discussion of it had taken place. This discussion is contained in *Metaphysics* A in which Aristotle is still a Platonist and it was read before a Platonic circle at Assos. Untersteiner admits that both *Metaphysics* A and the *De Philosophia* are early, but he declares it impossible to determine their relative chronology. Here Untersteiner accepts what he should not have accepted, namely that when Aristotle wrote *Metaphysics* A he was still a Platonist. That the use of the first person plural in A, 9 (and in other books of the *Metaphysics*) does not mean that Aristotle considers himself a Platonist has been shown by H. von Arnim (*Wiener Studien*, XLVI [1928-29], pp. 15 ff.), E. Frank (*A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 183-5), and H. Cherniss (*Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I [Baltimore, 1944], pp. 488-94). The most thorough discussion is that by Cherniss and his conclusions have been accepted by P. Moraux (*Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* [Louvain, 1951], p. 328, n. 14). Nothing of this is mentioned, let alone discussed, by Untersteiner. In what year Aristotle wrote the work we do not know, and it is fruitless to speculate on it. But it is strange to see that the only thing that can be determined, namely the relative chronology of *Met.* A and *De Philosophia*, is declared by Untersteiner impossible to settle. While the fact that Alexander (*In Metaph.*, p. 117, 24) refers to the

De Philosophia when commenting on *Metaphysics*, 992 A 10 ff. is not by itself an indication that the *De Philosophia* preceded *Met. A*,³ yet this can be deduced from the fact that *Met. A* presupposes the two first books of the *Physics*⁴ and that the *De Philosophia* is cited in *Physics*, 194A 35-6: διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα· ἐρηγται δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας.⁵

Untersteiner discusses the identification of the interlocutors in the dialogue and adopts Rose's notion that Aristotle and Plato were characters in it. For this there is no evidence at all, and it would have been desirable to have a clear statement of the evidence we have that the work was a dialogue. The only "evidence" known to me is that in the ancient lists of Aristotle's works the *De Philosophia* appears in the midst of titles of other works that are supposed to be dialogues. It is not my intention to deny that the *De Philosophia* might have been a dialogue, but to assume that Plato was a character in it and to explain some fragments as having been put by Aristotle into the mouth of Plato seem to me to go beyond any reasonable probability.

Another important point that Untersteiner fails to consider is to which of the ancient authors who refer to the work by title was the *De Philosophia* available. Of the authors quoted by Ross and Untersteiner as "Testimonia," Philodemus may have seen the work. But of the remaining three, Priscianus Lydus, Simplicius, and Asclepius, it can be shown that they had no first-hand knowledge of the work. Priscianus' own words, *et ex his quae quasi in dialogis scripta sunt de philosophia* show that if he was referring to the *De Philosophia* he never saw the work. The reference, however, may be simply to subject matter. Asclepius (*In Metaph.*, p. 112, 17-19) with the words ἐπαγγέλλεται . . . καὶ ἀπορεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιλύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας refers to the aporiae in B and the solutions in Γ and other books of the *Metaphysics*. This is shown by Asclepius' remarks (cf. *In Metaph.*, p. 113, 16-20; 137, 11-24; 173, 11-16; 222, 6-7, 13 ff.; 225, 6-8).³ Consequently ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας is a reference to subject matter and not to the title of a lost work of Aristotle. That Simplicius as well as Philoponus, Syrianus, Themis-

³ Yet this is at least probable, for from the way in which in *Met. A9* the arguments for and against Platonistic doctrines are mentioned and from Alexander's references, one gets the impression that A9 must be a list compiled from various parts of Aristotle's previous writings. Untersteiner's cautiousness here should be contrasted with the remark he makes (p. 71) on Asclepius, *Metaph.*, p. 112, 19: καὶ ἐπιλύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας: "dal modo come si esprime . . . parrebbe che π.φ. sia posteriore a *Met. A*." The passage of Asclepius does not refer to the π.φ. (cf. below); but even if it did, does Untersteiner suppose that Asclepius or Ammonius had any knowledge of the chronology of the two writings?

⁴ As Jaeger himself admits (cf. *Aristotle*, pp. 295-6). Cf. *Met.*, 983A33-B1, 998A21-22, 986B27-31, 989A24, 993A11-12.

⁵ Cf. H. von Arnim (*Wien. Stud.*, XLVI [1928-29], pp. 6 ff.).

⁶ This was shown by Cherniss (*Gnomon*, XXXI [1959], p. 38). Untersteiner is acquainted with this work of Cherniss' but does not mention what I have restated in the text.

tius, and the pseudo-Alexander had no first-hand knowledge of the *De Philosophia* and the *De Bono* has been shown by Cherniss (*Arist. Crit. of Plato*, I, n. 77, and *Gnomon*, XXXI [1959], pp. 38 ff.). Porphyry's reference (frag. 3) to the *De Philosophia* comes ultimately from Hermippus (cf. *Pap. Soc. Ital.*, IX [1929], no. 1093). Hermippus is also the source of Diogenes Laertius' single reference to our work (frag. 6 = D. L., I, 8). Besides Philodemus, Cicero and Alexander most probably had first-hand knowledge of the *De Philosophia*, and Alexander had such knowledge of the *De Bono* too. Some of these facts are mentioned here and there by Untersteiner, but he does not draw from them the natural conclusions for the interpretation of certain texts. Moreover, a clear and complete statement of the evidence under the heading "Testimonia" is a necessity for a truly critical edition of this work.

Untersteiner thinks that the first five fragments belong to the third period of the history of civilization. That Aristotle spoke of these periods he deduces from frag. 8 which he now proposes to put at the beginning of the collection as no. 1. In so doing Untersteiner accepts the ascription of Philoponus, *In Nicom. Isagogen*, Ia, 8-42 (Hoche) to the *De Philosophia*. This he does without even mentioning Cherniss' remarks (cf. *Gnomon*, XXXI [1959], p. 38 and notes 4 and 5) which prove, if anything can be proved in this field, that the passage is not a fragment of any lost work of Aristotle. Before discussing this, however, it may be well, first, to recall the reasons that led Bywater to ascribe this passage to the *De Philosophia*.⁷ Philoponus says that σοφία is a certain kind of σάφεια. Wishing to demonstrate this he mentions (line 11 [Hoche]) Aristotle and attributes to him *τά νοητὰ καὶ θεῖα . . . καὶ ἀμυδρά* (lines 10-12 [Hoche]). Then he asserts that σοφία and σοφός are homonyms and mentions that for the ancients there were five different ways to understand these words, as Aristocles said in the ten books of his *De Philosophia*. Then Philoponus explains what these five meanings were according to each period of the history of civilization. Bywater maintains (a) that both the etymology σοφία = σάφεια τῆς οὔσης and the quotation from Aristotle were also found in the *De Philosophia* of Aristocles, (b) that Philoponus did not know from which work of Aristotle the quotation came, (c) that Philoponus committed a mistake not realizing the extent of Aristocles' quotation from Aristotle, (d) that if this is so, the whole passage (lines 8-42 [Hoche]) is a fragment from Aristotle and that Aristocles prefaced his work *De Philosophia* with an introduction derived from Aristotle's dialogue *De Philosophia*. Let us for a moment grant to Bywater his first two arguments: does it follow that the whole passage comes from Aristotle? Evidently not. Let us even assume that the whole passage comes from Aristotle: does it follow that, because this was found in the *De Philosophia* of Aristocles, he took it from Aristotle's *De Philosophia*? Evidently not. Turning to his first three arguments, we may ask how does Bywater know that the whole text was in Aristocles' *De Philosophia* and that Philoponus committed the mistake of not realizing the extent of the quotation from Aristotle?

⁷ Bywater (*Journal of Philology*, VII [1877], pp. 64-75).

Is there any reason to think that Philoponus committed such a mistake? None, I believe, if Bywater's eagerness to find new fragments is excluded. Consequently, there never was any reason to accept this text as a fragment of Aristotle's *De Philosophia*. But it *can be shown* that this text is not a fragment of the *De Philosophia*, for Bywater's second argument, namely that Philoponus did not know from which work of Aristotle the quotation came, is wrong, since in a later passage of the same work Philoponus identifies his quotation of Aristotle as *Metaphysics a* (cf. *In Nicom. Isag.*, I γ, 33 ff. [Hoche]), i. e. *Metaphysics*, 993B 7-11. Therefore it is certain (a) that the quotation from Aristotle (lines 10-12 [Hoche]) does not come from his *De Philosophia* but from *Metaphysics a*, (b) that the different conceptions of *σοφία* corresponding to the five periods of the history of civilization Philoponus took from Aristoteles' *De Philosophia* to whom they belong (cf. also Philoponus, *In Nicom. Isag.*, I, ιε, 2-3, καὶ ὅτι τὸ σοφός, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας δέκα βιβλίοις φησι, πενταχῶς λέγεται).

Of all this Untersteiner mentions nothing. Jaeger did not accept this text as a fragment because he thought it contaminated by Stoic concepts. This Untersteiner thinks proper to refute with a lengthy quotation from Bignone, and proceeds to accept the text as a fragment coming from Aristotle's *De Philosophia*. In his commentary to Asclepius, *In Metaph.*, p. 3, 30 ff., which is attributed by Festugière to the *De Philosophia* on the basis of its similarity to lines 8-13 of the Philoponus passage just discussed, Untersteiner mentions the objections that Cherniss directed against Saffrey's acceptance of the Asclepius passage as a fragment. Saffrey, for his part, added Philoponus, *In Anal. Post.*, p. 332, 8-12, where there is a similar text in which Aristotle is mentioned without reference to work; but the fact that in the commentary to Nicomachus Philoponus himself refers to *Metaphysics a*, and that in still another passage (*In De An.*, p. 23, 28-24, 3) the source is given as the *Metaphysics* without specification of the book, makes it certain that none of these texts is a fragment of Aristotle's *De Philosophia*. May I be permitted to add that in the commentary to Nicomachus by Asclepius, still unpublished and which I am preparing for publication, we find both the supposed fragment and also the identification of it with *Metaphysics a*.

The only other text included in frag. 8, Synesius, *Calvit. Enc.*, 22. 85C, does not mention the *De Philosophia* and, since in some of the extant works of Aristotle (e. g. *Meteorology*, *Metaphysics*, *De Caelo*) there are statements that may have given rise to Synesius' assertion, it is well to conclude that we have no evidence that Aristotle in the *De Philosophia* spoke about the periods of the history of civilization. Of fragments 1 to 5, I leave frag. 1 aside. Frag. 2 is without any good reason attributed to the *De Philosophia*. Since the work was not available to Diogenes Laertius and since the *De Philosophia* is not referred to, there is no reason to assume that it comes from it. Frag. 3 mentions the *De Philosophia* (cf. below). Frag. 4 *cannot* come from the *De Philosophia* because οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην here does not mean "Aristotle and his students" as

Untersteiner translates, since it contradicts the information given by Porphyry in frag. 3. Frag. 5 is attributed to the *De Philosophia* by Rose and Jaeger on the argument that, since Bias is mentioned in frag. 3, the seven wise men appeared in the *De Philosophia*. But of what is called frag. 3, the only thing that comes from Aristotle is the statement that γνῶθι σαυρόν was inscribed in the temple; even the notion that this was before the time of Chilon may be only an inference of Porphyry's or of his source. In any case not all the text quoted by Ross and Untersteiner can be attributed to Aristotle, for he certainly cannot have quoted Clearchus! Consequently, there is no reason to think that frag. 5 comes from the *De Philosophia*.

Another fragment that calls for discussion is no. 6. To the texts given by Walzer and Ross, Untersteiner now adds *Physics*, I, 8-9. That the first text, i.e. Diog. Laert., I, 8, is derived from the *De Philosophia* cannot be denied. Let us assume that also the second text (Pliny, *N. H.*, XXX, 3-4) comes ultimately from the *De Philosophia*. From the wording of the latter passage the only thing that can be attributed to Aristotle is the idea that Zarathustra lived six thousand years before the death of Plato. To be sure Jaeger thought that Pliny committed a mistake here when attributing this chronology also to Eudoxus, for Eudoxus died before Plato. This is accepted by Untersteiner. But there is no reason to suppose that Eudoxus died before Plato; nor is there any reason to suppose that Pliny committed a mistake here. His statement should be accepted (cf. F. Gisinger, *Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxus von Knidos* [Leipzig-Berlin, 1921], p. 5, n. 1, and pp. 21-3), and other relevant evidence points to the fact that Eudoxus survived Plato. This evidence has been analyzed by de Santillana in an article published in 1949 which appears to be unknown to Untersteiner.⁸ Untersteiner accepts Jaeger's notion that Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.*, 370 E is parallel to the two texts included in frag. 6 and mentioned above and comes from the *De Philosophia*. Untersteiner appears to think that Plutarch is simply excerpting from the *De Philosophia*, for he gives *De Is. et Os.*, 370 C-F as a fragment. The reason that led Jaeger (*Aristotle*, p. 133) to consider *De Is. et Os.*, 370 E as parallel to the other two texts of frag. 6 are: (a) In a fragment of the first book of the *De Philosophia* (Diog. Laert., I, 8) Aristotle speaks of the two principles of Iranian dualism, Ormuzd and Ahriman which he identifies with Zeus and Hades; since Plutarch compares Plato's doctrine of the good and bad world-souls with the dualism of the Magi, it is natural to suppose that the same consideration was actuating Aristotle in the fragment where he draws a parallel between Zarathustra and Plato (namely Pliny, *N. H.*, XXX, 3-4); (b) this is confirmed by the only other passage where Aristotle mentions the Magi (*Metaphysics*, 1091B8), where the subject is again Platonic dualism and as the earliest forerunners of which Aristotle mentions Pherecydes and the Magi.

But the text of Pliny provides no evidence for the notion that the chronological relation established by Eudoxus and Aristotle be-

⁸ Cf. de Santillana, "Eudoxus and Plato: A Study in Chronology" (*Isis*, XXXII, part 2, 1940 [published 1949], pp. 248-62).

tween the death of Plato and the time of Zarathustra had anything to do with the doctrine of the periodicity of similar historical phenomena (cf. further below). A comparison of Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.*, 370 E, with Diog. Laert., I, 8 shows that the differences between both passages are striking. While Aristotle mentions the Magian doctrine of the good and of the bad god, Plutarch speaks of the two good planets, the two bad ones, and the three indifferent ones. But, what is more important, there is another passage of Plutarch which is parallel to Diog. Laert., I, 8; this is *De Is et Os.*, 369 E where οὗτος (sc. Zarathustra) οὖν ἐκάλει τὸν μὲν Ὀρομάζην, τὸν δ' Ἀρειμάνιον. But just before this line Plutarch asserted that Zarathustra is said to have lived five thousand years before the Trojan war. Since this chronology is at variance with the one given by Eudoxus and Aristotle, it is highly unlikely that Plutarch borrowed 370 C-F from Aristotle. Moreover, when Plutarch refers to the period of six thousand years divided into two periods of three thousand years in each of which one god overpowers the other according to the Magian cosmology (which Jaeger takes as the "reason" behind the chronology of Eudoxus and Aristotle), he does not quote Aristotle but Theopompus (cf. *De Is. et Os.*, 370 B-C), and he does not connect this with Plato at all. Finally, Aristotle in the extant works never speaks of a Platonic dualism of the good and the bad soul. The doctrine of evil that Aristotle attributes to Plato is quite different, as is shown by the very passage of the *Metaphysics* that Jaeger thinks corroborates his interpretation. There the One is identified with the good and evil is attributed to the indefinite dyad (in other passages matter is identified with evil). The interpretation of Platonic dualism in the *De Is. et Os.* is most probably Plutarch's own,⁹ and it is understandable that Plutarch, who is trying to show the similarity of Greek philosophical doctrines and the dualism of the Magi with his interpretation of the myth of Isis and Osiris, should have included his own interpretation of Plato's dualism of the good and the bad soul and Aristotle's dualism of "Form" and "Privation."¹⁰ Untersteiner, however, takes the passage of Plutarch as a fragment of the *De Philosophia* and claims that the dualism attributed there to Aristotle mentions a doctrine of Aristotle but not the demonstration of it, which demonstration he finds in *Physics*, I, 8-9 which for this reason he adds to the fragments

⁹ There are some differences between the *De Is. et Os.* and Plutarch's interpretation of Platonic dualism, especially in the *De Anima Procr.* Heinze (*Xenokrates*, pp. 33 f.) thought that the interpretation given in the *De Is. et Os.* comes from Xenocrates; but Jones (*The Platonism of Plutarch* [Menasha, Wisc., 1916], pp. 94 ff.) has refuted this hypothesis and has shown with great plausibility that the interpretation is Plutarch's own and that the variations with the *De Anima Procr.* are to be explained by the limitations imposed on Plutarch by the myth in the *De Is. et Os.*

¹⁰ It is amazing to see that Walzer and Ross quote the passage of Plutarch from Χαλδαῖοι το στέρησιν as a fragment of the *De Philosophia* and omit the following reference to Plato which was the reason behind Jaeger's attribution of the passage to our work. In that way the passage of Plutarch becomes a fragment *per se*!

of the *De Philosophia*. Since I have given reasons to show that Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.*, 370 C-F does not come from Aristotle, we can reject Untersteiner's new "fragment" without further discussion.

Untersteiner accepts Saffrey's thesis that the doctrine outlined in *De Anima*, 404 B 18-27 is Plato's. Since he does not even mention the arguments advanced by Cherniss, in his review of Saffrey, to show that the passage refers to Xenocrates, I shall not comment specifically on this point. But since he mentions Burkert (*Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* [Nürnberg, 1962], pp. 24-5) and Ross' commentary to the *De Anima* (Oxford, 1961) both of which claim that Theophrastus, *Metaphysics*, 6 A 23-B 9 proves the doctrine of the *De Anima* to refer to Plato, I shall discuss this point. The doctrine of 6 A 23-B 5 is said to belong to Plato because Xenocrates, in B 7, is contrasted to the *οἱ πολλοί* of 6 A 23. But the passage of Theophrastus goes on (cf. 6 A 23-B 15) and contrasts to *οἱ πολλοί* not only Xenocrates but also Hestiaeus and Plato and consequently 6 A 23-B 5 cannot refer to Plato either. It may be added (a) that the passage of Theophrastus has nothing to do with the *De Anima*, 404 B 18-27 and (b) that among the things derived from the indefinite dyad by *οἱ πολλοί* Theophrastus mentions the void (6 A 28-B 1). Plato did not believe in the existence of the void (cf. *Timaeus*, 60C, 79B, 80C) and this doctrine is not attributed to him either by Aristotle or Theophrastus. Once in the *Physics* Aristotle says that the material of body, for Plato, is the void, but this is only a construction of Aristotle derived from his notion that the void must be place deprived of matter and that Plato identified *τόπος* with matter; moreover this is contradicted not only by the *Timaeus* but also by Aristotle's other statements on the subject. Finally Burkert's quotation of *Laws*, 894A is really not to the point; this passage only asserts that to be perceptible a thing must have volume, that is, it has to be tridimensional. Furthermore there is no reference in it to idea-numbers or to the composition of the *αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον* and the passage is unrelated both to the doctrine of *De Anima*, 404 B 18-27 and to that of Theophrastus, *Metaphysics*, 6 A 23-B 5.

As an example of serious misquotation I may mention the following. In p. 298 Untersteiner quotes Cherniss and makes him say that the world-soul according to the *Timaeus* is composed mainly of fire, and that this implies a mixture of earth, air, and water. This is a serious mistake and one that Cherniss himself does not commit. Cf. *Arist. Crit. of Plato*, I, pp. 541-2: "... from his (*sc.* Aristotle's) point of view the action of the Platonic world-soul would have to be an unnatural constraint upon the heavenly bodies, since they according to Plato consist 'chiefly of fire' (*Timaeus* 40 A, which implies an admixture of earth, air, and water. . .)."

Among serious cases of misinterpretation I mention two. In p. 268, misquoting Bignone, Untersteiner asserts that the expression *quintum genus* in Cicero (*Tusc.*, I, 10, 22) is the same expression used by the *Epinomis* (981 B 7): *τὸ θεώτατον ψυχῆς γένος* and refers to 981 C 6: *πέμπτον . . . αἰθέρα*. So he appears to think that the soul in the *Epinomis* is the fifth body, namely the ether. That

Untersteiner is really confused on this point is made certain by his remarks in his article published in *Riv. di filol. e di istruz. class.*, XXXIX (1961), p. 147 where he says: "Dei cinque elementi (στερεὰ σώματα), il quinto nell' *Epinomis* è, appunto, l'etere, al quale solo πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν (!) προσήκει (981B-C)." Now in the *Epinomis* it is said that only soul πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν and it is emphatically asserted that there are only two kinds of existents: on the one hand soul and on the other five bodily forms among which the ether is included (cf. *Epinomis*, 981B-C, 983D, 984B-C, etc.). In pp. 253-4, Untersteiner quotes Lasserre who claims Parmenides, B7 as an example of the superiority of sight and hearing. This is a bad mistake on the part of Lasserre, but there is no justification for Untersteiner's repetition of it. I confess that I cannot even guess the reason that may lead a scholar to make such an assertion.

The review ends here. I am sorry that I have had to be so severe with Professor Untersteiner; he is an industrious scholar, but, following the fashionable reconstructions of Aristotle's lost works, he is uncritical in the handling of the evidence. And it seems to be a cruel joke of destiny that this lack of criticism is applied to study the thought of the superb mind that laid down the foundations of logic.

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D. VAN NES. *Die maritime Bildersprache des Aischylos*. Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1963. Pp. iv + 197.

There is good reason for coming to any of the rash of "image-counting" books with misgivings. The post-Spurgeon excesses in this line have largely subsided in studies of the English poets, but the method arrived late among the classicists and is at its peak now. There are many temptations lying in the path of the image-counter—to let the word "image" spread in all directions, so that it comes to mean almost any poetic device (as it does in R. D. Murray's book on Aeschylus' *Supplices*); to treat "faded" metaphors as still operative (as Goheen does in his book on the *Antigone*); to deal in lists and statistics taken from their immediate context (as Dumortier did in his early book on Aeschylus' imagery); to become hypersensitive to the things one may be looking for, and find them everywhere (as Musurillo tends to do in his book on Greek imagery). Yet all these pitfalls are circumvented by Van Nes, who gently corrects the excesses of those authors I have named (and many more).

To the general difficulties for a student in this area, Aeschylus adds many special obstacles (as one can see from Stanford's trail-blazing books, which anticipated our deluge of imagery-studies by several decades). For one thing, the text of Aeschylus, sticky enough in any case, gets darker whenever he launches into simile or metaphor; and since Van Nes is interested in the maritime imagery, he must deal at length with those two plays that depend most intimately

on sea-images and are, simultaneously, the text-critic's special delight and nightmare (the *Supplices* for its general obscurity and deep corruption, the *Septem* for the questionable authenticity of large sections in it). Van Nes ranges also through the fragments, where new finds and a recent edition of the *Fragmenta* (Mette's) are the subject of wide speculation and controversy. Besides all this, Aeschylus' imagery is so luxuriant and complex, so deftly interwoven with the literal and symbolic events of the plot, that to disentangle it, to speak coolly yet appreciatively of its contribution, takes intelligence and patience of a very high order. Which is precisely what Van Nes has to bring to all these problems. First of all, he takes each passage he discusses in its full context—not only within the particular play and particular poet that are his province, but against the background of that image's history in Greek poetry. (He introduces his treatment of "the ship of state" *Motiv* in the *Septem* with a discussion of the slight Homeric and the extensive lyric predecessors of this metaphor (including two useful pages on the famous Alcaeus passage); then he adds preliminary remarks on the special difficulties connected with *Sept.*, 857 and *Ag.*, 182-3; and, after analyzing the Aeschylean passages (first in the *Septem*, then in other plays), appends some useful remarks on the later history (Roman, Christian, mediaeval) of the image. The author's care in working from the text, in reporting all the readings of every important manuscript and edition, in entertaining every reasonable emendation that has been suggested, makes the book a valuable supplement to any edition of Aeschylus, simply for its judicious weighing of alternatives in so many difficult passages.

Van Nes also distinguishes very carefully the many poetic devices at Aeschylus' disposal—the pure simile or metaphor, the symbol, the *verblasste Metapher*, the kenning, the neologism using imagistic elements in such a way that they lose their specific color in the compound. He knows how an image may be affected by its position in a *Priamel*, or by its links with other images to form *Motive*. He austere demands, of images that have been described and translated in the vaguest way, the strict sense; he searches out the *tertium comparationis* without becoming ridiculously literal-minded, he analyzes the exact chemistry of those *Verquickungen der Bilde- und Sackosphere* that are so characteristically Aeschylean. He rejects many passages that have been accepted as maritime in their language (e.g., *Pers.*, 743, *P. V.*, 472, and especially *Ag.*, 995-7, *Cho.*, 185-7); on the other hand, he turns up possible images where none were suspected (as at *Pers.*, 158, 942, or *Cho.*, 494); and he dispels many misunderstandings—that *τρικυμία* at *P. V.*, 1015 refers to a third wave, that the image of the *πρύμνα πόλεως* is, in Earp's words, "almost as familiar as 'helm of state' in English" (it occurs only three times in extant drama, at *Sept.*, 2, 760-1, and *Supp.*, 345—Van Nes thinks the latter passage is based on the other two, a subsidiary indication of the late date for *Supplices*). He is not content to observe that the ship metaphor occurs often in the *Septem*; nor, with Hansen, does he let himself get engulfed in the imagery. He distinguishes two uses of the image-symbol (for so he gives us reason to consider it), corresponding to the public and

private tragedies of Thebes and Eteocles; and he traces the submerging (as in the long messenger's report) and emerging of the image (as in the conclusion) in a context that has important implications for our judgment of the text and of the poetry.

The division of the material, which must have taken much experiment in the book's early stages, turns out to be very economical—a chapter on sea-weather (wind, storm, calm), one on the ship-image generally, another on ship tackle, a fourth on the sailor's life, a final short one on reaching port. This, like all possible divisions, was bound to have the disadvantage that we meet the same passage in different places. The storm that shakes the ship will turn up in chapter one, the shaken ship in chapter two, its helm (or whatever) in three, and its captain in chapter four. But, within these confines, the treatment is so skilful that only rarely do things get separated that should be considered together—as when *Cho.*, 661-2 is treated on p. 150 without reference to the passages on the "Αἶδου λιμὴν" (given on pp. 2 and 168-70), to which the *Choephoroë* passage is bound by its reference to the idea of Hades as πολυδέκτης.

Van Nes is usually so measured in his decisions, and he casts so much new light on difficult passages in Aeschylus, as well as in other authors (e. g., his fine new explanation of *O. T.*, 420), that even where obscurities and doubts must inevitably remain, his judgment commands respect. I find only one somewhat wild suggestion (that ὑπαστρον μῆχαρ of *Supp.*, 393 is the same thing as the μηχανὴ καλή at v. 459). Several times his degree of certitude seems to exceed the evidence—as when he asserts that *Ag.*, 1215-6 must be based on a maritime image, though his own treatment of *Ag.*, 995-7, of the Erinyes' dances in the *Eumenides*, and of choreographic ἐρέσεων (p. 116), suggests that a *Ringeltanz* may also be behind *Ag.*, 1215-16 (φρουμίους would fit into this background better than into a maritime scene). He is certain that *Ag.*, 1140 cannot contain a storm-image ("god-tossed"), though φορώτατος at *Cho.*, 813 and κατ' εὐχὰς φορούμενοι at *Sept.*, 819 suggest that θεοφόρητος may not have had its merely technical sense in Aeschylus' day. At *Cho.*, 315-20, he dismisses entirely the idea that φάος is the object of οὐρίσας, yet his remarks on the connection between wind and light and strength on pp. 28-9 (discussing *Ag.*, 1178-82) indicate that οὐρίζειν φάος may be a very apt phrase. In connection with the fish-net imagery of ἀμφίβληστρον at *Ag.*, 1382 and *Cho.*, 492, he does not advert to περιβαλών in *Cho.*, 576, which may be a *Verquickung* of image and reality of the sort Van Nes discovers elsewhere. He does not agree with the scholiast that *Supp.*, 784-5 refers to water's disturbance as an image of mental perturbation; but he does not refer to Homeric πορφύρω and tragic καλχαίνω, which might lead one to agree with the scholion. In the course of his discussion of πνοή-πνεῦμα images, Van Nes goes as far afield as Cereicas to find examples of the erotic πνεῦμα (to throw light on the birth of Epaphus from Zeus' ἐπίπνοια), but he overlooks Aeschylus's own πνέων χάριν descriptive of Apollo's assault upon Cassandra at *Ag.*, 1206. Drawing upon, and arguing with, R. B. Onians, Jacqueline de Romilly, and Bruno Snell, he con-

tributes much of value to the discussion of Aeschylus' imagery for mental and emotional life; but there is no reason to think the πνέων at *Ag.*, 219 and συμπνέων at v. 187 are examples of a general comparison of "breathing" to "willing." Agamemnon, instead of opposing the thwart winds that hit him, surrenders to them, co-operating in his own destruction (*Pers.*, 598-602 and 742 give the complementary sides of that human-divine teamwork that destroys a tragic hero). Aeschylus has just expressed this cooperation of Agamemnon with his fate by saying he put the yoke of necessity upon himself (v. 218), and πνέων/συμπνέων seem to put in starkest terms his entry into and collaboration with the forces that destroy him. He sails with the wind (see Van Nes' own later comments on the phrase πάντα κάλων ἐξίεναι, p. 142).

The rich contents of this deceptively slim book will suggest different thoughts to each reader and on each reading. Van Nes himself draws no conclusions, though the material itself obtrudes some upon the reader. It is particularly striking that the veteran of Salamis draws no images from battle at sea, and very few from commerce or calm enjoyment of sailing (*P. V.*, 89-90 is one of the many things that set that play apart). The sea is presented as curiously uninviting, unrewarding in these dramas acted before the men who would found an empire upon their mastery of it. Aeschylus' frequent use of the "helmsman" image (ten certain instances) comes from no assertion of human control; he does not hail the polis in a triumphal vein ("Sail on, O ship of state"). The image is suggested, always, when man is losing control under the unmanageable impact of the water's enmity. Like O'Neill's Chris, Aeschylus had wrestled with the sea and learned never to trust it. Helen, after all, came to the unsuspecting Trojans like the very essence of sea-calm (*Ag.*, 738-40).

The book will be often consulted by anyone who owns it; it has an excellent index for words and passages cited (though peripheral references are not given, even when they might be helpful). There is a very brief Sachregister listing topics he has had occasion to discuss, often brilliantly (*Polarer Ausdruck, Kenning, Sprichwörter*—he might have added *Kompositum* and *Ringkomposition* to the list). A table of image-types also helps one find related passages. For the poet who was Ἄρεως μεστός, Van Nes has supplied us with a βιβλίον Ἑρμοῦ μεστόν.

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G. W. BOWERSOCK. *Augustus and the Greek World*. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1965. Pp. xii + 176. \$4.80.

The seeds planted by Gelzer and Münzer in their pioneer works on the Roman nobility and the importance of family relationship for the correct evaluation of Roman Republican history germinated very slowly and took root with difficulty. Syme was the first to apply the results of their studies on a grand scale to the internal pressures and political amalgam of the Revolutionary period, with

brilliant results. And Badian turned back to an earlier age to trace the development of the patron-client association and its impact on Republican politics down to 70 B. C. They all showed us how vital to the Roman political arena were such things as family connections, friends, and clients both at home and abroad. *Gloria* and *dignitas* were not won by accident. And the Roman provinces contained a vast reservoir of potential material, especially in the Greek East, wherein the far-sighted Roman might obtain power for himself and for his children. But the system can work both ways, of course. Out of Roman *clientela* and Roman connections can evolve a new kind of Graeco-Roman world resting upon the solid foundations of mutual interest and common objective.

In this agreeable little volume Bowersock investigates and dissects the personal relations formed between Greeks and Romans in the Augustan Age. It is a subject worthy of the effort and one that will point the finger inevitably toward further avenues of research. He begins, naturally, with the "Late Republican Background" and illustrates the patterns of relationships that were built up between Greek and Roman. By their connections with Roman commanders and officials Greeks such as Cornelius Epicadus, Theophanes of Mytilene, Antiochus of Ascalon, Hybreas of Mylasa, and very many others served to link East with West, to aid the Roman administration, to benefit their local communities, and to co-operate in the consolidation of the Augustan world at a critical phase in Roman history. Earlier Roman support of Greek oligarchies and wealthy families continued without pause. The majority of the educated Greeks realized after the First Mithridatic War the hopelessness of resistance to Rome. A second chapter examines the family history and connections of those Romans who had held appointments in the Greek East. Bowersock correctly concludes that what Augustus wanted in the East were not merely Romans of experience but Romans with Eastern *clientes*. But care was necessary. Thus some Roman families were suppressed, others flourished. Chapter three deals with those Greeks who lived in the imperial household or who moved in the circle of the emperor: men such as Areius of Alexandria, Apollodorus of Pergamum, Xenarchus, Pompeius Macer, and others. In a fourth chapter Bowersock examines the Augustan attitude toward Eastern kings and dynasts, seeing that the Princes accepted the system of client kingdoms and strengthened it by linking the royal families together, wherever possible, by marriage and Roman citizenship. Chapters five through eleven deal competently and often brilliantly with, successively, such matters as Eastern colonies, the Hellenic life, the cities, opposition among some of the Greeks, the imperial cult, Greek literature under Augustus, and a final sketch of the new horizons opened up to the Greeks by the Augustan encouragement of a union between East and West.

Throughout the work Bowersock has kept his eye steadily upon his objective and has given us a striking picture of the role played by the Greeks in consolidating the *imperium Romanum*. In a work such as this the author is bound to present his material more or less selectively. To include all examples of a process would be tedious, and to exclude others might be a mistake. But Bowersock has given us a well-balanced picture. The following suggestions, therefore, are not meant as adverse criticism.

Bowersock is aware of the importance of Greek embassies to the imperial court in establishing friendly relations between Romans and Greeks. A valuable addition to his book would have been a section listing those Greek embassies which are known to have come to Augustus. Even a bare list of the names of cities and of the individuals participating in the embassies would have been useful as a reference aid and a point of departure for future lines of investigation. The raw material is ready to hand in the compilation by Iacopi for Ruggiero's *Dizionario epigrafico*, s. v. *Legatus*. After all, these envoys were members of the educated and wealthy families serving usually as "volunteers" for liturgic service. Hence lists of such individuals will inevitably contain the names of influential citizens, including philosophers, rhetors, advocates, etc. They are an aid to us in establishing the local nobility and the important citizens of Greek cities. And Livy (XL, 11, 3), speaking of an earlier age, tells us of the effect that a *legatio* to Rome had upon the envoys: "Those who go to Rome from here, sound and untainted, believing that they have Philip for their king, return from there stained and corrupted by Roman enchantments." Odd details also are sometimes found in lists of envoys. The *Senatus consultum de Issaeis* of 56 B. C., for example, mentions a Roman citizen by the name of C. Gavenius C. f. Fab. acting as spokesman for the Issaeans. Rare, but significant.

Most interesting is Bowersock's suggestion (pp. 128-9) that the geographer Strabo may have received Roman citizenship through the good offices of Aelius Gallus, friend and highly placed equestrian official. He argues that Aelius Gallus may have been the man who adopted Sejanus, the son of L. Seius Strabo. The geographer might then have called himself Aelius Strabo, taking the *cognomen* from the family of his patron's adopted son. The support for such a view is rather thin, but certainly possible. After all, a Greek from Amiseia is not likely to have inherited the name Strabo. And Strabo's Pontic forebears are well known. How exactly could he have acquired the not very common Italian *cognomen*? A connection with the family of the prefect of Egypt, L. Seius Strabo, is therefore not to be dismissed idly, especially since Strabo went to Egypt in the company of Aelius Gallus. The fact of Roman citizenship, however, is not positive. In the last century of the Republic it became rather common for Greeks to take Roman names without benefit of citizenship. Caution is therefore advised on that particular point.

In the final chapter some attention might have been given to those Greeks who acquired equestrian status, especially through military service. Stein's *Der römische Ritterstand* would have given some fine examples, particularly in connection with the evidence afforded by the inscription of Oenoanda (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 500) and that of the enormously wealthy family of Opramoas (*T. A. M.*, II, 905). But, of course, Bowersock is concerned basically with the Augustan Age. A further, larger field of investigation is therefore wide open for reconnaissance and exploitation: a study of the Graeco-Roman family connections in the first, second, and third centuries after Christ. Sir William M. Ramsay had planned just such a work, but did not live to complete it. His posthumous *Social Basis of Roman Power in Asia Minor* is a mere collection of texts with commentary.

Separate studies of the provincial nobility in each of the provinces are a necessary preliminary to such an undertaking. Let us hope that the author of the present book will not let the matter end. The subject is far from exhausted.

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OSKAR RAITH. *Petronius ein Epikureer*. Nürnberg, Verlag Hans Carl, 1963. Pp. 84. DM 14. (*Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft*, Band 14.)

Petronius' purpose in writing the *Satyricon*, the personal philosophy, if any, which it expresses, and the artistic and moral judgment to be put upon it are problems of long standing. In this book, *Petronius ein Epikureer*, Oskar Raith attempts an answer by viewing Petronius as an "Epikureer nämlich wenigstens im Sinne des 'Epicuri de grege porcus'" (p. 2). The obstacles to such an endeavor, as the author well knows, are the underlying cynicism of the *Satyricon* and the difficulty of extracting philosophical ideas from a piece of literature of popular and comic setting. He sets forth his task as follows:

Diese Arbeit wird demnach zwei Fragen beantworten müssen: Sie hat erstens zu zeigen, in welchem Grade in den *Satirica* wirkliche philosophische Überzeugung des Verfassers nachgewiesen werden kann, und zweitens, dass diese philosophische Überzeugung in der Tat epikureisch ist (p. 2).

Although Raith acknowledges that Petronius is not a philosopher "im Sinne der Schule," he contends that the *Satyricon* has, nevertheless, a philosophical background, a "wesentlicher Bestandteil, . . . epikureische Philosophie, die sich jederzeit wieder entdecken lässt und deren Entdeckung gewisslich lohnt" (p. 5).

Following an introduction, the book is divided into four chapters which adduce evidence for the thesis. In the first chapter, "Epikureische Naturlehre (Petron und Lukrez)," the author strives to present Petronius' views on physics and natural phenomena. His method is to compare expressions and thoughts in Petronius with those in Lucretius and, in one case, Epicurus. The general conclusion reached is that Petronius essentially follows Epicurean teaching in accepting atomism, its application to the theory of sense perception and dreams, and the theology which denies the power of the gods. Raith, however, believes that Petronius went beyond Epicurus on two points: first, he rejected the existence of the gods; and second, for this very reason, Petronius has a much less serious attitude than we find in Lucretius towards the myths that enter into his work. Their differing treatments of Tartarus is an example (pp. 13-14). For Petronius the myths are mere allegory, not the false beliefs of superstitious religion which must be refuted. There remains for Petronius only "die Liebe, bei der die Religiosität, freilich in einer sehr zarten und zerbrechlichen Form, ihre Zuflucht

gefunden hat" (p. 19). The author concludes, therefore, that the work of Petronius with all its mime, burlesque, and parody "ist ein legitimer Ausdruck seiner philosophischen Anschauungen . . . Petrons scheinbare Oberflächlichkeit gehört zum Tiefsten, was er zu sagen hat" (p. 19). For this reason, Raith regards Petronius as "ein Epikureer von hohen Graden und von bedeutenden Originalität" (p. 19).

The first chapter sets the tone for all that is to follow. My criticisms of the methodology the author here follows may be taken to apply to the argumentation in other chapters as well. A serious fault, to my mind, is a heavy reliance for proof on "Petronian" poems outside the *Satyricon* in this chapter and in the third. Granted the poems cited in chapter one are those commonly accepted as genuine, i. e., frags. 25-7, 29-30¹ (they are included in Müller's recent edition), nevertheless, one feels as a matter of principle that a more restrained use of disputed material in so difficult a subject would have been desirable. As it stands, most of the argument in the first chapter rests on these poems. My impression is that Raith has used these poems extensively in his search for a less equivocal basis on which to establish his conclusions than the text proper of the *Satyricon*, which more often than not defies systematic analysis: these pieces, frags. 25-7, 29-30, if they are Petronian and from the *Satyricon*, are without a context.

Accepting these pieces as genuine, one still questions whether the similarities justify the assumption that Petronius was an Epicurean writing a work of Epicurean motivation or merely suggest the influence of Epicurus and his followers upon an extremely cultivated writer who was incapable of professing any dogmatic position. The objective tone and lack of moralizing in Petronius' writing in the *Satyricon* seem to indicate the latter. Moreover, the fact, which Raith does admit, that Petronius rejects totally the existence of the gods has reverberations throughout the whole structure of Epicurean doctrine. Significant and indicative too perhaps is the line of Epicurus which Raith compares with a Petronian fragment:

Gnomologium Vaticanum 24: ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θεῖαν
οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδῶλων.

Petronius, frag. 30, 1-3:

Somnia, quae mentes ludunt volitantibus umbris,
non delubra deum nec ab aethere numina mittunt,
sed sibi quique facit.

Though the discussion of "idols" may be out of place in what amounts to a lyric poem, the fact remains that there is a clear contradiction between the words γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδῶλων and *sibi quisque facit*. Accordingly, to argue that such a poem implies that Petronius was an Epicurean seems delusive.

Chapter two, "Epikureische Characterologie (Petron und Philodem)," is an attempt to show that Petronius drew on the work

¹ All numbers for pieces outside the *Satyricon* are from Buecheler's 1862 edition except as noted otherwise. Chapter and line numbers in the *Satyricon* are from Müller's recent edition.

of a well-known Epicurean for his characterizations in the *Genia Trimalchionis*. The parallels found in Philodemus' *περὶ Κακιῶν* seem reasonable, but the argument is weakened by the fact that Raith also has recourse to the *Χαρακτῆρες* of Theophrastus for his comparisons, regarding it as "das Vorbild für alle Schriften dieser Art" and indeed cites Theophrastus more than Philodemus. It is his privilege to think it more probable that the source for Petronius was Philodemus rather than Theophrastus. In the end, he must admit that "eine Entscheidung zwischen diesen Möglichkeiten kann auf Grund der angeführten Stellen selbst nicht gefällt werden" (p. 25).

In chapter three, "Epikureische Lebensweisheit (Petron und Epikur)," Raith presents six maxims in Petronius' work which he believes have their origin in sayings of Epicurus. The dualistic good, which has been discussed by N. W. DeWitt in his important book on Epicureanism, is one of these, but this plea for the health of mind and body, represented by the words *bona mens bonaque valetudo*, might easily have been a stock aphorism of the parvenu with no connection at all with a particular philosophical system. The closest parallel adduced, that between the poem, frag. 45 and Epicurus, *Κύρια Δόξα*, 15 is very convincing, but unfortunately frag. 45 is only doubtfully attributed to Petronius. The other parallels, three from the *Satyricon* and the fourth from frag. 50, did not strike me as peculiarly Epicurean; they seem merely possible. The speaker in these last three parallels from the *Satyricon* is the poet Eumolpus "der eindeutig als eine Art Epikureer gezeichnet ist" (p. 28). Even admitting this—and I am far from sure whether I should—one must still face the difficulty of discovering the author's actual views amid the equivocal atmosphere of the *Satyricon*. Raith, well aware of this, states:

So bleibt im einzelnen besonders im Stofflichen oft unklar, wie weit es Petronius ernst war und was nur Maskerade ist, in der Verfahrensweise und von der Anlage des Ganzen her—soweit wir sie feststellen können—enthüllt sich erst das Petronische und in ihm das Epikureische (p. 32).

The fourth chapter, "Epikureische Lebensgefühl (Petron und der sogenannte vulgäre Epikureismus)" deals with Petronius' censure of the misunderstandings of Epicureanism revealed in ethical sayings of characters in the *Satyricon*, especially with regard to hedonism. Raith discovers criticism on two levels: 1) a lower stratum characterized by "religiösen Aberglauben im eigentlichen Wortsinn," by "plumpe Missdeutungen einzelner aus dem Zusammenhang gerissener Lehren und eine grob sinnliche Lebenshaltung," and 2) a higher stratum, "die sich . . . durch ihren ästhetischen und raffinierten Hedonismus noch einen Zugang zum irrationalen Bereich offengelassen hat" (p. 48). Raith correctly notes that the author abstains from any ethical judgment in his dispassionate representation, but rather mocks the lower type "jedoch nicht mehr, als eben der ästhetisch Gebildete über den Ungebildeten lacht," while the higher "wird ironisiert, aber liebenswürdiger gezeichnet" (p. 48). The fact is that the criticisms Petronius expresses on the shallowness of

friendship, sexual indulgence, religious shams, etc. need not be construed as his answer to popular misunderstanding of true Epicurean views, with the possible exception of the poem at 132,15. Concerning this poem, however, which actually mentions Epicurus, it is difficult to say whether Petronius is mocking the perversion of Epicurean doctrine or merely being facetious. The author also contends in this chapter that there are scattered outbreaks of feeling at 132,15, at 79,8, and in poem 101 in Baehrens, *P. L. M.*, but this seems unsubstantiated, when one again considers the ambiguity of tone in the *Satyricon*. Moreover, poem 101 is one of the most commonly rejected items of the Petronian corpus.

Following an "Ergebnis" summarizing the conclusions, a "Schlussbetrachtungen" contains a number of interesting comments on Petronius and his work to which I could not do justice without going into detail. It need only be said that despite their relevance to the central thesis, they are of independent value and, together with many other observations scattered throughout the preceding chapters, testify to the author's perception and integrity.

The influence of Epicureanism upon Petronius' life and work is not to be lightly brushed aside. It is certainly worth considering that Epicurus' name does appear twice in the *Satyricon* and more importantly in circumstances which portray him and his thought in a deferential manner, however distorted in 132,15 and ironical in 104,3. This does not prove that Petronius was an Epicurean, especially if one accepts the attitudes and views that Raith is inclined to assign him throughout the book (cf. especially p. 55). Epicurean influence is a possibility. In any case, although Raith has not satisfactorily answered the two questions posed at the beginning of his book, he has given interested scholars the opportunity to reach their own conclusions having provided them with conveniently marshalled evidence and valuable commentary.

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ROGER B. MCSHANE. *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum*. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. ix + 241; map. \$5.00. (*Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, 53.)

The six chapters in this detailed study of Attalid foreign policy are provided with descriptive titles which will be a useful guide in our discussion. Chapter One, "The Greek Leagues of Asia Minor before 283 B. C.," the shortest of all, gives an interesting interpretation of the development of Hellenism along the coast and adjacent islands down through the centuries. And this is called for, because the Asiatic Greeks acquired a special set of attitudes, presiding as they did over a dangerous non-Greek majority whom they exploited. This made them more willing to cooperate with one another than the Greek cities at home, and it also allowed them to accept outside rule, even Persian rule, provided nothing was done to interfere with the "establishment." The author shows how in Asia the King's

Peace of 387 B. C., far from a source of anguish (as it seemed to their brothers across the Aegean) was actually the basis for great economic prosperity in the years before Alexander (p. 15). The Macedonian conquest strengthened the racial prejudices and increased the wealth of the Asiatic Greeks. Antigonos was shrewd enough to seek their friendship, but Lysimachus was less considerate, to judge by such evidence as we have.

The next chapter ("The Foreign Policy of the Early Attalids, 281-241 B. C.") is rather disappointing. For the historical writers the reader is referred to Tarn's pronouncements in 1913 (p. 29, n. 1), while the texts cited are from the old *F. H. G.*; yet Jacoby has invaluable comments to make on the historians of Heraclea, Rhodes, Chios, Crete, and even Pergamum. The epigraphical and numismatic evidence is presented quite fully, but not always with complete candor. For example a Pergamene inscription (*O. G. I. S.*, 266) is cited to prove that Eumenes I had "a well-organized mercenary army" (p. 43, n. 48), but no mention is made of the fact that Eumenes was trying to conciliate this "well-organized" army by dangerous concessions after they had rebelled (cf. M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques*, pp. 738 ff.). In general the author's conclusions about Pergamum's role as defender against the Galatae and respecter of the rights of Greek cities seem overstated.

Chapter Three ("The Defense of Hellenism leads to Symmarchy, 241-215 B. C.") contains much useful information conveniently documented. This is especially true of McShane's remarks about the general conception of a symmarchy in the late third century (pp. 73-8) and about a particular example, the symmarchy of Antigonos Doson and Philip (pp. 78-84). But Doson's symmarchy should not be used except with great caution to explain that of Pergamum. Sicily and Magna Graecia offer a better analogy, though at a somewhat earlier date, because there, as in Asia, the Greeks were privileged persons exploiting non-Greeks. The theme of the chapter, that the threat of barbarian unrest was an important factor in the growth of the Attalid symmarchy, is convincingly argued, but the author fails to establish any real difference between Pergamene and Seleucid treatment of their Greek allies (pp. 70-1).

The longest chapter ("The Coalitions against Macedonia and Syria in 211-189 B. C.") comes next. Here McShane introduces a favorite idea of his, that the collapse of Egyptian sea power had left "a vacuum into which Rhodes, Pergamum, Macedonia, Syria and eventually Rome were drawn by trade, diplomacy, or military force" (p. 95; cf. also pp. 105, 117). It would be tedious to discuss this in all its ramifications, but it appears to be a half-truth. The most important factor in the late third century for the whole Mediterranean area was not a negative one, the decline of Egypt, but the overwhelming strength displayed by Rome in the Hannibalic war. Agelaus apparently saw what was coming in 217 B. C. (Polyb., V, 103, 9 f.) at Naupactus. McShane, however, makes the mistake of interpreting the Eastern Mediterranean without reference to the West, a myopia which distorts his entire interpretation of Attalid foreign policy. The very successes of Attalus I and Eumenes II in forming victorious coalitions of Greek allies against Philip V

and against Antiochus III were disastrous, because Pergamum was too weak to control what her diplomatic ingenuity had created. Yet when her incapacity became evident, neither Macedonia nor Syria was any longer in a position to take over. It was the good fortune of the Greeks rather than the statesmanship of the Attalids that Rome eventually came to a sense of her responsibilities. Had it *not* been for the Attalids, the excesses of the Late Republic might not have made a battleground of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. However, the author has succeeded in raising our estimation of the influence Attalus and Eumenes had on their contemporaries. They did indeed shape policy, misguided though that policy was.

The last two chapters ("Diplomacy of Eumenes II after Magnesia," and "Roman Appropriation of the Attalid Alliance") require little comment, as they present nothing particularly new. It is startling, though, when Eumenes belatedly turned to conciliation of Bithynia and helping Antiochus IV against his enemies in Syria, to learn that Eumenes, "thus brought a closer solidarity to the Greeks of Asia than they had enjoyed at any time since Alexander's death" (p. 173). It was too late for that, as the Third Macedonian War was soon to show, and much too early to look forward to the Pax Romana.

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Atti del Colloquio Patavino sulla *Historia Augusta*. Roma, L' "Erma" di Bretschneider, 1963. Pp. 81. Lire 2000. (*Università degli Studi di Padova: Pubblicazioni dell' Istituto di Storia Antica*, IV.)

Historia-Augusta-Colloquium, Bonn 1963. Edited by JOHANNES STRAUB. Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1964. Pp. vii + 192. (*Antiquitas*, Reihe 4, Band 2.)

It seems that there never will be an end to the controversy about the *Historia Augusta*, that much-maligned collection of biographies which has been dubbed the most wretched work in Latin literature and which, for the last three quarters of a century, has been dissected from seemingly every possible angle. The "problem" of the *H. A.* began in 1889, with the publication of H. Dessau's *bahnbrechende Arbeit*, in which he argued that the biographies were not composed during the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine, as they purported to be, but in the last years of the fourth century. Since then, many great scholars have crossed swords on the questions of the date and value of the collection, with minutiae considered firm proofs and much vain argumentation. There is still no firm agreement on the date of composition, and, although the *H. A.* has been shown to contain much valuable information, its reputation in general is still not very high. When so much imagination and knowledge has been displayed for so long, what can be expected now which will shed significant new light on the problem?

Several years ago, A. Momigliano surveyed the present state of *H. A. Forschung* in a magisterial article, "An Unsolved Problem of Historical Forgery: The *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*," *Journal of the Warburg Institute*, XVII (1954), pp. 22-46 [now also *Secondo contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (Rome, 1960), pp. 105-34]. With a good sense remarkable and rarely displayed in this area of inquiry, he warned against drawing sweeping conclusions from shreds of evidence which appear convincing because possibly contradictory material has not survived, and reminded his readers that it has not yet been *proved* that the date of the *H. A.* could not be the first half of the fourth century. Momigliano's caution has not, unfortunately, always been followed by the contributors to the two colloquia.

The *Atti* present five articles, two by Johannes Straub, one each by Santo Mazzarino, Jan Burian, and Lellia Ruggini. All save Burian's, which is in German, are in Italian.

Straub's chief concern is to establish a date for the *H. A.* In "Le leggi di Severo Alessandro in materia di usura" (pp. 11-20), he discusses the statement in *Alex. Sev.*, 26,3 on the basis of the coinage, a dangerous procedure, as Momigliano had shown, but he does not present any counter-arguments. He states that we do not know exactly which emperor forbade usury, but that one thinks of Gratian or Theodosius the Great; yet this prohibition could not endure; and Arcadius, in agreement with Honorius, permitted senators to make loans at a rate of six per cent, while others could charge twelve per cent. The purpose of the author (whose identity is concealed by the pseudonyms of the six authors mentioned in the collection) was to plead for toleration of paganism as, he says, Christianity had been tolerated by Severus Alexander, who had had the humanity to abolish usury. He was producing an *historia adversus Christianos*, in a period later than 405. It counterbalances Orosius' *Historia adversus paganos*.

The same thesis appears in "Il precetto aureo" (pp. 21-8). Mention of the Golden Rule in the life of Severus Alexander by a contemporary of Jerome and Augustine derives from the desire to gain religious tolerance for the pagans. This is done despite the fact that Christianity had been a *religio illicita* under that emperor.

Straub's arguments are ingenious, yet not fully convincing. Too great a façade is constructed upon a limited foundation. Would these conclusions be likely to hold had we more evidence for this period? Does the *H. A.* really plead a case—for paganism, as Straub says? Momigliano for one thinks not, and Mommsen's query when confronted with the theory of forgery and fraud, *cui bono?*, still deserves careful thought.

Mazzarino, who has recently argued for the years 419-21 as the date of composition of the *H. A.*, in a brilliant and closely-reasoned contribution considers "La *Historia Augusta* e la *EKG*" (pp. 29-40). Enmann, with his postulation of a *Kaisergeschichte* in 1884, really laid the foundation for inquiry about the *H. A.* Enmann considered the reputation of Gallienus the most important problem of the third century. He was a great emperor but was maltreated by Enmann's *KG*, and the *H. A.* was influenced by this misjudgment. The *EKG* was a polemical work against the senatorial tradition.

Mazzarino bases his inquiry on a passage in Dracontius' *Satis-*

factio about Commodus Augustus, who, he shows, was not the son of Marcus but L. Aelius Aurelius Commodus Caesaris f. Dracontius' source spoke of Verus as being good, the *H. A.*, on the other hand, as being bad. The source of the latter judgment is the *EKG*.

The *EKG*, with its anti-senatorial bias, was able to change the historical verdict about Verus in Rome, but not in the periphery of the empire. The tradition represented by the *EKG* through the *H. A.* had not had time to spread in Africa before the period of Dracontius.

This study furnishes interesting insight into the question of the subsequent fortune of the *H. A.* even if it offers little precise information about the date. It deserves careful consideration by all students of the *H. A.*

The longest article in the volume, Burian's "Zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit der Gordiani tres in der Historia Augusta" (pp. 41-66), considers the sources used, their manipulation, and the historical value of the biographies. The best sources are Herodian and Dexippus; Iunius Cordus was concocted as a predecessor by the author to lend authority to some statements. Other sources, such as Eutropius and Aurelius Victor, are not identified, but alluded to as *imperi scriptores*. Much of the material in the three lives is valuable and from good sources, but its value is lessened because the author applied his fantasy and tendentiousness.

It is the desire to increase the stature of the Gordians that leads to this manipulation of material. The precedent of the Scipios is thus introduced, the Antonines are linked with the Gordians, and Maximinus is strongly contrasted with Gordian I. The author of the life of the latter drew inspiration from Suetonius' *Claudius*; there are numerous parallels of fact but only one of language. He chooses only good traits, to show his sympathy for the Gordians.

In "Il vescovo Ambrogio e la Historia Augusta: attualità di un topos politico-letterario" (pp. 67-79), Ruggini shows that, of the many authors who attack *Kinderkaiser* and the influence which eunuchs have over them, only Ambrose raises the level of his onslaught to a philosophical plane, as does the *H. A.* The key passages are *Exameron*, V, 50 ff. and *Vita Aureliani*, 43, 1-5. Ambrose's work was most likely composed for Easter 387; the *H. A.* must be dated several years later at the earliest, with the *terminus post quem* no earlier than 394.

The Bonn Colloquium had eight participants from Germany and France; the volume presents their contributions in alphabetical order of authors' names, an order which is best ignored in reading. Two very fine papers, by Nesselhauf and Pflaum, are only incidentally concerned with the *H. A.*; they examine historical problems to which the *H. A.* makes some contribution, but they are far broader in scope and significance than the others.

André Chastagnol's "Le problème de l'histoire Auguste: État de la question" (pp. 43-71) is the appropriate starting point. He presents an excellent survey of previous scholarship and the major views concerning the date of the collection which have received significant support. Momigliano's doubts are given due consideration, but the presence of anachronisms, and their importance, is stressed. Chastagnol finds the most decisive passage in *Aurelianus*, 1, 1, with mention of the *judiciale carpentum*. The *terminus post*

quem for this expression must be 382, and the most appropriate period is that of Theodosius. In spite of Chastagnol's spirited argument, it seems to me that W. Ensslin's doubts, expressed in "Carpentum oder Carruca?", *Klio*, XXXII (1939), pp. 89-105, have not been overcome.

The *H. A.*, says Chastagnol, springs from the senatorial aristocracy of Rome and displays pagan sympathies. The best dates for such a combination of circumstances are 394-398; final publication must fall in late 397 or early 398, with Nicomachus Flavianus perhaps the responsible individual.

Chastagnol insists upon a hypercritical and searching attitude when dealing with the *H. A.* But one may question whether one could not more profitably assume that information contained in the biographies is accurate until proven otherwise, rather than the reverse. So many individual items have been shown to be precise that the larger picture may be worth more than is often credited. And, where so many searching minds reach so many different, and frequently contradictory, conclusions, might absence of cynicism not have some value?

Herbert Nesselhauf traces the development and relationship of "Patrimonium und res privata des römischen Kaisers" (pp. 73-93). The claim of the *H. A.* that the *res privata* was instituted by Severus, which has long been accepted, is now shown to be false. Epigraphical evidence for the career of T. Aius Sanctus makes it clear that it existed long before his reign. Nesselhauf argues that Antoninus Pius was responsible for its institution, and shows that the *res privata* was nothing else than the *patrimonium* before the latter became part of the imperial inheritance. The *r. p.* was under the jurisdiction of a high equestrian official of the same rank as the supervisor of the *patrimonium*; under Severus, the *procurator rei privatae* became a *tricenarius*. Then, about the middle of the third century, the *patrimonium* was absorbed by the *res privata*. After this detailed examination, Nesselhauf concludes that there is much truth in the report of the *H. A.*, though it is not precisely accurate, for the *res privata* was reestablished by Severus, after its suspension under Pertinax and Iulianus. This is a careful and judicious contribution to the administrative history of the empire.

"Le règlement successoral d'Hadrien," by Hans-Georg Pflaum (pp. 95-122) traces with great epigraphical skill the political situation in Rome during the critical years 135-138, in the light of which Hadrian's decisions about his successors were made. His purpose was ultimately to assure the throne to Marcus, and the two successors who were chosen were picked because of their political insignificance. In making L. Ceionius Commodus his heir presumptive, with precedence over M. Annius Verus, Hadrian hoped to win over an influential part of the senatorial opposition. Commodus was included in the succession because of the influence of the Ceionii, Vetuleni, Avidii, and Plautii, families of Italian origin.

When Antoninus succeeded, the existing policy of favoritism toward provincials did not change. Most of the consuls of the beginning of the reign do not belong to the old nobility; and, during the reign, so many *rovi homines* rose because the old families refused the emperor their services.

Pflaum's thesis is closely-reasoned, well-supported, and convincing.

He presents a listing of consuls for some five years beginning with late 138 which is different from Degraasi's *Fasti Consolari* in several important details.

Andreas Alföldi, "Zwei Bemerkungen zur Historia Augusta" (pp. 1-8), underscores the anti-Christian tendency to be noted in the disagreement of the author of the *H. A.* with Lactantius concerning the fate of Valerian. He points out the absurdity of the chariot drawn by a team of stags. But there is a similar theme on three Kontorniates, which have Caesar on the obverse. It is impossible to tell whether there was any influence, in either direction, between the *H. A.* and the coins; both are part of the intellectual climate after 394.

Horst Braunert considers "Das Athenaeum zu Rom bei den Scriptores Historiae Augustae" (pp. 9-41). The *H. A.* contains more references to the Athenaeum than any other ancient source. Braunert points out that it is impossible to determine the source of the name, shows that the *ludus ingenuarum artium* was not a school only for the *grammaticus*, but served in preparation for secondary school education in grammar and rhetoric, with Greek studies carried on in Greek, and denies that the *procurator primae cathedrae* has anything to do with the Athenaeum. The Athenaeum was located in the atrium Minervae, adjacent to the curia, and the professors and the students themselves equated the atrium with the Athenaeum. The latter's name and official status were later taken over for a university-type establishment. The *H. A.*'s date for the existence of the Athenaeum is correct. Braunert dates the *H. A.* itself to the time of Symmachus.

Wolfgang Schmid, seeking "Eutropsuren in der Historia Augusta" (pp. 123-33), treats the names of Trebellianus and Laelianus which appear, in various forms, in *tyr. trig.* and in Eutropius. He supports the view of Dessau and Alföldi, *contra* Hohl, that Eutropius was a source of the *H. A.*, and that this fact points to a Theodosian date, or even a later one, for the *H. A.*

In "Avidius Cassius et les sources de l'histoire Auguste" (pp. 135-64), Jacques Schwartz points out that the Talmudic tradition of the murder of the Jews of Alexandria, which is charged to Trajan, cannot be earlier than Caracalla and cannot derive directly from Alexandria. He suggests that it refers to the repression of Avidius Cassius' revolt against Marcus Aurelius. The writer of the life of Avidius Cassius had a library which contained, at the minimum, Sallust, Suetonius, Fronto (in a manuscript very much like ours), Marius Maximus, and Arusianus Messius. The letters contained in this life are not entirely forged; there are parallels with Dio Cassius, who, one way or another, had knowledge of the Latin originals.

Schwartz further considers the heterogeneous character of *V. Marci*, 15-19, inserted between two chronological narratives, each of which contains material presented without regard to chronology, and, in discussion of the relationship among the *H. A.*, Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, and the *Epitome de Caesaribus*, claims that there was no *Vita Veri* in the *Kaisergeschichte* and postulates a series of post-Suetonian lives, perhaps up to and including Severus. He presents a table to show the relationship which he proposes, in which, it goes without saying, conjecture plays an important role. The author of the life of Avidius Cassius had a selection of documents,

covering the years 168-180, which was attributed to Marius Maximus. The life contains valuable information, and it should not be totally rejected.

Johannes Straub is represented by two brief contributions. He points out, "Marnas" (pp. 165-70), that the god is found for the first time in western Latin literature in Hieronymus. The chances are very slim that he was known at Rome in the reign of Alexander Severus, in whose biography he is mentioned. The temple of Marnas at Gaza was destroyed about 401, the final version of the life was after 405. The author of the *H. A.* gave such distinction to Marnas, who never had much importance in the Roman-Latin world outside of Gaza, at a time when Christian Rome rejoiced over the fall of the pagan gods: *Marnas victus est a Christo*.

In "Die ultima verba des Septimius Severus" (pp. 171-2), he underscores the difference in the report of the *H. A.* and those of Dio and Herodian; the author of the *H. A.* was indebted to Sallust.

The two volumes here reviewed contain a total of fourteen essays. May one draw any general conclusions from the variety of material presented therein? Clearly, the prime interest of scholars in the field remains the establishment of the date; as a previous generation, following in the footsteps of Baynes, inclined to the reign of Julian, today the great majority prefer the period of Theodosius or even later. But the very range of suggested dates invites caution; can we ever really hope to be precise, on the basis of evidence which is so often subjective? Perhaps the only sure verdict about date is *non liquet*.

Further, even in the midst of much adverse criticism, the *H. A.* still is credited with the presentation of much valuable information, as some of the essays discussed above have shown. Inquiry into particular aspects of the *H. A.* will continue to be fruitful, and it may well be that this collection of biographies, once so traduced by scholars such as Domaszewski, will as a result be accorded greater honor.

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Menandri Sicyonius, edidit RUDOLFUS KASSEL. Berlin, Verlag Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1965. Pp. iv + 44, br. DM 9,80. (*Kleine Texte*, Heft 185.)

Little more than a year after publication of the new fragments recovered from mummy-cases by the late Professor Bataille appears an edition of the *Sicyonian* that rearranges the material in proper order and numbers the lines 1-423. There are further eleven fragments that add some 20 lines, not all complete. Nine of these lines belong to a scrap, *P. Oxy.* 1238, edited by Hunt in *P. Oxy.*, X (1914), pp. 95-7. This is not located within the play by Kassel. It is the only bit in which names of speakers are supplied with the text in the MS. Since only a dozen or so letters from the beginning of each line survive, there is a wide field for speculation.

Kassel does not, as Gallavotti does in his edition, provide any discussion of the date of the play, the plot, characters, etc., but refers

the reader to his article in *Eranos*, LXIII (1965), pp. 1-21. Handley's notes in *Bulletin* 12 of the *University of London Institute of Classical Studies* provide much intelligent comment and include brilliant suggestions of many scholars. Some passages are now quite clear. Lines 3-14 of the prologue (III) tell how at Mylasa in Caria a rich and very helpful Sicyonian purchased from pirates a five-year-old girl (Philumene) kidnapped from Attica with a slave (Dromon). In VIII the scene is shown to be Eleusis. There is talk of finding a witness and mention of a festival and assembly. In VII Dromon is cursed, probably because he is working against the son and heir of the Sicyonian, Stratophanes, supporting the girl while she seeks to recover family and status in Athens. Stratophanes is a successful soldier who, though he owns the girl, has refrained from coercing her. In VII B he resents the interference of a rival. For lines 96-101 I suggest the following restoration with Stratophanes as speaker, discussing Philumene with Theron:

τίς οὐκ ἔᾱ; δέδωκ'. ἐδέξω. νῦ[ν δ' ἐμὲ
δ]έδοικε, φησί,—δεσπότην ξένο[ν θ' ἄμα
τρίτον τ' ἐρῶντ', ἐγγύς τε τῶ[ν τ]ρα[γῳδιῶν
λέγοντα τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἔπε[ιθ' αἰεί.
ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ τί πρᾶγμ' ἐστ[ὶν ποτε;
μὴ τοῦτον ἡμῖν τὸν τρόπον λάλε[ι σύ γε.

The girl resists the ardor of her lover because he is one whom she as an Athenian cannot marry. Compare Chariton's kidnapped heroine, who faces a similar problem when wooed by her owner.

In X Pyrrhias the slave arrives with news that Stratophanes was really an Athenian before adoption. Theron, the parasite, prays (145) that Stratophanes may now marry the girl and leave Malthake for him. Evidently this lady had been Stratophanes' concubine and housekeeper. I venture to suggest that Theron plays much the same part in this play that Phormio does in Terence's *Phormio* except that he adapts himself to the course of events instead of controlling it. He is tricky, litigious, and a scurrilous agitator for democracy against special privilege. There are at least two houses in the scene, one occupied by Stratophanes and the other by Smicrines the oligarchic man, whose son Moschion is Stratophanes' rival. In the end Stratophanes finds an Athenian father in Smicrines and moves across the stage to share his house. Moschion finds himself demoted to the role of best man at his new brother's wedding. Theron comes on, I believe, with Smicrines, at the end of the prologue (line 25, IV A). Smicrines is giving him a lecture on "manly rationality" and the rewards of industry or the opposite: λογισμὸν ἀνδρικόν and φιλόπ[ρο]νόους ὡς γίγνεται (or ἀπ[ρο]νόους). Theron escapes into the house and Smicrines' wife appears. Smicrines pleads with her not to inflict this voracious parasite on him. This is lightning exposition. We have the familiar situation of a rich wife who spoils her son and favors the parasite on whom he depends for help in his amours.

Probably it is as Moschion's ally that Theron approaches Malthake in order to separate Philumene from her owner. We have scraps of this conversation in fr. XX (*P. Oxy.* 1238). Malthake fears the

effect of jealousy on Stratophanes if Philumene is taken from him by the method later referred to by him as kidnapping. Here is my tentative reconstruction of the text:

μὴ ξηλοτυπῶν μ[ὲ] ἀφ᾽ ἧ τ' ἀρέσῃ τέ τις γυνή
 ἑτέρα παρούσα; (Θη.) τ[ῷ] τὸ δυσχερές γέ σοι
 τουτὶ τετολμηκό[τι; λόγῳ ποίῳ ποτὲ
 πεισθείσα; (Μα.) ἐμοὶ π[ᾶ]ρεστι νῦν: (Θη.) ἡ παρθένος;
 (Μα.) κακὸς κακῶς ἀπόλ[οι]το δ', ἢ τ' ἐρωμένη.
 ταύτη λελάληχ' ἀν[ή]ρ ἐρῶν. μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ
 τὸ [ν ᾧ] νδρ'. ἀ[φ]εῖμ' εἰς [κόρακας. ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς ἄρα
 τοῦτ]ο παρέ[χ]ετε τὸ [κωλύον. τᾶν κατῶ,
 ὥς φα]σιν. (Π[α].) εἰμῶζε[τε].

At the beginning of Act IV (150) there is an altercation between Smicrines and a "populist." The latter is presumably Theron, returned from getting Philumene's case advertised at the local festival. A messenger arrives and tells how the assembly thwarted Moschion by accepting Stratophanes' proposal to entrust Philumene to a priestess until her father was found. Stratophanes would then ask her father for her hand in marriage. At this point (X, V, VI) we have had a run of 169 lines (110-279) with slight gaps. Here, Stratophanes, returning from the assembly, attacks Smicrines as a kidnapper. No doubt he assumes that Smicrines was in league with Moschion. This leads to the recognition by Stratophanes of Smicrines as his father and Moschion as his brother. Theron as a good democrat joins the majority and is ready to intrigue in the interest of Stratophanes as the fourth act ends. In his altercation with Smicrines I should at line 158 (X C 4) make him throw back at Smicrines the adjective that belongs to the oligarchic ideal: ἀπολείτε μ' οἱ σφόδρ' ἀνδρικοὶ / ὑμεῖς, "you'll be the death of me, you supermanly types."

Lines 343-361 (XI B) are complete and show Theron suborning a destitute old man to act the part of the girl's father. Theron is working now for Stratophanes in his own way. When the honest man names himself Kichesias as he indignantly refuses, Theron at once proposes that he should act himself. By good luck he really is the girl's father. In line 353 I see no reason to read θύρας with a dagger. Read θυγατρὸς and note how the assonance - τρὸς, - τρᾶς and the sounds οἱ -, - οἱ lend themselves to heart-throbbing delivery by the actor: (Κ.) ἀνέμνησας πάθους/τὸν ἀθλιόν με καὶ θυγατρὸς οἰκτρᾶς ἐμοί, "You call to mind a sad event, a daughter—fraught her fate with woe for me." Euripides' Medea ends line 1037 with a similar ἀλγεινόν τ' ἐμοί, a parallel that I owe to F. H. Sandbach.

Stratophanes gets the old man's consent to marry his daughter, then orders his baggage and Malthake to be transferred to the house of Smicrines. The play ends with a festal procession but no such farcical scene as surprised us in the *Dyscolus*. The surprise in this play comes in the description of the assembly, where we find tragic diction and what amounts to a parody of the similar account in Euripides' *Orestes*, 866 ff. It is our first play of Menander to exploit an extant tragedy; also our first of his with a political background and, if I am right, an intriguing, politically radical parasite.

We also have now for comparison three plays with sensitive, attractive soldiers in love as heroes—Menander's, shall we say, educational plays for military men. Turner has recently published new fragments of *Misumenus* (*Bulletin*, Supp. no. 17, 1965, *University of London Institute of Classical Studies*) and has also greatly improved the text of old fragments in places. When all the fragments are included in one edition, the number of lines will probably exceed those of *Sicyonian* and *Perikeiromene*. The text seems to be even more difficult to restore than that of the *Sicyonian*. We can appreciate *Perikeiromene* much better than the other two because we have the prologue almost complete, scenes involving almost all main characters, and the final reconciliation. It is the story of a soldier who acts out of character when misunderstanding leads to jealousy and he cuts off his mistress' hair. The other two plays show soldiers who legally own unmarried girls with whom they are madly in love. They have enough self-command and respect for their lady-loves to allow them freedom to remain unwed. The hated soldier Thrasonides was probably the victim of a misunderstanding on the part of his beloved. Stratophanes is not, so far as we can see, influenced or hurt by misunderstanding. The barrier is artificial. Marriage is possible only when the law of a city specifically sanctions it. It is a reasonable guess that the emotions of Philumene were not stressed as much in this play as those of the other two heroines in theirs. In fact the whole tone of the *Sicyonian*, like that of the *Orestes*, is rather recklessly melodramatic. Perhaps it was also, like the *Orestes*, presented for the entertainment of a democracy defeated, divided, and distressed.

Kassel's text owes much to collaboration. C. Austin has restudied the papyri and provided an *index verborum*. At my age I can no longer scrutinize the problems that arise in reading papyri, but I have no doubt that the present edition is reliable and marks an advance. New understanding of many points will undoubtedly come with further study.

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JEAN COLIN. L'empire des Antonins et les martyrs gaulois de 177. Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1964. Pp. 266. (*Antiquitas*, Reihe I: *Abh. zur alten Gesch.*, Band 10.)

Professor Colin's thesis can be stated briefly. He disputes two of the most widely accepted cornerstones of the history of western Christianity: the martyrdom of about forty Christians at Lyons and Vienne in 177 and the subsequent episcopacy of Irenaeus at Lyons. Both he would transfer to Pontic Galatia. He does not dispute the date of 177 or the genuineness of the fundamental document, a letter quoted by Eusebius in his *Ecclesiastical History*, V, 1-4, except that he holds that Eusebius, or the source from which he drew the letter, had confused Gaul and Galatia, *Colonia Claudia* (Lyons) with *Neoclaudiopolis* (Andrapa), and *Colonia Iulia Augusta* (Vi-

enne) with *Sebastopolis* (also called *Herakleopolis*, modern Sulu-Seraï). By transferring the martyrdom to Pontic Galatia, he can identify the event with the "forty martyrs of Sebaste," though this last is traditionally dated under Licinius and placed at a site (modern Siwas) other than the two just mentioned. The misdating of this martyrdom was due to the composition of a work of exhortation to Christians during the persecutions of around 300, namely the "testament of the forty martyrs," the earliest evidence for it (pp. 101-9), and the dislocation was due to confusion after Sebastopolis had changed its name (pp. 175-89). Actually the chief site of martyrdom was Sebastopolis and the tomb stood in the nearby town of Sarein-Kyrklar. Irenaeus would at the time have been a presbyter at Neoclaudiopolis and later its bishop.

The "change of venue" for the trial and execution permits Colin to identify the governor concerned (unnamed in Eusebius) as C. Arrius Antoninus, known from inscriptions to have been legate about 177 of Cappadocia, to which Pontic Galatia seems to have been attached, and later proconsul of Asia (*P. I. R.*², I, 212 A, no. 1088). Tertullian, who says, *Scap.*, 5, that Arrius severely persecuted the Christians while proconsul of Asia, presumably confused his earlier with his later governorship in Asia Minor. *S. H. A., Comm.*, 7, 1 states that Arrius was put to death through the machinations of Cleander on charges arising from his condemnation of a certain Attalus during his proconsulship of Asia, and one of the "martyrs of Lyons" was an Attalus of Pergamum, a Roman citizen, about whose execution the governor in the Eusebian letter hesitated a good deal, only to yield to popular pressure (*Eus., E. H.*, V, 1 43-4). Colin goes so far as to argue (pp. 39-48) that Arrius was punished through the influence of the Christian wife of Cleander, Damostratia, and the Christian mistress of Commodus, Marcia. Moreover, by combining the dates given for the martyrs of Sebaste and for those of Lyons, Colin (pp. 120-41) identifies the three as follows: first martyrdom (given for Sebaste) on March 9, during the festivities following on the *dies imperii* of Marcus, March 7; second martyrdom (given for Lyons) on April 24, just before the birthday of Marcus on April 26; third martyrdom (also given for Lyons) on June 2, just before the festival of Hercules, a deity dear to Commodus (who had, within a year, been associated with Marcus) and also a deity naturally popular in Sebastopolis, whose alternate name was Herakleopolis so that there must have been there an annual provincial festival in his honor (pp. 141-75).

This ingenious argument is supported by an extensive analysis of the sources, of the persons involved, of the places, and of the festivals. Ultimately, however, it rests on two major points: the lack of evidence for any Christianity in central Gaul until about a century later, and the likelihood that Gaul and Galatia might be confused.

The principal difficulties with Colin's treatment of the text and with some of his more general arguments have been presented by Professor J. Deininger in a review in *Gnomon*, XXXVII (1965), pp. 289-91. Evidence for Christianity in central Gaul is indeed scanty before the mid third century and, as Colin remarks (p. 34), no western Christian writer mentions the martyrs until the time of Gregory the Great; he dismisses Sulpicius Severus' allusion in the

second half of the fourth century (*Hist. Sacr.*, II, 32) as a quotation of Eusebius and he notes that Sidonius Apollinaris, born at Lyons and bishop of nearby Clermont in the mid fifth century, does not refer to what should have been for him a significant event in local Christian hagiography. Gregory speaks of Irenaeus as having converted Lyons in his *Hist. Franc.*, I, 29, composed during the later years of the sixth century. The chief early evidence for Christianity in this area are statements by Irenaeus himself in his *Adversus Haereses*, which is preserved in Greek extracts or citations and completely in an early Latin translation. In I, 10, 2, Irenaeus speaks of churches founded ἐν Γερμανίαις . . . ἐν ταῖς Ἰβηρίαις . . . ἐν Κελτοῖς. Colin (pp. 66-9) makes the unlikely claim that "Germanies" refers not to the provinces on the Rhine but to tribes settled near the Black Sea and in contact with the east. "The Iberias" could then be the Iberian tribes of the Caucasus and the Celts the Galatians. Deininger points out that the fem. plur. ταῖς Ἰβηρίαις must mean the three Spanish provinces and, although ταῖς does not occur with Γερμανίαις, the same argument would apply. Moreover, though Irenaeus curiously uses Κελτοῖς instead of a fem. parallel to the others, as Γαλατίαις, this term seems never to have been used of the Galatians but only of the western Gauls. A further weakness in Colin's argument is that by confining Irenaeus' statement to the east, he spoils the point. Irenaeus claims that despite differences of languages, the Christian doctrine was uniform throughout the whole world, κατὰ τὸν κόσμον. He then specifies first the north-western provinces, in the sentence under discussion, then the east, then those in Egypt and Libya (i. e. North Africa), and finally, having completed the circuit of the provinces, those founded in the center of the world, αἱ κατὰ μέσση τοῦ κόσμου, i. e. in Italy and Rome.

Similarly Colin (pp. 69-70) wrongly applies "Celts" to the Galatians when he applies to Galatia and its language Irenaeus' statement in pref. 3 that he had lived long ἐν Κελτοῖς and had had to speak a βάρβαρον διάλεκτον. Deininger notes also that though Γαλατία and Γαλάτης are used equally for Gaul(s) or Galatia(ns), Γαλλία, the term used by Eusebius in *H. E.*, V, 1, 1, applies only to Gaul, never to Galatia, so that a transfer seems unlikely unless Eusebius' source had already changed the place names and he put in the province. Irenaeus makes two other references which have been applied to Gaul. In I, 14, 7, he speaks of the followers of a certain Marcus corrupting women ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς κλίμασι τῆς Ῥοδανουσίας. Colin (pp. 76-80) thinks that Marcus, whom he regards as a Gnostic, would hardly have been active in southern Gaul (though Eusebius speaks only of followers) and that, therefore, the place name should not be *Rhodanousia*, a small town near Marseilles, but some name in Asia Minor, as *Rhýndakos*, a stream flowing into the Sea of Marmara. Irenaeus' final reference survives only in the Latin, in III, 4, 1, where he speaks of *multae gentes barbarorum*, which A. Harnack, *Mission und Ausbreitung* (ed. 3, 1915), II, p. 272, n. 4, interprets as Celts and Germans, but this could, of course, be disputed. It may further be noted that Eusebius nowhere speaks of *Colonia Claudia* or *Colonia Iulia Augusta* but consistently of Lyons and Vienne, and that, there-

fore, the misidentification, if it occurred, had already become well established. Moreover, the letter three times mentions Latin remarks or writing in connection with the martyrdom (V, 1, 20, 44, 52) and while this would not be impossible before a Roman legate in the Greek east, it does suggest a Latin-speaking audience. Finally the full list of the names of the "martyrs of Lyons," which Colin (pp. 109-20) tries to show is more suitable in Asia Minor, actually proves little because the names are both Greek and Latin and all common.

Colin's radical transfer of the "forty martyrs" and Irenaeus from central Gaul to Pontic Galatia would make them much more reasonable. It has always seemed strange that in the west, under the philosophic Marcus (who, rather than the Verus implied by Eusebius, must have been responsible in 177), there should have been so bitter and numerous a persecution; as Colin points out (pp. 109-10), the persecution in Palestine under Maximin Daia, fully recorded by Eusebius and lasting intensely for several years, seems to have comprised in all only forty-eight martyrs. At least in the provinces of Asia Minor, hostility to the Christians had been strong since the time of St. Paul and the aroused state of public opinion which the Letter describes would there be credible (pp. 58-60). Moreover, though Greeks were common in the lower Rhone valley, they are very poorly attested in central Gaul (pp. 32-3). A persecution in Pontic Galatia makes more natural a letter to the faithful in Asia and Phrygia, and certainly a bishopric for the Asiatic Irenaeus in that area seems preferable to having him emigrate to Gaul. That Colin's thesis runs counter to long accepted and apparently well-attested tradition is no objection, given the chance of error or falsification in the records of the early Church available to Eusebius. But Colin, as Deiningen shows, must interpret the consistently reported texts of Eusebius and Irenaeus contrary to Greek usage. Moreover, among the difficulties which he fails to explain away is that of why, at the moment of the persecution, Irenaeus should have been sent by the prospective martyrs to Pope Eleutheros in Rome, as reported by Eusebius in *H. E.*, V, 3, 4-4, 2; a mission much more likely if he was sent from Lyons. Thus despite extensive learning and great ingenuity, Colin has not succeeded in making his case.

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STERLING DOW and ROBERT F. HEALEY, S. J. *A Sacred Calendar of Eleusis*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1965. Pp. 58; 3 pl. (*Harvard Theological Studies*, XXI.)

When ten pages of index, the blank page 6, and half of the half-blank pages 5, 31, 38, 43, and 48 are subtracted, a work of about forty octavo pages remains, but this study deserves a notice because of its inaccessibility and interest. The inscription, long known as *I. G.*, II², 1363, has never received so thorough a revision and so full a commentary before. The authors date the inscription to the

period 330-270 B. C. and they interpret this Eleusinian calendar as a late supplement to the State Code. Though the document contains not much more than twenty-seven lines, there are many difficulties. The authors have faced them all and have shed much light.

The text is seriously changed in lines 10, 11, 16, 18, and 25 for the better. The reviewer, however, will not quite accept the new version of line 25. Whereas one reads [βωμὸν] στ[ο]λ[ι]σας τοῖν Θεσμο[φόρου] here in Hiller's edition (*S. I. G.*³, 1038), Dow and Father Healey restore ε[ἰς] ἐ[σ]τίασας τοῖν Θεσμο | [φόρου] and translate "for the banquets to the Thesmophorian deities." But that would require εἰς τὰς ἐστιάσεις. If ἐ[σ]τίασας represents a participle (and what else could it be?), then the reviewer would expect, instead of the grammatically impossible ε[ἰς] ἐ[σ]τίασας, a dative such as ἐ[φ]ε[σ]τίασαςι (possible in the photograph) or -σα<ι>ς. And instead of citing parallels for the noun ἐστίαςις, which does not occur here, would it not be better to cite a parallel for the verb ἐστιᾶν, e. g. Isaeus, III, 80, θεσμοφόρια ἐστιᾶν τὰς γυναῖκας? The prefix is suggested by *Od.*, XXI, 267, ἐπὶ μηρία θέντες Ἀπόλλωνι.

One of the most interesting changes occurs in line 10, where the reading *προγόνιον* is made for the first time. In the Eleusinian calendar the *progonion* is an object connected with the cult of Apollo Pythius, the ancestral Apollo of the Athenians. The authors have not failed to point out that in the State Calendar (*I. G.*, II², 1357) one finds a *στέμμα προγόνιον* connected with the cult of Apollo, but they are unwilling to admit that *progonion* is a mere abbreviation of *stemma progonion*. Instead they suggest that the *progonion* is a ritual apron hanging before the knee. To the reviewer it seems to be a banner or painting of a genealogical table or of legendary ancestors recalling to mind the close connection of Apollo and Ion. The word *progonion*, from *progoni*, has nothing to do with knee. The reviewer thinks that Apollo's paternity of Ion is asserted on the occasions prescribed on both calendars. On the State Calendar the tripod and *epitoxides*¹ (which recall the locale and service of the child Ion: Eur., *Ion*, 106-9 and 158-73) and the *stemma progonion* are to follow the *kanoun*, a round basket such as that in which the infant Ion was placed (Eur., *Ion*, 19, 37, 1337-1405: for representations see references by D. B. Thompson in *Hesperia*, XXIII [1954], pp. 94 f.). Other Greeks claimed that Xouthos was the father of Ion, and so with the reviewer's new interpretation of the two calendars the *progonion* served an important propagandistic purpose when exposed. But if the *progonion* were merely an apron, why the insistence on its exposition?

The phrases "the *hiereosyna* . . . was" (p. 11), "a *ιερεώσυνα*" (p. 24), "a *hiereosyna*" (p. 35), "an *apometra*" (twice on p. 35), and "the *apometra* . . . seems" (p. 35) disturb the reviewer, but the printing is excellent.

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¹ The equipment which Ion employed to frighten off the birds. For we know from Eur., *Ion*, 179 that he did not shoot the birds but merely shot at them.

DAVID WIESEN. *St. Jerome as a Satirist. A Study in Christian Latin Thought and Letters.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv + 290. \$6.00. (*Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, 34.)

In the opening chapter of his book Professor Wiesen argues that since in the fourth century the epithet *satiricus* was commonly applied to any harsh critic of society, whether he wrote in prose or verse, and since Jerome considered himself *satiricus* in this sense, "he provides justification for regarding as satire and studying as a unit those elements in his writings which express caustic, scurrilous, and abusive judgments of society in general or of individual men" (p. 3).¹ The remainder of the book, aside from a concluding chapter on Jerome's view of satire, consists of a number of quotes from Jerome illustrating his views on society in general (Chapter II), the Church and the clergy (Chapter III), women and marriage (Chapter IV), heretics, jews and pagans (Chapter V), and personal enemies (Chapter VI). Wiesen's analysis of these passages is generally limited to pointing out rhetorical devices and echoes of earlier Latin satirists; his emphasis upon quantity over quality (in Chapter II, for example, there are forty-seven pages of text and thirty-nine long quotes), as well as the repetitious content of selections, makes this a difficult book to read. Wiesen acknowledges this problem toward the end of the book, when he says: "But the monotony the reader may feel in considering Jerome's satiric passages *in toto* is not justly to be blamed on the writer himself. Jerome did not, after all, intend that satiric sections be sliced from the body of his writings and then placed under a microscope for purposes of examination and comparison" (p. 268). In view of this statement one wonders why Wiesen chose this approach to his subject in the first place.

More puzzling than Wiesen's superficial treatment of Jerome's writings is the limited view of satire which emerges from this study. A writer discussing Jerome as a satirist might be expected to have a thorough knowledge of both the primary and the secondary sources on Roman satire and to place Jerome in this tradition. Wiesen, however, hardly discusses the earlier satirists and he appears to have read very little of the recent scholarship on satire since U. Knoche's *Die römische Satire* (Göttingen, 1957) with the exception of W. S. Anderson's study, "Juvenal and Quintilian," *Y. C. S.*,

¹ In his book, *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory* (Leiden, 1965), which appeared after Wiesen's, C. A. Van Rooy notes (pp. 158, 180) that Porphyry first uses this term both as an adjective and as a noun in the early third century A. D. but that throughout the fourth century the spelling *satyricus* is preferred to *satiricus*.

It should also be pointed out that Jerome does not call himself *satiricus* in any of the passages cited by Wiesen (*Letters*, XXII, 32; L, 5; XL, 2; CXVII, 1). In Letter XXII, 32, for example, Jerome remarks in the course of an anecdote, *nomina taceo ne saturam putes*, and in L, 5 he implies that he has read Horace and Juvenal. Wiesen erroneously says that in these passages "Jerome specifically speaks of himself as a successor of Horace and Juvenal" (p. 2, n. 5).

XVII (1961), pp. 3-93. In the opening paragraph of his study he quotes Diomedes' definition of *satura*, *not* in order to show the fourth century view of satire (for which it is appropriate), but, oddly enough, in order to illustrate the general Roman concept of the genre. Wiesen apparently believes that Jerome is a satirist in the classical tradition largely because he uses vituperative criticism, echoes Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, and treats commonplace satiric themes, such as avarice, gluttony, and misogyny.

Wiesen's evaluation of Jerome is equally perplexing. In his concluding chapter he calls him "the most important of the Christian satirists" (p. 264) and refers to "his great satiric talent" (p. 268) and his "unique greatness as a satirist" (p. 269), yet his earlier comments hardly suggest such admiration. He accuses Jerome of hypocrisy (pp. 28, 36, 69-70) and lack of good taste (pp. 28, 82, 132), and implies that there is a certain dishonesty about Jerome's reliance upon rhetoric (pp. 138, 151-2). Wiesen's uncertainty about Jerome even leads him to contradict himself. In Chapter II he includes among the characteristics which make Jerome an effective satirist "a certain lack of sympathy for human failings" (p. 46), but in Chapter IV he labels one of Jerome's remarks "coarse and humorless satire, completely wanting in any sympathy for human feelings" (p. 132) and accuses him of "a certain callousness toward normal human hopes and aspirations . . ." (*ibid.*). Similarly, in discussing Jerome's satire of the clergy, Wiesen mentions his "primarily negative approach" (p. 83) and adds a few pages later that "Jerome was again unable to rise above the unpleasant reality of clerical behavior as it was in his day and thus to describe the true monastic life as a difficult but attainable ideal" (p. 86). In the final chapter, however, he seems to reverse himself, for he praises Jerome's "firm and certain moral system" (p. 269) and says: "His attack on society thus acquires a direction and reforming purpose quite foreign to most classical satire, which usually tends toward purely negative social criticism" (p. 270). This last statement, completely ignoring the positive qualities of Lucilius, Horace, and Persius, reveals how imperfectly Wiesen understands classical satire. Reading his evaluation of Jerome, one wonders how he conceives of the effective satirist. Presumably he would be completely honest, aware of his own faults, sympathetic to those he criticizes, sensitive to the canons of good taste, and more interested in presenting his ideal vision than in satirizing human failings. Horace perhaps illustrates some of these qualities, but one would hardly argue that he is the only kind of effective satirist.

Wiesen might not have found Jerome's character as a satirist so enigmatic if he had considered the latter's use of a *persona*.² Wiesen himself offers much evidence for this device in Jerome's works. He refers frequently to the latter's rhetorical training (pp. 7, 34, 46,

² In addition to the article by Anderson cited above, cf. M. Mack, "The Muse of Satire," *Yale Rev.*, XLI (1951), pp. 80-92; A. Kernan, *The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 1-36; and E. Witke, "The Function of Persius' Choliambics," *Mnemos.*, IV, 15 (1962), pp. 153-8, for a discussion of this device in satire.

268) and his use of rhetoric (pp. 29, 33, 42, 84, 101, 122); he points out that Jerome's language, "even when vehemently passionate is always under careful control of his intellect" (p. 268); he observes that Jerome adapts his style to his audience, dropping the satirical invective, for example, in the homilies addressed to his close circle of fellow monks (p. 94); and, finally, he reiterates Jerome's dependence upon both Cicero and the Roman satirists, all of whom exploit the device of the *persona* (pp. 8-10, 78, 171-2, 265-6). Yet in spite of this evidence, and in spite of the contradictions into which his own view leads him, Wiesen concludes that "Jerome in his satire depicts his own character, his loves and hates, his ideals and disappointments, with greater vividness and vigor than any of the pagan satirists, including Juvenal, reveal themselves in theirs" (p. 269). Recent scholarship on the rhetorical element in Roman satire renders this statement, at best, highly debatable.

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VICTOR A. TCHERIKOVER, ALEXANDER FUKS and MENAHEM STERN, eds. *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum*, Volume III. Published for the Magnes Press, The Hebrew University. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. XVII + 209; 6 plates. \$12.00.

With this third volume *C. P. Jud.* is now complete—as complete, that is, as such collections ever are. In the present instance additional relevant documents appeared within a twelvemonth in *Papyri from Hermopolis* (London, 1964).

If Volume III leaves the expectant reader disappointed, it is not because of any deterioration in the editorial work but because of the poverty and ambiguity of the post-Trajanic source material. Especially when contrasted with the documents from earlier centuries, those in Volume III have relatively little to tell us. In addition, the problem of identification increases: bearers of common Semitic names are not necessarily Jews, and the advent of Christianity increases the chances that they are not. Absent the designation *Ioudaios*, how does one distinguish? "It is obvious that no strict criterion could be established, and we have to limit ourselves to some general considerations. . . . The Hebrew name has been up till now our principal criterion for distinguishing between Jewish and non-Jewish papyri. In the Byzantine age this criterion is no longer valid, since Christians begin to call themselves by Biblical names. It is of great importance to establish when this process started. We can state roughly that in the third century . . . the process had not yet begun, that in the fifth century it is in vogue everywhere, and that the fourth century is the period of transition" (pp. 3-4).

Even less satisfactory is the situation in Section XIII, devoted to the bearers of the name Sambathion and its variants. That these

names derive from Sabbath has long since been demonstrated; but what degree of "Jewishness" do they imply? Tcherikover devotes to the problem a fourteen-page introductory essay, in which he correctly notes that not all bearers of these names were Sabbath-observers, and not all Sabbath-observers Jews. "We cannot be sure that *all* the Sambathions collected in this section were really Sabbath-observers, and some of them, especially those of the third century, might already have freed themselves of any connexion with Judaism" (p. 56). That being so, would it not have been better to cite the ensuing documents in summary fashion rather than reprint them *in extenso*? All the Sambathions of this section, it may be noted, are omitted from the "Prosopography of the Jews in Egypt" in Appendix II.

Appendix I (pp. 138-66) contains corrected texts, by D. M. Lewis, of the inscriptions from Egypt published in Volume II of *Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum*. The purpose is laudable, and Lewis, as one would expect, has done his work well. But was it a wise decision to print the corrected texts *here*, where nothing in the title or the abbreviation *C. P. Jud.* warns the reader to expect inscriptions? Buried in this volume these inscriptions will, I am afraid, be overlooked more often than used. If it is not too late to do so, they should be reprinted and issued as a separate fascicle, which can then be kept in libraries as part of *C. I. J.*

A few points of detail: Most of the introduction to No. 460 must be disregarded. The notion that that document (= *P. Ryl.* 594) indicates "that there was only one Jew in Karanis at this time" was called into question ten years ago, in *P. Col.*, V, pp. 65-6.—In No. 463 something is wrong in the last sentence of the introduction.—A small but repeatedly disconcerting failing is the erratic English transcription of names: see e. g. pp. 5, 63, 73, 104, 149, 158 (Jesus, Justos, Protoktetus).

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R. THIBAU. Les rapports entre le latin et le grec. Essai de réhabilitation de l'hypothèse italo-grecque. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1964. Pp. xiv + 62. 8 Guilders.

In the preface to this monograph the author expresses his conviction that the results of scientific research must from time to time be reexamined if they are to escape being beset by a dogmatic intolerance of non-conformity. He accordingly seeks to revive the doctrine, held by several nineteenth-century scholars, of an especially close relationship between Greek and Latin, reflecting a period of Greco-Italic unity after the breakup of the Indo-European speech-community.

This review will not concern itself with the Italo-Celtic hypothesis, which for some decades has generally enjoyed more favor than the view which Thibau is seeking to defend, but will be limited to the discussion of Greco-Latin connections. In compiling the etymological evidence which forms the basis of his argument Thibau has adopted

the two principles that (1) two words are to be considered related when they are phonetically and morphologically identical, even if they are at first glance semantically incompatible, and (2) two words are to be considered related when they are semantically and morphologically identical, even if they involve a phonetic difficulty in relation to the usually recognized correspondences (pp. 32-3, here paraphrased). More cautious scholars under such circumstances would be likely to employ only such etymological equations as are fully satisfactory from both a phonological and a semantic viewpoint, but even if we should grant the two principles, Thibau has applied them with a freedom which is altogether reckless. For the correspondence of Greek κ with Latin g , claimed for $\kappa\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$: *gloria*, $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\nu\omicron\nu$: *ignum*, $\nu\epsilon\kappa\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$: *niger*, $\pi\iota\kappa\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$: *piger*, we should need equations far more satisfactory, especially in semantic equivalence, than most of these. No better are $\acute{\alpha}\delta\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$: *ater*, $\delta\rho\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$: *trabs*. A Latin change $*-n->-r-$, of dissimilatory character, has long been recognized in *carmen* (root $*can-$) and *germen* (root $*gen-$), but it would be no support for *mora*: $\mu\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$, *arbor*: $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$, nor for *morbus*: $\mu\acute{\omicron}\mu\phi\omicron\varsigma$ despite his equation of *aeger*: $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ as additional evidence for a semantic relation between physical illness, ugliness, and moral turpitude. His belief that d is the exceptional, b the normal reflex of IE $*-dh-$ has led to two startling results (pp. 10-11, 48): (1) the $-b\bar{a}-$ of the Latin imperfect and the $-\theta\eta-$ of the Greek first aorist passive are connected, the Doric forms with $-\theta\eta-$, not $*-\theta\bar{a}-$, being conveniently ignored; (2) *habere* is connected with its semantic equivalent $\epsilon\chi\omega$, $\iota\sigma\chi\omega$, with Hom. $\sigma\chi\epsilon\beta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ providing the $-\theta-$ to match the Latin $-b-$.

It would be idle to list more of the etymological equations which are impossible for reasons of phonology, semasiology, or both. To build a new set of etymologies would not be unjustifiable in principle, if one could produce really cogent evidence that the sound changes outlined in the standard handbooks are wrong and must be formulated anew, but this Thibau has not done; and in fact it can no longer be done, at least to the extent which would be necessary to support his conclusions, so considerable is the accumulated body of reliable evidence for most of the generally accepted sound-changes.

Some of Thibau's equations, even if valid in themselves, would be no proof of especially close Greco-Italic unity, since the features in question are not limited to Greek and Latin. This is the case at least when the IE perfect active participle in $*-wes/wos/us-$ is taken to be the source of the Latin v -perfect (pp. 15-17, after W. Schulze, *K. Z.*, XXVIII [1887], pp. 266-74). Most today would prefer one of the other explanations of the origin of the Latin v -perfect, but the important point is that the perfect active participle based on $*-us-$ and its ablaut variants is not limited to Greek, but is prominent in Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic, with traces elsewhere.

The monograph ends with conclusions regarding the external history of the Greco-Italic linguistic community, prominent among which are the claims that its home was in the northwestern part of Greece and that it was broken up as late as around 1500 B. C. The reader, however, has by this stage learned to expect surprises.

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GÜNTER RAMMING. Die politischen Ziele und Wege des Aischines. Inaugural-Dissertation, Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1965. Pp. 141 off-set; 2 charts.

The events of 348-338 B. C. as reflected in Aeschines I-III and Demosthenes XVIII-XIX are studied in a well-documented and unusually well-written, lucid, and vivid dissertation by Günter Ramming on the aims and methods of Aeschines. The study is organized in the following chapters: I, Greece and Macedon to the political début of Aeschines in 348; II, From the political début of Aeschines to the Peace of Philocrates (winter 348 to summer 346); III, From ratification of the Peace to the eve of the Fourth Sacred War (summer 346 to spring 339); IV, The activity of Aeschines as *pylagoros* during the Amphietyonic meeting of 339; V, From the start of the Fourth Sacred War to the death of Aeschines (339-315). The argument proceeds with careful consideration of modern controversies and with frequent summaries and culminates in eighteen pages of a conclusion, The political aims and methods of Aeschines in relation to the intentions of Demosthenes.

From the reviewer's standpoint Chapter II is the most important. The author thinks that after the Peace of Philocrates Aeschines was reacting with more and more bitterness to the intentions of Demosthenes but that before the Peace he was rationally pursuing positive aims of his own, to which a precise chronology of events gives the right clue. The treatment of the Peloponnesian tour of Aeschines and that of the expedition of Proxenus are admirable. He regards Aeschines as a realist who early in 347 decided that the unification of Greece against Philip was impossible and that the interest of Athens demanded an accommodation while she was still in a bargaining position. He builds on Wüst's determinations concerning the word *εἰρήνη* with and without article. Naturally he owes a good deal to F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346-338* (Munich, 1938) and to other scholars, but he everywhere judges independently. Chapter IV, even though not quite as persuasive, will interest any student of the period.

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